In particular, the problems with credit and the banks are going to reach their real crisis in about six to eight months time. The reason is that the fallout of the sub-prime fiasco is just the start. The next phase will be the consumer credit crisis and the SME crisis - and the results will be equally as dramatic, but with the added pain of hitting the banks when they are already suffering severely.I said all of this before the huge bailouts and nationalisations. The truth is that the government was always going to have to keep pouring money into the black hole of the banking system. I had the following to say in September, at the time the bailouts were being justified to 'get the banks lending to each other':
So what are these crises. The first is that consumer credit was already reaching breaking point, where many households were borrowing to repay borrowing. This was, in any event, unsustainable. Added to this factor, the story of inflation needs no more retelling. Finally, we have the spectre of rapid increases in unemployment, and it will be this development that will spark the second banking crisis. In particular the number of delinquent loans will start rising rapidly as unemployment increases, and accelerating concerns about the already weak balance sheets of the banks will see even greater tightening of credit conditions. Furthermore, unemployment will see even more mortgage defaults, and the banks will be trying to sell assets into a falling market. Quite simply, their losses are going to be staggering.
The second problem will come from the Small / Medium size businesses. As the economy turns down, think of the small traders - such as restaurants, who are already only marginally profitable. These will rapidly fail, in many cases leading to losses for the banks. Even the medium size companies, with a better financial base, are going to be negatively effected by the consumer downturn, and their failures will hurt the banks even more.
Remember that these problems are going to hit the balance sheets of banks when they are already tattered, and hit the reputation of the banks when their reputations are at a low.
The reasons that the banks are not lending to each other is that they all know that they are all holding toxic debt. This is not just CDOs etc. but also fast deteriorating commercial debt, unsecured consumer debt, and old fashioned mortgage debt (held on devaluing assets with people with ever more insecure job prospects). Furthermore, the sources of liquidity from the East are drying up as confidence in the 'rich world' banking system is evaporating.And finally, I had the following to say in October, having discussed lending into a falling market, and the attempts by government to push the banks to lend.
The government is talking about re-privatisation in about five years time, and suggesting that the nationalisations will not cost the taxpayer money in the long term. The idea that the government will be able to gain any return on the investment, in light of what I have discussed, is very remote indeed. Instead, as the finance of the nationalised banks continue to decline in parallel with the economy, the government will find itself having to provide more and more capital injections to keep the banks afloat. This will be never ending, as the risky lending that is the condition of the nationalisation will just produce ever more toxic debt.I could go on quoting such commentary, but I hope that you get the picture. In the first quote I suggested that the second crisis would be in 'six to eight months time'. That was in June, and we are now at the point in time that I predicted that the second crisis would hit - and all the major news papers are highlighting that a new bailout is imminent (e.g. Times, Telegraph, Guardian). The Times says the following:
Under one option, a “bad bank” would be created to dispose of bad debts. The Treasury would take bad loans off the hands of troubled banks, perhaps swapping them for government bonds. The toxic assets, blamed for poisoning the financial system, would be parked in a state vehicle or “bad bank” that would manage them and attempt to dispose of them while “detoxifying” the main-stream banking system.And from the Guardian:
Banks and building societies are being deterred from lending by the worsening economic outlook and the fall in house prices and other assets against which loans are secured.Over the last month, we have articles reporting that the problems in mortgage repayment are spreading to 'prime' borrowers, reports of increasing insolvencies in the retail and service sectors... the articles in the links are just a random sample. I could go on, but the news is best expressed in the necessity of the Telegraph to publish an article on how to avoid repossession of your home.
All the while this is hitting the banks when they are already struggling with battered balance sheets, and it is going to get a lot worse yet....
This raises the question of how much the government can pour into this black hole, and takes us right back to the money printing scheme that is the last desperate attempt to stem the tide. With the government sitting on the boards of major banks, they will certainly be aware that the balance sheets of their 'investment' are, even as I write, falling off a second cliff. As I sit here typing I am listening to 'Ne andrĂ² lontana', and it seems somehow appropriate background music for this post.
The trouble with the banks has only just started, and there is much more pain yet....
Note 1: I will try to address some of the many questions that I have been neglecting. I will work backwards from the most recent, and apologise that I will only be able to get so far....there have been a very large number of comments of late (my inbox is overflowing), many of which have (as ever) been extremely good.
I will start with the comments on my post on government or market responsibility for the crisis. I am unsurprised that, in the current climate, my post is causing some controversy. Unlike just about everyone, my post exonerates the market.
From anonymous there is the suggestion that, rather than bailing out the banks we should do the following:
'I'm sure there are science(physics) and humanitarian projects that could chew up several hundreds of billions of dollars without too much problem probably over the next 10 to 15 years but at least it will inject large amounts of cash into the world and people won't have to pretend to work to get government handouts but actually do some real work with real future benefits.'Whilst agreeing that pouring money into the pit of the banking system is not the best use of the money that is being borrowed, my answer is quite simple. Do not borrow money when the problems you are experiencing are as a direct result of .....borrowing money. However the money is spent, it must be paid back, and that means a future contraction in growth. We can not spend the same money twice - if we spend it now, we will not have it in the future. Yes, it would be better to spend the money on something else, but the real answer is not to spend money you do not have. If you read the other sections of the blog, you will see why this is the case...
Jeremy (an increasingly regular commentator) makes the following comment:
'Isn't the best end-game for China to wait until the US stock-market bottoms and then buy all the best assets with their huge $ reserves?A very good thought. If China were to use the money to buy US assets, it would help buttress the $US for a while, but it would not help in solving their current domestic contraction. Furthermore, once the money was used, the US would still be left in a position of not having enough to sell, meaning that the $US would in any case fall. China would then be left with substantial losses on its assets - albeit at the benefit of increasing their economic power. The point of my post is that the problems lie with how they can ameliorate their collapsing export market, and that problem is short-medium term, and one which risks the very stability of China overall. They would also face a backlash (protectionism) if they started buying up the high-tech assets that you refer to in any significant quantity. However, as I said, a very good thought.
They don't want the US to go bust, but they want it cheap and they might not want to buy dodgy motors from them but they'd probably be interested assets like Silicon Valley.
If China invested $1 trillion in US companies then there would be plenty of americans with enough money to buy chinese exports again and China would eventually end up owning the US lock, stock and barrel.
Just a thought. '
I have had an interesting question from anonymous, as follows:
The point about China's accumulation of Treasuries is that most of them stem from the last couple of years, so even if they were to be worthless soon, the Chinese have the process mechanisms of creating that wealth again quickly.I am afraid to say that the trade imbalances with China remain, even as the economies of the West are contracting. China makes many products for the budget end of the market, and are therefore relatively well placed to continue to export. In more cost conscious times......
Also, how is it possible that China can seemingly subsidize its economy to gain such an advantage over the whole world when its economy is in fact still only a fraction of total worldwide output, i.e. how can a government with such comparable resources manage to create such a huge distortion? That seems very odd.
Furthermore, how far worse of would Western consumers be without cheap Chinese goods? As far as I know spending in America has gone down for consumer goods but massively increased for government-distorted things like health-care and housing.
The subsidy question: There are many forms of subsidy that China can use. One of the subsidies that I highlight is the subsidy implicit in their currency manipulation. In this case, the subsidy is collectivised over the whole economy. In keeping their currency low, they are effectively removing purchasing power from every individual in the country, and every business. It is actually an indirect taxation. This is quite difficult to explain in short but I will try. When a consumer walks into a shop in China to buy a pen, the artificial exchange rate will make the pen made in the US x% more expensive. The indirect taxation on purchasing is the difference between the price of the US made pen in the situation of a free floating currency and the actual price today with the fixed exchange rate (y). The person is 'y' poorer as a result of paying that indirect tax.
Although you suggest that China is only a small part of total world output, the size of the (so called) output of countries like the US and UK is overstated by huge amounts (I estimate at least 30% for the UK), as the output of such countries includes output that is resultant from debt. One of the major creditors for that debt is actually China. If the lending by China to the US was retained within China, for example used as it has been in the West for consumption, there would be a significant rise in the output of China, and a commensurate fall in output in the US. This is actually what is happening to US output - as the credit taps switch off, their 'output' is falling. I suggest a read of this post to explain it more clearly. This is not to include the critical consideration of relative strengths of currencies in the consideration of output. For example, UK 'output' has been falling both absolutely but also because of the weakening of the currency.
I will leave the answer there, though much more could be said...I think most of the detail is scattered through the blog.
Another anonymous poster asks the following:
"Our creditors, such as China and Saudi Arabia, are now turning off the supplies of credit, and are no longer buying the £GB to lend to us. Demand from this source will continue to evaporate..."The short answer is 'yes', they buy bonds, and a range of other forms of assets. A full analysis of the situation can be found here. A quote from this discussion is:
Could somebody briefly explain the mechanichs of this? How did they lend to us? By buying Government bonds?
China’s low (controlled) interest rates imply that, since its reserve holding are believed to be held primarily in medium- and long-term industrial country treasury instruments and government agency bonds.However, there are many other factors that need to be accounted for, such as 'round-tripping' (setting up a fictional Hong Kong entity for a mainland company), and the report details this better than I can in a short answer. However, you will note how opaque it all is....The tables at the end of the article are the most useful part (tables 7,8 and 10 if I remember correctly), and these will give you a detailed answer.
Another anonymous poster questions the idea that the market is a good thing, suggesting that government will always need to intervene:
As I see it, in a finite world and an exponentially increasing population, unfettered markets won't cut the mustard, unless of course you are prepared to throw millions of losers overboard.If we look at China, it was a 'fettered' market before 'opening'. Millions of 'losers' were already 'overboard', and have been rescued by markets. As I have always emphasised, the world has overall become considerably richer overall since China opened, but the problem for the West is that, not only has the world become richer overall, but there is also an ongoing redistribution of the wealth towards the emerging markets.
A simplistic way of illustrating this can be seen in the car market. In the West there has been massive growth in the luxury brands of cars such as Mercedes. It became conventional wisdom that the best place to be in the car markets was the upmarket brands, which explains why Ford invested so heavily in European luxury brands. This is a perfect illustration of the imbalances that are now becoming evident. It is now, as the wealth of the world redistributes over more people, that we see the emergence of the Tata Nano, and the amazingly cheap Renault being sold into Central European markets.
There are more people with more wealth, but that wealth is divided over more individuals, making these cars a type that best serves the market. The luxury brands are looking increasingly vulnerable as the shift in distribution of wealth occurs. However, in the long term, as the wealth distribution runs its course, the demand for these luxury brands will return. The question to ask is where that demand might originate?
Lemming asks many questions and raises many points, as follows, so I will need to quote in full:
'I am persuaded by your view that government intervention is a distorting element which prevents the free markets from functioning 'properly' - and your idea that we need less, not more, banking regulation seems to be 180 degrees opposite to the view of every other economics commentator I have read, recently, by the way.The first point is that I am increasingly alone in defending the markets. To this I would highlight that I was in a very lonely (though apparently not completely alone), when predicting this crisis. It certainly seems that the mainstream are all becoming increasingly interventionist. This is in part because they look at the symptoms, not at the cause of the symptoms. They see that there has been lunacy in the banking system, and think that this lunacy is the result of a free market. However, they do not ask why it is that people were happy to place their money so blindly in a system that was simply not working. They do not ask why there was such a flood of capital in the first place. I could go on, but I do not want to repeat my post. They are quite simply not asking the right questions.
But I am still worried that there are other distorting factors which might render "the invisible hand" useless. One such is the way that money is issued: is the free market system meant to be stable regardless of how money is issued? In your post you suggest that growth and recession are both natural conditions for the economy, but I cited Eddie George speaking to the Treasury Select Committee in a comment a few days ago, stating that the BoE had pursued a policy of unsustainable lending rates in 2000/2001 to avoid "recession", as though that condition was to be avoided at all costs. Why? Is it because almost all money in circulation is temporary and therefore growth must be maintained otherwise the system collapses uncontrollably? Certainly a condition of recession is assumed by most economics commentators to be a huge problem. If our version of free market capitalism is set up to depend on perpetual growth, then in the real world of finite resources, it must fail eventually, and you have often given the example of a temporary bottleneck in the supply of oil limiting growth. Is continual growth a prerequisite of free market capitalism, and if so, does this example, alone, negate the validity of free market capitalism in principle?
(And how about the fact that interest rates are set 'manually' in our system of fractional reserve banking? It seems to be a very crude government intervention in itself, yet "the invisible hand" is supposed to be self-regulating and shouldn't need any external control to function.)
Another distorting factor must be the free markets operating on commodities whose availability and price do not vary by supply and demand. There is a frequent commentator on CiF called 'physiocrat' who continually refers to the problem of land in the economy and points to this website: www.landvaluetax.org. I suspect he is probably right. Surely a commodity such as land is a huge fly in the ointment of free market principles? '
With regards to the question of stability and instability. Should economies be stable, and should the governor of the Bank of England be trying to manipulate the economy to avoid recession at all costs?
I will illustrate the need for instability from my experience in China. When I first arrived there was a boom in the manufacture of televisions to supply into the China market. There was massive growth as ordinary Chinese people tipped over the financial point where they could afford this item. That emerging demand saw the emergence of large numbers of manufacturers, all of whom responded to the market demand, and provided ever cheaper and better televisions. In the early stages, no doubt, many were making good money. However, as more and more companies entered the market, the market became flooded, and the bust then happened. All of the new entrants saw the potential for profit, but ended up destroying those profits through oversupply. The only answer was a rash of bankruptcy in order for the market to reach an equilibrium (in this case the over-supply was exacerbated by local governments jumping into the market with their own investment in production). At the end of this process considerably less businesses were left standing, but those businesses would be the strongest businesses, operating with the best products to meet the demands of the market.
Such an example shows how markets can boom then bust. In the process a lot of people purchased consumer durables, and future industrial giants started to rise. The bankruptcy of the other companies was a necessary part of that process, but would have led to a lot of people also losing money, as well as people losing their jobs. However, you are left with an industry where the output is actually geared to meeting demand, and the companies meeting that demand are the most efficient in their overall operations.
Lemmings' other questions largely pertain to the status of commodities within a free market. These are a critical element, as without commodities, the market can not expand. The trouble arises with many commodities is that, during times of growth, it often takes a while before new commodities come 'on stream'. As such, what often happens is that commodity supply lags growth, such that the growth in commodity supply comes on stream just as a spurt of growth comes to an end. If we think of the television example as a proxy for world markets, the cycle of that sudden growth and bust was over (I guess, but am not sure) about five years. If we think of this example, and imagined that component suppliers needed to build new factories to supply the components for the television (equivalent in this example to commodities), the extent of the boom would only become truly visible in about the second year of the boom. If we imagine that this fictional component required two years to build a factory, it would only come on stream as the boom is about to collapse, leaving the factory with excess capacity.
However, if the next boom is in hi-fi, and the components the factory makes are suitable for hi-fi, then the factory will benefit from the second boom. The trouble is that, whilst awaiting the second boom, they lose money. Commodities suffer from the same problems. The problem recently was that the dumping of so much labour into the world market so quickly just left the ability for commodity producers to keep up as an impossible task.
As for the question of land, the Economist gives a good example of where 'land' rights ensure that land is utilised well. I have not read the full report in the latest edition which is on rights in sea fishing (my print edition has not yet arrived) but, when you give rights to the sea to individuals/companies, they seek to preserve the value of those rights through better management of the fishery. The original report I read dates back a while, but can be found here. I am sure that the new report in the Economist will have similar examples.
Regarding Property Tax: I have read some of the property-tax arguments briefly, but do not have time to discuss these in depth on this occasion. However, I will quote something from the home page of the website Lemming pointed to as follows:
It would operate as an annual charge on the rental value of land, assuming that each site was in its optimum permitted useI will leave you to work out why that might be problematic in this proposal, but the words 'who' and 'how' come to mind. I checked their FAQ, and looked briefly elsewhere, but found no answer.
I have a had a few comments from the curiously named B33ENN (?), who asks in one post:
If there is a Western economic collapse on the horizon, meaning China's export economy fails along with us, what effect would having a surplus supply of real and valuable raw materials have on China's internal economy? What effect would their fast-track education in modern technology have on their internal development?China has a long history of supposedly being isolationist, but their moves towards the development of a blue water navy, the quest after commodity supplies around the world tells us a different story. China simply does not have the access to the materials they need to function as a modern economy. For example their major oil fields are close to exhaustion (I forget the name of the oilfield, but I am thinking of the one in which a revolutionary hero, 'Iron Man Wang', sprang from).
At that point, would they really need or want anything from us at all? If they learn to produce everything for themselves, from low-tech to high-tech, what would they need to trade with us and our worthless currencies?
The question then becomes, is China really viewing itself as part of a world economy? Or is it exploiting the benefits while it can, all the while more interested in its own internal wealth and future, independent of the world?
Perhaps an interesting perspective on the rise of China is the argument that China is just returning to its 'natural' status in the world. This is the argument found in 'The Great Divergence' by Kenneth Pomeranz. I think his argument is very poor in places, but would agree with the central principle that China does have a natural 'weight' in the world. He ignores that this weight has been achieved by the greatest and most enduring imperial expansion in history, and there is nothing to say that China will not seek to continue this pattern of growth and expansion. It is very easy to forget that China is an empire, and is therefore not as isolationist as perhaps is commonly perceived. The nature of China's growth may be simply towards economic expansion, but any idea of it taking an isolationist approach is very unlikely.
With regards to trading with us for our 'worthless' currencies, it is at this point, when our currencies are 'worthless' that we might be in a position to once again return to growth. At that time, we will all be much poorer, but will therefore be more competitive. In the most basic terms, our workers will be demanding less of a return for their labour, a return closer to that of an equivalent Chinese worker, allowing for us to sell our goods. However, as I have emphasised, we will also need to reform ourselves broadly in order to return to growth, and that is something detailed throughout the blog, and which I will not cover here.
Note 2: At this point, I have to offer my apologies, but I must call a halt. I have answered the questions in order, so I have not made any particular determination in which questions I would answer. I mention this, as there have been many other excellent questions and useful comments that I would like to respond to...Sorry for some rushed answers, and I hope that they are as clear as I would like them to be.
A fascinating post that raises many issues.
ReplyDeleteI would like to comment on your discussion of Chinese protectionism through currency manipulation.
You state:
“One of the subsidies that I highlight is the subsidy implicit in their currency manipulation. In this case, the subsidy is collectivised over the whole economy. In keeping their currency low, they are effectively removing purchasing power from every individual in the country, and every business. It is actually an indirect taxation. This is quite difficult to explain in short but I will try. When a consumer walks into a shop in China to buy a pen, the artificial exchange rate will make the pen made in the US x% more expensive. The indirect taxation on purchasing is the difference between the price of the US made pen in the situation of a free floating currency and the actual price today with the fixed exchange rate (y). The person is 'y' poorer as a result of paying that indirect tax.
When China devalued the RMB in 1994 by 45%, this functioned as an export subsidy to US and EU markets, but surely also as a domestic tariff on foreign manufactured goods imported into China.
Your analysis about the pen is very interesting: when someone buys a pen in China the cost is as follows:
x (the cost of the pen made in the US in a floating currency) + y (the additional cost because of the undervalued RMB = z (the cost that is sum of these two factors).
But it is very obvious the factor y really just functions as a de facto tariff on foreign goods imported into the Chinese market for domestic consumers spending RMB they have earned.
So in actual fact the devalued RMB is a double form of protectionism: a de facto export subsidy for exported goods from China to the West, and a de facto tariff on foreign imports coming into China. This is the classic form of the infant-industry protectionism, or import-substitution industrialization (ISI), as it is now known in its modern theoretical form.
The real question is this: for many goods this policy is actually a fundamental drive to create new industries in China that produce for the domestic market: for instance, why buy an imported pen from the US or the EU anyway, if China can produce it in domestic industries using domestic parts and labor (perhaps some imported raw materials are necessary and initial purchases of machine tools to create the factories). If this creates more industries in China, it will good for the Chinese economy in the long run, as it can make pens internally, and eventually export them to foreign markets at a cheaper price.
Chinese consumers may be suffering “indirect taxation” in the short term, but in the long term there are more jobs for Chinese people to make pens and thus earn income to consume on other things. The “indirect taxation” ends when domestic pen manufacturers market their cheaper product to domestic Chinese consumers (who will presumably prefer to buy it over imported ones) and then start earning foreign dollars from pen exports overseas. In the long run, the overall economy wins.
Secondly, you state:
“If we look at China, it was a 'fettered' market before 'opening'. Millions of 'losers' were already 'overboard', and have been rescued by markets.”
What has China been rescued by? It is certainly not pure classical liberalism or true free trade or the orthodox form of neoliberalism or consistent, pure “free market” economics. We have spent a good part of this blog demonstrating that China follows a radical state interventionist and protectionism/mercantilism system. It has followed a variant of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that created the economic giants of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Access to the US market, a fundamental element of these countries export-led economic growth, is also a feature of China’s.
The classic policies of ISI were:
(1) an active industrial policy to subsidize and orchestrate production of strategic substitutes
(2) protective barriers to trade (e.g. tariffs)
(3) an overvalued currency to help manufacturers import capital goods (heavy machinery), at least initially in industrial development.
In South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, there also these additional elements of ISI:
(4) Export led growth = outward-oriented ISI
(5) direction of subsidies and investment on industries which would make goods for export
(6) no significant attempt to undervalue the local currency.
China certainly practises (1), (4), and (5). (2) is achieved by the undervalued currency. China is an exception to (3) and (6). Other East Asian states did not rely so much on an undervalued currency, but had the government invest directly in creating industries for export.
Markets can operate in Keynesian states or protectionist states, but they were hardly the only or most important cause of China’s spectacular economic rise. For that, you must look to the state and protectionism. If the free market had truly been allowed to function in China (i.e., the abolition of protectionist policies, a free floating currency etc), it would simply not be the economic giant it is today.
Mark, many thanks for having the patience to tackle my meandering questions.
ReplyDeleteJust a thought on China: a few months ago I suggested that the West would have been better off had it not tried to compete with China, but had, effectively, refused to trade with them - protectionism. I seem to recall that you replied that protectionism was never a good idea, and that it would have been unfair to deny the Chinese people access to the benefits of capitalism that we enjoy. But as you have suggested, and as Lord Keynes points out so well above, the Chinese were practising their own form of protectionism anyway and we appear to have fallen into a clearly-marked trap. As you have also discussed previously it is possible that Chinese policies will have unforeseen global consequences that leave China in a worse position than it would otherwise have been.
Yet to the outside world, if we didn't know about the Chinese government interventions, China would just look like a country with people who have a culture of working extremely hard for very competitive wages and who save a lot of their earnings. It appears that trading with such a country is enough to bring down the entire global capitalist economy. It does make the system seem a bit... fragile, doesn't it?
I obviously understand that simplistic government policies distort what would have been the independent(-ish) actions of millions (billions?) of individual participants in the economy, but then again, what about the distorting effects of huge companies such as Microsoft?
Cynicus,
ReplyDeleteI feel this thought provoking film is extremely pertinent to your blog and would be of interest to many of your readers who are - like me - left wondering about the future.
http://thezeitgeistmovement.com/addendum.htm
Whilst the original Zeitgeist movie is interesting it leaves you feeling somewhat depressed.
However the Addendum proposes an alternative system to what we currently have and has been updated to include current events.
Enjoy.
Cynicus,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your reply, your thoughts pretty much confirm my own views on China. I agree that China has evolved from an imperialist culture, much like our own in the West. Your view that they are lacking sufficient material assets within their mainland economy rightly supports the argument that we may expect expansionist policies in the future. When we returned Hong Kong in the late 90’s, it was clear they had a plan as they agreed all too easily not to interfere too much with its governing. Today, as they eye up Taiwan, one can only guess where it will lead. My guess is that China would like to mimic the growth of the USA in the last century and become a dominating force in Asia. How Japan, India and Australia might live with that remains to be seen. And I imagine Russia will have something to say about it.
However, I differ with you on any optimism for a resurgence of the West as productive force, particularly the UK. It has always been easier to destroy, then to create. It took decades for us to build our manufacturing and production industries. Destroying them took the Tories a couple of terms in power. Re-training skilled labour into virtual pen-pushing became the educational focus. The emergence of the financial sector has been focussed mostly on the London & South East economy, whereas the rest of the UK has been largely disregarded as an asset. What little major manufacturing exists in these regions is increasingly foreign owned creating an outflow of wealth to offset any gains. This especially contains any areas where British industry has had a key competitive and innovative technological edge, which have been systematically sold-off to boost GDP in various years.
In contrast, what has driven the success in Asia has been a cultural work ethic from the grass roots coupled with nationalist government uncompromised by democratic principles, which are, by their nature, unfocussed and in constant flux over the decades. In periods, this has worked against them, but since Nixon’s visit, that’s been changing. Today we see a very different attitude, but with the same determined focus. And motivationally, China is driven by strong hunger: they have been the “third world” and now want the same things we take for granted. Our debt culture has spoiled us into thinking we all have the right to a certain living standard, rather than Asians who believe they must earn it.
The UK could not suddenly metamorphose back to lower living standards and emphasis on manufacturing and technology. It would require complete reversal in the culture of a generation or two, and immediate and aggressive internal investment, which is not offered by the electable parties in our parliament. It would require a frank admission that mistakes have been made by the present as well as previous administrations. It would require the voices of the wealth producers becoming more important than the wealth accumulators, or a much smaller world where we were forced to depend on ourselves: During the Industrial Revolution period, European countries were much more independent and often politically opposed to neighbours, driving them to a compete individually. Major EU economies still retain some structure of independent wealth, but the UK has followed the US model of asset stripping for “growth”.
It would require a revolution in political terms as well as economic progression from easy money, to the hard earned. As has been discussed in previous posts, the democratic need for our politicians to please voters in the short-term is prohibiting a sensible plan to survive the recession for the long-term already: Capitalism and free markets require the natural deflation of the economy and find its own confidence floor based upon the fundamentals and intrinsic value. However, our political leaders favour large-scale government intervention to maintain the illusion and support the bubble. Brown & Co do know clearly that without London acting as the worlds cash conduit, taking its cut for playing the “middle-man”, we have a marginal GDP coupled to net worth compromised by a massive, untenable debt burden.
To recast the country into a producer economy would take decades, and even then, there is no guarantee we’d have the same advantages in the future as we did in the past – i.e. before competition was limited to a few developed nations, now the so-called “third-world” has caught up and in some cases exceeded us. That’s not even counting competition from the EU which exceeds us in pretty much everything but debt. Why can Germany and France build world-class quality cars for a profit but the USA and Britain cannot?
Western voters will not voluntarily choose a lesser standard of living, whether it is real wealth (earned) or virtual wealth (debt) is of little concern when an individual’s personal “growth” is at stake. Since modern leveraged-living means there are more people in debt than people who are solvent, voters will much rather the government pursued policies of “de-bubble and re-bubble” over “boom and bust”.
By comparison, I wonder how much the displeasure of the Chinese people on crisis measures would influences their political class. You have mentioned the possibility of unrest in China if their economy was to suffer any serious fall out, but I’m wondering how their politicians would explain the problems to the people. Would they spin it, and use debt to create the pretence that all is fine and “growth” is a human right? Or would they advise the people that difficult times are ahead, and a unified effort and sacrificial endurance is required?
China has strong history of putting aside internal differences and uniting in the face of foreign threats, whereas politics in the West is governed by appealing to the emotions and vanity of the popular classes. Politicians here have to win the “hearts and minds” of the people to win elections. For any UK government, honesty is a risky policy, especially in issues concerning the downgrading of peoples personal wealth, threatening their individualism, and providing no short term easy results. If it is fair to say that capitalism respond to paying the least to make the most; then democracy should respond to policies that cost the least and promise the most.
What I find strange is, how did France and Germany manage to hold onto much of their export industries yet our democracy unable to prevent the hollowing out of our industrial heritage? I am sceptical when people say our governments walked into this blindly. It would be a damning indictment of our people if we cannot put intelligent people in power at the helm of our nation.
But then I also find it strange that it was the US and UK that together defied international opinion and launched the invasion of Iraq. It was the US and UK that allowed national level property bubbles to get out of control to simulate growth. And it is the US and UK companies that have precedence in the contracts to extract the oil...
Wars tend to be very expensive investments, and usually are only undertaken in defence, or to acquire a greater return. Historically they are often also proceeded by periods of high inflation, which both the US and UK have tried to distort with questionable statistics from altered measurement criteria.
Is it possible that preferential share of future Iraqi oil revenue maybe the intended collateral for the latest round of government borrowing?
This doesn't really follow on from your present post, but here goes.
ReplyDeleteMany companies operating in the UK are based in Eurozone countries. If the Euro holds firm and the pound goes belly up, will they start conducting all their UK business in Euros? If they do, will the Euro become the preferred currency for other businesses operating here too?
If so, then John Major's old idea of a common rather than a single currency competing with domestic currencies in each member state will come true here at least - though scarcely in a way he would have expected all those years ago. And presumably inflation will then hit the public sector workforce paid in sterling worse than the private sector paid in Euros.
On currency devaluation as a trade policy
ReplyDeleteLet me write an addendum to my previous post on Chinese currency devaluation as an industrial policy.
Lest people think that this policy is confined to East Asian countries and not to the West, the US has actually practised it as well!
The Plaza Accord (1985) was an attempt by the Reagan administration to boost its exports after the recession of 1980-1982.
A brief summary on Wikipedia:
“The Plaza Accord … was an agreement signed on September 22, 1985 at the Plaza Hotel … by … France, West Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. The five agreed to, amongst others, depreciate the US dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark by intervening in currency markets.
The exchange rate value of the dollar versus the yen declined 51% over the two years after this agreement took place ….
The reason for the dollar's devaluation was twofold: to reduce the US current account deficit, which had reached 3.5% of the GDP, and to help the US economy to emerge from a serious recession that began in the early 1980s. The U.S. Federal Reserve System under Paul Volcker had overvalued the dollar enough to make industry in the US (particularly the automobile industry) less competitive in the global market. Devaluing the dollar made US exports cheaper to its trading partners, which in turn meant that other countries bought more American-made goods and services. The Plaza Accord was successful in reducing the US trade deficit with Western European nations but largely failed to fulfill its primary objective of alleviating the trade deficit with Japan because this deficit was due to structural rather than monetary conditions. US manufactured goods became more competitive in the exports market but were still largely unable to succeed in the Japanese domestic market due to Japan's structural restrictions on imports …. The Louvre Accord was signed in 1987 to halt the continuing decline of the US Dollar.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plaza_Accord
So there we have it: the supposedly free trade Reagan administration, with its passionate belief in “free markets,” pioneered the approach that China later took. The only difference was that the Plaza Accord was not very successful with respect to Japan, simply because Japan protects its domestic markets from foreign imports in a way that overcame the effects of the currency devaluation.
Hi, i made a comment about the bail out going towards science or humanitarian projects but this applies to infrastructure projects or big spending initiatives, the point I was trying to make was that credit isn't a bad thing in this case consumer credit has turned out to be very bad but i think the original idea and one of the main reasons for banks in the first place were to lend so people have the extra resources available to increase productivity, as long as the lending is going towards productive branches of the economy it should be encouraged, the bail outs that we've seen recently are towards failing or failed branches of the economy in which case they are indeed bad.
ReplyDeleteProtectionism stirs in the US
ReplyDeleteThe US has a very large economy, and, if it ever went fascist or adopted a left-version of protectionism, it might rebuild its industries through a large-scale state-directed industrial policy.
The neoliberal wing of the Republican party has been rejected in its McCain and Bush incarnations. What is left for the GOP? It has always had a "paleo-conservative" wing, whose effective leader over the 16 years has been Patrick Buchanan. This wing preaches protectionism and looks to its 18th century hero, Alexander Hamilton, the inventor of American statism and protectionism.
If an Obama administration causes a new Great Depression, one can easily see a paleo-conservative Republican victory in the next presidential election and a return to US protectionism.
One only needs to see what Buchanan, the spokesperson for this faction of GOP, is saying:
Patrick J. Buchanan, China’s Path to Power, November 11, 2008
http://buchanan.org/blog/2008/11/pjb-chinas-path-to-power/
Okay, let me be the first to admit that although I know almost every economist on Earth thinks protectionism is a mortal sin (and I respect their greater knowledge), I find it kind-of attractive.
ReplyDeleteThe argument seems to be that the costs of implementing protectionism greatly outweigh the potential gains from it. I understand that and have always supported free trade... but lets just consider the alternative.
It seems to me that some nations are more 'abundant' than others. Natural resources, energy, good environment for agriculture, non-destructive political environments, non-destructive weather patterns and the like. So some places are 'lands of plenty' while others struggle to survive.
Putting aside (for the sake of argument) the need to 'feed the world', I wonder whether Protectionism could work, where a nation is able to provide everything it needs to maintain a good standard of living?
Yes, goods would cost lots more. Yes, our own exports would be 'hit' because other countries would reciprocate (but we export much less than we import). I know the cost of enforcing the trade barriers would be expensive. Yes, we wouldn't be able to so-easily get the cheap foreign luxuries we now enjoy. But would we not simultaneously ensure reasonable jobs and opportunities at home?
It's easy to count the pennies and say that what we gain from being able to outsource manufacture of cheap goods from other nations is valuable. I'm sure the cost of Protectionism is very, very high in monetary terms. But did anybody ever consider other factors, which are not monetary?
There are psychological and sociological implications to losing jobs and skills overseas. They don't have an obvious 'cash' value, but society is damaged as unemployment increases and as people see their ability to contribute to society eroded. The cost of that damage is hard to quantify, but is likely to be extremely substantial. Creativity and Confidence is assisted by opportunity, not the lack of it.
I know I've just chucked petrol on the fire, and much of this comment is Devil's Advocate, but I'd really like to hear Cynicus (and other intelligent posters here) take on this.