Showing posts with label Debt and Growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debt and Growth. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

The Perpetual Economic Growth Machine

When first starting this blog, I had a thesis; that debt growth was the underlying cause of 'economic growth'. As the blog progressed, along with the breadth and depth of my analysis, I came up with the idea that the economic crisis had an underlying cause; a labour supply shock in conjunction with a lack of commensurate increase in commodity supply. It was an idea that I then used to develop the idea of hyper-competition. In light of this theory, I thought that the outcome would be clear. The Western economies were uncompetitive, and they would lose out in the face of the competition from the emerging economies. It seemed so screamingly obvious that I wrote a post in 2009, predicting that it was the year of the fall of the West (Japan was counted in the West, which I know is a little odd). It was a post in which I made a poor assumption; I thought that, one way or another, the underlying and obvious problems of the Western economies MUST be recognised.

The crash I predicted failed to take place, and I took a hit to my credibility.

When the predicted crash failed to materialise, I was heavily criticised by commentators on Reddit. I responded by saying that at least I was willing to put a date on the turning point, whilst others lack confidence in their theories and refuse to predict outcomes. I should have added that a theory needs to be tested by evidence; can it predict? If it cannot predict, then it fails. Most of what you read does not offer the confidence to predict outcomes, or leaves the timings of outcomes open. The authors shroud their thesis in ambiguity, and nothing they say can be held accountable.

My mistake at the time I wrote of the Downfall of the West was that I failed to see that there was plenty of extremes to which policy makers were willing to resort. In addition, I failed to see how entrenched views of the world were; the West was the heartbeat of the world economy, and NOTHING would ever change that. It a question of government action acting to support and shore up a world view that is resilient the the underlying facts. We would return to the status quo of the West living high on the hog, whilst those poor countries tried to catch up. The world economy would return to the natural order, once we just sorted out the fallout from the 'financial crisis'. It was just a problem in the financial system, and some policy action here and there would return all back to 'normal'.

If you have contrary evidence to your theory, you need to ask why you got it wrong. Perhaps, in the explanation I have given above, I am making excuses. I am highly self-critical, and do not believe these are excuses. In fact, as time has progressed, I have come to the view that I was right all along. Not right that there would be a terrific crash, but right in my underlying thesis. I expected drama, not the steady and relentless decline that has taken place. I argued that the West is 'poorer than we think' and we are steadily recognising this in the decline of the standard of living in many Western countries. We are slowly but surely seeing the middle classes being hollowed out, declining real incomes, growing unemployment (or underemployment). This is taking place against the backdrop of crazy levels of sovereign borrowing, money printing, and the related issue of extraordinarily low interest rates. None of this extreme policy seems able to lift the economies of the West.

Instead, whilst governments rack up debts, and money is pouring forth from central banks, we are just getting poorer. I have to emphasise the point that governments are creating mountains of debt, and we are still in day-to-day terms, getting poorer. We are already poorer, but how much poorer will we be when (assuming we actually pay it) we start to bear the load of the debt being accumulated now. Tax must rise at some stage to pay for it. The opposite view is that economies will return to major growth, and this will cover the debts. It is a promise that has been made for a long time. However, even as governments borrow, as money is printed, there is no real growth. There is only the anaemic growth that is following profligate borrow and spend policy.

It has never been complicated. If I borrow money, and use that money to pay for consumption, it generates activity in the economy. The borrowed money circulating through the economy creates activity, and that reflects in the GDP figures. Take away the borrowing, and GDP falls. We see this in Greece and Spain, and start to see what takes place when an economy reliant on borrowing stops borrowing. The evidence is there in plain sight. Nevertheless, there are many who argue that the problems of overly in-debt countries is to borrow more, and they convince many people. Borrow 1 billion, and it will produce 3 billion of activity in the economy, and the tax income from that activity will allow the economic growth to pay back the debt through increased tax revenue.

Just think about this. A country borrows money to produce revenue to pay back the borrowing. The problem is simple; resources are being consumed along the way. The view that borrowing more is going to solve problems is based upon the idea of a perpetual motion machine. There is no loss of energy, or in this case no loss through the consumption of resource. Borrow and spend is a perpetual motion machine. Borrowed money comes in, generates revenue to pay back the borrowing, and revenue then pays the borrowing. Nothing is lost. No resource is consumed. It is the perfect system. Except that it is impossible.

The perpetual borrow and spend, create revenue, repay borrowing machine is a truly unique idea. It is unique in that so many people have persuaded themselves of its possibility. We laugh at the perpetual motion machine, but many view this perpetual economic growth machine as possible. No loss. Just gain. Here is how it can work. Every year, we can increase our borrowing, and increase the activity in the economy. As the activity increases, we can increase our revenue, and that increases our ability to service our debts. In fact, we are not borrowing enough. If we accelerate our borrowing, we will increase our revenue, and we will be in an even better position to repay our borrowing. The more you borrow, the better you are able to pay back the borrowing. No loss, just growth in revenue, as nothing is apparently being consumed in the process.

If only the perpetual economic machine were true. We could forget having to compete and just borrow our way to prosperity.

I now return to my failed prediction of the 'downfall of the West'. We are growing poorer. And we are consuming based upon growing debt. Real resource is being consumed through debt accumulation. All would be good if there were a perpetual economic growth machine, but it is a fantasy. Nevertheless, that fantasy has real currency in the real world. It has prevented a crash, but we are nevertheless getting poorer. My error of thought was to believe that illogic would be uncovered. Instead, debate and discussion takes place, and the perpetual economic machine is the winning argument that drives belief.  Policy will make the economies of the West return to their natural and rightful position. If in doubt, just keep borrowing towards wealth.

The exceptions, the Spain and Portugal examples, just need to abandon austerity, and they will return to growth. The perpetual economic growth machine will deliver. It WILL deliver, because it MUST deliver. It is a costless machine. Nothing is consumed.

Update just after publication: Just a little note as I left my  thread of thought behind as I wrote (yet again). I missed making a key point. How could anyone predict that people might believe in a perpetual economic growth machine? But people do..... this was a crucial fault in my prediction. Sorry, but I was distracted from the point I was trying to make. I could not accept that the perpetual economic growth machine could be a foundation of belief, and the belief therefore might avoid the crash which I predicted. What we are looking at in the world economy is the contradiction between the perpetual economic growth machine as a belief, and the reality that it cannot and does not work (barring the exceptions such as Spain where we can see the idea collapsing). Reality and belief are bumping together, and reality is slowly winning out.

2nd Update just after publication: Long term readers will have seen my prediction, but still come back. I have always left it in place as I think my record of what I have got wrong is as important as what I have been right about (notwithstanding that I argue here that I was not so wrong). I do not believe that bloggers should 'airbrush' their record, and have left all of my posts as live.  I encourage new readers to dig into the archives. See where I have been right and wrong. Make a judgement on  whether I have something interesting to say based upon my record. I am obviously biased, but I think my record overall puts me in a strong position.....despite my admission/s that I have got things wrong (there is one case where I presented a detailed analysis of an economic forum, only to have an astute reader point out that I was a year out of date; I was analysing the meeting and output of the previsous year, but the post and apology is still online).


Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Austerity - The Consequences

I am going to start this post with a comment from Suzy, given on my last post:
Cynicus what do you think about the theory that nothing now can save us. As is being made clear the austerity measures - that you seem to support are causing deflationary problems on a massive scale in the countries they are being used in. This means the markets are jittery about possible double dips and jittery about Greece entering a horrible recessionary scenario.

So it seems we are damned if we cut and damned if we don't. And what is worse - default or ten years of depression - which is what some commentators think Greece now faces.
The problem identified by Suzy is indeed a real problem - damned if we do, and damned if we do not. It will not have escaped the notice of readers that the word 'austerity' appears to be the word of the moment. This is a report from Forbes which is headlined as 'Austerity - the New Worrisome Buzzword':

Dictionaries define austerity as economic restriction, scarcity, sternness, hardship.

No wonder then that people in Greece and Spain are taking to the streets in protest of the austerity measures required of countries accepting aid from the EU/IMF rescue plan announced a week ago. Among the austerity measures are pay cuts, cuts in pensions, later retirement ages, and fewer government services.

The push for austerity adds to concerns that the rescue from record government debt loads may be as negative for the economies of Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, and therefore the fragile overall European economy, as actual defaults on the debts might have been.

In the U.S., worries over the austerity programs in Europe have overwhelmed the positive U.S. economic reports that have been coming out. Among the worries is that bank and investor losses on government debts in Europe could undermine confidence in global financial systems again.

The report goes on to say that the State of California is also implementing 'austerity' measures, and it is also apparent that 'austerity' measures are also in prospect in the UK. Ireland has already implemented such measures, and Italy appears to be in process of measures. What we are seeing is a grand beauty contest, in which sovereign states are in competition, one with another, as to who will be in receipt of further credit. The exception, of course, is the US, which is still relying on the irrational belief that it is a 'safe haven'. Regular readers will know that I have always expected a reaction to crisis would be to initially flee to the illusory safety of the US, and this is what has taken place.

What we are seeing is that we are now in a situation in which 'austerity' measures are taking place simultaneously, and that demand for goods and services will (in aggregate) start to fall as the austerity measures bite. This has led to a lot of talk about Fisher's debt deflation theory, and fears of deflation are commonplace in many reports. The following is a sample of the kind of discussion that is very common:

Germany is pressing other eurozone countries to push ahead with brutal austerity measures to slash their budget deficits. Spain, Portugal and Greece have already announced their austerity measures, while Italy is expected to soon announce tough budget cuts. Meanwhile, to comply with its new balanced budget laws, Berlin will have to slash its budget deficit by about $US13 billion each year for the next five years.

There are worries that this strong contraction in government spending in the eurozone will force many economies into recession, making it even more difficult for countries to collect the tax revenues they need to stabilise their debt levels. Steep declines in economic activity will put additional downward pressure on prices and already there are signs that prices are falling in Portugal, Spain and Ireland while underlying inflation in Germany is close to its lowest levels in more than a decade – making it even more difficult for countries to service their debts.
I suggest that you re-read the second paragraph. The argument is this:

  1. If a government reduces the quantity of borrowing, the economy will contract.
  2. If the economy contracts, there will be less tax revenue.
  3. If there is less tax revenue, debt servicing will be more difficult.
  4. Stabilising debt levels needs borrowing to be continued.
All I can say to this extraordinary thinking is ??????! Are they serious? In order to stabilise borrowing, there is a need for more borrowing, to increase activity, such that some of that borrowing ends up back in the hands of the government as tax revenue so that they can service the borrowing that they are undertaking. Apparently, this will stabilise debt levels.

Within the article quoted above is exactly the dilemma proposed by Suzy. Damned if they do, and damned if they do not. Governments have the option of continuing the high borrowing until, finally, investors take fright, or they cut back borrowing to sustainable levels, and see the GDP go down as a result of reduced borrowing - and then see the tax revenues fall, causing further tightening, and all the while seeing their debt to GDP ratio move in the wrong direction, thereby further alarming investors.

Within this scenario is a problem, which I now feel I am endlessly repeating. This is that countries have mistaken growth in GDP for real growth, when the reality that the growth was not in their ability to generate wealth internally for consumption, but a growth in their consumption of the output of other countries. When you borrow $1 billion a year from China, you can purchase Chinese goods to that value. However, as with all borrowing, China would expect to get the $1 billion back, and with interest, which means an equivalent amount of output from your own economy. If we think of it in simplistic terms, we are borrowing 50 million colour televisions from China, and must repay in (or the equivalent of) 55 million televisions. When we make our repayment to China, unless we have an economic miracle, we will have less of our output for ourselves. A proportion will be returned to China.

What we have in effect is a situation where we appeared to be 50 million colour televisions richer, and now we no longer have these, and in addition, we are having to return some of our own output of colour televisions to China (I know, we do not make them anymore). We immediately feel a loss as we commence living on our own output, and that output available for consumption is further reduced due to having to apportion some of it to repay our creditors. The 50 million televisions were never our output, though we believed this to be the case. Because we never realised this was not our own output, we are now in a situation where there is resentment at the prospect of falling living standards, and reaction against living within our means, and paying our debts.

What we now have is a situation in which we are having to face some tough decisions. For the countries that have the ability to devalue, they can do so. However, if they want to continue to have access to credit, they must devalue at the cost of paying much higher interest on their debt. In particular, where government borrowing is in the economy's own country, the repayment is made in devalued money (think of returning three quarters of a television in return for the one that was given as a credit) and, unsurprisingly, creditors will protect themselves against the risk of you doing this again. In addition, this lowers the standard of living of everyone in the country which has the currency devalued. I always give the example of the person who enjoys imported Belgian beer having to pay more for their beer to illustrate this. This simple pleasure takes a greater proportion of your wages, and you are therefore literally poorer.

The above scenario is, of course, inflationary, and we are seeing climbing inflation in the UK, which has seen a steady devaluation of the £GB. The inflationary effects are taking place despite the contraction of the economy. A long, long time ago, I asked myself the question of whether we could expect inflation or deflation. I pointed to a falling £GB outstripping the impact of the contraction of the economy, and this is what has taken place. In a letter to the Chancellor, explaining inflation being above target, the Bank of England has recognised this impact (belatedly).

Interestingly, the Bank of England is still talking of 'spare capacity' in the economy - what they are not talking about is whether that capacity might have any utility. In a crude example, if we think of a shop worker who has been made redundant, how might the worker be spare capacity. If retail was structurally over-represented in the economy, and the economy has corrected the credit fuelled over-capacity, what is this worker 'spare capacity' for? Can they go and work in an engineering works? The same might be said of a wholesaler to the catering trade, which has seen business grow at a rate fuelled by excess credit expansion. They might have 'spare capacity', but it is pointed at the wrong sector.

At present, the only way that this 'spare capacity' might be utilised is if a government keeps pouring borrowed money into the economy to soak up this spare capacity. However, the reality is that the capacity must eventually disappear. At some point, the credit will stop, and we are seeing this taking place. For many countries, they are under threat of a complete halt to further credit. The only solutions to the problems is to re-balance their consumption and output, and that means to move from living on credit to generating surplus to repay the credit. The problem is that this can not be achieved overnight, and without considerable economic destruction. The expansion of sectors that were reliant upon credit will have to shrink to a size which is appropriate to the economy.

The solutions to these problems are varied. In the countries locked into the Euro area, in the end, it must mean wage cuts which will allow them to export. In countries that have currency independence, they can 'inflate their way out of trouble' through devaluation, thereby commencing a process of increasing inflation internally, and thereby indirectly lowering wages to allow their economies to become competitive. In doing so, they will pay a high price for any further borrowing. You may note, that this still means reduction in wages, and simply means that the wage cut is not in quantity of money but undertaken through lowering the value of money.

However, there are signs that inflating out of trouble may not be the chosen solution. It seems that austerity is the more probable route, and that will mean wage cuts. It may be remembered that making a saving of £50,000 a year with one redundancy is the same as cutting the wages of many workers by £1000 each. In both cases, the wage cut is real, only in the former case it is concentrated in one person (the provision of unemployment benefits is, of course, a complication, but we will leave that alone for the sake of simplicity). There are some problems in implementing across the board wage cuts, such as minimum wage laws and the provision of benefits. I will explain.

In the case of a minimum wage, the floor of a minimum wage worker will also influence the wages of higher paid workers, such as their supervisors, or the manager who manages the supervisor. In each case, there is a necessity of a differential and a floor on the overall wages is therefore set by the minimum wage. Benefits also create a minimum wage as follows (from my first post, A Funny View of Wealth):

As mentioned before, all things in the UK are not equal due to the minimum wage, but also because the UK employer needs to compete for labour with the UK benefits system (which is an indirect minimum wage that applies to anyone entitled to social welfare benefits). This system allows an individual to remain economically inactive, or to choose an option of accepting a low paid job for very little real remuneration despite a major increase in the expenditure of their labour. In such cases the value of the labour expended is far below the minimum wage as it needs to be calculated as the weekly pay minus the benefits, to give an actual wage for the work done. The rational person in this situation might reasonably ask whether the loss of their free time to work is worthwhile for what will often be little financial incentive as, in this situation, the UK worker is often working for extremely low wages[10].
The problem with these minimum wage effects is that they have potential to displace lower wages into high unemployment. It encourages a system of haves and have nots. The upside is that it encourages organisations to do more with less labour, thereby encouraging improvements in productivity, but does so at the cost of throwing individuals to the scrap heap of unemployment. Whatever happens, however it takes place, wage cuts are on their way - whether concentrated into unemployment or shared more equitably over the workforce.

The real problem in these scenarios is that everyone seems to be looking to exports as the route out of the global economic crisis, whether China, Spain, the UK or the US. Just looking at the US and China, China has enjoyed an export boom partly based upon credit provision to the US, and its industry is directed in part to servicing those US customers. In other words, China has used massive provision of credit to support an export sector that does not have enough customers. As such, it must also eventually adjust. As 'austerity' takes over, their export sector will suffer. As such, China will do everything it can to support the export sector, rather than risk unemployment at home. They need to keep exporting. At the same time, the US are seeking ways to compete in export, and are now facing a China that seeks to continue to win in the export game. A similar scenario can be painted for the PIIGS and Germany.

In the examples above, I am simplifying, but the essence of the problem is as I have put it here. Competition on labour costs is on its way, with the aim of winning the export game. However, not everyone is going to win in an export game when many of the markets that previously drove exports are going into decline. Whilst continued borrowing by debtor countries might prop the system up for a little while longer, it does not alter the fundamental imbalances that the credit boom created. All over the world, there are industries pointing at markets that simply can not afford to consume the goods they have been consuming in recent years. They do not have the capacity to both repay and consume at the same rate as they were when the credit taps were wide open. As these markets contract further, as austerity bites, each country will seek to generate competitive advantage. In the case of the major debtors, they will have to, one way of another, cut their wage bills.

But what happens if more and more countries are doing the same thing - whether directly or indirectly through devaluation? How does it end?

The answer to this question lies in the eventual re-balancing of the world economy, and in particular a re-balancing in the allocation of resources available for consumption. I have given an explanation of why this is a problem in earlier posts, and it is too long to detail here. In short however, the amount of commodities in the world has yet to catch up with the new input of labour represented by the emerging markets. If the labour force increases without a commensurate increase in resources, then there must be a period of hyper-competition. This hyper-competition was emerging but was masked by the credit boom. However, if you want to understand this, I suggest you read one of the posts on the subject, such as this one on Huliq.

Having said that there should be a re-balancing towards the emerging markets, this is to ignore one thing. The losers in this process do not want to see this happen. This is where politics, and in particular geopolitics come into play. How the game might play out is, in many respects, dependent upon how world leaders address the problem. How they might react as the economic crisis continues to unfold, and fully reveals itself, is going to be highly unpredictable.

Note 1:

Within this mess, we have the further complication that the US is seen as a law unto itself. Whilst they have similar structural problems to many countries faced with crisis, their problems are still being hidden under the irrational rush to safety to US assets. They are still on the path of borrowing to support their economy, and to generate the tax revenue to support their repayments, and to gradually lead their economy to the point at which investors finally take fright. Where California is leading, the rest of the US will eventually follow.

Note 2: Some replies to comments on the last post

Ginger Tosser: Yes, the US is currently a safe haven, but they have the same problems as elsewhere......it is only a matter of time.

Kiwi: I long ago proposed Norway as the best bet.....stable government, resource rich, large sovereign wealth fund....but even then we can never be sure in the chaos that we are now seeing.

Ian: I have a few moments where I have metaphorically held my breath, asking is this the big plunge?

Anonymous on the Scorched Earth: There has been considerable commentary on the state of what was inherited by the new UK government. It is a good opportunity to get the skeletons out of the cupboard and address the real scale of the problems in the UK. I have not yet commented on the election result, as I am waiting for more firm policy details.

A Real Black Person (yes, that is the commentator's posting name): I liked your pithy comment on Dubai, as follows:

But still, it makes one wonder what compelled them to start building very lavish and exquisite real estate properties for rich people that don't exist?
An extreme example of pointing in the wrong direction, unless they manage to market these to the new wealthy....

General: I have worked up the list of comments, and that unfortunately is all I have time for. However, some interesting links and comments as ever....I am always impressed with the quality of the comments.

Note 3: There is an error in the Huliq article, if I recall correctly. A section should read 'zero sum game', not 'zero sum gain'.

Friday, February 5, 2010

Why the Risk of Sovereign Debt Crisis?

The subject of this post will be familiar to long term readers of the blog, but I will nevertheless plunge on with newer readers in mind. I have just read a column by Jeremy Warner in the Telegraph, in which he describes how he sees the progression of the economic crisis. It is an analysis with which most analysts, politicians and commentators would broadly agree. The problem is that it is wrong.

The interesting thing about the analysis is that it is made in the context of the sovereign debt worries about the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece Spain), and the broader worries about the AAA rated larger economies such as the US and UK. His view is that this is a new potentially damaging phase in the crisis. This is how he describes the first two phases:
The first was a fairly conventional, if extreme, banking crisis where a cyclical overexpansion of credit and lending suddenly, and violently, corrects itself in a great outpouring of risk aversion.

In the second phase, governments and central banks attempt to counter the economic consequences of this crunch with unprecedented levels of fiscal and monetary support. Temporarily, at least, it seemed to work.

The reason that this is wrong is that the first phase is not actually the first phase at all. Something else entirely caused the current economic mess, and the risk of sovereign default naturally flows from the real first phase (it is a long post, but if you stick with it, it will be clear why the sovereign debt crises are inevitable). I first discussed the real causes of the economic crisis in a series of posts that steadily built a picture of what was going wrong in the world economy. The posts tracked my evolving thinking on the problem, up to the point where I identified the real cause of the current economic crisis (some of the key posts in the development of the ideas are here, here, here, and here).

My cause for the crisis does not originate with the financial crisis, but with shifts in the world market for labour. In particular, I track the economic crisis to the massive expansion in the world labour market that commenced with the full entry of China and India into the world economy (as well as a more broad expansion e.g. Vietnam, but these are the two major factors). It might be noted that the labour was already in place in these markets, but the key difference was that there was a change such that these labour markets were connected with world markets, capital and technology. It is impossible to pick a specific date when they started to impact upon the world economy, but I consider the late 90s as an approximate starting point.

If we want to understand the degree of impact of such a change, we just have to think of labour as a factor of production. The greater the supply, the lower the cost of the supply. Both in China and India there are vast pools of labour that is still not fully connected into the labour force, but with potential to be connected. The migration of lower value manufacturing to the West of China is an example of how partially connected labour is continuing to be brought into the world economic system.

What this amounts to is a massive expansion of availability of one of the key factors of production, such that there is an oversupply of labour. However, in order to make this labour productive, it is necessary that the labour has access to the other factors of production, such that the labour might be utilised. These other factors commence with the supply of commodities. I will try to illustrate the point with a simple illustration.

If the world standard of productivity is such that each unit of labour can process 1 unit of commodity, and there are 100 units of labour, the available commodity supply must exceed or equal 100 units for the labour to be fully utilised. If the commodity supply is less than 100, then there will be unemployment/underemployment until the supply of commodities catches up with the supply of labour.

We know that life is not that simple, with variable levels of productivity, but the underlying principle nevertheless applies. In order for labour to be productive, it needs to have a supply of commodity that matches demand according to the potential productivity of the time commensurate with the available supply of the input factor of labour.

What we have seen with the entry of emerging economies is a massive labour supply shock, which is a supply shock that might be regarded as unprecedented in world history (perhaps new world silver supply expansion might be comparable?). The important point about the supply shock is how the supply of the other key input factor responded - the supply of commodities. I will quote from a previous post rather than rewriting the section.
The best example of the problem can be found in oil, as it is still so central to economic activity. In 1997 output was around 75 million bpd, and output had only climbed to about 85 million bpd in 2007 (a chart here shows the output - not a good source but the chart is usefully clear and conforms to charts from better sources). Copper has seen higher growth in output from around 11 million tons to 16 million tons over the same period, but this would still suggest that the growth is still probably not matching growth in labour.

However, not all of the commodities have seen a similar pattern to these examples, with iron ore output nearly doubling over the same period. Whilst this might suggest that there is no problem, it is necessary to remember that countries such as China have been growing infrastructure at an astounding rate, such that their demand for steel will be exceptionally high in comparison with a 'developed' economy (take a look the pictures of Pudong in Shanghai, or Chongqing and you will get a visual sense of one source of demand).
The point here is that there has been a major bottle neck in the supply of one of the key inputs to production, and that the supply of other commodities has not fully reflected the extraordinary demands created by emerging economies. The increase in the supply of labour in the world economy was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in supply of materials for labour to process, and for the extraordinary infrastructure development of the emerging economies.

The other side of this coin is, of course, that the final output of commodities and labour is consumption of the value created by labour in conjunction with commodities. As fast as new labour enters the market, there is a demand for supply of commodities to process, but also increase in demand for consumption of the output of the factors of labour and commodities. Again, a simple illustration will make the point.

If an average Western consumer is consuming one unit of commodities per year, and there are 100 consumers and 100 units of available commodity, it is possible for the one unit of commodity consumption to be sustained. However, if we add 20 consumers per year, and then add only 10 units of commodity per year, it is possible to see that the world average of consumption per person is falling. This, of course, does not make sense. In particular, countries such as China have grown richer, such that the Chinese consumer now has the means to buy more goods and services than before. The point here is that countries like China were so poor, they barely registered per unit as consumers, just as they did not register as labour in the world economy. What is really taking place is a reduction per person of available commodity, alongside a redistribution of this lower per person supply.

In essence, the supply of commodities has increased, but not in a way sufficient for each person to utilise the same amount of commodity as a pre-economic crisis developed world consumer. As such the proportion of available commodities available to places like China is increasing in proportion to the developed world, at the cost of the availability of those commodities in the developed world. The available resources of the world are steadily transferring to countries like China, and the only way for the developed world to maintain the current standards of living is if there is a massive expansion in the supply of commodities.

The big question is how this relates to the sovereign debt crises that are looming. I am afraid this requires more explanation.

If we jump back in time to, for example, the entry of Chinese labour into the world market in relation to the US economy. We see that the Chinese were savers and the US were debtors. It is no secret now that China has been playing a large part in funding the US government deficit and that there have been ongoing negative current account balances in the US. Whilst the US has remained an industrial power house, in aggregate the country has been consuming more than it produces. If we think of the real shift in the balance of resources that has taken place, what we can see is that the Chinese share of the available resources has been increasing, and that it has taken a proportion of that increased resource, and handed it back to the US as credit. This has hidden the real shift in the balance of resource allocation.

In the US, the lending of that proportion of Chinese resource has allowed consumption to continue as if the rebalancing did not take place. In China, it has hidden the real increase in wealth of the Chinese. In the short term, it has appeared that the US is wealthier than it is, and that China is less wealthy than it is. However, the reality is that it is the lending of one country's resource share to another country, and needs to be repaid. If the US does pay, then China will start to increasingly appear as it really is - a far more wealthy country than is presently apparent.

At this stage, you will note that I have not mentioned the financial crisis at all. This despite the fact that nearly every analyst points to the idea that the current crisis was all due to irresponsible lending by the banks. How does this fit into the cause of the crisis that I have discussed here?

There are a multitude of factors that contributed to the crisis, such as the nature of financial regulation, the role of central banks, and the role of government policy more broadly. However, the real root of the financial crisis lay in the provision of ever greater levels of credit to consumers. The source of that credit was from many sources, such as the petro-economies who benefited from rising prices of oil, which in turn reflected the lack of supply matching the increasing demand from the increase in labour. Then there was the supply of credit, exemplified by Chinese lending into the US. Finally, there was central bank policy, best exemplified by the Japanese carry trade, which flooded the rest of the world with Japanese credit, fresh from the Japanese bank's printing press (takes some explanation, see here).

The overall net effect of this was a flood of money into the developed industrial economies. When a bank is offered money, it is highly unlikely to turn it down, and will seek to profit from utilising that money in pursuit of profit for itself and the originator. The problem that arose in this situation of the flood of money is the question of where it might go. If there is a huge supply of money, the first tranche is likely to go into investments in which the risks are well balanced, the second tranche is likely to go into a slightly higher risk investment, and so forth. At any given moment, there are only so many good investment opportunities, and problems arise if there is more available money for investment than good opportunities. However, if there are a dearth of opportunities, then the bank will still find opportunities, even if these are higher risk.

Thus was the consumer boom born, and the service economy built on asset price inflation and debt. This 'new economy' was (in most analysts' minds) different from previous booms, as a virtuous cycle of increasing asset prices supported increased credit, which supported increased service activity and consumption, which increased employment and so forth. The trouble was that, it was not different, but was a massive expansion in credit fuelled by the lending of resource from the rest of the world that needed repayment. The wall of money that was being introduced into the developed world economy was not being invested, but being consumed. If you wanted to invest in productive output, long term investment with a return in wealth generation, all the 'action' was in the emerging economies.

Sure, there were investments in many sectors of the developed world economies, but these investments were largely made in support of the boom in consumption. That consumption was achieved by a combination of internally generated resource, but also with the loaned share of the resource of the overseas creditor. Large sectors of economies were, in the long term, unsustainable.

The financial crisis was simply the unwinding of the many mal-investments as the unsustainable nature of the credit boom became apparent. As the banks made losses, the overseas creditors turned off the taps to the banks. As fast as governments poured money into the financial system, the money flooded out the back door to repay the losses of overseas creditors. If we think about it, as the government bailed out bank A, if the problem was internal creditors, the money would have reappeared in bank B as new credit for lending. Instead, as fast as governments poured in money, it appeared to vanish. The only way that governments could keep the whole system up in the air was to use quantitative easing and massive purchases of distressed assets. In doing so, the losses of the banks, and the losses of overseas creditors appeared on (in the broadest terms) government balance sheets.

Effectively, the overseas credit spigots were turned off, and the only way that credit could be obtained was through the government. The direct credit from overseas lending was simply rechanneled through the government, and thence again appeared in the banking system or as direct spending in the economy. The government had become the debt fuelled consumer of last resort, in an attempt to hide the fact that the economy no longer had the underlying wealth of the past.

If we return to the point about resources in relation to labour, it is very clear that, if the emerging economies were utilising a greater share of a diminishing per person availability of resource, someone somewhere was, by definition, poorer. I was in China in 1997, as a boom in television manufacture took place, along with a boom in the consumption of this good within China. Each television that was consumed in China represented a redistribution of the allocation of the resource of the world into the hands of Chinese consumption, and a move of resource into the hands of Chinese labour. Had the world increased the supply of resources, or commodities, commensurate to the growing supply of labour, this would have presented no problem.

This is not what happened.

We can make an analogy of the resources as a pie. Even as the resource pie is growing, you are confronted with a zero sum game. The number of people sharing the pie is outstripping the growth of the pie, and somebody therefore has to lose. If we want to understand why sovereign defaults are inevitable, we just have to see the actions of governments for what they are. They are pretending that the share of the pie has not moved, and are borrowing the share of pie of others in order to convince their electorates that nothing has changed. The problem is that, even as they borrow a proportion of that pie from others, there is an expectation that it will be returned in the future. Even as the developed world governments borrow, their relative share of the pie continues to diminish, leaving them in a situation where they are committing an ever greater share of a diminishing share of the pie to the creditors.

It is all unsustainable, and no amount of monetary tinkering will change the reality. As labour entered the world economy at a faster pace than resource growth, somebody was going to lose. Monetary tinkering and borrowing will not be able to change this reality, which must somehow emerge.

Note: I have not discussed why the emerging markets have won a greater share of the resources, as the post was already very long. Apologies for this, as it is an important component of the argument, but I am sure there will be many suggestions provided in the comments. There is a great deal more detail that could be added, but I wanted to keep the arguments as simple as I could. I hope that it is clear, and that I have made no significant errors (sometimes it is hard to summarise these kinds of ideas).

Saturday, July 11, 2009

The Danger in GDP Measures

Some time ago I read an interesting paper from within the field of academic economics. The article, by Ole Rogeburg was written pre-economic crisis, and was titled 'Taking Absurd Theories Seriously: Economics and the Case of Rational Addiction Theories'. Perhaps the most important point of the paper was that it was a case study to illuminate what he saw as a more widespread problem.

I will not detail the entire argument of the paper, but he identifies that economists used mathematics to present a completely absurd explanation of drug addiction, and that the resultant nonsense has been used in the formulation of government policy. The most striking element of the discussion is how the completely implausible might become plausible with the backing of clever academic argument, and the respectability of a veneer of academic rigor.

One of the themes of this blog has been trying to view the current state of the world economy as it might be observed in the circumstances of today, rather than through any particular perspective derived from academic economists. As part of that process, one of the problems with economic theories that I have identified is the obsession with GDP figures as a measure of the health of an economy. I might even go as far as to say that the subject has become something like an obsession of my own. As such, I hope that I will be forgiven a post devoted to the subject, and which pulls together some earlier points that I have made.

Before I continue further, I will quote the understanding of GDP that is described in the UK's official publication of statistics, National Statistics online:
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an integral part of the UK national accounts and provides a measure of the total economic activity in a region. GDP is often referred to as one of the main 'summary indicators' of economic activity and references to 'growth in the economy' are quoting the growth in GDP during the latest quarter.

In the UK three different theoretical approaches are used in the estimation of one GDP estimate.

GDP from the output or production approach - GDP(O) measures the sum of the value added created through the production of goods and services within the economy (our production or output as an economy). This approach provides the first estimate of GDP and can be used to show how much different industries (for example, agriculture) contribute within the economy.

GDP from the income approach - GDP(I) measures the total income generated by the production of goods and services within the economy. The figures provided breakdown this income into, for example, income earned by companies (corporations), employees and the self employed.

GDP from the expenditure approach - GDP(E) measures the total expenditures on all finished goods and services produced within the economy.

The estimates are 'Gross' because the value of the capital assets actually worn away (the 'capital consumption') during the productive process has not been subtracted.
Whichever approach is taken, the key point is that the measure is made of activity, and therein lies the problem. A whole host of factors might determine activity, but they offer no indication of the health of an economy.

For example, if we look back to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, there was a massive programme of rebuilding following the destruction of so much infrastructure. The infrastructure that was destroyed represented an accumulation of investments being destroyed, or the destruction of wealth represented in infrastructure. However, the replacement of the infrastructure would be represented in activity such as construction and cleaning up the areas of devastation. This would, in turn, feed into the GDP figures, such that GDP would see a rise as a result of the devastation of a city. As such, whilst GDP does indeed represent activity, it can not be said to mean 'growth in the economy'. In other words, can replacement and cleaning up of this destroyed infrastructure represent economic growth?

If such a view of economic growth is taken seriously, then the logic of the measure would suggest that a good way to achieve economic growth would be to destroy infrastructure such as factories, roads, bridges, houses etc.

There is an even more significant worry about GDP and the way it is used. An example is taken at random from the news on a Google news search for the term 'US debt % GDP', and produced this article:
The UK is drowning in debt. The total amount owed by our households, firms and the government is staggering – more than five-times our national income. On top of that debt stock, the UK is heading for a 2009 budget deficit of 14pc of GDP – by a long way the biggest in our peace-time history.
I actually support much of what the author this quote says (Liam Halligan of the Telegraph), but think that he is making a major error using GDP as any kind of a reference point. I will explain why.

As I have already identified, the measure of GDP is a measure of activity in the economy. As such, it is a measure that takes no account of the source of activity, such that a hurricane's devastation might increase GDP. However, included in the level of GDP is the economic activity that is resultant from the debt driven consumption. If we then view the idea that debt is '14 pc of GDP' we encounter a problem. What is being measured is the proportion of debt in relation to economic activity that is itself, in part, driven by debt. The economic impact of that debt is itself difficult to quantify.

For example, here are two charts from the UK National Statistics website, regarding fiscal deficits:



The problem that arises is that the measure on the left shows the money that is being borrowed, and the chart on the right shows the total economic activity that includes that borrowing. It is when we see how debt driven consumption actually impacts on the economy that the scale of the problem makes sense.

For the sake of simplicity, we might imagine that a small slice of the money that is borrowed by the government is used to pay the salary of one individual. When that individual goes shopping and purchases a shirt, they will spend some of that borrowed money. The purchase of the shirt will register as economic activity. However, the story does not end there. The retailer will then need to order another shirt for stock, and this will then see economic activity in a wholesaler, which in turn might see economic activity from an importer. Furthermore, the money spent on the shirt will contribute to many of the support services that are a necessary part of retail, creating ever more activity. The money will then contribute to the wages of the staff who will then spend the money, creating yet more activity.

In other words, this tiny slice of the government's borrowing will generate activity far in excess of the headline figures, or in this case in excess of the individual's salary. All of that activity will be recorded in the GDP figures.

The problem that this generates is to ask how the activity that is generated by debt might be stripped out. I will confess that I do not know the answer to this question (comments welcomed), but it is certain that GDP is a measure which has little meaning in the measurement of an economy. More borrowed money results in more activity in the economy such that the measure of the economy becomes a measure of the borrowing against output that includes activity from previous borrowing. The big question here is how a measure that does this might be an indicator of the sustainability of borrowing?

To illustrate this, imagine if a factory's performance was measured against activity rather than cash flow or profitability. The owner of the factory might produce more product if they borrow more money for materials, labour and power, but that would do nothing to indicate the health of the company that owns the factory. If a measure like GDP were used, the output resultant from the borrowing would be seen as an indicator of a healthy business, even though the accumulation of debt would suggest otherwise. However, the measure would consider the debt in relation to the activity, such that the debt accumulation would increase activity, and this would be represented in output. I am not sure this is the clearest description, but I hope the underlying point is clear (if you can phrase it more clearly, please feel free to add a comment).

I will use a related example from a recent post as a further illustration. If an individual earns £50,000, and borrows £10,000 per year, they appear to have an income of £60,000 in their lifestyle. If GDP type measures are used, then the sustainability of the borrowing of £10,00 a year would not be measured on the actual £50,000 of income, but would instead be measured on the apparent income of £60,000 per year. Nobody in their right mind would do such a thing, but this is in effect what GDP measures are doing.

The reason why I highlighted the problem with economic theory at the start of the post is to point out that economics can be a matter of playing with clever ideas. GDP is just such an idea. It seems to be a perfectly rational and clever idea, that an economy's output might be measured through the activity in the economy. However, if an economy is being financed in part by debt, the meaningfulness of the measure completely disappears. Even when an economy is not partly funded through debt, the Katrina example illustrates how fundamentally flawed the measure actually is. It ceases to have any plausibility. Just as with the drug addiction thesis, GDP is being used by economists to shape government policy, but it should be viewed as a nonsense.

The idea that this measure is one of the most important measures in shaping fiscal and monetary policy is deeply disturbing. In particular, GDP is falling in an environment when there is an explosion in government borrowing. If it were possible to strip out the impact of the government borrowing from these figures, then the situation of the absolute borrowing versus the absolute output without the borrowing would reveal a very, very ugly picture.

We have witnessed a private credit bubble economy (in conjunction with expanding public debt) and have seen the damage that this has wrought. During the entire time the damage was being done, the GDP figures created an illusion of a healthy economy. We are now witnessing a massive increase in public borrowing, and again the GDP figures flatter the relative success of the policy, hiding the severity of the crisis, and likely unsustainable debt. With regards to how unsustainable this policy might be, there appears to be no way to measure this, just as there was no way during the private credit bubble.

The problem that then arises is how to determine the actual health of an economy. The answer is actually surprisingly simple. The actual health of an economy overall is determined by whether the economy can be sustained without any borrowing. If borrowing is necessary in aggregate, whether the source of the borrowing is private or public, the economy is unhealthy. In other words, an economy's sustainability is determined by the ability for the economy to have aggregate output which matches the aggregate consumption.

The only question that remains is how to determine how bad borrowing might be, and for this I can offer no solution. However, in economies like the US and UK, the numbers are shockingly large relative to the history of borrowing, and should therefore be a cause for worry. In particular, when comparisons are possible with the debts accumulated in a period of total war (World War II), then there is real cause for worry. Such comparisons suggest that the situation is indeed extremely bad.

Thursday, November 6, 2008

Economic Crisis - A Torrent of Bad News

I thought I would write a quick post, as there have been some items in the news which are interesting.

The first of these is a report from the IMF, which said the following:
'In its bleakest assessment yet of rapidly worsening global prospects, the International Monetary Fund predicted that industrial economies as a whole will shrink through next year by 0.3 per cent, in the worst such slump of the postwar era.

The IMF said that the toll imposed by the downturn across the West would sap the strength of the world economy and cut global growth next year to an anaemic 2.2 per cent. That is down 0.8 points from its last forecast, made only a month ago, and is below the 2.5 per cent threshold at which the world economy is judged to be in the grip of global recession'

It might be noted that the IMF reports are progressively becoming more downbeat. The reaction from stock markets was predictably negative, in yet another case of a rally of optimism being dented by economic reality.

Meanwhile the Bank of England has slashed interest rates in an attempt to turn around the economy. For regular readers, they will be aware of my lack of support for central banks setting interest rates, but I have argued that, if they must, they should have cut rates a long time ago. For those that are unaware of the mechanism by which interest rates are 'set' (targeted), I have copied an explanation of this from an earlier post:
'interest rates are set (as a target) to govern the money supply in the economy (through open market operations in the UK primarily through the London Interbank Offered Rate). The control of the money supply is managed by either buying or selling securities such as second hand government debt (e.g. bonds), or by lending to or borrowing money from banks.'
The trouble is that the banks are not playing ball, and are holding interest rates higher than the rate targeted by the Bank of England. The real problem here is that the same article details that the banks are now being pressurised to accept lower interest rates in their lending. This is what the article had to say:

'John McFall, chairman of the Commons Treasury Committee, told The Times:“These guys came in with some pretty big begging bowls asking for taxpayers’ money. They are displaying an alarming lack of social conscience. They should pass on the cuts in full.”

Yvette Cooper, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, said that ministers expected banks to pass on the cuts as fast as possible. “The Government has stepped in to make the banking system safe, to support the banks,” she said. “It is right now that the banks do their bit to support everybody else.”'

The absurdity of this position is that the reason for the banking crisis was the mis-pricing of risk, which has led to huge losses for the banks. Having been scathing about the banks for doing this, now that the banks are (rightly) being cautious, the government is now using its newly acquired whip hand to force the banks to return to mis-pricing of risk. This is exactly one of the many problems that I predicted would arise as a part of the government bailout of the banks. It also sows the seeds of further troubles for the banks in the future.

The reason for such pressure is the belief that banks need to start lending again, as there is still a fundamental belief that everything can be solved through borrowing. This attitude is implicit in many commentaries, and just one example can be found in a commentary on the problems being faced by Barack Obama:

'America is looking to its new president for a string of answers: how to stop the US economy shrinking at its fastest rate for seven years; how to stop unemployment, already at a five-year high of over 6pc, rising even further next year; how to rebuild consumer confidence, which suffered its steepest drop in October since records began in 1952; how to kick-start consumer spending, which represents two thirds of the US economy and fell in September for the first time in many years.'

It is the last part that is most telling. The key to the revival of the economy apparently lies in getting consumers spending again. Note that there is no mention of increasing wealth generating business and activity, but instead the answer lies in consumers going shopping. The question of shopping with what is not discussed, but the reality is that what they really mean is shopping with borrowed money. That is why governments are urging the banks to cut interest rates and pressuring them to lend. Whatever way you look at it, it is increasingly clear that governments view the solution to all the problems is increased consumer spending, and they do not care whether that spending is generated through increased consumer debt. Even were such a solution to succeed (which it will not), at what point would the unsustainability of such a proposition become evident? How much debt can consumers actually shoulder? In this foolish conception of economics, apparently consumers can go on borrowing for eternity.

This does make me wonder whether governments have any idea of what they are really saying. Surely, even when dressed up with economic jargon and euphemisms, the thrust of what they are suggesting must be apparent to them.

Note 1: There have been some very interesting and insightful commentaries on the blog, starting with Lemming, who says the following:

'Mark, I'm still thinking along the lines of a comment I made a few months back in which I asked whether the financial system is so broken, that only some sort of 'reset' can get things back on track. It seems to me that nothing has gone greatly wrong with the world's ability to produce sufficient 'stuff' for most people to live adequately, but that capitalism has tied itself into such knots that it cannot be untangled without destroying society in the process. Can we continue with capitalism in its present form?'

The idea of a reset makes sense in some respects. The trouble with such an idea is that it would be a very bitter pill for the creditors to accept, as they would have to write off large tracts of wealth as unrecoverable. In writing off such wealth, it would then cause a complete loss of confidence in all kinds of investment, as investment is built on the trust that there are rules that support a return on investment. If the rules can simply be torn up when it is no longer convenient, and the defaulter suffers no adverse consequences, then on what basis would anyone invest? Would you give an individual, £1000 to open a shop if you were told that he could do anything with the money that he liked, for example using to throw a party, and that if he never repaid the money, then there was nothing you could do about it. You might notice that he owns a house, and a car, but you would have no claim on these things if he failed to repay. You would just be told, 'tough luck'. Would you ever lend again under these circumstances?

What you have in a reset, is an 'unfair' situation and game theory has tested this. In an experiment they sit two people at a table, and say that if the two sides can agree on a division of money, then they will both get the money according to the split that they agree to. In other words they both will win if they agree. Universally, people will not agree if they think that the division of the money is unfair. In these circumstances, they would rather get nothing, rather than get an unfair share. In a reset situation, both sides would benefit, but would benefit unfairly. Game theory shows that the inclination is to not allow an unfair outcome, even at cost to oneself.

Lemming goes on to say the following:

'I think in previous posts you have described how the world economy expanded to such a degree that bottlenecks in the supply of essential raw materials, like oil, caused the expansion to halt, thereby causing an inevitable crash (the economy must expand constantly to keep paying off the interest on loans..?) If a requirement of capitalism is to constantly expand the amount of economic activity towards infinite size (and it sounds as though it is) then the bottlenecks you describe are unavoidable, and no degree of ingenuity can get around them, whatever Adam Smith says. Isn't capitalism just a giant pyramid scheme which collapses as soon as a bottleneck in the supply of energy or raw materials or cheap labour is reached? And like all pyramid schemes can't you point to persuasive evidence that 'it works' right up until it collapses?'

There is an element of truth in this. However, the current circumstances are unique, and that is why the current crisis is unique. It is the scale and speed of the introduction of productive labour into the system, with the emergence of countries like China, that is the problem that makes the bottlenecks so devastating. For example, in China, it is not an inherent fault in capitalism, but a knock on effect that arises from communism. The communist system restricted the productive potential of workers, whilst providing just sufficient resource to keep the numbers of workers expanding. When the communist system was abandoned, the workers were allowed to start reaching their productive potential, and the speed of this development reflected the strength of the capitalist system. It demonstrated the actual potential of the workers. However, in doing so, it provided a supply shock that has only recently become apparent in the evident lack of commodity to supply their new found productivity. As such, the shock is not the result of capitalism, but the removal of a distortion caused by communism. Whilst the capitalist system is flexible, this has stretched the flexibility to a literal breaking point.

The shock is evident in the current crisis, and as I described before, the world has run towards the commodity brick wall, bounced back, and will in due course start running at the wall again. Whilst the wall is moving forwards too, the runner will keep catching up and bouncing back. In other words the capitalist system is responding, but it can not respond fast enough.

DZ followed up Lemming's comment with this:

'If a society deals with interest, then like lemming said, we have to assume infinite growth. However the world is not full of infinite resources. So it becomes a pyramid scheme with the initial lenders gaining the lion share of resources and the guys at the bottom working to pay of ever increasing debt until they give up, which cause market crashes to reset things.

However, take away the "interest on loans" concept away and you are left with trade. Trade is all about dealing in resources so you will have winners and losers but the economic system then doesn't depend upon infinite growth. Instead we rely on increasing productivity to maximise usage of finite resources.'

DZ is right that there are not infinite resources, at least not for everything. However, at the moment resources are still there to meet growth, they have just not yet been harnessed. In principle there is potential for the world to rise up to an overall higher standard of living by better harnessing and extraction of resource. For example, huge areas of Russia are not fully exploited for agriculture (I read about this in the Economist some time ago, but must apologise that I do not have time to find the article). The availability of resources such as oil is more questionable, but the dominance of oil is in part due to its availability. There are arguments that when oil starts to run down that the economic incentives to develop alternatives will be compelling and will therefore spur alternative solutions/structures. This is all debateable, but I personally buy this argument.


With regards to charging interest, what happens if you are a productive person and generate a surplus. Without an incentive to utilise that surplus, why would you use it in any way? Interest allows you to use that surplus to improve the economic activities/performance of other individuals. It also allows people to lend into consumption, which is not always obviously beneficial. However, that comes down to a point of view of whether you believe individuals should be free to accumulate debt. For example, although housing has been confused with investment, for owner occupiers it is also a form of consumption (consumption of a mode of shelter, as well as social status, comfort and so forth). Would it therefore be acceptable to restrict borrowing for this kind of consumption? If this is acceptable then it is hard to find a reason to restrict other borrowing towards consumption.

I hope that I have addressed the points in the comments. There were some other comments I would like to have addressed, but I have run out of time. As a general point, it is really good to see such thought provoking comments on the blog.

Note 2: I have just made one of my regular visits to the New York Times and it makes bleak reading. Retailers are reporting shcocking falls in sales, another report tells of stock market falls inspired by negative news such as General Motors struggling to keep its head above water, and poor figures on unemployment. The 'Obama bounce' is rapidly disappearing, as the hard economic news onces again bites optimism.

Perhaps the greatest concern is that the Chinese economy is also showing signs of strain. Regular readers will be aware that I have always had mixed views on what would happen to the Chinese economy in this crisis, but erred towards the possibility that the economy would hurt, but not as badly as others. This is becoming less and less certain. We have yet to see how the Chinese government might deploy the substantial reserves to support the economy, but the negative side of that for the Western countries is that there is less and less chance of China using the reserves to prop up the world economy. There is also the problem that, if China draws on the reserves, in particular the $US reserves, this will also bring about a collapse in the value of the $US and thereby destroy some of the value of the reserves. It is a very tangled web.

The real worry is that, if the Chinese economy slows sharply enough to bring about hardship, the potential for unrest in China remains high. There have been many reports over recent months of simmering discontent with the government, and my own sources within China are suggesting that there is some anger over government behaviour in general. The consequences of unrest in China are very, very disturbing, so we should all hope that China can ride out the problems without too much damage.

Note 3: I have not posted this link for a while, but for new readers, I would recommend that you read this post if you would like to understand why we are really going through the current financial crisis.