Showing posts with label Credit Crunch. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Credit Crunch. Show all posts

Friday, January 2, 2009

UK Bank Bailout - Round 2 Begins?

The main post today is quite brief as I would like to catch up on some of the questions and comments from previous posts. I have been reading the news and it is ever more apparent that the bailouts of the banking system are really just not working. I had the following to say on the subject in June of 2008:
In particular, the problems with credit and the banks are going to reach their real crisis in about six to eight months time. The reason is that the fallout of the sub-prime fiasco is just the start. The next phase will be the consumer credit crisis and the SME crisis - and the results will be equally as dramatic, but with the added pain of hitting the banks when they are already suffering severely.

So what are these crises. The first is that consumer credit was already reaching breaking point, where many households were borrowing to repay borrowing. This was, in any event, unsustainable. Added to this factor, the story of inflation needs no more retelling. Finally, we have the spectre of rapid increases in unemployment, and it will be this development that will spark the second banking crisis. In particular the number of delinquent loans will start rising rapidly as unemployment increases, and accelerating concerns about the already weak balance sheets of the banks will see even greater tightening of credit conditions. Furthermore, unemployment will see even more mortgage defaults, and the banks will be trying to sell assets into a falling market. Quite simply, their losses are going to be staggering.

The second problem will come from the Small / Medium size businesses. As the economy turns down, think of the small traders - such as restaurants, who are already only marginally profitable. These will rapidly fail, in many cases leading to losses for the banks. Even the medium size companies, with a better financial base, are going to be negatively effected by the consumer downturn, and their failures will hurt the banks even more.

Remember that these problems are going to hit the balance sheets of banks when they are already tattered, and hit the reputation of the banks when their reputations are at a low.
I said all of this before the huge bailouts and nationalisations. The truth is that the government was always going to have to keep pouring money into the black hole of the banking system. I had the following to say in September, at the time the bailouts were being justified to 'get the banks lending to each other':
The reasons that the banks are not lending to each other is that they all know that they are all holding toxic debt. This is not just CDOs etc. but also fast deteriorating commercial debt, unsecured consumer debt, and old fashioned mortgage debt (held on devaluing assets with people with ever more insecure job prospects). Furthermore, the sources of liquidity from the East are drying up as confidence in the 'rich world' banking system is evaporating.
And finally, I had the following to say in October, having discussed lending into a falling market, and the attempts by government to push the banks to lend.
The government is talking about re-privatisation in about five years time, and suggesting that the nationalisations will not cost the taxpayer money in the long term. The idea that the government will be able to gain any return on the investment, in light of what I have discussed, is very remote indeed. Instead, as the finance of the nationalised banks continue to decline in parallel with the economy, the government will find itself having to provide more and more capital injections to keep the banks afloat. This will be never ending, as the risky lending that is the condition of the nationalisation will just produce ever more toxic debt.
I could go on quoting such commentary, but I hope that you get the picture. In the first quote I suggested that the second crisis would be in 'six to eight months time'. That was in June, and we are now at the point in time that I predicted that the second crisis would hit - and all the major news papers are highlighting that a new bailout is imminent (e.g. Times, Telegraph, Guardian). The Times says the following:
Under one option, a “bad bank” would be created to dispose of bad debts. The Treasury would take bad loans off the hands of troubled banks, perhaps swapping them for government bonds. The toxic assets, blamed for poisoning the financial system, would be parked in a state vehicle or “bad bank” that would manage them and attempt to dispose of them while “detoxifying” the main-stream banking system.
And from the Guardian:
Banks and building societies are being deterred from lending by the worsening economic outlook and the fall in house prices and other assets against which loans are secured.
Over the last month, we have articles reporting that the problems in mortgage repayment are spreading to 'prime' borrowers, reports of increasing insolvencies in the retail and service sectors... the articles in the links are just a random sample. I could go on, but the news is best expressed in the necessity of the Telegraph to publish an article on how to avoid repossession of your home.

All the while this is hitting the banks when they are already struggling with battered balance sheets, and it is going to get a lot worse yet....

This raises the question of how much the government can pour into this black hole, and takes us right back to the money printing scheme that is the last desperate attempt to stem the tide. With the government sitting on the boards of major banks, they will certainly be aware that the balance sheets of their 'investment' are, even as I write, falling off a second cliff. As I sit here typing I am listening to 'Ne andrĂ² lontana', and it seems somehow appropriate background music for this post.

The trouble with the banks has only just started, and there is much more pain yet....

Note 1: I will try to address some of the many questions that I have been neglecting. I will work backwards from the most recent, and apologise that I will only be able to get so far....there have been a very large number of comments of late (my inbox is overflowing), many of which have (as ever) been extremely good.

I will start with the comments on my post on government or market responsibility for the crisis. I am unsurprised that, in the current climate, my post is causing some controversy. Unlike just about everyone, my post exonerates the market.

From anonymous there is the suggestion that, rather than bailing out the banks we should do the following:
'I'm sure there are science(physics) and humanitarian projects that could chew up several hundreds of billions of dollars without too much problem probably over the next 10 to 15 years but at least it will inject large amounts of cash into the world and people won't have to pretend to work to get government handouts but actually do some real work with real future benefits.'
Whilst agreeing that pouring money into the pit of the banking system is not the best use of the money that is being borrowed, my answer is quite simple. Do not borrow money when the problems you are experiencing are as a direct result of .....borrowing money. However the money is spent, it must be paid back, and that means a future contraction in growth. We can not spend the same money twice - if we spend it now, we will not have it in the future. Yes, it would be better to spend the money on something else, but the real answer is not to spend money you do not have. If you read the other sections of the blog, you will see why this is the case...

Jeremy (an increasingly regular commentator) makes the following comment:
'Isn't the best end-game for China to wait until the US stock-market bottoms and then buy all the best assets with their huge $ reserves?

They don't want the US to go bust, but they want it cheap and they might not want to buy dodgy motors from them but they'd probably be interested assets like Silicon Valley.

If China invested $1 trillion in US companies then there would be plenty of americans with enough money to buy chinese exports again and China would eventually end up owning the US lock, stock and barrel.

Just a thought. '
A very good thought. If China were to use the money to buy US assets, it would help buttress the $US for a while, but it would not help in solving their current domestic contraction. Furthermore, once the money was used, the US would still be left in a position of not having enough to sell, meaning that the $US would in any case fall. China would then be left with substantial losses on its assets - albeit at the benefit of increasing their economic power. The point of my post is that the problems lie with how they can ameliorate their collapsing export market, and that problem is short-medium term, and one which risks the very stability of China overall. They would also face a backlash (protectionism) if they started buying up the high-tech assets that you refer to in any significant quantity. However, as I said, a very good thought.

I have had an interesting question from anonymous, as follows:
The point about China's accumulation of Treasuries is that most of them stem from the last couple of years, so even if they were to be worthless soon, the Chinese have the process mechanisms of creating that wealth again quickly.
Also, how is it possible that China can seemingly subsidize its economy to gain such an advantage over the whole world when its economy is in fact still only a fraction of total worldwide output, i.e. how can a government with such comparable resources manage to create such a huge distortion? That seems very odd.
Furthermore, how far worse of would Western consumers be without cheap Chinese goods? As far as I know spending in America has gone down for consumer goods but massively increased for government-distorted things like health-care and housing.
I am afraid to say that the trade imbalances with China remain, even as the economies of the West are contracting. China makes many products for the budget end of the market, and are therefore relatively well placed to continue to export. In more cost conscious times......

The subsidy question: There are many forms of subsidy that China can use. One of the subsidies that I highlight is the subsidy implicit in their currency manipulation. In this case, the subsidy is collectivised over the whole economy. In keeping their currency low, they are effectively removing purchasing power from every individual in the country, and every business. It is actually an indirect taxation. This is quite difficult to explain in short but I will try. When a consumer walks into a shop in China to buy a pen, the artificial exchange rate will make the pen made in the US x% more expensive. The indirect taxation on purchasing is the difference between the price of the US made pen in the situation of a free floating currency and the actual price today with the fixed exchange rate (y). The person is 'y' poorer as a result of paying that indirect tax.

Although you suggest that China is only a small part of total world output, the size of the (so called) output of countries like the US and UK is overstated by huge amounts (I estimate at least 30% for the UK), as the output of such countries includes output that is resultant from debt. One of the major creditors for that debt is actually China. If the lending by China to the US was retained within China, for example used as it has been in the West for consumption, there would be a significant rise in the output of China, and a commensurate fall in output in the US. This is actually what is happening to US output - as the credit taps switch off, their 'output' is falling. I suggest a read of this post to explain it more clearly. This is not to include the critical consideration of relative strengths of currencies in the consideration of output. For example, UK 'output' has been falling both absolutely but also because of the weakening of the currency.

I will leave the answer there, though much more could be said...I think most of the detail is scattered through the blog.

Another anonymous poster asks the following:
"Our creditors, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are now turning off the supplies of credit, and are no longer buying the £GB to lend to us. Demand from this source will continue to evaporate..."

Could somebody briefly explain the mechanichs of this? How did they lend to us? By buying Government bonds?
The short answer is 'yes', they buy bonds, and a range of other forms of assets. A full analysis of the situation can be found here. A quote from this discussion is:
China’s low (controlled) interest rates imply that, since its reserve holding are believed to be held primarily in medium- and long-term industrial country treasury instruments and government agency bonds.
However, there are many other factors that need to be accounted for, such as 'round-tripping' (setting up a fictional Hong Kong entity for a mainland company), and the report details this better than I can in a short answer. However, you will note how opaque it all is....The tables at the end of the article are the most useful part (tables 7,8 and 10 if I remember correctly), and these will give you a detailed answer.

Another anonymous poster questions the idea that the market is a good thing, suggesting that government will always need to intervene:
As I see it, in a finite world and an exponentially increasing population, unfettered markets won't cut the mustard, unless of course you are prepared to throw millions of losers overboard.
If we look at China, it was a 'fettered' market before 'opening'. Millions of 'losers' were already 'overboard', and have been rescued by markets. As I have always emphasised, the world has overall become considerably richer overall since China opened, but the problem for the West is that, not only has the world become richer overall, but there is also an ongoing redistribution of the wealth towards the emerging markets.

A simplistic way of illustrating this can be seen in the car market. In the West there has been massive growth in the luxury brands of cars such as Mercedes. It became conventional wisdom that the best place to be in the car markets was the upmarket brands, which explains why Ford invested so heavily in European luxury brands. This is a perfect illustration of the imbalances that are now becoming evident. It is now, as the wealth of the world redistributes over more people, that we see the emergence of the Tata Nano, and the amazingly cheap Renault being sold into Central European markets.

There are more people with more wealth, but that wealth is divided over more individuals, making these cars a type that best serves the market. The luxury brands are looking increasingly vulnerable as the shift in distribution of wealth occurs. However, in the long term, as the wealth distribution runs its course, the demand for these luxury brands will return. The question to ask is where that demand might originate?

Lemming asks many questions and raises many points, as follows, so I will need to quote in full:
'I am persuaded by your view that government intervention is a distorting element which prevents the free markets from functioning 'properly' - and your idea that we need less, not more, banking regulation seems to be 180 degrees opposite to the view of every other economics commentator I have read, recently, by the way.

But I am still worried that there are other distorting factors which might render "the invisible hand" useless. One such is the way that money is issued: is the free market system meant to be stable regardless of how money is issued? In your post you suggest that growth and recession are both natural conditions for the economy, but I cited Eddie George speaking to the Treasury Select Committee in a comment a few days ago, stating that the BoE had pursued a policy of unsustainable lending rates in 2000/2001 to avoid "recession", as though that condition was to be avoided at all costs. Why? Is it because almost all money in circulation is temporary and therefore growth must be maintained otherwise the system collapses uncontrollably? Certainly a condition of recession is assumed by most economics commentators to be a huge problem. If our version of free market capitalism is set up to depend on perpetual growth, then in the real world of finite resources, it must fail eventually, and you have often given the example of a temporary bottleneck in the supply of oil limiting growth. Is continual growth a prerequisite of free market capitalism, and if so, does this example, alone, negate the validity of free market capitalism in principle?

(And how about the fact that interest rates are set 'manually' in our system of fractional reserve banking? It seems to be a very crude government intervention in itself, yet "the invisible hand" is supposed to be self-regulating and shouldn't need any external control to function.)

Another distorting factor must be the free markets operating on commodities whose availability and price do not vary by supply and demand. There is a frequent commentator on CiF called 'physiocrat' who continually refers to the problem of land in the economy and points to this website: www.landvaluetax.org. I suspect he is probably right. Surely a commodity such as land is a huge fly in the ointment of free market principles? '
The first point is that I am increasingly alone in defending the markets. To this I would highlight that I was in a very lonely (though apparently not completely alone), when predicting this crisis. It certainly seems that the mainstream are all becoming increasingly interventionist. This is in part because they look at the symptoms, not at the cause of the symptoms. They see that there has been lunacy in the banking system, and think that this lunacy is the result of a free market. However, they do not ask why it is that people were happy to place their money so blindly in a system that was simply not working. They do not ask why there was such a flood of capital in the first place. I could go on, but I do not want to repeat my post. They are quite simply not asking the right questions.

With regards to the question of stability and instability. Should economies be stable, and should the governor of the Bank of England be trying to manipulate the economy to avoid recession at all costs?

I will illustrate the need for instability from my experience in China. When I first arrived there was a boom in the manufacture of televisions to supply into the China market. There was massive growth as ordinary Chinese people tipped over the financial point where they could afford this item. That emerging demand saw the emergence of large numbers of manufacturers, all of whom responded to the market demand, and provided ever cheaper and better televisions. In the early stages, no doubt, many were making good money. However, as more and more companies entered the market, the market became flooded, and the bust then happened. All of the new entrants saw the potential for profit, but ended up destroying those profits through oversupply. The only answer was a rash of bankruptcy in order for the market to reach an equilibrium (in this case the over-supply was exacerbated by local governments jumping into the market with their own investment in production). At the end of this process considerably less businesses were left standing, but those businesses would be the strongest businesses, operating with the best products to meet the demands of the market.

Such an example shows how markets can boom then bust. In the process a lot of people purchased consumer durables, and future industrial giants started to rise. The bankruptcy of the other companies was a necessary part of that process, but would have led to a lot of people also losing money, as well as people losing their jobs. However, you are left with an industry where the output is actually geared to meeting demand, and the companies meeting that demand are the most efficient in their overall operations.

Lemmings' other questions largely pertain to the status of commodities within a free market. These are a critical element, as without commodities, the market can not expand. The trouble arises with many commodities is that, during times of growth, it often takes a while before new commodities come 'on stream'. As such, what often happens is that commodity supply lags growth, such that the growth in commodity supply comes on stream just as a spurt of growth comes to an end. If we think of the television example as a proxy for world markets, the cycle of that sudden growth and bust was over (I guess, but am not sure) about five years. If we think of this example, and imagined that component suppliers needed to build new factories to supply the components for the television (equivalent in this example to commodities), the extent of the boom would only become truly visible in about the second year of the boom. If we imagine that this fictional component required two years to build a factory, it would only come on stream as the boom is about to collapse, leaving the factory with excess capacity.

However, if the next boom is in hi-fi, and the components the factory makes are suitable for hi-fi, then the factory will benefit from the second boom. The trouble is that, whilst awaiting the second boom, they lose money. Commodities suffer from the same problems. The problem recently was that the dumping of so much labour into the world market so quickly just left the ability for commodity producers to keep up as an impossible task.

As for the question of land, the Economist gives a good example of where 'land' rights ensure that land is utilised well. I have not read the full report in the latest edition which is on rights in sea fishing (my print edition has not yet arrived) but, when you give rights to the sea to individuals/companies, they seek to preserve the value of those rights through better management of the fishery. The original report I read dates back a while, but can be found here. I am sure that the new report in the Economist will have similar examples.

Regarding Property Tax: I have read some of the property-tax arguments briefly, but do not have time to discuss these in depth on this occasion. However, I will quote something from the home page of the website Lemming pointed to as follows:
It would operate as an annual charge on the rental value of land, assuming that each site was in its optimum permitted use
I will leave you to work out why that might be problematic in this proposal, but the words 'who' and 'how' come to mind. I checked their FAQ, and looked briefly elsewhere, but found no answer.

I have a had a few comments from the curiously named B33ENN (?), who asks in one post:
If there is a Western economic collapse on the horizon, meaning China's export economy fails along with us, what effect would having a surplus supply of real and valuable raw materials have on China's internal economy? What effect would their fast-track education in modern technology have on their internal development?

At that point, would they really need or want anything from us at all? If they learn to produce everything for themselves, from low-tech to high-tech, what would they need to trade with us and our worthless currencies?

The question then becomes, is China really viewing itself as part of a world economy? Or is it exploiting the benefits while it can, all the while more interested in its own internal wealth and future, independent of the world?
China has a long history of supposedly being isolationist, but their moves towards the development of a blue water navy, the quest after commodity supplies around the world tells us a different story. China simply does not have the access to the materials they need to function as a modern economy. For example their major oil fields are close to exhaustion (I forget the name of the oilfield, but I am thinking of the one in which a revolutionary hero, 'Iron Man Wang', sprang from).

Perhaps an interesting perspective on the rise of China is the argument that China is just returning to its 'natural' status in the world. This is the argument found in 'The Great Divergence' by Kenneth Pomeranz. I think his argument is very poor in places, but would agree with the central principle that China does have a natural 'weight' in the world. He ignores that this weight has been achieved by the greatest and most enduring imperial expansion in history, and there is nothing to say that China will not seek to continue this pattern of growth and expansion. It is very easy to forget that China is an empire, and is therefore not as isolationist as perhaps is commonly perceived. The nature of China's growth may be simply towards economic expansion, but any idea of it taking an isolationist approach is very unlikely.

With regards to trading with us for our 'worthless' currencies, it is at this point, when our currencies are 'worthless' that we might be in a position to once again return to growth. At that time, we will all be much poorer, but will therefore be more competitive. In the most basic terms, our workers will be demanding less of a return for their labour, a return closer to that of an equivalent Chinese worker, allowing for us to sell our goods. However, as I have emphasised, we will also need to reform ourselves broadly in order to return to growth, and that is something detailed throughout the blog, and which I will not cover here.

Note 2: At this point, I have to offer my apologies, but I must call a halt. I have answered the questions in order, so I have not made any particular determination in which questions I would answer. I mention this, as there have been many other excellent questions and useful comments that I would like to respond to...Sorry for some rushed answers, and I hope that they are as clear as I would like them to be.

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Banking Bailouts - Why they will help bankrupt the US and UK

Note Added 2nd October:

For visitors from the US, the example given below uses the UK. Except for some local details, the principles apply just as much to the US as the UK. Original post continues below......

I have written about the banking bailout several times, but thought that an analagy might help to clarify the reasons why I oppose all bailouts. However, rather than starting afresh I will continue on with the analogy that I used at the start of an essay that I wrote back in November, 'A Funny View of Wealth'. The analogy made at that time follows (note how at that time the common view was that the economy was a success! Hard to believe now...):
'I am going to start by looking at the world from the point of view of many modern economists. Whilst none of the economists would accept that what I am about to portray is their belief, when you look hard, you will find that this must be their basic belief. If not, then they have no justification for their pronouncements of success for the UK economy.

Imagine a family living in the UK, not an atypical family, not a typical family, but an ordinary middle class family. We will call them the Wilsons. The father has a job in management for a chain of retailers, and earns £30,000 per year. The mother has a good job in a local hotel where she is the marketing manager and earns £30,000 per year. They therefore have an income of £60,000 a year. They have two children at the local school.

The Wilsons have purchased a home, which cost them £300,000, which is five times their combined income, using a 95% mortgage. The house has increased in value by £30,000 a year, in each of the three years since they purchased it. They are very pleased to see their house growing in value, as it is like having another earner in the house, except this earner pays virtually no tax on the income, making it an even better earner than themselves.

The Wilsons have a relatively large mortgage, but interest rates are low. Despite this, they struggle to balance the quality of life that they enjoy against their income. As such, they make use of credit cards to occasionally purchase items. Each year, for three years, they have added £6000 to the family debts through overspending on the ‘little luxuries’ in life, such as holidays, and new goods for the house. At the end of the second year in the house, Mr. Wilson decided that he would fulfil his dream of owning a Mercedes, and re-mortgaged the house to realise £20,000 of the increase in value of this asset. He used this as the down payment on the car, and took a loan for £20,000 to pay for the remainder.

Overall, the Wilsons non-mortgage debt stands at £18,000 for the credit cards, and £15,000 remains of the loan for the car. They are starting to find the payments on these debts are stretching them, and they seem to be using the credit cards a bit more often than before.

Next door to the Wilsons live the Jones family. The Jones family know and respect their next door neighbours. They can see how successful they are. They are always doing something to the house, making improvements, and they seem to be living the good life. Only recently the Wilsons bought a new Mercedes and Mr. Jones feels a little jealous, as he would love a Mercedes too.

The Jones family, have less income than the Wilsons, but every year they save a few thousand pounds. They have no debt except for their mortgage, and only spend what they earn. They purchased their house at the same time as the Wilsons, and are steadily paying their mortgage. Their belts are tight, but they get by, and look forward to better days ahead.

Which of these two families is the more wealthy family?

The answer largely depends on whether you are an economist who has been a cheerleader for the boom of the last ten years, or whether you are a person grounded in the real world. The Wilsons have been the motor of growth in the Anglo-Saxon economies. Apparently we have gone through a period of sustained growth and, in moments of hubris (Gordon Brown in the UK being a wonderful example), we promote the ‘success’ of the Western economies to the rest of the world. The trouble arises when we ask a simple question; ‘Where is this growth?’'
At this moment in time, both the UK and US economy are at the stage where the Wilsons are now having trouble servicing their debts. They seems to be pouring more and more money into interest payments, and with the increase in interest payments, they are finding that they are now borrowing ever more just to stand still. The situation is even worse though, as the retailer at which the father works is now struggling. Business is so bad that they have stopped evening opening hours (e.g. in the real world there has been a reduction in shifts at car plants), which means that the income coming into the house is dropping. The hotel is doing badly too, and there are mutterings about shortened hours, or even redundancy there too. Every day that goes by, the equity in their house disappears and they will soon be going into negative equity. One evening the Wilsons look at their family balance sheet and fall into despair.....they can see that they can not afford to continue as they are and that they are sliding towards bankruptcy. Fewer and fewer lenders are willing to lend to them, and the terms of lending are getting more and more onerous.

However, even as they are despairing, there is a knock on the door. Mr. Wilson answers the door, and finds a man in a slick suit smiling at him. He is from the 'Slick and Friendly' loans corporation, and he is going door to door drumming up new lending business. For a small arrangement fee, and high interest payments, he will solve all of their problems with a lump sum loan.

Mrs. Wilson is excited, as she can now buy the new computer for her son, and Mr. Wilson can renew his membership at the golf club.
The question here is; should they take the loan?

The answer is, of course, obvious. The only time they should consider such a loan is if they had certain prospects of a massive boost in their income with which to pay off the loan. As far as I am aware, not even the most blind and foolish analysts or commentators are proposing that this is the case for the US or UK economies. As such, what would we recommend for the Wilsons?

There is really only one solution. They absolutely must reduce their expenditure (no more little luxuries for a long time), and they should also look at reducing their expenditure sufficiently such that they can start to repay the principle on the loan. Only through such tough action will they be able to improve their situation in the long term, and avoid the very real risk of bankruptcy. After all, their income is dropping, and with the prospect of further falls.

I can think of no clearer way of expressing the stupidity of these bailouts. As I have said before, they are just an extension of the delusion that has collectively been gripping economists, politicians and the public alike. In short, time to face reality, and it is not going to be pleasant.

Note 1: I have come accross a very interesting paper from an economist in the US. He is suggesting the US is bankrupt. It is (painfully) gratifying to see that an academic economist 'gets it', though (as always) I wish that the pessimists like myself were wrong. The paper is not easy going, but if you can get through the maths, it is powerful material.

Note2:Why is it that perfectly rational people, who would readily advise individuals not to become too indebted, will advise that a country mired in debt should seek to solve their problems by borrowing more money? I would take a guess that Paulson and Bernanke would not recommend that the Wilsons continue to borrow. Why then do they recommend such a course of action for a national economy? It is genuinely baffling......


Wednesday, September 17, 2008

The Banking Crisis is as Much a Symptom as a Cause

It seems that my post on reform regulation will have to wait a little longer, so I apologise to regular readers who may have been waiting for the post. It seems that the news of the moment is worth further comment.

A good starting point is to refer you to some commentary in the Telegraph newspaper:
'In a year's time, consumers may look back on the past 48 hours as a bit like the first few minutes after the Titanic struck the iceberg, when high-spirited passengers played snowballs unaware of the danger they were in. '
It seems that people are finally waking up to the reality of the dire situation that we are in. The current banking crisis has arrived a little sooner than I expected (about one or two months earlier than I thought), and is actually just the start of the carnage. In a related story The Times today reports that unemployment has now reached a 9 year high, and with the highest increase since 1992. Once again, it is very much as predicted. The return home of Central Europen workers has acted as a dampener, but it could only slow the growth in unemployment so long. There is also a growing recognition that house prices have a long way to fall yet.

Following the Northern Rock fiasco, the first of the second tranche of UK banking problems is HBOS, with the government scrabbling around for a rescue package. I have not looked at individual banks closely, so I will not give a long list of those at risk. However, a good way of looking at the question of which bank is at risk is simply to ask which banks have seen massive growth in profits and expansion over the last ten years. Banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland come to mind, but I emphasise that I have not looked closely at individual institutions.

As if the fiasco were not bad enough, there are calls for the prevention of short selling of stocks (see here for a good description of what this means). This makes me think of the analogy of a person saying that they want to ban the use of thermometers for patients with a fever. It reveals the ignorance of those in power. The short selling is just an indirect indication of the underlying problems.

As for the whole idea of bailing out the financial system, I have suggested that government bailouts are not the solution. I am now ever more confident in that view. The reality is that the governments are just taking on liabilities from a stricken sector, and will then have to use the remaining healthy sectors of the economy to pay back the debt that they accept. Taking on such liabilities will also add to the coming crisis of government finances, as governments find that confidence in their ability to repay debt wanes, or collapses. They are, in other words, spreading the 'sickness' into other parts of the economy. Furthermore, where will governments stop, and how much can they bail out? The following makes the point:
'Fears that America's central bank – the Federal Reserve – may have over-stretched itself in agreeing to bail out AIG were underlined after the US Treasury announced plans to raise $40bn to allow the Fed to "better manage their balance sheet."'
Incidentally, the Economist reported a long time ago about the potential risks in insuring credit, but I am afraid that I do not have a reference for this (despite a quick search of the Economist site). We can expect more problems to emerge amongst the insurer and reinsurance companies.

The bail outs, I'm afraid, amount to a philosophy of 'something must be done', whether the something makes any sense or not.

In amongst the emerging realisation that the crisis is not going away, and the realisation that it will get much worse, there is no sign yet that anyone has yet realised that the banking crisis is not the problem. The mainstream economists, governments, and bankers still do not understand what is happening. The foolishness of the credit bubble has just been a mechanism of delay in the rebalancing of the world economy, putting off the inevitable restructuring of the world economy. There is no doubt that the credit bubble will have made what was always going to be a painful adjustment much worse. But it is not the cause of the problem.

For those who are new to the blog, I would suggest that you take a look at the recommended reading at the top left of the blog for an explanation of why the world economy needs to rebalance. The reasons are pretty straightforward, and blindingly obvious once you read them. The shocking thing is that none of the 'experts' seem to have grasped the nature of the problem.

The purpose of this post is, as much as anything else, to re-empahise that the banking crisis is not the real crisis. It is as much a symptom as a cause. It has taken such a long time to wake up to the fact that the economies of the OECD have been built upon foundations of sand, it makes me wonder how long it will take for everyone to wake up to what is the real cause of the problems. No doubt, for a long time yet, the symptoms will be confused for the cause.

Without understanding what the root cause of the problems might be, the solutions provided to solve the crisis will continue to be misguided. The UK, and other Western economies, can not afford to continue to try to navigate whilst blind.

What of New Zealand?

I had a comment from someone asking the prospects for the New Zealand economy. My apologies for the belated reply, and that I do not have time to find the original comment.

The answer is that, like the rest of the 'rich world' New Zealand will suffer in the current crisis, but there will be some countries that will feel the pain more than others. I do not know the New Zealand economy that well, (due to the size of the economy, it is not well reported on) but will hazard an opinion nevertheless (so treat what I suggest with caution). As a second apology I am rather pushed for time, so can only go on memory rather than checking facts and figures (so I reemphasise treating my comment with caution).

New Zealand has strengths and weaknesses. The first weakness is that, as the world globalises, scale of businesses will increasingly matter. New Zealand is just too small an economy, and lacks the large companies that will increasingly be dominant in the world economy. Another problem is that the New Zealand economy has a large tourism sector, and that this will be hurt by the current financial turmoil. However, this can be ameliorated by finding ways to appeal to new markets, such as China and India. The question is whether New Zealand can find an appeal that will resonate with these markets, and that is a question of marketing. At the moment New Zealand is very good at promoting itself as a 'clean green' location. The trouble is that the environmentalism that New Zealand loves may hobble other sectors of the economy, in particular agriculture and forestry.

As for the rest of the OECD, New Zealand has had a housing and credit bubble, but the size of the bubble is not as large as, for example, the UK. I have not looked in a long while, but I believe that the government debt is very high. and overall external debt, allowing for population and size of economy, is at a similar level to a country such as Germany (based upon a quick back of a cigarette packet estimation - please do not take this too seriously).

On the positive side of the balance, New Zealand has a large commodity sector, and this is a good thing in the world economy now, and in the future. Whilst commodities will have a bumpy ride, as the world economy swings wildly, the demand for commodities is, on balance, going to increase. Of particular note is the New Zealand agricultural sector, which has more potential than is currently realised. In particular, New Zealand has potential to develop a stronger food industry, and move up the value chain. If New Zealand is to realise this potential, they need to start to switch their added value food products to products that will service the Asian market. This will need a shift in the thinking of the people who run the large New Zealand food companies. The current milk scandal in China will not help matters much, but hopefully that is just a blip.

Overall, I think that New Zealand has the potential to fare relatively well, but I would like to reemphasise again that I speak from a position of relative ignorance.

Note for Lemming (a regular commentator on the blog):

Anatole Kaletsky still seems to have retained his job as a columnist, despite getting it all so wrong. He is still opining with complete confidence, and still seems to think he knows the answers. I wonder whether he reflects on his previous errors and suffers doubt? See his latest article here.

Note For Tin Hat:

Tin Hat, thanks for your question which I have edited and added below:
What are your views on how bad will it get. Lots are suggesting another Great Depression, that bad? Is there anything that can be done to protect your savings. On the basis of your assessment government bonds do not even sound appealing and gold buried in your back garden seems extreme! Your thoughts would be appreciated
Right now, I am afraid that I would be a very foolish person I were to be giving firm advice on where to invest. The trouble is that, in the short term there is no place of safety. The reason for this is that world economy is going to become more and more chaotic in the coming year. Much will depend on the actions of governments and politicians, and they are individuals who carry all of the faults of people anywhere. How will they react? So far, not very well. However, as the situation worsens, and the demands for action multiply, they will likely act upon their economies in increasingly irrational ways.

The other problem, at least in my mind, is what the instability will do to China. I have discussed this in another post, and the problem is that, if China's economy is pulled down enough by the turmoil, it is quite possible that the country will see civil unrest. The real question is whether China can sustain itself through the current turmoil, and I confess that I do not know the answer to that question. It is too opaque an economy to have any certainty. However, if the current crisis tips China into recession, then the world really will be in for a period of chaos, including civil unrest in China and the possibility of war as well.

As a general point I would suggest commodities, as they are likely in the medium term to gain in price, but holding commodities is not easy. I do not know enough about futures to know the maximum length of contracts, but suspect that they would not meet your needs, and would any case be too complex for most people. However, as the world economy absorbs the current blows, it will shrink back, lowering commodity demand in the short to medium term. I do not know what your time scales are.

As for putting gold in the garden, that seems as good a bet as any (just don't tell your neighbours). But seriously, as mindless as it is, gold does do well in periods of turmoil. The danger with gold is the very fact that it is a safe haven, and that means sentiment is the real driver of value. However, in the current climate, I can not see sentiment turning positive (on aggregate at least) for some time yet. However, I have to reiterate that, in the current situation, there really is no safe investment (there never has been, but I speak in relative terms). It seems that your instinct appears to be in accord with mine. Maybe you need to get out and buy that shovel (or spade if you are from Yorkshire).

Sunday, September 7, 2008

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - What does it mean?

Note added 9 September:

The Times columnist, Anatole Kaletsky, has this to say about Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae:

'Anyone betting against this package is, therefore, betting that the US economy is doomed to irreversible and inevitable decline. Such a bet has always been wrong in the past and is likely to be wrong again this time. So Sunday's probably was the Big One - and a US economic recovery is now assured.'
As will be seen below, I am not so optimistic. The idea that the biggest government intervention in history is seen as a 'good thing' suggests that the markets themselves (a curious metonymy, like they have agency?) have lost faith in themselves and the economies that they constitute.

Original post continues.......

A very quick post on the nationalisation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. There appear to be very positive responses to the US government nationalisation of these institutions.

The first point to note here is that this will help the battered balance sheets of the UK banks, as many of them hold debt issued by these institutions. This is good news for the UK banking system. However, having seen the positive, it is worth considering the negative. If these two institutions were in so much trouble due to the collapse in the US housing market, what of the UK institutions?

I have often predicted runs on some of the major UK banks in the coming months, and the saga of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac just continues to confirm my worst fears. The recent headlines do not mention that one of the problems for these institutions was that they were indirectly buying into the US sub-prime market, but the big question today is one of how you might define sub-prime. My own view is that, with a collapsing housing market and rising unemployment, there is an awful lot of sub-prime out there. However, in the case of the UK banking system, unlike the US mortgage giants, the UK lenders will be exposed to huge amounts of souring consumer credit, as well as souring commercial lending.

The big question this raises is to where it might be that the UK banks might be able to raise the finance to shore up their balance sheets. For a while, sovereign wealth funds looked like one option. However, as is reported in the Economist, they have already had their fingers burnt in the banking market, and are unlikely to come back for more pain. The Economist suggestst that. perhaps, private equity will come to the rescue, but this appears to be a forlorn hope. One has to ask why they would take on such risk.

The reality is that the UK has been bailing out the banks for some while, through the special liquidity schemes. How long can this go on?

The other problem that arises is illustrated by the US example. The US government has taken on huge liabilities meaning that, one way or another, the US taxpayer is going to pick up the bill for the problems in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It is worth being 100% clear on what that means. It means that the productive parts of the economy will be picking up the bill for the financial disaster. In other words the problems of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will hobble the productive part of the US economy.

As the US government is aware, the collapse of the mortgage giants would have seen a systemic crisis in the whole banking system, in both the US and the OECD. They have chosen not to have the crisis. Is this a good thing?

I will confess to, for once, being unsure. On the one hand I can game out the consequences of the collapse of the institutions, and can see the financial meltdown that would follow. On the other hand there is the reality that this would create the rebalancing of the world economy faster, creating the opportunity for the OECD to make the necessary structural reforms to compete with the emerging economies. In other words, I wonder whether this is not a case of prolonging the agony? It returns to the analogy I made in a previous post about falling from a height, or climbing down a ladder.

In the case of the UK, I wonder whether the UK government will have the financial wherewithal to actually have a choice in the matter. When the next credit crisis strikes, I expect confidence in the UK economy to be at a very, very low point, and the only way the government will be able to finance the bail outs will be through 'printing' money, with all of the negative consequences that entails.

It will be interesting to watch the reaction to the nationalisation in the coming weeks. I suspect there will be a brief bounce in confidence, but that the underlying economic problems will quickly dent that confidence. The trouble is that there is no escaping the reality that there must be a massive rebalancing in the world economy, and no amount of intervention can stop that process. In such circumstances, it is quite possible that, in the long term, such bailouts will only create more pain than gain.

For the UK, perhaps bailing out the two mortgage giants may delay the next credit crisis for a few months, but nothing more than that.....and the longer the delay, the worse the crisis that will follow.

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

UK Inflation and house price support - What is going on?

I will interrupt my commentary on UK government spending as there has been a string of news that is worth consideration.

There is a lot of excitement in the press at the moment about inflation in the UK (see here and here and here). I have already detailed elsewhere about why I am puzzled that our largest living expense (housing) is excluded from inflation. However, even if it was accepted that the inflation figures made any sense in the real world, why would the current inflation be any prompt for interest rises?

Interest rises are supposed to rein back inflation when an economy is at (or near) capacity, and where there are upward price pressures as a result. In other words, raising interest rates is there to restrain economic activity through a reduction in the money supply.

See the following quote from the Guardian (link above):
'The Bank has said global trends beyond the control of its nine-strong monetary policy committee have been responsible for the rise in inflation and has left the cost of borrowing at 5% since April after three quarter-point cuts in the preceding five months.'
On this rare occasion I am an 100% in agreement on the cause of inflation. It is not generated from within the UK, but is the result of wider global forces. In fact, were it not for such forces, it is very likely that (even on the inadequate measures used), that inflation would be falling in the UK with the economy contracting. Excepting government workers, who in the current climate will be risking high wage demands...
The Bank has warned that if it sees evidence that wage inflation is rising, it may be inclined to raise rates. (in the Telegraph report linked to above)
...and how on earth is the economy going to reach capacity? Shops are already reported to be slashing prices...businesses are already shutting down, unemployment is rising.....

The same Telegraph report suggests that the Bank of England is considering the contraction in the economy 'next year' as part of its consideration. However, this should be the only consideration, excepting government worker's pay.

This brings me to a central problem with the stance on interest rates and inflation.
What exactly is holding or raising interest rates supposed to do in the face of recession and global forces? I am genuinely puzzled, as I can only think of one mechanism that this might impact, and that is the value of the £GB. If interest rates are raised, this may have an upward effect on the £GB as it will attract money into the economy, such as 'Carry Trade' money. Now if the £ rises, this will have the effect of reducing the cost of imported goods, including foods. As such this mechanism will (to some degree) lower inflation in the economy (though I would think not by a great deal, as the £ can only be supported this way to some extent).

However, as the UK service industry goes into recession, the only hope of recovery is manufacturing, and export manufacturing at that. In such a situation, the rise in the £ will be fatal. Also, it will negatively impact the balance of payments, as imports will surge, it will damage tourism, and so forth. Furthermore, raising interest rates will increase the cost of business overall, and further lever down an economy rapidly heading into free fall due to strains on consumers, and the fall in house prices. It will accelerate these processes.

All of this just to try to overcome food price inflation that does not even originate in the UK? Furthermore, one of the inflationary factors has been oil, and the price is dropping. When we consider the reason for fighting inflation with interest rates, this makes no sense whatsoever. As such it is only possible to conclude that this is either an unthinking knee jerk reaction (macho economics? Being seen to be 'tough' on inflation?), or it is politically inspired. For the latter, it is hard to see what can be gained.

In summary, I am genuinely puzzled as to how the thinking on interest rates is playing out, even if we consider the inadequate measures that are used in calculation.

Having expressed puzzlement at the potential political motivation for interest rates, there is one are of the economy which is plainly a matter of political convenience, and that is help for the housing market. A Times article reports that the government is going to extend further support for the market as follows:
'The scheme allows banks to swap mortgage-backed bonds issued before the end of 2007 for much more tradeable Treasury bills that can then be used to raise funds in the markets.'
In short, the government is going to take on a pile of low grade debt, and swap it for high grade debt (though the government is claiming that the debt exchanged is all high grade - sound familiar?). Furthermore Darling is
'considering a more controversial multibillion-pound plan for the Government itself to guarantee temporarily high-quality mortgage-backed securities. This could help to create investor demand for the government-backed bonds, assisting lenders to sell on their loans and so increase the supply of finance for lending.'
All this on top of the Stamp Duty holiday. All in all, this smacks of desperation. The fundamental question to ask here is as follows:

On what basis do they think that the current house prices should be supported? In other words, are the current house prices the right price, too high or too low. If they are making these proposals they must have a reason as follows:
  1. If they think prices are too high, then they are doing this to delay the day when prices fall.
  2. If they think the prices are 'just right' then they are supporting prices to protect the right price. However, how would they be able to demonstrate that the price is 'right' now?
  3. If they think that prices are too low, then the same question as above. How do they work out that they are too low? Do they have some magic formula to justify this. If not, then why not?
As is evident in the points above, there are some serious problems with each of these scenarios. The first is that the government has made a decision on what the correct house might be, but they have offered no evidence of how they could make such a calculation. As for trying to hold or boost prices artificially, how can this be sustainable in the long term? How can they keep prices from eventually correcting to a different level? The only thing such measures can do is delay any price adjustment. This raises the final question - at what cost?

The truth is that such measures will not do anything significant. Nothing is going to make the banks lend in the way they were in past years. In order to support the market, they need to continue with their dangerous practices of high income multiples for lending, self certification etc. The banks must do this if prices are to rise or stabilise, as the boom in housing was in part the result of an increase in the finance supply (see a funny view of wealth - the section on housing for a fuller discussion of this).

I am guessing, and it is only a guess, that Darling knows that the banks will not use the finance for new lending, but it will be used to shore up their battered balance sheets. In other words, with the exception of stamp duty, the measures look remarkably like the government trying to prop up the banking system. It looks like he realises that there is another credit crisis on the way, and is trying to forestall it.

Alternatively, he may just be incompetent, and responding to expediency in order to prop up the economy short term at the price of greater havoc later.

A quick post, and I will return to government spending soon. As a note, this is a quick review, as much more explanation could be given for why this is very odd behaviour.

Update Made on 14 August:

Just a quick note to mention that it seems that the BoE is not going to play ball on the idiocy that Darling is contemplating. Mervyn King says the following:

“We don’t guarantee lending to other forms of borrowing. There is no reason why in the long run you need any guarantee of lending to the mortgage market.”
Taken from the Times here....

Thursday, July 3, 2008

Peak Oil and the Credit Crunch? Any Relationship?

Note Added 30 July: I have been rather lazy in my use of the expression peak oil, as has been pointed out here.


Peak oil is defined as the point at which production is about to go into actual decline, which means that prices would actually rise. By contrast I have discussed peak oil as the point at which reserves are being exhausted faster than they can be replenished, or more efficiently extracted, which is not strictly correct, but which reflects the arguments of many peak oil proponents. In other words they claim that we have reached the peak for these reasons.
----------------

I have had some comments/questions posted, so I thought I would answer these over my next couple of posts.

The first is a question in response to my post; 'The Economic Collapse is Starting'. The question is as follows:

'What connection do you see between the 'credit crunch' and high oil prices? While I can see that the housing bubble and our lack of wealth creation were ultimately unsustainable, are we also witnessing a genuine 'peak oil' effect?'

It is certainly an interesting question, and one I have not thought about directly before. As such I will give my best stab at an initial answer. Perhaps with further reflection I may have a more developed answer, but for the moment this is a first attempt.

I attended a talk on the subject of peak oil recently in which it was suggested that we had already reached the peak, and that it was all downhill from here. On the other hand I saw a video of a very interesting talk by Bjorn Lomberg in which he pointed out that we have had peak oil scares since the 1930s[i]. Whilst agreeing that, in principle, easily pumped out of the ground oil is finite, no one is really certain when it will reach a peak or run out. Furthermore, there are many sources of oil that may become more economic with improved technologies, and that oil is (primarily) just an energy source with a potential to be substituted by other energy sources (again, with the proviso that technological development can make such sources economic).

Let’s assume for the moment that the doomsters are right, and that we have reached peak oil. Would this explain the recent spike in oil prices?

The first point to make is that reaching peak oil is a long way away from running out of oil. Regardless of the peak there is still enough easily accessible oil to last the world for decades on current consumption levels. As such, why would reaching a peak cause a spike in prices now? Such a spike could only be the result of hoarding oil against the day when supplies run out. With decades of oil left to be pumped such speculation would, to say the least, be rather premature.

The second point is to ask the question of how expensive oil actually is. The Economist recently ran an article that pointed out that, whilst expensive, oil is not as expensive as we imagine - if inflation is taken into account[ii]. However, since that article, prices have continued to rise. There is no question that oil is now relatively expensive, though still not as relatively expensive as many think. A better way of looking at oil prices is to view the recent low prices as being one of the foundations of economic expansion over the last two decades as there was too much oil capacity compared with demand, and that oil prices are now adjusting to the expansion in the world economy.

As such, one reason for the relatively high price is quite straightforward. The overall output of oil has declined in the face of world economic expansion, though the decline has nothing to do with peak oil[iii]. In short, it is no different from the bottlenecks that have created high prices in many other commodities (an interesting example of such a bottleneck is the lack of capacity for tyres for the heavy earth movers used in mining). What we are now witnessing is that the world has reached capacity/bottlenecks in many commodities and, regardless of the so called ‘credit crunch’, growth was going to slow whilst capacity in commodity industries caught up with demand. Oversupply has turned into under-supply, leading to higher prices, and higher inflation as a result.

Another reason for the high oil price is the fall in value of the $US, as oil is priced in $US. It is here that the problem becomes more complex and I am not sure that I can do justice to this in a quick reply. The fall in the $US is the result of a rebalancing of the world economy. When a currency devalues, it actually makes a country economy poorer, as the cost of imported goods goes up, which is an indirect form of wealth reduction. The U.S. (and U.K.) is becoming poorer.

The relative increase in oil prices is just one facet of the reduction in wealth of the U.S. The U.S. has funded economic expansion (not growth) through borrowing, and the result is that whilst appearing to grow richer, the country has become poorer. The fall in the value of the dollar is recognition that the U.S. is no longer selling enough goods or services to support the value of the U.S. currency. Countries such as China already have a massive dollar surplus, but the U.S. is not producing enough goods or services for the dollars to have utility – there are not enough goods and services at competitive prices to buy. As such the value of dollars has fallen.

Only through relative impoverishment can the U.S. regain its competitive position in the world economy. Quite simply, the U.S. economy as a whole had ceased to be competitive in global markets. The only way out for the U.S. is to reduce its cost base, and that means reducing labour costs, and the costs of managing its infrastructure and government. Devaluation (making everyone in the U.S. poorer), is one process of making this adjustment. As such, high oil prices are partly the result of the devaluation of the U.S. currency, and that is the direct result of the lack of competitiveness of the U.S, economy.

Does this relatively high oil price have any relation to the so called ‘credit crunch’? I do not like the expression credit crunch, as it has taken on the status of being like a force in its own right – disconnected from the causation. The causation is that financial institutions plunged into ever more reckless forms of lending. The lending (inevitably) went wrong, leaving banks with battered balance sheets, and creating a loss of confidence in their ability to manage risk. Of particular note is the lending has been into consumer/mortgage debt, and this debt drove so called ‘economic growth’ (expansion) in many western economies. The credit crunch is therefore not the result of high oil prices, but the result of foolish lending.

The interesting feature of the foolish lending is that the banks chose to lend into the consumer market, rather than using the money to expand manufacturing and other productive business. This is a reflection of the fundamental lack of competitiveness in the U.S. (and U.K. economy). The fact that lending to high risk consumers (sub-prime) was judged a better investment than investment into business says much about the dire state of the competitive position of the U.S. economy.

The credit crunch and high oil prices are linked in a couple of other respects. The boom that has been supported by the debt money-go-round has expanded demand for goods and services, and this demand has been the source of strained capacity in commodities. Furthermore the boom in oil prices has seen the accumulation of vast reserves of capital in some of the big oil producers. This accumulation has seen sovereign wealth funds, for example, bailing out the banking system with injections of capital (e.g. Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth fund invested $7.5bn in Citigroup). In this respect the high oil prices are supporting the banking system and ameliorating the effects of the credit crunch.

On the other hand, the inflation caused by high oil and other commodity prices is a further downward lever on consumer spending, thereby speeding the rebalancing of the Western economies towards relative impoverishment (note the use of the term relative). The situation, as it now stands, is that the world is entering into a period of (at least) a lull in growth, or possibly economic contraction. The cause for the contraction is a combination of capacity constraints, and the problems of the banking system, resultant from the bursting of the credit bubble. The two causes are separate but related (which sounds contradictory?) but are coming together at the same time, creating a double whammy. However, the problems with commodity prices are going to be temporary. The fall back in world economic growth that is taking place is going to reduce demand for commodities, just as more capacity for many commodities is coming on stream (though the mining companies and oil producers have been more cautious in their expansion than in past booms). For example Saudi Arabia has agreed to increase production, though not by a very large amount. Also, high oil prices are already spurring action to reduce demand, for example leading governments to reduce fuel subsidies and car manufacturers to switch away from manufacturing ‘gas guzzlers’.

Having said that demand for commodities will fall, as the world economy slows, a counter-effect will be the ongoing readjustment of the U.S, economy, with continued pressure on the dollar for some time. Whether the increase in supply will outstrip any further weakening of the dollar becomes the question. My own view is that the increase in supply will see oil falling back in price in about six month’s time. My best guess, and it is no more than that, is that in two year’s time, oil will be back to about $US60-70 a barrel. This is based upon the provision of a small increase in capacity, a drop in demand, set against a further weakening of the dollar. Lots of ‘ifs’ - which is why it is a best guess.

What I am saying is that there is a relationship between oil prices and the ‘credit crunch’, but not in the respect that high oil prices have caused it. The idea that ‘peak oil’ is reflected in the price is unlikely in the extreme. The high oil prices stem from the underlying weakness in the U.S. economy and (temporary) problems of capacity. The credit boom may have fuelled the world economy and high oil prices, but the credit crunch will see oil prices fall back. What we are actually seeing is one of the mechanisms of economic rebalancing in action.

I have perhaps answered the question in a very indirect way. I hope that the answer makes sense. As I said, it is an interesting question. It raises some interesting points. For example, the way in which the world economy has come to a period in which bottlenecks have started to constrain growth and also, more interestingly, the rebalancing of economic power from West to East. The rise of the importance of sovereign wealth funds (including the Asian ones) is just one example of the rebalancing, the fall in the value of the dollar another. I have not mentioned the rise of the Euro, the status of the RMB, or the Gulf States’ currency pegs, and many other factors in this picture. The problem here is that any question starts to open up many more questions, and it is impossible to cover them all in short answer. As such, for what it is worth, I will leave the question there. Perhaps with greater reflection I will be able to offer a better answer, but hope that this suffices for the moment.



[i] Sorry, I have hunted for a link but can not find one. In place of this, I have quoted a paper abstract below, though this lacks the punch of Lomberg's discussion:

'Predictions of imminent oil shortages have been made throughout the 20th century. Although all previous predictions have been false, in recent years a new generation of predictions based on the Hubbert model have become ascendant and attracted media attention. The Hubbert model assumes that a resource is limited and finite. Although conventional oil supplies are finite, it has proven difficult to estimate the size of the ultimate resource. Over the last 50 years estimates of the size of the world’s conventional crude oil resources have increased faster than cumulative production. The estimated size of the ultimate resource base will continue to increase in the future as unconventional fossil fuels come on line. Oil production from Canadian tar sands has already begun.'

Oil: Are We Running Out? by David Deming
http://www.energycrisis.com/deming/aapg_oil.pdf The important points are that peak oil has been predicted for many years. Oil is a finite resource, but the peak....every time it happens, it doesn't. This is not to say that we have not reached the peak of relatively easily extracted oil. In the simplest terms the boy has cried wolf many times. Is it real this time? No one can be certain.
[ii] http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11066673

[iii] http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11528901