Showing posts with label Service Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Service Economy. Show all posts

Friday, January 9, 2009

The Underlying Value in Currency - Why the £ is Falling

This post started out as a short response to a comment by B33ENN, who is a relatively new commentator on the blog, and who commented on my post on 'UK Government Borrowing - Where is the Money Coming From'. However, as I wrote my response I found that I was reiterating many of the points that I have made throughout the blog. As such, it occurred to me that newer readers of the blog may not have an underlying understanding of the principles of the blog, and that sometimes I make posts with assumptions that they do.

The problem with the way that the blog is structured is that it is a cumulative argument. I therefore strongly recommend that newer readers take a look through the key posts that I have linked to (these can be found to the left of this). In the meantime, I have adapted what was originally going to be a quick comment in the comments section of the UK borrowing post.

The original post discussed how low interest rates were possibly leading to a reluctance of depositors from depositing money in the banking system. I pointed out that under normal circumstances these deposits would be made available for investment, and the government was therefore constraining the supply of capital for investment through such low interest rates.

The first point I would like to address is that two commentators quite rightly identified that I was simplifying the methods by which bank deposits are channeled into the economy. This from B33ENN:
This is not exactly as I understand the mechanism. Yes, the banks do use the reserves as a basis for lending. However, the banks actually use the reserves as margin for leveraged lending. In simpler terms, they create “new money” in the form of new loans by amplifying the reserves according to the fractional reserve lending criteria. So for example, if a bank holds £10 in saved deposits, it then can create a further £90 worth of loans. These loans then become “real money” in the economy flowing out through business and individuals who borrowed and then deposit it into more banks that repeat the exercise until you reach a maximum amount that can be created from that first £10.
Lemming also commented to this effect. They have have both rightly pointed out that I have simplified the method by which deposits are turned into lending. I did not want to go into Fractional Reserve Banking (FRB) as this would distract from the underlying themes of the post, which was the centralisation of the government in the economy and where the government was actually finding the money to lend. In a sense they are right that this is unavoidable as part of the discussion, but I wrongly assumed that it did not need to be detailed. The point here is that deposits create the opportunity for banks to make further lending.

For readers who have never previously heard of FRB, I strongly recommend the (controversial) Wikipedia article here as an introduction, as it also includes the role of central banks (you may also want to read the heated debate that is linked to at the top of the article if you are really interested). If you have never heard of the system, it may come as quite a surprise, or even a shock. Another interrelated point that you may want to consider is the system of 'fiat money' which I discuss here.

The reason why these are important considerations is that they are at the heart of our economic system. In the case of FRB, we have a system which is inherently inflationary, through a continual steady expansion of the money supply by central banks (printing money if you wish), and through fiat money we have a system in which the value of money is almost entirely built upon confidence (which I discuss here- not an easy post, but stick with it) and which allows for unconstrained printing of money. It should be noted that printing money does not require physical printing of bank notes and minting of coins and quantitative easing is a process in which the process of 'printing' money goes into overdrive.

My argument is simple. Flooding money into the market in the manner of quantitative easing to create money for the government to lend to the banks, in order for the banks to lend to the government, business and consumers can only lead to currency collapse and hyper-inflation. Governments/central banks are claiming that they are doing so to avoid deflation, and I will address this question for the UK.

What the government is doing is massively increasing supply of the currency at a point in time when the external demand for the currency is in free fall. A large part of the demand for the £GB has been to buy the £GB in order to then lend it into the UK, and this source of demand is disappearing. Another part of the demand is as a reserve currency, but that status is diminishing with the weakening of the £GB (the two factors are related). On the other hand, there has not been much demand for the £GB as a currency to buy goods or services from the UK, something that can be seen in the balance of trade figures. Essentially, the value of a currency rests in supply and demand, and the confidence in the currency. The confidence element needs some explanation.

Confidence is a very difficult problem as it is possible for individuals and institutions to assign a greater value to a currency than underlying supply and demand would suggest that it should have. The loss of confidence in the £GB is seeing the £GB's value declining through loss of confidence, but that loss of confidence is rooted in the reality that the UK does not produce enough goods or services that people in other countries want to buy. In other words, individuals and institutions have realised that the £GB is not very useful as a currency to exchange for goods and services - there are many pounds in the market but there is little demand for goods and services that are exchanged in pounds. In the end the value of a fiat currency is determined by how many goods and services there are that people want to buy versus how many units of currency there are in circulation.

What has happened over the last couple of decades is that this principle has been forgotten. Demand for the £GB (and the $US - though the $US is a more complex case), has been supported by demand to lend into UK consumption. What has been forgotten by all of these lenders is to ask exactly with what the UK could produce to repay this lending. This error is now being recognised and what you then have is a situation in which investors are 'getting out of'' the £GB, as they recognise that there is simply not enough being produced in the UK to support its value. It is for this reason that the £GB is falling so fast. At the same time as demand for the £GB is falling there is a situation in which government creating more £GB at a time when there are already more £GB than the market wants. This is inherently inflationary.

The inflationary aspect of this is twofold. On the one hand all imported goods are going to become more expensive. In a massive simplification, there is a situation in which the UK currently does not produce enough goods that the Chinese factory worker wants to buy, such that his labour on a plasma TV can not be exchanged for any goods from the UK.

In order for UK consumers to buy that plasma TV, they must produce something with a commensurate value that the Chinese worker wants to buy. If they do not, then there is nothing to exchange for that plasma TV. The only solution to the problem is devaluation of the £GB. What this means is that the UK worker must work x number of hours more in order to be able to offer something in exchange for the plasma TV. In other words, the value of the labour in the UK must be adjusted to a point at which it can produce something that has sufficient value in exchange for the Chinese worker to buy.

What you are seeing in the change in the exchange rate devaluation is the value of labour between the UK and China moving to a new equilibrium. This example, of course, is just for the UK and China but needs to be applied across the global economy which, whilst more complex, does not change the underlying question of relative efficiency in the production of goods and services between economies.

Quite simply, the UK is not efficient enough at producing goods and services to continue to compete in world markets on the current exchange rate. This has simply been hidden through a false confidence that arose out of demand for the £GB to support lending into consumption. The illusion of the £GB was built upon a false confidence in the efficiency of the UK as an economy. It is actually not very efficient.

In light of this, the £GB can only continue falling until it reaches a new equilibrium that reflects the true state of the UK's efficiency in the production of goods and services. This problem can only be compounded by the production of more currency. The underlying value of a currency can be simplified as follows (ignoring investment overseas):

The total of goods and services produced in the country which have value in exchange with other countries divided by the units of currency in circulation.

In a fiat money system, if you increase the units of currency in circulation, without increasing the value of goods and services that you produce, the value of the currency must eventually fall. As such, in printing money, you create inflation on all imported goods and services. If you print with wild abandon, then you create massive inflation in imported goods and services. A simple case in point is oil, which has been falling in price around the world as demand for oil has been reducing. In principle, as a net importer, the UK should be seeing dramatic drops in the price of this input, but the reality is that the reduction of the cost of this commodity is ameliorated by the falling £GB.

Whilst the UK is seeing an absolute fall in the price of oil, it is seeing a relative increase in the price of oil in relation to countries whose currency is appreciating against the £GB. In other words, the UK is becoming poorer relative to those countries, even though it appears that oil is becoming absolutely cheaper. In practical terms, the UK worker must now work x number of hours more than a worker in another country to fill up his car with petrol (gas if you are a US reader). However, the falling price of oil is seen as deflationary by government and the central bank, such that their solution is to incorporate this in overall inflation, and print more money to prevent this deflation.

In doing so, they increase the supply of units of currency, the value of £ goes down further, thereby increasing the cost of oil imports, further impoverishing the individual filling up their car with petrol relative to a person in another country. Although the solution has prevented deflation within the country, it has also done so at the relative impoverishment of the person filling his car up with petrol. In this case the person is poorer as the value of his £GB has been transferred to the newly printed money.

The real question however, is how all of this will balance out. Will the fall in the £GB offset the fall in the price of commodities and counteract the fall in demand for a range of goods and services. I have argued that it is more probable that the plunge of the £GB will actually counteract the deflationary effects of contraction in demand through the increased cost of all imports. However this is not certain, as it depends on where the £GB will eventually settle. This in turn depends, in part, on the government.

However, a fundamental problem in all of this is whether deflation is a bad thing. For example, if the price of a loaf of bread deflates, is this a cause for worry? The answer to questions such as this largely depend on whether you are a saver or borrower. If you are a saver, you see the value of your savings increase in relation to the price of goods and services so you do very well in a deflationary environment. On the other hand, if you are a borrower, you see the value of your debt in relation to goods and services increase. This is very bad news for you. It is also unfortunate that so much has been done to encourage you into borrowing, and discourage you from saving.

If we look at the wider economy, there has been a problem that too many people have been borrowing for consumption, and not enough people have been saving. This is a problem. Deflation creates a situation in which individuals are motivated to pay down debt as fast as possible, and people are encouraged to save. This would represent a dramatic shift in the balance of borrowing and saving, and arguably a shift that would rebalance the economy away from being consumption driven to being driven towards saving and investment.

The counter argument is that this deferral of spending will create a self-reinforcing downward spiral of the economy, where nobody is producing anything due to lack of demand, as everybody is saving or paying down debt. However, if the economy has been balanced to much towards borrowing for consumption, and has therefore become imbalanced (the crux of my argument), then surely this is exactly what is needed. If the only thing supporting large parts of your economy is rooted in unsustainable borrowing, then the only solution is that the parts of the economy that have been artificially supported by that borrowing driven consumption must be allowed to be destroyed. They could not be sustained in any case. Deflation is just a mechanism of rebalancing.

Deflation would also have the effect of creating greater savings. In so doing the capital base of the financial system would effectively be fixed, but painfully so. Those banks that were overstretched would go to the wall, creating a period of further crisis. However, the surviving banks would end up accumulating capital, and would then be able to divert that capital into the process of economic recovery. With the £GB having fallen, and the true efficiency of the UK economy reflected in the realigned £GB, many new potential areas of business would once again become potentially competitive. Such new businesses will need capital in order to grow.

As such, B33ENN was correct when saying that if the government did not act as it is, there would be huge asset liquidations. Where he is wrong is that the government has the capability to save the economy by acting as a guarantor through printing money and borrowing. The fundamental point is that the current crisis is about the fundamental state of the economy, the inability to produce enough goods and services to exchange for our massive levels of importation of goods and services. It is the massive imbalance in the economy that is the problem. The real problem with the deflationary solution is not that it would lead to a rebalancing of the economy away from debt fuelled consumption, which is any case essential, but that it would do so in a very painful way. This is politically unacceptable, but absolutely MUST happen.

We then have to ask ourselves what will happen with the borrowing and money printing solution. As I pointed out in my last post, the banks are now offering interest rates that are a deterrent to saving. As such, the only way to fill the hole in bank capitalisation is through the government providing that capital. However, the government must either print money, causing inflation and further disincentive for saving, or borrowing. How can either of these solutions possibly help in rebalancing the economy away from consumption? On the one hand the money printing will further devalue the £GB, but that would in any case happen with the £GB falling to its natural equilibrium value. It would not really have any impact on the reduction of the value in relation to the equilibrium, it would just be a further devaluation for devaluation's sake. In other words, it will not change the equilibrium which is determined by relative efficiency in creating goods and services for exchange versus the number of units in circulation.

Printing more money just changes the number of units, not the equilibrium point.

In addition we need to remember that, as I have pointed out in many posts, the creation of fiat money in this way is a transfer of value from the existing money supply onto the new money. As such it is a form of taxation. In this situation, the government is both pointlessly devaluing currency and also massively increasing the tax burden in a time of economic crisis. In doing so they are impoverishing every investor, and every saver. The only result of such activity is eventually to kill investment activity, and create capital flight. Available capital and investment is the long term solution to the crisis, and will be needed to restructure the economy.

As for borrowing more money, the problem arises (as I have endlessly pointed out) that borrowing for consumption today (which is what the borrowed money would primarily be used for) means a contraction at some point in the future. In other words, it will delay the contraction now at the cost of a greater contraction in the future.

My argument is that what all of this money creation and borrowing amounts to is an attempt at pretending that the economy is actually still producing enough wealth to support the UK's high standard of living. Whilst the economy was previously built upon consumer borrowing, the government is seeking to replace the position of borrower and spender. One of the comments of B33ENN was the traditional role of central banks is to be the lender of last resort. In this case the government is becoming the borrower of last resort. What it is doing is pretending that we still create value in goods and services for exchange with other countries that we do not in fact do. Borrowing money is just a method to try to bury this reality.

In short, the UK has built an economy around consumption, and that consumption is built upon debt, and without the flood of credit into the UK, nothing is going to allow us to continue the service/consumption economic model. Whatever the government does, somewhere, somehow, there must be sufficient wealth creation to pay for the goods and services that we consume from our trading partners. Our trading partners have (foolishly) been extending credit to us for a long time. That has stopped. No amount of government intervention is going to prevent reality from emerging.

Whatever the government does, the bankruptcy, unemployment MUST happen, as the basic shape of the economy was directed towards unsustainable consumption built upon debt provided by wealth producing economies.

The government can guarantee all kinds of things, but in doing so the government will just transfer the damage from private companies and individuals to the government, making the government ever less solvent. The government can, of course, just keep printing more and more money to address this. However, in doing so they just destroy the value of money, and this MUST lead to hyper inflation. If you doubt this is the case, you may wish to read this article in the Telegraph. Quite simply people are losing their confidence in money, even in the 'mighty' $US. In the case of the article, the rich are moving into having physical holdings of golds - literally buying gold as an 'in the hand' physical asset. The rich have the ability to get sophisticated advice on how to invest their money, and are therefore in the vanguard of the collapse in confidence.

The whole point of this blog is to point out that there is something fundamentally wrong in the UK economy. It is no longer able to generate the wealth to support itself at the current standard of living. As such I was surprised to see B33EN suggesting that the government can somehow turn back economic reality. He is not alone in this. Many clever economists are effectively telling us that you can create something from nothing, but at some point the illusion must disappear. Creating money from thin air does not create value, it transfers value. At some point, somehow, you have to create value, and that means engaging in activity that creates something - wealth creation through selling goods or services that our trading partners want.

We are simply not doing enough of this. How can government guarantees, borrowing money, and printing money change this reality?

B33ENN is falling into the trap that many mainstream economists fall into, by looking at the situation as if it were complex. It is not. It is very simple. A strong economy is one in which you create things that others want exchange with you. Without that, there is nothing.

Government can not make wealth. It can not produce anything, it can only spend the money of those that create wealth, which is those who create something with value in exchange. The only role government can have in wealth creation is to set up an environment in which wealth creators can thrive. Destroying the value of money is not such a situation, and nor is the taxation implicit in money printing. It is simply a way of pretending that the fundamental problems do not exist. If you do not sell enough goods and services that people want, eventually they will not want to sell you anything, as you do not have anything they want in return.

It can not be put more simply than this. All the rest is nonsense. All the rest is window dressing that hides this reality.

It has been a bit of a meandering post (again), but as usual I have simply been writing my thoughts as they occur to me. I hope, however, that this makes sense. I hope that I have illustrated that any illusions of endless government interventions is just (at best) a delaying mechanism. The economy must change, and that change will under all circumstances be painful. I am not sure that I have given the post a good title, but I hope that it is roughly right.

Update to the Post: 14 January 2009

I mention a couple of times in the post that the fundamental problem of the UK economy is that it is just not very good at the creation of goods and services that other countries want to buy. The result is revealed painfully in this Telegraph article:
The trade gap ballooned to £8.3bn from £7.6bn in October, the highest level since records began in 1697, reflecting the fact that Britain is importing more from other countries than it is exporting. Economists had expected the deficit to narrow to £7.5bn because of sterling's sharp slide in the final few months of 2008.
This is a reflection of the underlying problems in the UK economy. Just as poor economic conditions expose the weakness of companies, it is the same with the economic position of countries. Even with a sinking currency, we are still importing more than we are exporting. However, we should also remember that there will be a time lag from currency change to the shift in the balance of trade. As such, whilst these figures probably reflect the exchange rate of the £ a few months ago, rather than now (e.g. in long supply chains, there will be delay before contracts expire, and new contracts sought)

A Note for one of the Regular Commentators, Steve Tierney: Steve, apologies but your post appears to have been lost by the Blogger system. I have had no email notification (I have checked through my inbox), and there is nothing in the system. Please be assured that your comments are seen as a welcome contribution to the blog, and I would not, in any case, not publish just because someone said something that I did not 'like'. As such please accept my apologies.

As a general note to all readers, I publish all comments provided that they are not spam, do not use bad language and...that is pretty well it. I am a follower of the political philosophy of Mill's 'On Liberty' on the issue of free speech, so do not undertake any censorship. Bad language is unacceptable, as it is unnecessary to express a point of view but can be offensive, so this is why this would not be published. Spam is deleted as it is just using the site for advertising for which the writers do not wish to pay, and adds nothing to the site.

I have had a complaint from a person for deleting a post which I believed was spam. I flicked through their very long web pages, and found that they were recruiting individuals into some kind of new form of investment. I read no further, and the person has complained that I did not understand what was written. My answer is simple - any offer of any kind of investment requires the capital of individuals. It is therefore treated as spam.

Monday, October 20, 2008

Economic Crisis - The Eye of the Hurricane before the 'Service Economy' Collapses

It seems that we have now entered a period of relative calm, following the storm of the bailout. For a while, following the Bernanke promise of yet more support for the finance system, stock markets rallied, only to later wobble on bad economic news. This is now becoming a pattern, where governments take action, markets have a fit of optimism, then the real economy offers bad news and pulls sentiment back down. In short, governments are pouring liquidity, guarantees, and borrowed money for short term bounces in confidence, completely ignoring the possibility that the underlying economy is in deep trouble.

I have spoken about the fact that GDP measures have been inaccurately measuring economic growth previously. I think it may be time to return to this theme, and take a look at why there is no escaping the simple fact that the US and UK economies must contract by such a large amount. Below is a chart of UK GDP growth:












And additionally a chart for US and Canadian GDP Growth (it includes Canada because this was the first good chart I found):

















So now we have one side of the equation. What of the increase in debt? First a chart for the UK and US as a percentage of disposable income:

















And now a chart for the US of absolute debt (the UK would look a similar shape):














My apologies for the variable sources for these charts, but I hope you can get a feel for the situation from these (I am rushed so just did a Google image search - I usually use the ONS but do not have the time to find the section). I did have a very good chart for the UK which shows that there has been a close correlation in debt growth and GDP, but have been able to dig it out again. However, if you review these charts, you will see that there during the recent boom, there has been a massive growth in debt. Like any figures that correlate the charts do not prove causation of GDP growth, but causation becomes more likely if there is an explanatory mechanism that can be identified.

So how can the increase in debt translate into GDP growth. I have discussed the multiplier effect, and also illustrated examples in 'A Funny View of Wealth'. The principle is very easy, and I will use the example in 'A Funny View of Wealth', as follows:

If we go back to Mr. Smith in the restaurant, we can see that he has borrowed money to finance his restaurant visit. In doing so he has decreased his wealth in order to fulfil a short term need. This is, partly, what wealth is for, but this is Mr. Smith’s future wealth that he is spending. This borrowed money that Mr. Smith has spent in the restaurant will then recycle throughout the economy in many ways. The restaurant owner will be a little wealthier, and will then spend some of the money on buying goods and services, the restaurant staff likewise, and so on. Furthermore there will be suppliers to the restaurant who will also be beneficiaries of the spending of Mr. Smith, as his consumption of foods will mean that the stock will need to be replenished, and the process of cooking will require energy, and some of his money may contribute to decorators, maintenance people and so on through all of the restaurant support services. We can then see the same process with each of these support services spending their small share of Mr. Smith’s transfer of wealth in a host of different ways, each further helping to support another layer of businesses.

It is only when we look at lots of versions of Mr. Smith, all borrowing money, all of which dissipates through the economy in a myriad of ways, that we can see what a dramatic effect this has on the economy. Throughout the UK economy there are millions of people who, just like Mr. Smith, are reducing their future wealth daily through the borrowing of money. Each of these individuals supports a multitude of businesses through each of their purchases of goods and services. This massive dispersion of borrowed money is financing large numbers of businesses, and the transfer of their (future) wealth that occurs is apparent in what appears to be a booming economy.
The reason why I am returning to this theme is that I have, on several occasions mentioned that the way that GDP is measured is flawed. In the case of borrowing, it can either be an internal transfer of wealth from within a country, or it can be from outside of the country. Much of the borrowing in the US and UK has been funded from overseas. Each time a person goes into a restaurant, or buys something on credit, there is a transfer of wealth out of the country, and a foregoing of future wealth. I will return to 'A Funny View of Wealth' again:

What if the money that provides the loan has been borrowed from outside of the UK, and the UK bank is effectively the ‘distributor’? In this case the transfer of wealth from Mr. Smith will go to the restaurant, the UK bank and the foreign bank. In this case, there has been a real transfer of wealth from Mr. Smith in the UK to the overseas bank that provided the finance for the credit. There is therefore a transfer of real wealth to the country of the overseas bank.

It could be argued at this stage that the overseas lender only has a very small amount of the total transfer of the wealth, and that the majority of the wealth goes to the restaurant owner. This is largely correct. However, depending on the status of the individual and the type of loan, the final interest that is paid on the loan might actually be very high, and translate into a large sum of money over the period of the loan. Some of this interest is profit for the UK bank, and some of the interest is profit for the foreign bank. If we say Mr. Smith is an overstretched credit user, with a moderate credit history, and give him a £500 balance on this credit card, an 18% interest rate, and ongoing minimum payments of 5% of the balance, this £500 will cost Mr. Smith a shocking £214 over the life of the loan. This is not an atypical profile for a heavy credit card user with a moderate credit history, but better and worse examples can be created in any number of permutations. In this case a £50 meal will see a transfer in wealth of £21 to the banking system from the restaurant goer, a significant loss of wealth to the individual, and a significant transfer of wealth to both the UK bank and the overseas bank. Different profiles will produce different results, and the example given is just to give a sense of the potential scale of the transfers. In this case we might hazard a guess that Mr. Smith has just transferred as much as £8 of his wealth to another country, in order to pay for a £50 meal, a meal that might otherwise have seen no transfer of wealth outside of the UK.

This is a very expensive transaction for both Mr. Smith and UK Plc, and has a negative impact on the overall wealth of both.
Despite this, the example of Mr. Smith above will be seen in the UK GDP figures as economic growth. My purpose here is not to recycle the original essay (which I recommend reading if you have not done so).

I have also not covered government debt in the charts, as you will all be aware of the growth in debt over the last few years, and this also creates a multiplier effect once it enters the economy.

The key point here is that the GDP figures do not reflect the reality of real growth in the economy, but growth in debt. If you factor in the multiplier effect, then it is even possible that the underlying growth of the economy might even have been negative. This is why I am predicting that the economy will have to drop back at least 10 years in growth terms, but quite possibly a lot more. As I have pointed out several times, the world was a kinder place for the West 10 years ago with still relatively little competition from countries such as China.

I thought I would add this post because the symptoms are now apparently arising from the disappearance of the debt based multiplier effect. Whilst the economy has been sliding very fast towards collapse, the first signs of spinning out of control have appeared. One of the first elements to go when consumers tighten their belts is discretionary spending. This means meals out, leisure activities of all kinds, and taxis in particular might be seen as the 'canary in the mine'. The reason for taxis being of particular interest is they are a particularly vulnerable form of discretionary spending, as there are always alternatives (albeit less convenient) to their use. They are also widely used in the evening, and are therefore a good symptom in the slowdown in leisure spending, such as restaurants, bars and nightclubs. Whilst there has been plenty of 'bad news' on consumer confidence and spending, I was struck by an article in which sales of new London black cabs are described as 'tumbling'. Whilst mainstream economists look to other (often abstracted) barometers, I am always looking for these kind of signals, as taxis are such a good barometer of spending behaviour. This example only applies to the UK, but the UK and US are going through a parallel process, so it might also be suggestive of the US position in the crisis.

From here we come to the real point of this post, the destruction of the service economy. Other articles are also starting to tell the tale (though the black cab story is the best illustration). For example, in the headlines today, there are calls for a fund to help small business survive the bad times, and another commentary is highlighting the plight of small businesses. Small business is at the heart of the service economy, and these businesses will be the first to really feel the pain. We should also remember that many of these small businesses will show a time lag before they start to appear in the bankruptcy figures. Again, the black cab story suggests that the we are now at a point where the pain has really kicked in. It is sad to say, but many small businesspeople will now be facing the hard fact that they are in deep trouble. The sole traders, and other small business people, are probably already appearing in the unemployment numbers, but the drip of new claimants will very shortly become a deluge.

If we strip out the debt led growth of the last 10 years, then the scale of the coming carnage in the economy becomes painfully apparent. Quite simply, most of the economy has been supported on a life support of debt, and now that life support has been switched off, we can start to see what will happen next. As I have said, the black cabs are the canary in the mine and we can now expect bankruptcy figures to soar.

Meanwhile, in the US, reportedly they are pressing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to boost lending, in a desperate attempt to regain credit driven growth. The same will happen in the UK, and there are already, for example, reports that pressure and/or legislation will be put in place to slow down the mortgage repossession process. We can expect to see more and more of such measures in the coming months. However, all they will do (at best) is create further losses for the financial institutions, and in many cases that will mean losses for governments.

Meanwhile, as time progresses, the fiscal position of both the UK and US government will deteriorate very rapidly, as the full savagery of the crisis are unleashed in the service sector. I am taking the black cab story as the signal that a new phase is starting in the economic collapse. I predicted the state of the economy as it now stands, as an ever faster downward spiral. I recently identified that all of the elements of the collapse were in place. I think that we are now about to see an even more rapid acceleration. The unemployment figures are going to rise at an ever faster rate, along with a massive rise in government expenditure, and government receipts are about to fall through the floor.

As such, I am very sorry to say that we are moving on track for the first government credit crisis, which I predicted a couple of weeks ago (as coming within three months). I suspect that the UK will go first, as the position in the UK is far more acute, and the US will follow shortly after. At the moment, the pattern of disaster is starting to emerge into reality, just as it did for the bank failures. Just as when I predicted the bank failures, the failure of (at the very least) the UK government is now probably irreversible. There was a brief period during which they could have built a buffer of confidence for creditors with a tough program of reform, but I believe that the moment has passed and the course is set.

At this stage, you might consider that this a fairly extreme analysis from the news about purchases of new taxis. However, if you think about the behaviour of your friends and family in their use of taxis, you will see why this is such a stark warning. If the money is drying up in the taxi business to this degree, then the rest of the economy is very likely freezing very fast.

Note 1: I have had an intriguing post from a regular commentator, who posts under the name Lemming. Lemming had the following to say:
Are you absolutely sure that our creditors will be turning the taps off any time soon? Is China, in fact, happy to fund our lifestyles indefinitely so they can simply 'buy' the West in the long term? To me, that sounds like a perfectly rational explanation, and Western politicians who espouse globalisation would be more than happy to facilitate it, I imagine, even if they were unaware of exactly what they were signing up for.
I have to admit, this a fair point. If China keeps lending, they will gain formidable economic power in the long term. As such, it is a very real possibility, and I can not discount that this might be a reason for continued lending. However, as China slows down, they might need to start to redeem some of that lending in order to support their own economy through the crisis, and will want to use whatever resources for that purpose, restricting their ability to lend. In this situation, depending on what happens with the Chinese economy, they may not have the option of continued support for the West. Another commentator kindly posted the following link, and I will repost it here as it applies:

Note 2: Another poster has kindly posted a link here. It makes interesting reading, in particular the article of 1998, financial capitalism vs industrial capitalism. I recommend it to all readers.

Note 3: Jeremy commented as follows:
Darling's plan of bringing spending forwards is truly dreadful. I can only imagine that he thinks that it might boost the economy prior the the next election as a last ditch effort for labour to avoid complete wipeout. I suspect the chances of that are nearly as small as the grey nobbly organ situated between his ears. Either way, we can reasonably expect sterling to get trashed in the process and look forward to some serious inflationary pressure moving into 2009.
This was a prescient comment, as £sterling has been tanking. The curiosity is the $US is still acting as a 'safe haven'. How much longer? Not much longer, I believe, though perhaps it will take the default of a major rich world government to finally do it? Meanwhile, would you lend into anything demoninated in £sterling at the moment? I think others will have their doubts too - which means that demand for £sterling to lend back into the UK will probably fall back, creating a stronger downward spiral.

Note 4: LordSidCup has the following to add to some other interesting comments:
My point is; if the politicians and financial elites could use whatever means to get confidence high again, is it possible that after after a correction things could stay the roughly the same/ a lower level ) for many more years, if not indefinitely?

Also, there are all these interbank debts looming, Credit Swaps etc, why don't the most important banks get together and write them off? I assume that would be painful, but as its all abstract wealth created as debt, what would it matter?
For the first point, others widely share this idea, but confidence is not a magic force but has to be rooted in something. If every day brings news of an ever slowing economy, ever smaller government receipts, then how can a government maintain confidence. Without the fuel of debt, it is impossible that confidence can be maintained, as I have outlined here. This is why every attempt to pour money into the economy sees a subsequent later fall in confidence. Reality just keeps on intruding and governments just do not have the resource to bail out both the financial sector and the rest of the economy.

For the second, the Credit Default Swaps are guarantees against default. They are therefore an insurance policy that moves real damage in the economy to a different place. Whatever happens, somebody will make the loss, and it is just a question of who will suffer. Note added approx 1 hour after the post: MattinShanghai has commented below on this answer and has pointed out that I have blundered. One of the wonders of the online world is that, when we make an error, we are soon corrected. Apologies to LordSidCup, for an incorrect answer....I will rethink and hopefully, if I have enough time enough to get my facts straight, will reply again.

A note to my note, added a little later.....MattinShanghai is quite correct to say that there is no knowing the size of the market, due to the private nature of the transactions. However, the products are an insurance contract, according to a reference I quickly checked: 'The seller sells protection (buys risk) and generally receives a fee for this protection' ('Credit derivatives and Synthetic Structures', J Tavakoli, 2001, p5). A note of caution however, as this in derivatives terms is a little dated as a reference. Apparently they are called swaps to avoid regulation as an insurance, which I dug out from Wikipedia, as I could not find anything more substantive in the economics journals on why they are not classified as an insurance. However, they still appear to be an insurance, whatever the legal niceties that determines their name. I think Matt is referring to the fact that:

'Economically, a CDS buyer is tantamount to a short seller of the bond underlying the CDS. Whereas a person who owns a bond profits when its issuer is in a position to repay the bond, a short seller profits when, among other things, the bond goes into default. Importantly, CDS buyers do not have to own the bond or other debt instrument upon which a CDS contract is based. This means CDS buyers can "naked short" the debt of companies without restriction.' from here.

It is, as Matt said possible to buy an insurance against another person's house burning down. The point I think that Matt is making is that, in principle, it is possible for LordSidCup suggests to happen. This is I believe the comment Matt made about the fact that the counterparties being on the line for more than the value of the original debt - the ability to profit from debt default....

However, the complete abandonment of the CDS contracts would presumably hit some institutions harder than others. In the current situation, where the banks are so exposed to wider damage as a result of defaults, in principle I can not see why it would not be possible to write them off if they could see a common interest in their survival as a group. The trouble is that the institutions who stand to gain would have a very tough time being able to justify their giving up their positions. Such a position moves into game theory, and requires trust and cooperation from all parties to secure a common good - it is not a zero sum game. It would face problems of imperfect information, due to the private nature of the transactions. Who does hold what, and what is their exposure, or their potential for gain? I am probably doing injury to game theory here, but hope that the answer helps. Thank you Matt for your clarification, and thank you LordSidCup for what was a far more challenging question than I originally considered. I also think that there is more to the point being made by Matt, so any further clarification will be welcomed. In the meantime, time allowing I will look at this a little more, and may add a further note if I have anything more to add. I am not sure that I have yet got to the root of the question, or the operation of CDS contracts. Even as I am writing, I have found a helpful quote on the underlying principle of CDSs which I hope will help others (The Journal of Finance, Volume 60, Issue 5 (p 2255-2281)'An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relationbetween Investment-Grade Bonds and CreditDefault Swaps'), & a good introduction to first principles.
'Single-name credit default swaps (CDS) account for around half of the credit
derivatives market. They are the most liquid of the several credit derivatives
currently traded and they form the basic building blocks for more complex
structured credit products.1 A single-name CDS is a contract that provides
protection against the risk of a credit event by a particular company or country.
The buyer of protection makes periodic payments to the protection seller until
the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract, whichever
is first. If a credit event occurs, the buyer is compensated for the loss incurred
as a result of the credit event, which is equal to the difference between the par
value of the bond or loan and its market value after default.
2. CDSs provide a very easy way to trade credit risk. Many corporate bonds are
bought by investors who simply hold them to maturity (Alexander, Edwards,
and Ferri (1998)). Secondary market liquidity is therefore often poor, thereby
making the purchase of large amounts of credit risk in the secondary cash
market difficult and costly (Schultz (1998)). Shorting credit risk is even more
difficult in the cash market. The repurchase agreement (repo) market for risky
bonds is often illiquid, and even if a bond can be shorted on repo, the tenor of
the agreement is usually very short. Credit derivatives, especially CDS, allow
investors to short credit risk over a longer period of time at a known cost by
buying protection.'
Matt may well be right that they are another bomb about to go off. No doubt they will add to the damage, but I still think that they are more likely to just relocate it. Defaults may melt one institution's balance sheet, but will improve that of another (assuming that the institution can pay). It all depends on the how many times the same house has been insured by whom, and that is not clear. This returns to LordSidcups question - as the lack of knowledge is a source of fear and that threatens stability further. In writing off the credit default swaps, the system as a whole would benefit, and that would be big plus for all instituions. However, I was not previously aware of some aspects of these derivatives, and suspect my knowledge is still imperfect. I would like to look at this more closely, but that is it for time for the moment.

Origninal post continues below......

I'm afraid that is all I have time for today.

Note 5: Despite my assertion of having finished, it should be noted that the LIBOR has fallen, which will hearten those who supported the bank bailout. However, is this because the state owned banks are now lending again because it is required, or because they think it is wise to do so? I do not know the answer, but in any case, the bad news in the economy feeding into more losses will drag the rate back up, unless the government has very deep pockets indeed....

Note 6: Oil has now dropped into the $60-70 per barrel level, as I predicted would happen. However, much, much sooner than I expected. For once, the news is positive, as the drop in oil prices will be a major positive for the world economy - as long as OPEC does not spoil the party by cutting back on production.