Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts

Friday, November 2, 2012

GDP And 'Economic Growth'

It seems a long while since I discussed the Economist article in which Hurricane Katrina was given a positive slant due to its potential to add to GDP growth (so long ago the I do not have a link). I was therefore fascinated to see this account:
Paul Ashworth, chief US economist at Capital Economics, said in a note that while the initial impact of the storm on the economy could be quite large" when the clean-up is taken into consideration the "overall impact on GDP growth could even be positive."
He said, assuming all output was lost in the two regions for two days, it could mean a 0.7pc loss for the quarter as a whole.The economy expanded 2pc in the last quarter.
However, he cautioned that this was an extreme assumption: "These back of the envelope calculations undoubtedly overstate the loss of output. Not all output has been lost, particularly not across the whole East Coast region. Some people will be working as normal, others will be working from home."
Regular readers know that I have long railed against the use of GDP, which I see a being close to useless, if not positively dangerous. This analysis just highlights the point. It was therefore extremely encouraging to find an article by Bob McTeer, a former Dallas Fed President, who recognises the danger in the use of GDP:
Generally and loosely speaking, a higher GDP, reflecting both higher spending and higher incomes, is a good thing. However, if the higher GDP is boosted by hurricane clean-up and repair, that’s not so good. The problem is we don’t get a subtraction for the destruction of existing assets; just an addition for replacing them. At least one might think of the clean-up as “shovel ready” projects. Wars are similar in that they generate GDP without bringing with them a higher standard of living.

My favorite example in school of the short-comings of GDP (GNP then) was provided by the question what happens if a man marries his maid. If she keeps doing the household chores as a wife, they are taken out of the market place and GDP shrinks. Getting hair cuts at home or eating at home more and eating out less would have a similar impact on GDP without necessarily reducing standards of living. Just remember that GDP was designed to measure output in the marketplace, not to measure economic well-being.
The article seems to imply that the faults of GDP are well recognised, but this is not apparent when considering the almost fetishistic focus that is made on the GDP measure. One of my biggest bugbears is the government debt to GDP ratio. It is now a commonplace, and frequently replaces the hard number of the actual cumulative total of debt and GDP growth is used as a signal that an economy is capable of servicing debt. In the case of our earlier commentator, we can see quite how dangerous GDP actually is.

In the case of Hurricane Sandy, hurrcane damage will apparently be able to improve the governments capability to service debt. Never mind that the government will be borrowing a bucket load of money to pay for the clean up of the devastation and destruction of assets; this will better allow the government to pay back its debt because, you see, GDP will grow from the fallout of a hurricane. I can see no better illustration of the fallacious thinking of those who worry about GDP slipping when governments cut back on borrow and spend. Borrowing to create activity in an economy, as I have argued previously is seen as a perpetual growth machine which is 'lossless'. In this case, the loss and replacement of perfectly good assets apparently creates economic growth.

No doubt some commentators will claim that government 'investment' is different; it creates long term growth. For example, many such people will propose project 'x' or 'y' as an investment. What they do not discuss is that these projects will come on top of borrowing for consumption. Also, as I discussed in a recent post, in one case I found a proposal to 'invest' in new rail infrastructure for the UK, even though rail is heavily subsidised such that this is not an investment with a positive return, but an investment to increase expenditure into the future (not withstanding that it might have quality of life benefits). 'Yes', there are some genuine investments that might be made, but these should not be made on top of borrowing for consumption. However, the term 'investment', as used by government, is often highly malleable, and is often nothing to do with investment but is rather concerned with expenditure for consumption.

The case of the US is interesting, as I have seen arguments made that the US has under-invested in infrastructure, and then present the idea that investment now is the solution. Again, why was the US government borrowing during the 'good times' and not investing in these apparently neglected projects? Why were they borrowing for consumption rather than for investment? Why is it that these economists were not railing against the government borrowing and consuming in the good times, when they could have been borrowing to invest in these projects? The answer is simple; they do not want to make the hard choices. Every element of government spending can be found to have a justification, but that justification does not include confronting the hard choices of either raising taxes or choosing between priorities within the constraints of the actual tax revenue available.

It is much easier to just borrow the money and leave the problem of paying until later. As I have long argued, at least in developed economies, there is no real reason why governments should be borrowing at all, barring major natural disaster or events like World War II. They have a strong base of income to draw upon, and can pay for both expenditure and investment from that income. Even if taking a Keynesian position, governments are not supposed to be borrowing and spending for consumption during the good times, but are supposed to only do this during the bad times.

I reiterate the point; those who support government borrowing and spending have never wanted to make the hard choices - either persuade the taxpayers that they really need to pay more taxes, or confront the difficult problem of priorities for expenditure. Instead, they propose borrowing and spending, during both the good and bad times. As they do so, they hide behind fig leaves such as GDP, which hides the long term damage that they are inflicting upon the economy; they persuade people that the economy is 'growing', even whilst the debts mount, and the activities which are developed through borrow and spend boost GDP. The real problem is cowardice; they cannot persuade people to pay for the expenditure of the government, so they pass on the problem of paying to the future. They believe that all of those government expenditures are 'good', but do not have the guts to make their case honestly and openly and subject the real cost to the scrutiny of voters. It is a tragedy, and I can only wish that voters would start to punish this cowardice.


Tuesday, April 10, 2012

Has Anything Changed?

I it now seems a long time since the Lehman crisis revealed the underlying problems in the world economy. The post title asks the question of whether anything has changed since that time; the obvious answer is that, yes, there have been changes. The situation has been revealed to be very poor indeed. The response is even poorer. Unlike most of my posts, this will probably be relatively free of links and references. I thought it might be a good time for an overview.

The response to the Lehman crisis, and the financial crisis that surrounding the collapse of Lehman's, was to dismiss the problem as being a problem in the banking sector. The name for the problem became 'financial crisis', rather than the more appropriate 'economic crisi's. As I have argued elsewhere in the blog, the nature of the world economy had shifted; the joining of countries such as China and India into the world economy joined a massive supply of labour into the world economy, and effectively flooded the world with new labour capacity that could not be readily absorbed. In particular, the 'emergence' of these economies was infrastructure intensive, and they presented new demands on the supply of the basic commodities that sit underneath economic growth. Whilst the supply of commodities have expanded, the supply is continually being stretched to meet ongoing increases in demand (with the ups and downs of the Western economies sometimes masking the underlying pressure on supply). As a result, there has been the development of what I term 'hyper-competition', in which limits in the growth of commodity supply means that a finite supply of commodities generates a zero sum game (for those new to the blog, read a more comprehensive explanation here).

Alongside the problem outlined above, there was a flood of money entering into western markets from the petro-states, from the emerging economies, and from Japan (partly as a result of their policy of printing money). This is the root of the financial crisis. Whilst money flooded into the banking system, the opportunities to invest in new productive capacity was limited. The smart money for such investment was going to the emerging economies. With limited capacity to invest the money in productive investments, the money was instead moved into consumer lending, presenting the consumer credit markets with a flood of money. The result was the housing boom and bust, and consumers gorging on the credit. This consumer debt driven boom hid the underlying changes in the world economy and the emergence of hyper-competition. Even as the emerging economies were growing more wealthy, their wealth was recycled into consumer credit, and much of the Western world appeared to be in rude economic health, as the wealth of others was consumed in the Western economies. The Lehman crisis simply highlighted that much of Western growth was built upon the foundations of sand of a credit bubble (sorry to mix metaphors here).

Governments were totally oblivious to the crisis that was taking place. They mistook growth founded upon unsustainable increases in debt as underlying economic growth. A raft of economists gave explanations for this fantasy of economic growth and provided comfort; the West would do all the added value whilst the rest of the world did the messy business of making things, the service economy was the new paradigm, boom and bust had been ended, the great moderation was taking place. One of the factors that was so important was the apparent growth in GDP whilst inflation remained subdued. That this was the result of the lowing of labour and other costs in the emerging economies was ignored. Central banks, and the banking regulators were no better. They likewise considered that all was well. They devised rules and regulatory systems which were based upon fantasies that they could uniquely see risk in the future. If you do doubt this, look at the Basel banking accords. As just one example, Basel I regulated OECD sovereign debt and OECD banks as safe investments in relation to banking stability. Apparently, they knew what was safe and what was not. Their rules and regulations were fantasy.

The Lehman crisis revealed to the world that all was not well. Much of the banking system was insolvent after recklessly lending into to the consumer boom. They had hidden the risk in a multitude of ways, creating an illusion of stability. Lehman's was not alone, but was just an exemplar of an insolvent system. The response to the banking crisis was to pour every resource possible into the banking system. Governments provided direct financial support, and central banks poured even more support into the banking system in less transparent bailouts, whilst accounting rules were relaxed to hide bank insolvency. The idea of 'too big to fail' was discussed, and used as an excuse to save insolvent banks. The result was ever more concentration of the banking system, making the potential failure of one of the major banks ever more dangerous. Supporting the massive bank bailouts was a massive allocation of resource from the government, which saw government debt increased to support the banking system. Somewhere, the politicians and economists had forgotten, or were ignoring, the function of banks.

The function of banks is to allocate resources into productive investments. They are a service provider to the economy providing support for economic growth. Instead, the rest of the economy is supporting the banking system. The bailouts represent the rest of the economy paying for the banking system's failures. Banks have ceased to be a support to economic growth, and are now a drain on economic growth. The productive parts of economies, one way or another, are paying for the support of the banking system. After all, resource must come from somewhere productive. To add insult to injury, the salvation of the insolvent banks has seen the banks return to 'profit', and the re-emergence of the big bonus culture. Whilst the rest of the economy is still paying for the failures of the banks, those running the banks have emerged from the crisis as wealthy as ever, and as powerful as before (if not more so).

Has anything changed with the banking system? The answer is yes and no. In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) is busy in the task of bailing out the European banking system. They are flooding the banks with easy money, with one wag (I forget who) suggesting that the ECB will take a bus ticket as collateral for loans. When the federal reserve supplies liquidity into Europe, the federal reserve is concerned about US bank exposure to Europe's banks. The EU crisis is not only about sovereign insolvency, but about the potential damage to the banks exposed to sovereign default. And this is one of the changes. The banking system is not only exposed to bad consumer credit, but also to bad sovereign credit. Again, their recklessness is backstopped. The banking system remains outsized in relation to the rest of the economy, and the risk taking continues unabated, with the too big to fail banks larger than before. Yes, there have been regulatory tweaks, but the problems remain. The major banks have simply learned that whatever happens, they will be rescued. Heads they win, and tails they win. Someone is paying for their bets, and that can only mean the productive parts of economies.

It is argued by many economists that the bailouts were regrettable, but they saved the Western world from depression. In doing so, they assume that the West has been saved from depression, and that conclusion is premature. The response to the economic crisis in most countries was for government to replace the consumers as the engine of credit driven economics. Many governments have gone on a debt fuelled spending spree. As growth in consumer credit driven consumption abated, governments stepped into the breach, and grew the rate of their own debt accumulation. Some countries are now starting to address the problems of the growth in government debt, but much of it is too little, too late and too timid.

There was always a fundamental problem, and one that is not recognised by most economists. The structure of economies that enjoyed the consumer credit boom were adapted to service the consumer credit. As a basic illustration, when a person used their housing equity to buy the BMW car that they always dreamed of, this put money in the hands of the BMW dealer, and orders into the BMW factory. This in turn put money in the hands of those businesses, and the workers working in those businesses, and this money then flowed into support other sectors of the economy. This shaped the structure of the debt consumption economies. We can see in Greece what happens when debt derived consumption takes place, by seeing the reversal of debt driven consumption. The real shape of the economy emerges when the credit flow stops, and it is not a pretty sight.

When governments replaced the consumer as the borrower and consumer, they were seeking to support an economic structure built upon endless growth in the accumulation of debt. It was never going to work, as there must come a point in time where the growing mountain of debt can no longer be supported. Whilst the growth in debt provides an illusion of stability, in the end it must stop, and economies must then (like Greece) face the reality of the underlying size of their economies without debt growth. This brings me to the myth of expansionary fiscal austerity. The myth is that, if governments reduce their borrowing (note, not stop), economies can expand as they do so. However, if a government stops borrowing and consuming, parts of the economic structure supported by that borrowing and consuming must contract. Whilst reducing borrowing is absolutely essential, the pretence that this can be achieved without economic contraction is pure fantasy. Again, Greece is an exemplar, but we might also add the examples of the other economies that are seeking to reduce their rate of borrowing.

There are those who argue against reducing the rate of debt growth by governments. They argue that it is 'self-defeating'. In a recent post, I hope I (and some of the commentators on the post) punctured the logic of the self-defeating argument. In short, the logic is one in which debt based consumption creates an illusion of an ability for governments to pay for its existing debt, whilst allowing more debt to be accumulated, which requires more debt to be accumulated to continue to pay for existing and rapidly accumulating new debt. It is not easy to explain in brief, so you may wish to read the post, and some of the further explanation from the commentators here.

And so we come to the situation of the major economies. Let's start with the US, which has again been discussed as being on the road to recovery. However, it is necessary to remember that the US is currently accumulating massive government debts. It would be easy to provide a more detailed account of the current US situation (which I will do another time), but this is sufficient to tell us that the US is in no way close to recovery. The US can only be said to be in a position of recovery when the rate of debt accumulation goes into reverse, and if the economy were to continue to grow. The same applies to the UK, where the word austerity is thrown about, even whilst the levels of government borrowing are at record levels. The situation in Europe is one of ongoing crisis, pretense that the crisis is resolved, before crisis reappears. Expansionary fiscal austerity is being tried and is, of course, failing. The future of the Euro looks ever more questionable, and the fallout of a major sovereign default such as Spain does not bear thinking about. Whilst each rescue plan produces a respite, the crisis continues to pop back into life. I see nothing except some kind of fiscal union that might stem the tide and the idea of a fiscal union is highly improbable.

In the case of Japan, it is also facing problems. They are unusual in that their government debt is funded by Japanese savers, but demographics are working against the government. Those savers are starting to draw down on their savings, and that will start to finally strain the debt mountain accumulated by the Japanese government. Furthermore, as an exporter, Japan is exposed to the travails of the Western world. A similar picture emerges for China with regards to exports. However, in the case of China, there is a different problem. The statist economics that served China well in the early stages of economic development are now showing their limits. In fact, it seems that China has learned some bad lessons from the West in economic management. They have created their very own real estate bubble.

China's statist approach is also seeing broad based malinvestment, and they are now seeing the fruits of this in their banking system. When they first commenced their opening of the economy, it was difficult for investment to be anything but productive as the economy was so backwards. As the economy has grown, the easy opportunities for investment have diminished, and the result is poor state led investment. The cozy relationship between the state banks and local government, alongside corruption that accompanies such a relationship, has seen curiosities such as building cities in which nobody lives, but this is likely just the tip of a very large iceberg. It is quite possible that the combination of this poor state led economics, in conjunction with the problems in Japan and the West, may see the Chinese miracle come to an end. At the very least, it seems probable that growth in the Chinese economy will slow markedly. This may be a problem for stability in China. Again, at the very least, China is unlikely to be the engine of world economic growth that many assumed it would be. This is a change in the world situation. China has emerged from this crisis as a major economic power, but the contradictions/problems of their state led system are starting to show.


In the end, the real point of this rambling review is to suggest that whilst the situation has changed, it has not changed in some fundamental respects. In particular, the economic theory that saw economists blinded to the reality of the change in the world still holds sway. Behind the policy responses to the economic crisis, the same (or similar) cast of characters are still acting in devising policy based upon economic theory that does not work. Or rather devising economic policy that hides economic reality for a little longer, whilst all the time building ever greater future problems. If you were unwell and visited a doctor, and the doctor told you all was well, you might believe the diagnosis. However, if you later found that you had been suffering from advanced cancer at the time of the visit, you might consider that there was a problem with the doctor. In the case of economics, we are still using the same economists and same economic theory that failed to diagnose the disease. And their prescription for the economy is based upon the same economic theory that failed to diagnose the disease until the results were so apparent that they could not be missed. Continuing the analogy, the economists can see that there is an illness, but their theory is unable to diagnose the disease. As such, they are prescribing economic medicine on a poor diagnosis, and with a poor theory of how the economy works.

The disease in this case is debt driven consumption. Debt is not, of itself, a bad thing. Debt is the foundation of investment. It can produce new products, innovations, new systems of production, new factories, new service industries, and so forth. In moderation, it can help individuals. For example, a mortgage allows a person to eventually own their own home. The problem with debt arises when debt becomes a means to fund consumption now, at the cost of less consumption in the future. When so-called growth is built upon nothing more than ongoing growth in debt levels to fund consumption, unless real productivity growth exceeds the rate of debt growth, there must be a future contraction. The longer the period of debt consumption continues, the greater the eventual contraction; the longer the period, the more the economy is structured to service debt based consumption.

If you doubt that economic theory is fundamentally wrong, think of the widespread use of GDP as a measure of the 'health' of an economy. If country A borrows $1 billion from country B, country A will see growth in GDP as a result. The borrowed money will be used and will create economic activity in the economy. This consumption of the resource of another country will see GDP growth in the borrowing country. Or even more absurd. Hurricane Katrina was a good thing. All the activity needed for rebuilding would result in an increase in economic activity, and therefore a growth in GDP. Nevertheless, just about every economist, all governments, and all policy makers use this measure. It is no wonder that they all misdiagnose the disease. They have a tool for diagnosis that is no better than a doctor trying to diagnose cancer with a telescope. And this is the result; more consumption based debt growth solves the problem of consumption based debt accumulation. 

So my conclusion. The world has changed, the situation has changed. However, the policy devised to meet the crisis is founded upon the same fantasy. The change of the situation is not for the better, but for the worse. It is policy that chases a measure, and that measure is so flawed as to be dangerous. As such, nothing has really changed, as policy is stumbling blindly forwards, ignorant of the flaws in the measure upon which it is based.

Note 1: Many thanks to those who contributed to the last post with very good comments. I am always impressed with the standards of the comments on the blog, which suggests that the blog readership are an impressive group of individuals. The comments, I felt, added significantly to the value of the post. I did suggest that I might publish an explanation that explained my point better. However, in the end (and I am of course biased), I felt that they added to explanation rather than presenting a better explanation.

Note 2: I was tempted to include money printing in the content of the post, but the added complexity that this throws in to the scenario would hinder making the point I wanted to make. For those who read the last post, they might note that it is a follow on from the post, but setting some context around it.

Note3: My posting will continue to be patchy for a while, as I am extremely busy at the moment. My aim is to do a proper review of the US economy next, but that will demand a lot of time. Also, circumstances may sway me in another direction. However, I will try my best to find the time for the review.

Update 13 April, 2012: Ronanpeter (see comments below) has kindly provided a reference to some critiques of GDP by mainstream economists. As I am short of time, I browsed through the shorter narrative section, and it appears that (in places) there is some recognition of the problems that I describe (the section on country balance sheets is a move in the right direction). However, the focus of the paper does not reflect the critique given here. GDP measures are seen as inadequate, rather than being dangerous. Nevertheless, it is a positive to see that this measure is being subjected to some critical scrutiny.

Lord Sidcup has provided a link to a talk in the comments below. It is highly recommended. As per Lord Sidcup's comments, skip the first 10 minutes.

Friday, April 30, 2010

The Lessons of Greece

I have now written several posts on the subject of the Greek crisis, but I thought it might be an appropriate moment to explain why we should all be alarmed at the implications of the Greek crisis. It is not a post about contagion, but about the fundamental problems for all of the countries that are financing huge and growing debts through overseas borrowing.

For regular readers, they will be familiar with the discussion that follows, but I hope they will forgive the repetition for any new readers. The problem that I would like to outline is the problem with the measure so dear to economists, analysts and policymakers; the measure of GDP. The fundamental problem of GDP is that it measures activity within an economy, rather than the underlying size of an economy. As one extreme example of how flawed this measure actually is, if we imagine that a country has an earthquake that destroys a city, the activity that is generated from the rebuilding will possibly see a rise in GDP as the city infrastructure is rebuilt (assuming the loss of productive capacity from the city does not offset the increased activity from the rebuilding). In other words, destruction of assets might give the impression that an economy is growing.

In addition to this problem, there is a more fundamental problem in this rather dangerous measure. This is the inclusion of activity financed through overseas borrowing in the GDP figures. The way this works is simple, and I will give an example to illustrate how it works. Imagine that I go to a restaurant and purchase a meal with a credit card, and the origin of the finance for the card comes from Japan. When I purchase the meal, the activity will be recorded as activity within the economy, and will be reflected in GDP. However, it does not end there. The restaurant will then use that money to pay for a range of expenses, and each payment will also constitute activity in the economy. For example, the restaurant staff will be paid from my borrowed money, and might spend that money in a shop, again creating more activity, then the shop will use that restaurant worker's money and so forth.

What we have is a situation where my borrowed money will not just register as activity in the restaurant, but will also finance considerable subsequent activity. The problem is that this activity is really the result of the output of Japan, as it is Japanese lending that is paying for all of the activity. It is the equivalent of an individual earning £100,000 and borrowing £10,000 and imagining that he actually earns £110,000 per year. Yes, our individual can have a £110,000 lifestyle, but only at a future cost to his diposable income, and only for so long.

In an earlier post, I made a rough and ready calculation of US GDP if overseas funded activity was stripped out of the figures, and came to the following conclusion:

In other words, something like 17% of the US economy is funded by overseas borrowing. You may note that there is a large amount of 'fudge factor' in all of this, and comments and critiques are therefore welcomed (especially from those who are more numerate than myself - which is most people).
There were no critiques, and I would encourage readers to look at the original article, and again encourage critiques. The reason for bring this up in relation to the Greek crisis, and the concern that it should raise for the world economy is relatively simple. If we imagine that Greece does not receive the bailout from the EU/IMF we can see what will happen (I am assuming that there will be no further finance from the markets).

The Greek government will be in a position where it can no longer use the borrowed money to finance activity within the economy, and will have no choice but to enforce extreme austerity measures. As the flow of overseas borrowed money disappears from the economy, the level of activity within the economy will start to fall in an alarming and dramatic way. What will then rapidly follow is that many businesses will find no customers for their goods and services, or a significant reduction, and they will find that they are no longer solvent. Furthermore, many direct employees of the government will be made redundant or have pay-cuts. All of this will lead to less activity within the Greek economy.

The next step will be that a large number of businesses will go bust or start laying off workers, and unemployment will start to rise rapidly. All the while this happening, GDP will be falling off a cliff, and with that falling off, the debt to GDP ratio will be rapidly moving in the wrong direction. Even more worrying is that, as the activity in the economy is falling, the size of the tax base supporting government activity will also be shrinking, causing yet more damage to the fiscal position of the government, which is already in a very poor state. The government will be forced into a further round of cuts.

What we will really see is the actual real output of the Greek economy being laid bare before us. If the ongoing injection of borrowed money is taken out of the economy, many of the jobs accross the economy will simply disappear. In a crude illustration, we might just focus on the amount of activity that is generated by a single civil servant going about their daily life, with their shopping, payment of bills, visits to restaurants and so forth. If the civil servant is made redundant, we can see how the effects of that redundancy will ripple through the economy. Our civil servant will stop their trips to the restaurant, may not be able to pay for their mortgage and put their house on the market, the local shops will lose a customer and so forth. Each of these direct losses of income to businesses will see further downstream losses of income, multiplying the effect of the losses.

It is notable that, within our one rather crude illustration, it is evident that our civil servant will no longer be able to support their mortgage payments. Bearing in mind that unemployment will be rapidly rising over the whole economy, this problem will be replicated over the whole economy. The price of housing will sink, and with it the collateral the banks used for their previous lending. The same will be happening to commercial real estate, as the many businesses that will find that they are in trouble, or going bust, will see a growing flood of commercial properties onto to the market, either for rental or sale. Prices of real estate assets in the country will start to collapse.

That collapse of real estate assets will take away the foundations for bank lending. As businesses go bust, and individuals become unemployed in greater numbers, large numbers of what appeared to be sound loans will become delinquent. The banks will start to make large losses on what had appeared to be prime lending. With the values of property falling rapidly, they will not be able to recover their full losses, and they will be on a fast track to insolvency. As they attempt to protect themselves against their losses, they will hold on to cash. They will not only hold on to cash to protect against insolvency, but also out of the fear that they simply do not know where future losses might originate; after all, prime lending is going sour before their eyes.

What we are seeing is that the assets in Greece have been valued not upon the basis of the underlying output of the Greek economy but upon the foundations of unsustainable overseas borrowing.

With bank lending in decline, sources of potential growth in the economy will be closed off. Furthermore, in the case of Greece, capital flight has already been taking place, but it will accelerate rapidly as the crisis progresses from bad to worse. The discovery of the mispricing of assets will create panic. Access to capital will diminish.

What we are seeing is a downward spiral that is resultant of Greece being forced to live within its actual means. To return to the GDP example, it is like the person who has been living on £110,000 having to move to living on £100,000. They find that they can no longer afford their mortgage payments, the trip to the expensive restaurants, and so forth. Moreover, they are now having to pay back their previous borrowing, and they find their disposable income is collapsing. They have no choice but to live a far, far more austere lifestyle.

The essential problem is this. The more a country borrows from overseas, the more it supports GDP growth (or forestalls GDP decline). As time goes on, the more businesses rely on the overseas borrowing in order for their businesses to be solvent, and the more employment is founded in borrowing from overseas. The more businesses and individuals that are reliant on the income from overseas borrowing, the greater the extent of assets being priced on the overseas borrowing. The greater the extent that assets that are priced on the basis of overseas borrowing, the more the banks solvency is reliant on overseas borrowing. In order for an economy to be kept from collapse, it is necessary to keep borrowing, and the more it borrows, the more the economy is adapted to survival on borrowed money.

The only solution is to break the borrowing spiral as soon as possible.

A long, long time ago I proposed reforms for the UK economy. At the time of writing I argued that the UK needed reform now. The reason for the urgency was the absolute necessity to keep creditors on board whilst the reform took place. My argument was that it was necessary to keep them onboard such that the transition to a more sustainable fiscal foundation could be undertaken with the minimum of hardship. I never pretended that it would be easy or painless, but I always had in mind the scenario I have just painted for Greece. Better to reform with the benefit of credit to ease the transition, than face the imposition of reform and change in a state of shock. I think I made the analogy of falling down a hole, or using a ladder to climb down. You arrive at the same place, but in the latter case without broken bones.

So here we are, about two years after I suggested reform, and no reform has been enacted. This applies to the UK, the US, and a host of other 'rich world' countries. Instead of using the access to credit to allow a transition to a sustainable and realistic economic structure, governments have chosen to use massive borrowing to support their faux economies, and frittered away the chances to make the transition to their real size as painless as possible. We have seen the situation get worse, not better. Rich world economies are now increasingly reliant on overseas borrowing, not less so. In doing so, governments have taken a severe crisis, and turned it into a potential catastrophe.

This is the lesson that Greece teaches us.

Friday, October 30, 2009

US Economic Growth Deconstructed

I had planned a review of the UK economy and stock market, but I was overtaken by the news that US economy ‘grew’ by 0.9 percent in the third quarter. A fairly typical explanation for the growth can be found in a Telegraph article as follows:
The primary reason US economic output has rebounded so strongly is the slug of growth contributed by state programmes, including "cash-for-clunkers" and similar stimulus schemes.
As such, I thought it might be worthwhile to return to the well worn subject of GDP growth. What we are seeing is the mirage and magic of statistics. I will explain this as clearly and simply as I am able through an analogy, and show why this is all 'magic' growth.

Imagine that I am a farmer, and that my output of food is not quite enough to feed my family. As a result, I have frequently turned to my neighbour, who has each year lent me enough food to make up for the shortfall. As each year goes by, I am borrowing more and more from my neighbour, and I am starting to owe him a great amount of food overall. Finally, one year, a river floods and damages many of my crops and drowns some of my animals. My output is reduced to an even lower level, and I am going to struggle to meet my family’s needs.

Once again, I turn to my neighbour, and ask to borrow even more food to take my family through the next year. He agrees and loans even more food than on previous occasions, and I add the borrowed food to the store of my own farm’s output in the barn. At the same time, I also do something to address the problem of the shortage. I decide to change the systems of measuring the output of my farm. For example, instead of counting my units of corn in whole kilograms, I change the units so that one unit becomes three quarters of a kilogram. With my new system, I now measure my output from the current year as all of the food in the barn, and find that I have increased my output of units of food overall for the year.

I look at the large pile of food in the barn, and behold that, despite the problems of my lack of output of food; I have actually achieved an increase in output. There are more units of food in the barn than in comparison with the previous year.

As my generous neighbour is lending me so much food, he comes around to visit my barn, and see how I am running things. As reassurance, I count out my units of output, and show him how much my output has increased. I am very pleased with myself, and I smile with pleasure as I count the units. Then I note that my neighbour is frowning and I am puzzled to find that my neighbour does not share my pleasure.

He asks whether I am going to repay him in the old units of kilograms or the new units of three quarter kilograms. Now I start to frown, and suggest that he does not understand the situation. For every unit he has lent me I will, of course, return one unit as a repayment. I am a little grumpy. Can he not see that my output has grown? Can he not see that, if I can keep up this rate of growth, I will achieve a level of output that will allow me to easily pay him his food back? I wonder at his lack of confidence in me when I have demonstrably improved my output.

I am left wondering that my neighbour simply does not understand output. My neighbour is left wondering how much longer he will continue to lend me food.

Note:

I finally got around to reading this week's copy of the Economist magazine. On reading the magazine, I was struck how many of my views which were previously considered radical (if not barking mad), are now mainstream. There was even one section where they contrasted financial wealth with 'real' wealth, which is almost a perfect mirror of my first article, 'A Funny View of Wealth' (which predicted the economic crisis in the UK). The Economist also addressed the relationship between the US and China, and much of their analysis mirrors the analysis I offered a long time ago (though with different outcomes), and the same applies to the prospects for the $US (again with different outcomes).

I should also mention that I predicted a $US collapse for April of this year and got it wrong. However, the possibility of a $US collapse is now being discussed in the mainstream. What I am really saying is that, in about 6 months time (a wild guess), expect to be reading that the growth in the US economy was not genuine growth at all.

Friday, October 16, 2009

The Underlying Size of the US Economy

I would like to start this post with a hypothetical item of government spending, such as building an extension to a government building, and track some of the money that might be spent. The example uses the US, but the principles apply to any country. The reason for this example will become apparent later, and may be a little disturbing.

As soon as the money for the extension is approved, there will be a surge in economic activity. Project management groups will be formed, an architect firm hired, contractors will be tendering, and medical suppliers will be preparing for large orders. In this case, I will just track some of the spending as it passes to the firm of architects. Depending on the nature of the contract, money will eventually start being passed to the architect firm, and that money will arrive in the firm's bank account. Once in the account, the money will be used for a range of purposes, such as the cost of operations, cost of office space, and legal and other services. All of these economic activities will be partially supported by the government expenditure. For the next movement of the money, I will concentrate on the salary paid to the workers in the firm, and in particular one of the architects.

Let us imagine that one of the the less senior architects is a man who works on the project for 6 months, and all of his pay is therefore coming from the hospital extension project. We might imagine that the architect is an average type of individual in a professional occupation, and that he is married with a young family and earns $100,000 per year. We can therefore imagine his spending, with his income covering a mortgage, payment on a car loan, and fairly large expenditure on consumer items, and consumption of services like trips to restaurants. All of these will be paid with government money. If we just consider the example of expenditure on consumer items, we might think of a toy purchase for one of the architects. He will visit a store, and we can imagine that he spends $50 on a toy for his daughter's birthday.

The $50 originates in government money for the extension, and it now lands in the till of the retailer selling the toys. The retailer then banks the money, and the money will then be utilised for a range of purposes. If we imagine that the toy has a $25 mark-up, then $25 of the money will be used to reorder the toy. The toy is made by a company based in the US, but with manufacturing overseas in China. As such, some of the money will be used to pay for the manufacturing in China, and we will just imagine that $10 covers the cost of manufacturing a replacement. That means that £15 will go to the US company, and will pay for the operations of the company and profit, with $10 'leaking out' of the US economy into the Chinese economy.

As with the architect firm, the $15 that goes arrives in the US toy company will contribute to staff salaries, pay for the costs of the office, pay for business expenses and so forth. If we imagine one of the office staff, part of the pay of the person will come from the sale of the toy, and that money has come from the architect, and that money has come from the building project, and that money has come from government expenditure. The money for the building extension is rippling through the economy creating activity....Whilst the headline amount of the money diminishes at each level, the money is utilised many times over in multiple transactions.

What I am (I hope) showing, is the way in which the money spent by government generates economic activity way beyond the headline figure of the actual expenditure. Each of the activities that the money generates, as the money use multiplies throughout the economy, is recorded in the GDP figures. It is a very complex process to track, and economists have great difficulty in trying to work out how much government spending increases activity throughout the economy. For example, one review of academic literature (see note 1) identifies that different fiscal expenditure in different situations and countries can lead to multipliers of between zero and four.

It is actually quite easy to see why the multiplier effects of government spending are so difficult to calculate. For example, the spending of government money on infrastructure such as a steel bridge might have very different effects according to the individual economy. If the economy has a strong steel industry, then the multiplier will likely be much greater, as otherwise a large portion of the expenditure will rapidly 'leak out' of the economy to pay for the purchase of the steel from overseas suppliers.

What we are therefore left with is a big question mark over how much activity each $1 of government expenditure might generate within the US economy. In light of the estimates of between zero and four, I will proceed on the basis of a multiplier of three, as the study cited suggests higher multipliers occur in larger economies. Furthermore, a large proportion of the US economy is based upon services, which again suggests a high multiplier. This means that the US might even have a multiplier of four, but I will stay with three as a more conservative estimate.

Having come this far, you may be wondering what all of this means, and why I am discussing this in so much detail. The reason is relatively straightforward. I want to give a (very, very) rough estimate of the real size of the US economy - the size if there were no borrowing from overseas. When we see that way that government spending multiplies in the economy, it is apparent that borrowing money from overseas (translated into government spending) will inflate the GDP figures more than the headline borrowing figures suggest.

Starting with the basics, the US economy for 2009 will produce about $14 trillion of GDP, the federal deficit is expected to be something like 12% of GDP for 2009 overall, and according to the Congressional Budget Office the deficit for the fiscal year (just ended)was $1.4 trillion. In order to isolate the effects of overseas borrowing, it is necessary to find out how much debt has been sold overseas. I naively thought that I might find these figures relatively easily, but this has proved to be problematic (see note 2). For example, I searched the Treasury website, and only found an 'estimate' of the overseas holdings of US government debt. Likewise, the St. Louis Federal Reserve (an excellent resource normally) only offers the following chart, for overseas federal debt holdings:



According to the chart, overseas holdings of federal debt have increased in the first six months of 2009 by $305.3 billion, making an annualised rate of overseas accumulation of US debt of around $600 billion (assuming that overseas investors continued to buy US debt at the same rate). It might be noted that the fiscal year in the US does not match the calendar year, so there is some more fudge in the numbers. However, we might make an approximation on the total amount of GDP that is actually due to the multiplier effect, by multiplying the figure by 3, which gives us $1.8 trillion.

Now at this stage, it would be normal to then minus the $1.8 trillion from the overall size of the economy ($US 14 trillion). The first problem is that some of the borrowed money will be servicing interest payments on previous borrowing ($182 billion), such that it will not create activity. The second problem is that there is the question of how much private borrowing is sourced from overseas lenders, in particular consumer borrowing. I have tried to identify how much of this borrowing originates from overseas, but have been unable to come up with any firm figures. I will therefore just take a guess at the impacts of these two factors and raise the overall total to $2 billion, implying something like $127 billion of consumer credit provided by overseas lenders (remember the multiplier of 3), an extremely conservative guess.

With the current figure of $14 trillion, the correction to remove the activity resultant from overseas borrowing would mean that the real size of the economy is just $12 trillion. In other words, something like 17% of the US economy is funded by overseas borrowing. You may note that there is a large amount of 'fudge factor' in all of this, and comments and critiques are therefore welcomed (especially from those who are more numerate than myself - which is most people).

What does this mean?

As I have frequently pointed out, measurement of GDP is flawed in any economy that has a net accumulation of debt, for the very reason that the activity in the economy includes debt activity derived from overseas borrowing. The problem becomes particularly acute when measuring the ratio of debt to GDP, as the activity from debt is included in GDP. Even more curious is the idea of GDP growth, when a country is accumulating debt, but nevertheless economists are predicting 'growth' for 2010.

The real concern is the question of what would happen if the overseas lenders were to stop lending. In this event, the US economy would quickly revert to its real size, and that would be significantly smaller than today. The results of any halt in credit provision for the US are extremely worrying, as support for a large percentage of the economy would disappear. The result would be that unemployment would explode upwards, government could not operate at current levels, and the shock would likely precipitate a broader collapse in the economy.

The problem that is faced by the government is that for the years preceding the economic crisis, the economy was also being flattered by a combination of overseas borrowing for government expenditure, but in combination with consumer borrowing that originated in overseas credit. I am guessing that, if it were possible to strip out the effect of borrowing for the three years preceding the crisis, the same kind of results would emerge. In other words, I believe the problem is structural, meaning the current level of the economy can not be sustained. As such that there is no possibility in the near term of achieving anything near pre-crisis economic conditions unless creditors continue to fund the US at current levels.

This is improbable.

One reason is that the printing of money by the Federal Reserve and size of deficits are already alarming creditors such as China, with China giving implicit threats to stop lending. A devaluation of the $US might provide a solution to the problems by eventually return the US economy to its true size and wealth relative to other countries. However, ongoing $US devaluation will just accelerate the point at which overseas creditors refuse further lending. In other words, it will precipitate a crisis before the adjustment is completed. In the event of no further credit, the US would face the prospect of rapidly transitioning to the real size of the economy.

The only solution that I can see is for the US to first freeze the growth in borrowing, and to then implement a clear and binding plan to reduce borrowing aggressively over the short to medium term, with a clear plan for a return to surplus in five years time. This plan would give confidence to overseas creditors, and allow a more orderly transition to the real size of the economy. Such a plan would be very, very painful, as the economy would still shrink dramatically. However, it would be less painful than the sudden collapse that might take place if overseas lenders were to stop lending.

The problem is that, at present, there are no such plans. Instead, deficits stretch to the horizon, overseas creditors express their doubts, and the $US is steadily sinking. In other words, my very rough estimates may be put to the test.

Note 1: Spilimbergo, A., Symansky, S., Blanchard, O., Cottarelli, C., & Hall, W. (2009) 'Fiscal policy for the crisis', Centre for Economic Policy Research, Paper No. 7130, January 2009.

Note 2: I used the Treasury website here, and downloaded the document titled 'Ownership of Federal Securites'. Actually getting firm numbers on actual sales of new debt is very difficult, and news reports, for example, seem to focus on debt type and/or sales to particular countries. A fairly tpical example is the following report:
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- Net foreign purchases of long-term securities increased to $28.6 billion in August from $15.3 billion in July, the Treasury Department said Friday. Net foreign purchases of long-term U.S. securities were $ 32.9 billion. Of this, private investors purchased $21.3 billion and foreign official institutions bought $11.6 billion. U.S. residents purchased a net $4.3 billion of long-term foreign securities. China's holdings of Treasurys slipped $3.4 billion to $797.1 billion in August. So far in 2009, China has increased its holdings of Treasurys by $57.5 billion
If you have a definitive source of sales to overseas, a link would be appreciated, or more accurate figures. I am surprised that this data is so hard to find....perhaps I am looking in the wrong places..

Thursday, August 6, 2009

A Recovery in the UK?

A recent comment on the blog suggested that perhaps there was not much to write about, as the UK economy appears to be recovering. Bearing in mind that such stories are now appearing in the press, it is not surprising to see that this point of view is gaining some traction. For example, we have this from the Telegraph, reporting on the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR):
NIESR’s optimism was echoed by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), which expects house prices to rise this year, in a startling reversal of its forecast that prices would plunge 10pc to 15pc in 2009.

A slew of positive economic data and an upbeat trading update from Carpetright – often seen as a bellwether for the economy – prompted analysts to predict the UK could emerge from the recession as early as the third quarter.
From David Wighton, of the Times, we have the following:
Still more convincing, the purchasing managers’ survey of services, the most timely and respected gauge of the economy’s most vital sector, shows expansion for a third month, and at the fastest pace since February last year.

The equivalent manufacturing survey shows that industry is rebounding too, and the fightback is affirmed by official data, with the biggest monthly output jump since October 2007.

Markets seem convinced — the FTSE 100 is up by a third from its lows plumbed at the start of March.

It all appears to be compelling evidence of recovery, does it not?

The truth is that we are witnessing a mirage. My first article for this blog was entitled 'A Funny View of Wealth', and I return in this post to the theme in this (very long) essay. The essay was written before the economic crisis struck in full force and, in the essay, I tried to find the apparent source of wealth in the UK, but found that there was no explanation except for a massive expansion in credit. Output of commodities were in decline, manufacturing output had remained static for many years, and export of services provided no explanation for the massive 'growth' that had apparently taken place in the economy. The remaining explanation was that the UK's growth had been built upon borrowing, and in particular borrowing from overseas.

We can now fast forward two years in time, and I can ask the same questions. Exactly what is the source of the current 'recovery'? Which sector is producing the growth in wealth creation to justify the 'recovery'. Let's start with manufacturing:

The chart above is the production index from the Office of National Statistics (ONS). It seems that, even with an uptick now, we are now producing significantly less than ten years ago. This is what the index of production covers:
The Index of Production (IoP) measures the volume of production of the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, and energy supply industries, which covered 17.2 per cent of the UK economy in 2005.
How the word 'recovery' might be applied to this is very puzzling. With regards to productivity, the picture is as bad, with this from the ONS.



As can be seen here, the UK is not in the midst of any kind of productivity miracle that might explain the sudden recovery.

The other potential source of real growth in an economy is in the exports of services. In the essay at the start of the blog, it was apparent that financial services were at the heart of the growth in services export, and the decline of the sector has been reflected in recent services export figures, with a negative trend appearing in the figures (raw data taken from the ONS here - series IKBB & IKBC & IKBD). Curiously, 2008 did see a moment of increase in the positive balance (in part as a result of an expansion in financial services exports! - see data here), but quarter 1 2009 reversed this. Overall, the picture is one of a continuing positive balance in the export of services, but still with nothing that might offer an explanation of the current 'recovery'. On the latest figures from the ONS, which takes us to Quarter 1 of 2009, there is no explanation for the recovery.

Then there is the overall trade balance, which has seen a shrinking of the deficit, but still an ongoing deficit. This from TradingEconomics:

The trade deficit continues, despite a substantial devaluation of the £GB since the crisis began, such as the decline against the $US (apologies for the poor chart). Devaluation has the effect, for example, of reducing the purchasing power of consumers within a country, and is therefore a real reduction in wealth of the individuals whose income is derived in the currency.



However, it is when we see the current account that the scale of the problem becomes really apparent, with the following chart from TradingEconomics:


If taken together, what we are seeing here is no growth in output from manufacturing that might explain a 'recovery', no growth in the export of services, and an ongoing current account deficit. It is hardly a picture of a 'recovery'. To this happy picture of 'recovery', we can add unemployment, with this from the ONS:


It is worth thinking about the underlying meaning in this chart. The proportion of working age people in employment is falling off a cliff. If people are not working, where is the output in the economy coming from? We know that there is no productivity miracle, so how exactly can an ongoing decline in working people explain a recovery? Where can real increases in output in the economy come from except from either a growth in productivity or a growth of the numbers in the workforce actually in work?

For regular readers, they will be aware of my cynicism about what GDP figures actually show, as they include activity from debt based consumption (see here for a full explanation). However, even this indicator, which potentially massively overstates the positive in an economy, looks like this:


So exactly what is the source of this recovery? Here is a summary of where we are at:
  1. There is no productivity improvement but a decline
  2. The number of workers in the workforce is in rapid decline
  3. Production is below the levels of 1998
  4. The trade balance of goods and services is negative, the trade in services remains positive but with no growth, and the current account balance is negative. On balance, we are still consuming more than we produce.
  5. GDP growth, a poor measure that exagerates the positive, is still negative. Even if it were to move to the positive, how much of the activity recorded comes from growth in debt?
Altogether, this simply shows that there is no sustainable recovery. A shrinking UK workforce is still consuming more than it produces, and productivity and output are still in negative territory.

So where exactly is the recovery? The indicators given as evidence of recovery are the slight uptick in manufacturing, which I have already dealt with, house price recovery, and the stock market recovery. The recovery proposed appears to the return to price inflation of two asset classes, but with no underlying economic justification for these that might be seen as sustainable.

So where is this 'recovery' coming from? Once again, I return to the theme outlined in 'A Funny View of Wealth'. The only real reason for any signs of 'recovery' is that there is yet another increase in debt. The only real difference this time is that the source of the borrowing is primarily the government, and that borrowing is expanding at a record rate. Again, from the ONS:



And how is the government funding that borrowing? By the Bank of England printing money, which is then used to purchase gilts (UK government bonds). The Bank of England has just announced yet another expansion of the so called 'quantitative easing' (QE - printing money) programme, which is primarily being used to purchase government debt. I have previously shown that the QE purchase of debt is propping up the UK bond market, and that it is the monetization of government debt.

What we are looking at is simply more delusion, more hiding from the underlying dire state of the UK economy. The 'recovery' is founded on printing money and more debt. I will quote myself from an earlier blog post, which in turn quoted an even earlier blog post. It is shocking that nothing has actually changed:
Quite simply, aside from the fact that a failure to fund the deficit would be catastrophic, what kind of 'recovery' is it, if it is being financed by borrowing 13% of GDP?

A long time ago, I made an analogy with a household to explain the absurdity of this notion. A household has been racking up huge debts due to too much expenditure on the 'good things in life', but continues spending. All the time the family's debt is increasing, and then the bad news comes. The wife's job is under threat, and the husband's working hours are being reduced. Their income is declining, but the cost and size of the debt is increasing. They are in deep financial trouble, and are borrowing more and more money in order to keep their lifestyle and also to make payments on previous debt.

It looks like the household is in crisis, and they will soon go bankrupt if they continue their profligate spending. Fortunately, so it seems to our irresponsible family, a visitor comes to their house from 'Dodgy Loan Corporation' and offers them a further and much bigger new loan. They look at the figures, and it appears that, if they accept the loan, the family will be able to continue to live the same lifestyle as they had before. A massive weight lifts off their shoulders, and they live happily ever after.....

We can all (I hope) see the problem in the happy ending. I have not mentioned the prospects for the family's income increasing in the future, and without a massive increase in income, bankruptcy will just be delayed. Sadly, for the family, there is no identifiable prospect of such a massive increase in income in the future, and they are just hoping that 'something will turn up'.
I keep wondering how long this can continue. How long can we delude ourselves that all will be ok if we just keep on borrowing more and more, even as our income declines. I keep on asking myself, 'when will we wake up to reality?'

Saturday, July 11, 2009

The Danger in GDP Measures

Some time ago I read an interesting paper from within the field of academic economics. The article, by Ole Rogeburg was written pre-economic crisis, and was titled 'Taking Absurd Theories Seriously: Economics and the Case of Rational Addiction Theories'. Perhaps the most important point of the paper was that it was a case study to illuminate what he saw as a more widespread problem.

I will not detail the entire argument of the paper, but he identifies that economists used mathematics to present a completely absurd explanation of drug addiction, and that the resultant nonsense has been used in the formulation of government policy. The most striking element of the discussion is how the completely implausible might become plausible with the backing of clever academic argument, and the respectability of a veneer of academic rigor.

One of the themes of this blog has been trying to view the current state of the world economy as it might be observed in the circumstances of today, rather than through any particular perspective derived from academic economists. As part of that process, one of the problems with economic theories that I have identified is the obsession with GDP figures as a measure of the health of an economy. I might even go as far as to say that the subject has become something like an obsession of my own. As such, I hope that I will be forgiven a post devoted to the subject, and which pulls together some earlier points that I have made.

Before I continue further, I will quote the understanding of GDP that is described in the UK's official publication of statistics, National Statistics online:
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an integral part of the UK national accounts and provides a measure of the total economic activity in a region. GDP is often referred to as one of the main 'summary indicators' of economic activity and references to 'growth in the economy' are quoting the growth in GDP during the latest quarter.

In the UK three different theoretical approaches are used in the estimation of one GDP estimate.

GDP from the output or production approach - GDP(O) measures the sum of the value added created through the production of goods and services within the economy (our production or output as an economy). This approach provides the first estimate of GDP and can be used to show how much different industries (for example, agriculture) contribute within the economy.

GDP from the income approach - GDP(I) measures the total income generated by the production of goods and services within the economy. The figures provided breakdown this income into, for example, income earned by companies (corporations), employees and the self employed.

GDP from the expenditure approach - GDP(E) measures the total expenditures on all finished goods and services produced within the economy.

The estimates are 'Gross' because the value of the capital assets actually worn away (the 'capital consumption') during the productive process has not been subtracted.
Whichever approach is taken, the key point is that the measure is made of activity, and therein lies the problem. A whole host of factors might determine activity, but they offer no indication of the health of an economy.

For example, if we look back to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, there was a massive programme of rebuilding following the destruction of so much infrastructure. The infrastructure that was destroyed represented an accumulation of investments being destroyed, or the destruction of wealth represented in infrastructure. However, the replacement of the infrastructure would be represented in activity such as construction and cleaning up the areas of devastation. This would, in turn, feed into the GDP figures, such that GDP would see a rise as a result of the devastation of a city. As such, whilst GDP does indeed represent activity, it can not be said to mean 'growth in the economy'. In other words, can replacement and cleaning up of this destroyed infrastructure represent economic growth?

If such a view of economic growth is taken seriously, then the logic of the measure would suggest that a good way to achieve economic growth would be to destroy infrastructure such as factories, roads, bridges, houses etc.

There is an even more significant worry about GDP and the way it is used. An example is taken at random from the news on a Google news search for the term 'US debt % GDP', and produced this article:
The UK is drowning in debt. The total amount owed by our households, firms and the government is staggering – more than five-times our national income. On top of that debt stock, the UK is heading for a 2009 budget deficit of 14pc of GDP – by a long way the biggest in our peace-time history.
I actually support much of what the author this quote says (Liam Halligan of the Telegraph), but think that he is making a major error using GDP as any kind of a reference point. I will explain why.

As I have already identified, the measure of GDP is a measure of activity in the economy. As such, it is a measure that takes no account of the source of activity, such that a hurricane's devastation might increase GDP. However, included in the level of GDP is the economic activity that is resultant from the debt driven consumption. If we then view the idea that debt is '14 pc of GDP' we encounter a problem. What is being measured is the proportion of debt in relation to economic activity that is itself, in part, driven by debt. The economic impact of that debt is itself difficult to quantify.

For example, here are two charts from the UK National Statistics website, regarding fiscal deficits:



The problem that arises is that the measure on the left shows the money that is being borrowed, and the chart on the right shows the total economic activity that includes that borrowing. It is when we see how debt driven consumption actually impacts on the economy that the scale of the problem makes sense.

For the sake of simplicity, we might imagine that a small slice of the money that is borrowed by the government is used to pay the salary of one individual. When that individual goes shopping and purchases a shirt, they will spend some of that borrowed money. The purchase of the shirt will register as economic activity. However, the story does not end there. The retailer will then need to order another shirt for stock, and this will then see economic activity in a wholesaler, which in turn might see economic activity from an importer. Furthermore, the money spent on the shirt will contribute to many of the support services that are a necessary part of retail, creating ever more activity. The money will then contribute to the wages of the staff who will then spend the money, creating yet more activity.

In other words, this tiny slice of the government's borrowing will generate activity far in excess of the headline figures, or in this case in excess of the individual's salary. All of that activity will be recorded in the GDP figures.

The problem that this generates is to ask how the activity that is generated by debt might be stripped out. I will confess that I do not know the answer to this question (comments welcomed), but it is certain that GDP is a measure which has little meaning in the measurement of an economy. More borrowed money results in more activity in the economy such that the measure of the economy becomes a measure of the borrowing against output that includes activity from previous borrowing. The big question here is how a measure that does this might be an indicator of the sustainability of borrowing?

To illustrate this, imagine if a factory's performance was measured against activity rather than cash flow or profitability. The owner of the factory might produce more product if they borrow more money for materials, labour and power, but that would do nothing to indicate the health of the company that owns the factory. If a measure like GDP were used, the output resultant from the borrowing would be seen as an indicator of a healthy business, even though the accumulation of debt would suggest otherwise. However, the measure would consider the debt in relation to the activity, such that the debt accumulation would increase activity, and this would be represented in output. I am not sure this is the clearest description, but I hope the underlying point is clear (if you can phrase it more clearly, please feel free to add a comment).

I will use a related example from a recent post as a further illustration. If an individual earns £50,000, and borrows £10,000 per year, they appear to have an income of £60,000 in their lifestyle. If GDP type measures are used, then the sustainability of the borrowing of £10,00 a year would not be measured on the actual £50,000 of income, but would instead be measured on the apparent income of £60,000 per year. Nobody in their right mind would do such a thing, but this is in effect what GDP measures are doing.

The reason why I highlighted the problem with economic theory at the start of the post is to point out that economics can be a matter of playing with clever ideas. GDP is just such an idea. It seems to be a perfectly rational and clever idea, that an economy's output might be measured through the activity in the economy. However, if an economy is being financed in part by debt, the meaningfulness of the measure completely disappears. Even when an economy is not partly funded through debt, the Katrina example illustrates how fundamentally flawed the measure actually is. It ceases to have any plausibility. Just as with the drug addiction thesis, GDP is being used by economists to shape government policy, but it should be viewed as a nonsense.

The idea that this measure is one of the most important measures in shaping fiscal and monetary policy is deeply disturbing. In particular, GDP is falling in an environment when there is an explosion in government borrowing. If it were possible to strip out the impact of the government borrowing from these figures, then the situation of the absolute borrowing versus the absolute output without the borrowing would reveal a very, very ugly picture.

We have witnessed a private credit bubble economy (in conjunction with expanding public debt) and have seen the damage that this has wrought. During the entire time the damage was being done, the GDP figures created an illusion of a healthy economy. We are now witnessing a massive increase in public borrowing, and again the GDP figures flatter the relative success of the policy, hiding the severity of the crisis, and likely unsustainable debt. With regards to how unsustainable this policy might be, there appears to be no way to measure this, just as there was no way during the private credit bubble.

The problem that then arises is how to determine the actual health of an economy. The answer is actually surprisingly simple. The actual health of an economy overall is determined by whether the economy can be sustained without any borrowing. If borrowing is necessary in aggregate, whether the source of the borrowing is private or public, the economy is unhealthy. In other words, an economy's sustainability is determined by the ability for the economy to have aggregate output which matches the aggregate consumption.

The only question that remains is how to determine how bad borrowing might be, and for this I can offer no solution. However, in economies like the US and UK, the numbers are shockingly large relative to the history of borrowing, and should therefore be a cause for worry. In particular, when comparisons are possible with the debts accumulated in a period of total war (World War II), then there is real cause for worry. Such comparisons suggest that the situation is indeed extremely bad.

Monday, October 20, 2008

Economic Crisis - The Eye of the Hurricane before the 'Service Economy' Collapses

It seems that we have now entered a period of relative calm, following the storm of the bailout. For a while, following the Bernanke promise of yet more support for the finance system, stock markets rallied, only to later wobble on bad economic news. This is now becoming a pattern, where governments take action, markets have a fit of optimism, then the real economy offers bad news and pulls sentiment back down. In short, governments are pouring liquidity, guarantees, and borrowed money for short term bounces in confidence, completely ignoring the possibility that the underlying economy is in deep trouble.

I have spoken about the fact that GDP measures have been inaccurately measuring economic growth previously. I think it may be time to return to this theme, and take a look at why there is no escaping the simple fact that the US and UK economies must contract by such a large amount. Below is a chart of UK GDP growth:












And additionally a chart for US and Canadian GDP Growth (it includes Canada because this was the first good chart I found):

















So now we have one side of the equation. What of the increase in debt? First a chart for the UK and US as a percentage of disposable income:

















And now a chart for the US of absolute debt (the UK would look a similar shape):














My apologies for the variable sources for these charts, but I hope you can get a feel for the situation from these (I am rushed so just did a Google image search - I usually use the ONS but do not have the time to find the section). I did have a very good chart for the UK which shows that there has been a close correlation in debt growth and GDP, but have been able to dig it out again. However, if you review these charts, you will see that there during the recent boom, there has been a massive growth in debt. Like any figures that correlate the charts do not prove causation of GDP growth, but causation becomes more likely if there is an explanatory mechanism that can be identified.

So how can the increase in debt translate into GDP growth. I have discussed the multiplier effect, and also illustrated examples in 'A Funny View of Wealth'. The principle is very easy, and I will use the example in 'A Funny View of Wealth', as follows:

If we go back to Mr. Smith in the restaurant, we can see that he has borrowed money to finance his restaurant visit. In doing so he has decreased his wealth in order to fulfil a short term need. This is, partly, what wealth is for, but this is Mr. Smith’s future wealth that he is spending. This borrowed money that Mr. Smith has spent in the restaurant will then recycle throughout the economy in many ways. The restaurant owner will be a little wealthier, and will then spend some of the money on buying goods and services, the restaurant staff likewise, and so on. Furthermore there will be suppliers to the restaurant who will also be beneficiaries of the spending of Mr. Smith, as his consumption of foods will mean that the stock will need to be replenished, and the process of cooking will require energy, and some of his money may contribute to decorators, maintenance people and so on through all of the restaurant support services. We can then see the same process with each of these support services spending their small share of Mr. Smith’s transfer of wealth in a host of different ways, each further helping to support another layer of businesses.

It is only when we look at lots of versions of Mr. Smith, all borrowing money, all of which dissipates through the economy in a myriad of ways, that we can see what a dramatic effect this has on the economy. Throughout the UK economy there are millions of people who, just like Mr. Smith, are reducing their future wealth daily through the borrowing of money. Each of these individuals supports a multitude of businesses through each of their purchases of goods and services. This massive dispersion of borrowed money is financing large numbers of businesses, and the transfer of their (future) wealth that occurs is apparent in what appears to be a booming economy.
The reason why I am returning to this theme is that I have, on several occasions mentioned that the way that GDP is measured is flawed. In the case of borrowing, it can either be an internal transfer of wealth from within a country, or it can be from outside of the country. Much of the borrowing in the US and UK has been funded from overseas. Each time a person goes into a restaurant, or buys something on credit, there is a transfer of wealth out of the country, and a foregoing of future wealth. I will return to 'A Funny View of Wealth' again:

What if the money that provides the loan has been borrowed from outside of the UK, and the UK bank is effectively the ‘distributor’? In this case the transfer of wealth from Mr. Smith will go to the restaurant, the UK bank and the foreign bank. In this case, there has been a real transfer of wealth from Mr. Smith in the UK to the overseas bank that provided the finance for the credit. There is therefore a transfer of real wealth to the country of the overseas bank.

It could be argued at this stage that the overseas lender only has a very small amount of the total transfer of the wealth, and that the majority of the wealth goes to the restaurant owner. This is largely correct. However, depending on the status of the individual and the type of loan, the final interest that is paid on the loan might actually be very high, and translate into a large sum of money over the period of the loan. Some of this interest is profit for the UK bank, and some of the interest is profit for the foreign bank. If we say Mr. Smith is an overstretched credit user, with a moderate credit history, and give him a £500 balance on this credit card, an 18% interest rate, and ongoing minimum payments of 5% of the balance, this £500 will cost Mr. Smith a shocking £214 over the life of the loan. This is not an atypical profile for a heavy credit card user with a moderate credit history, but better and worse examples can be created in any number of permutations. In this case a £50 meal will see a transfer in wealth of £21 to the banking system from the restaurant goer, a significant loss of wealth to the individual, and a significant transfer of wealth to both the UK bank and the overseas bank. Different profiles will produce different results, and the example given is just to give a sense of the potential scale of the transfers. In this case we might hazard a guess that Mr. Smith has just transferred as much as £8 of his wealth to another country, in order to pay for a £50 meal, a meal that might otherwise have seen no transfer of wealth outside of the UK.

This is a very expensive transaction for both Mr. Smith and UK Plc, and has a negative impact on the overall wealth of both.
Despite this, the example of Mr. Smith above will be seen in the UK GDP figures as economic growth. My purpose here is not to recycle the original essay (which I recommend reading if you have not done so).

I have also not covered government debt in the charts, as you will all be aware of the growth in debt over the last few years, and this also creates a multiplier effect once it enters the economy.

The key point here is that the GDP figures do not reflect the reality of real growth in the economy, but growth in debt. If you factor in the multiplier effect, then it is even possible that the underlying growth of the economy might even have been negative. This is why I am predicting that the economy will have to drop back at least 10 years in growth terms, but quite possibly a lot more. As I have pointed out several times, the world was a kinder place for the West 10 years ago with still relatively little competition from countries such as China.

I thought I would add this post because the symptoms are now apparently arising from the disappearance of the debt based multiplier effect. Whilst the economy has been sliding very fast towards collapse, the first signs of spinning out of control have appeared. One of the first elements to go when consumers tighten their belts is discretionary spending. This means meals out, leisure activities of all kinds, and taxis in particular might be seen as the 'canary in the mine'. The reason for taxis being of particular interest is they are a particularly vulnerable form of discretionary spending, as there are always alternatives (albeit less convenient) to their use. They are also widely used in the evening, and are therefore a good symptom in the slowdown in leisure spending, such as restaurants, bars and nightclubs. Whilst there has been plenty of 'bad news' on consumer confidence and spending, I was struck by an article in which sales of new London black cabs are described as 'tumbling'. Whilst mainstream economists look to other (often abstracted) barometers, I am always looking for these kind of signals, as taxis are such a good barometer of spending behaviour. This example only applies to the UK, but the UK and US are going through a parallel process, so it might also be suggestive of the US position in the crisis.

From here we come to the real point of this post, the destruction of the service economy. Other articles are also starting to tell the tale (though the black cab story is the best illustration). For example, in the headlines today, there are calls for a fund to help small business survive the bad times, and another commentary is highlighting the plight of small businesses. Small business is at the heart of the service economy, and these businesses will be the first to really feel the pain. We should also remember that many of these small businesses will show a time lag before they start to appear in the bankruptcy figures. Again, the black cab story suggests that the we are now at a point where the pain has really kicked in. It is sad to say, but many small businesspeople will now be facing the hard fact that they are in deep trouble. The sole traders, and other small business people, are probably already appearing in the unemployment numbers, but the drip of new claimants will very shortly become a deluge.

If we strip out the debt led growth of the last 10 years, then the scale of the coming carnage in the economy becomes painfully apparent. Quite simply, most of the economy has been supported on a life support of debt, and now that life support has been switched off, we can start to see what will happen next. As I have said, the black cabs are the canary in the mine and we can now expect bankruptcy figures to soar.

Meanwhile, in the US, reportedly they are pressing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to boost lending, in a desperate attempt to regain credit driven growth. The same will happen in the UK, and there are already, for example, reports that pressure and/or legislation will be put in place to slow down the mortgage repossession process. We can expect to see more and more of such measures in the coming months. However, all they will do (at best) is create further losses for the financial institutions, and in many cases that will mean losses for governments.

Meanwhile, as time progresses, the fiscal position of both the UK and US government will deteriorate very rapidly, as the full savagery of the crisis are unleashed in the service sector. I am taking the black cab story as the signal that a new phase is starting in the economic collapse. I predicted the state of the economy as it now stands, as an ever faster downward spiral. I recently identified that all of the elements of the collapse were in place. I think that we are now about to see an even more rapid acceleration. The unemployment figures are going to rise at an ever faster rate, along with a massive rise in government expenditure, and government receipts are about to fall through the floor.

As such, I am very sorry to say that we are moving on track for the first government credit crisis, which I predicted a couple of weeks ago (as coming within three months). I suspect that the UK will go first, as the position in the UK is far more acute, and the US will follow shortly after. At the moment, the pattern of disaster is starting to emerge into reality, just as it did for the bank failures. Just as when I predicted the bank failures, the failure of (at the very least) the UK government is now probably irreversible. There was a brief period during which they could have built a buffer of confidence for creditors with a tough program of reform, but I believe that the moment has passed and the course is set.

At this stage, you might consider that this a fairly extreme analysis from the news about purchases of new taxis. However, if you think about the behaviour of your friends and family in their use of taxis, you will see why this is such a stark warning. If the money is drying up in the taxi business to this degree, then the rest of the economy is very likely freezing very fast.

Note 1: I have had an intriguing post from a regular commentator, who posts under the name Lemming. Lemming had the following to say:
Are you absolutely sure that our creditors will be turning the taps off any time soon? Is China, in fact, happy to fund our lifestyles indefinitely so they can simply 'buy' the West in the long term? To me, that sounds like a perfectly rational explanation, and Western politicians who espouse globalisation would be more than happy to facilitate it, I imagine, even if they were unaware of exactly what they were signing up for.
I have to admit, this a fair point. If China keeps lending, they will gain formidable economic power in the long term. As such, it is a very real possibility, and I can not discount that this might be a reason for continued lending. However, as China slows down, they might need to start to redeem some of that lending in order to support their own economy through the crisis, and will want to use whatever resources for that purpose, restricting their ability to lend. In this situation, depending on what happens with the Chinese economy, they may not have the option of continued support for the West. Another commentator kindly posted the following link, and I will repost it here as it applies:

Note 2: Another poster has kindly posted a link here. It makes interesting reading, in particular the article of 1998, financial capitalism vs industrial capitalism. I recommend it to all readers.

Note 3: Jeremy commented as follows:
Darling's plan of bringing spending forwards is truly dreadful. I can only imagine that he thinks that it might boost the economy prior the the next election as a last ditch effort for labour to avoid complete wipeout. I suspect the chances of that are nearly as small as the grey nobbly organ situated between his ears. Either way, we can reasonably expect sterling to get trashed in the process and look forward to some serious inflationary pressure moving into 2009.
This was a prescient comment, as £sterling has been tanking. The curiosity is the $US is still acting as a 'safe haven'. How much longer? Not much longer, I believe, though perhaps it will take the default of a major rich world government to finally do it? Meanwhile, would you lend into anything demoninated in £sterling at the moment? I think others will have their doubts too - which means that demand for £sterling to lend back into the UK will probably fall back, creating a stronger downward spiral.

Note 4: LordSidCup has the following to add to some other interesting comments:
My point is; if the politicians and financial elites could use whatever means to get confidence high again, is it possible that after after a correction things could stay the roughly the same/ a lower level ) for many more years, if not indefinitely?

Also, there are all these interbank debts looming, Credit Swaps etc, why don't the most important banks get together and write them off? I assume that would be painful, but as its all abstract wealth created as debt, what would it matter?
For the first point, others widely share this idea, but confidence is not a magic force but has to be rooted in something. If every day brings news of an ever slowing economy, ever smaller government receipts, then how can a government maintain confidence. Without the fuel of debt, it is impossible that confidence can be maintained, as I have outlined here. This is why every attempt to pour money into the economy sees a subsequent later fall in confidence. Reality just keeps on intruding and governments just do not have the resource to bail out both the financial sector and the rest of the economy.

For the second, the Credit Default Swaps are guarantees against default. They are therefore an insurance policy that moves real damage in the economy to a different place. Whatever happens, somebody will make the loss, and it is just a question of who will suffer. Note added approx 1 hour after the post: MattinShanghai has commented below on this answer and has pointed out that I have blundered. One of the wonders of the online world is that, when we make an error, we are soon corrected. Apologies to LordSidCup, for an incorrect answer....I will rethink and hopefully, if I have enough time enough to get my facts straight, will reply again.

A note to my note, added a little later.....MattinShanghai is quite correct to say that there is no knowing the size of the market, due to the private nature of the transactions. However, the products are an insurance contract, according to a reference I quickly checked: 'The seller sells protection (buys risk) and generally receives a fee for this protection' ('Credit derivatives and Synthetic Structures', J Tavakoli, 2001, p5). A note of caution however, as this in derivatives terms is a little dated as a reference. Apparently they are called swaps to avoid regulation as an insurance, which I dug out from Wikipedia, as I could not find anything more substantive in the economics journals on why they are not classified as an insurance. However, they still appear to be an insurance, whatever the legal niceties that determines their name. I think Matt is referring to the fact that:

'Economically, a CDS buyer is tantamount to a short seller of the bond underlying the CDS. Whereas a person who owns a bond profits when its issuer is in a position to repay the bond, a short seller profits when, among other things, the bond goes into default. Importantly, CDS buyers do not have to own the bond or other debt instrument upon which a CDS contract is based. This means CDS buyers can "naked short" the debt of companies without restriction.' from here.

It is, as Matt said possible to buy an insurance against another person's house burning down. The point I think that Matt is making is that, in principle, it is possible for LordSidCup suggests to happen. This is I believe the comment Matt made about the fact that the counterparties being on the line for more than the value of the original debt - the ability to profit from debt default....

However, the complete abandonment of the CDS contracts would presumably hit some institutions harder than others. In the current situation, where the banks are so exposed to wider damage as a result of defaults, in principle I can not see why it would not be possible to write them off if they could see a common interest in their survival as a group. The trouble is that the institutions who stand to gain would have a very tough time being able to justify their giving up their positions. Such a position moves into game theory, and requires trust and cooperation from all parties to secure a common good - it is not a zero sum game. It would face problems of imperfect information, due to the private nature of the transactions. Who does hold what, and what is their exposure, or their potential for gain? I am probably doing injury to game theory here, but hope that the answer helps. Thank you Matt for your clarification, and thank you LordSidCup for what was a far more challenging question than I originally considered. I also think that there is more to the point being made by Matt, so any further clarification will be welcomed. In the meantime, time allowing I will look at this a little more, and may add a further note if I have anything more to add. I am not sure that I have yet got to the root of the question, or the operation of CDS contracts. Even as I am writing, I have found a helpful quote on the underlying principle of CDSs which I hope will help others (The Journal of Finance, Volume 60, Issue 5 (p 2255-2281)'An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relationbetween Investment-Grade Bonds and CreditDefault Swaps'), & a good introduction to first principles.
'Single-name credit default swaps (CDS) account for around half of the credit
derivatives market. They are the most liquid of the several credit derivatives
currently traded and they form the basic building blocks for more complex
structured credit products.1 A single-name CDS is a contract that provides
protection against the risk of a credit event by a particular company or country.
The buyer of protection makes periodic payments to the protection seller until
the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract, whichever
is first. If a credit event occurs, the buyer is compensated for the loss incurred
as a result of the credit event, which is equal to the difference between the par
value of the bond or loan and its market value after default.
2. CDSs provide a very easy way to trade credit risk. Many corporate bonds are
bought by investors who simply hold them to maturity (Alexander, Edwards,
and Ferri (1998)). Secondary market liquidity is therefore often poor, thereby
making the purchase of large amounts of credit risk in the secondary cash
market difficult and costly (Schultz (1998)). Shorting credit risk is even more
difficult in the cash market. The repurchase agreement (repo) market for risky
bonds is often illiquid, and even if a bond can be shorted on repo, the tenor of
the agreement is usually very short. Credit derivatives, especially CDS, allow
investors to short credit risk over a longer period of time at a known cost by
buying protection.'
Matt may well be right that they are another bomb about to go off. No doubt they will add to the damage, but I still think that they are more likely to just relocate it. Defaults may melt one institution's balance sheet, but will improve that of another (assuming that the institution can pay). It all depends on the how many times the same house has been insured by whom, and that is not clear. This returns to LordSidcups question - as the lack of knowledge is a source of fear and that threatens stability further. In writing off the credit default swaps, the system as a whole would benefit, and that would be big plus for all instituions. However, I was not previously aware of some aspects of these derivatives, and suspect my knowledge is still imperfect. I would like to look at this more closely, but that is it for time for the moment.

Origninal post continues below......

I'm afraid that is all I have time for today.

Note 5: Despite my assertion of having finished, it should be noted that the LIBOR has fallen, which will hearten those who supported the bank bailout. However, is this because the state owned banks are now lending again because it is required, or because they think it is wise to do so? I do not know the answer, but in any case, the bad news in the economy feeding into more losses will drag the rate back up, unless the government has very deep pockets indeed....

Note 6: Oil has now dropped into the $60-70 per barrel level, as I predicted would happen. However, much, much sooner than I expected. For once, the news is positive, as the drop in oil prices will be a major positive for the world economy - as long as OPEC does not spoil the party by cutting back on production.