Saturday, July 25, 2009
Reforming Money - Fixed Fiat Currency
I have long promised a discussion of a system of fixed fiat currency, and the discussion that follows is my first attempt at this। It is a very long discussion, and I hope that you will have the patience to plough through such volume (I guess that many will not). However, I do hope that it will prove to be an interesting potential system that might help prevent a repeat of the current economic crisis.
The fixed fiat currency system proposed here will not please any school of economics, as within the proposed system is something to cause consternation within each school. The discipline of macroeconomics is currently going through a period of turmoil as a result of the economic crisis that is engulfing the world. Leading economists such as Krugman are calling into question many of the foundations of macroeconomic theory, and debate is commencing on both the causes and solutions to the current economic crisis. The fixed fiat currency proposed here is an addition to that debate.
In order to understand the fixed fiat currency system there is a necessity to return to the basic question of what money actually is. Furthermore, once the nature of money is explained, it is apparent that any system of money must also include non-traditional forms of money, and that will mean that the proposed system must also take into account the financial system.
The proposed system is not perfect. It will not remove booms, it will not provide for social justice or any other ‘magic’ solution to the economic ills of the world. However, it offers greater stability, transparency and above all honesty and fairness. The latter notions are curiously absent from most macroeconomic discussion, which is puzzling as economics has a foundation in human endeavour.
The article is sparsely referenced, but includes ideas such as the value of labour which is rooted in the work of Karl Marx, critiques of fiat money which owe a debt to the many articles on the von Mises Institute website, and the overall theory and work of Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations is an important overall inspiration.
There have, of course, been other sources, but none of these are specific such that they might be referenced. Overall, the majority of the considerations are the result of personal analysis and thought arrived at independently. This does not preclude the possibility of others already having come to similar conclusions or ideas, and I will apologise in advance if these ideas have been proposed by others.
Due to the relatively independent way in which this has been considered, robust but polite critiques are welcomed. It is, after all, the musings of an individual barely schooled in any economic theory.
The Nature of Money
The first point to make is that all economic activity is rooted in the value of labour. A commodity such as gold only has value once labour has dug it from the ground, and labour has moved it to the surface. Once it arrives at the surface it will be some form of labour that is utilised to move it to where it is next utilised.
For example, if a commodity is moved by truck, the truck represents a store of the value of labour of others, with the truck being a representation of a long chain of economic activity rooted in labour. From the commodities dug from the ground and being processed, the transportation, sale and processing of the commodities, the purchase by component manufacturers of the commodities and the final assembly of the truck, each step of the manufacture of components is rooted in the labour of individuals.
At the heart of all economic activity is human labour, and economics is the process of exchange of value of labour between individuals, organisations and other economic units.
Within this system of exchange of value of labour, the underlying purpose of money is very clear. It should only act as a medium through which the value of labour might be accounted, and is always representative of a store of value of labour, with an underlying contract that it might, at some future point in time, be exchanged for the value of labour of others.
Any system of money should seek to represent the value of labour in a way that is both fair and stable, such that the underlying contract is met regardless of elapsed time. Such a system implies that the value of money should be a neutral token to be used in the exchange of value of labour, such that it offers a fair exchange as determined by how individuals and organisations value the labour of each other. The purpose here is not to discuss the rights and wrongs of how one person’s labour might be valued against another, which is a debate about social justice, but rather to identify that all economic activity is the exchange of value of labour.
If we view what might constitute money as it is defined here, it is possible to see that there are two forms of money that operate within an economy. The first form of money is the issuance by government of fiat currency, which might be called ‘traditional money’ for the sake of ease of expression. This is the money that is currently created by central banks in the form of banknotes and coins, as well as by entries in the balance sheets of banks. At present, the issuance of such money is controlled by central banks according to their understanding of the underlying state of the economy, and historically has seen a progressive and continual expansion of the money supply wherever the system has been enacted.
The other form of money is IOU money. To illustrate the principle of IOU money, a simple illustration might serve to explain how it is created, and from where the value in IOU money is derived. This will also aid in understanding of the value of traditional money, as the two types of money interact throughout an economy, and traditional money is just a particular form of IOU money.
If we think of an individual (we will call him Fred) in a small town who is short of traditional money, he might visit his local pub and talk with his associates in the pub about exchanging his labour in return for pints of beer. In return for the pints of beer, Fred might promise the individuals who are buying the beer for him that he will mow their lawns which will take one hour of his labour in their garden. This means that one pint of beer = one mowed lawn, which represents one hour of labour for each pint of beer that has been purchased for him. As he is drinking beer, he is worried he will forget to whom he has offered his services, and will therefore provide a slip of paper offering one mowed lawn to be undertaken next week.
Fred, being a heavy drinker, starts to issue many IOUs and Henry has exchanged pints of beer for two IOUs. However, on reflection, Henry decides that he only needs one mowing of his lawn next week, and wonders what he might do with the IOU. He then sees a friend with a sandwich and offers the IOU to the friend, in exchange for half the sandwich. The friend accepts the IOU and provides half a sandwich.
What we are seeing is the creation of money. Fred, in offering a future commitment of his labour, is creating IOU money. It serves as money, as the IOU notes have become a recognised unit of exchange. When the person exchanged the sandwich for the IOU, he was exchanging the sandwich on the basis that the value of labour stored in the sandwich would be exchanged in the future for the value of Fred’s labour. In so doing an exchange of labour has taken place, and an underlying contract has been created. The IOU also acts as a measure/account of value of labour, as we are starting to see that one hour of labour in a garden = one pint or half a sandwich.
At the moment, Fred’s IOU money is ‘good’ money. Everybody in the pub accepts Fred’s IOUs as money, and Fred continues to drink beer in exchange for the IOU money. At the end of the first day, rather drunk, he staggers out of the pub having exchanged 15 IOUs for pints. He returns to the pub the next day and, being a heavy drinker, does the same thing. On the third day that he returns to the pub, he tries once again to make the exchange of IOUs for beer. However, as he enters the pub, he meets a cold reception.
Fred now owes 30 hours of gardening for next week. An individual in the pub has pointed out that Fred is already employed by a gardening firm, and that his ordinary working hours are 40 hours per week. This will mean that next week, Fred will need to undertake 70 hours of labour. There are doubts in the pub that he is this hard working and, just before he came into the pub, one of his IOUs was therefore hurriedly exchanged for a packet of peanuts, which are half the price of half a sandwich in traditional money. Confidence in the money being issued by Fred has fallen. The currency has devalued due to lack of confidence in Fred meeting the contract in his IOUs.
Fred is thirsty and alarmed at the lack of confidence in his IOUs. He therefore decides to take measures to restore the value of his IOU money. He explains to everyone in the pub that, if he does not meet his gardening commitments, he will instead provide the holders of the IOUs with some of his gardening tools. Whilst many people do not want the gardening tools, having the IOUs backed by the tools means that, at least, if all else fails, they might sell the tools in lieu of the labour owed. Fred’s IOU money is now backed by assets, and Fred is now able to continue exchanging IOUs for beer.
Within this scenario, it is possible to see how the value of money is created and maintained. In all cases the money is backed by, or representative of, the value of labour. Even when Fred backs his IOU money with his tools, the tools represent a store of value of labour of others. In all cases, the money is an IOU of value of labour, and the value of money is determined by the confidence in Fred’s ability to deliver that value next week.
In the case of traditional money, the same thing occurs. It is accepted on the basis that it will, at a future point in time, represent a contract for the exchange of labour. It is identical to what Fred has done, but is different in that it represents a wider pool of labour, and is abstracted away from being a single variant of value of labour. Whilst Fred’s money uses units of one hour of gardening as the base unit of measure, traditional money has no single base unit to measure against. This is different to, for example, a gold standard currency, in which the commodity becomes the base unit of measure.
We can also see in the case of Fred how money holds value when supported by an asset. If we look at a commodity standard, or the issuance of asset backed securities, we can see that asset backed money simply offers a substitute of stored value of labour in place of the future commitment of labour.
However, there is a problem with asset backed money. If we imagine that Fred is very lazy, and fails to meet his future commitment of the value of his labour, he will have to offer a large number of his tools in lieu of his labour. Many of the recipients of the tools will want to sell them, and the result will be a flood of tools being offered for sale in the local classified section of the local newspaper. However, there is no reason why there might be a sudden demand for so many tools within the town, and therefore many of the tools cannot be sold. The holders of the tools are faced with holding on to the tools in hope of later demand for the tools, or selling them at a steep discount. They believed that the tools were a substitute for the hour of gardening labour, but find out that they are not.
This point is the underlying problem with any asset backed form of money. Whilst, in the case of Fred, he has offered an assurance over and above his promise to deliver, the value of that underlying assurance does not necessarily represent the actual value of labour that is contracted in the money that he is issuing. The same point may be made for any money secured by an asset, such as gold backed currency. The value of the underlying asset is subject to fluctuation, such that it may advantage or disadvantage the holder of the money, with no reference to any labour undertaken by the holder. The same might be said for any commodity currency, such as gold coins or silver, which might be subject to variations such that each unit changes value in relation to the value of labour.
What is apparent from the example of Fred’s money is that the only real value of money resides in the meeting of the underlying contract of provision of value of labour. In other words, the only way to achieve the full value of Fred’s IOU money is for Fred to actually do the hour of gardening work promised in the IOU, which means one mowed lawn. In practical terms, therefore, any good money system should not be based in assets but in firm commitments for the fair exchange of the value of labour at a future point in time.
Current Fiat Currency Systems
In the current fiat currency system, it is apparent that the currency is neither fixed against an asset, and is not fixed against any value of labour in the economy. The issuance of the money is not referenced to the potential output of value of labour in the economy, and the supply of money is continually inflated. It is like Fred offering ever more IOUs regardless of whether he might meet the contract for each unit offered. The issue of each unit of currency does not represent the actual value of labour in the economy, and is issued independently of this.
An interesting comparison with current fiat systems is the issuance of currency in the online world of Second Life. It is a currency issued by the owners of the Second Life world, is utilised for exchange within the world and can be converted into $US through a currency exchange. Both currencies are as arbitrary as one another, as neither currency is rooted in anything. People are now earning a living in Second Life, and use the currency exchange to allow them to convert their online value of labour into ‘real world’ money.
As an example of the problem of un-rooted currency, if we were to imagine the economy has a total daily output of 100 units of labour, and Joe provides one unit of that labour, the value of Joe’s labour is worth 1% of the total value of labour in the economy. If today we have 100 units of money in circulation, Joe will be given 1 unit of money as a result of his labour, and Joe would hope to be able to exchange his money for 1% of the total value of labour the next day. However, if the units of money are increased by ten units the next day, then Joe’s 1 unit can no longer be used in exchange for the 1% of the total value of labour.
The problem arises as to where that value of Joe’s labour has gone? He undertook the labour, stored his labour in the unit of money, and some of it has now disappeared. He might reasonably think that this is unfair and unjust. He might reasonably ask where that value has gone.
The value has, of course, been transferred to the newly issued money। They have, in effect, taken some of the value of Joe’s labour from him. Whoever issued the money, they are now in a position to utilise that value of labour that has taken from Joe to exchange with the value of labour of others. In so doing, they have expropriated some of the value of Joe’s labour. Any such system is inherently unfair and unjust. The new holders of the value of Joe’s labour have not actually done anything which might justify their expropriation of his labour. If Joe’s labour was building a brick wall, and his payment was made for this task, it is not clear how someone who made no efforts or contribution to the building of the brick wall might have a portion of the value of that labour of building the brick wall.
An interesting point to note is that, once a central bank creates money, as is pointed out by the Austrian economists, the first recipients of the newly created money are banks. The earlier the money is utilised, the greater the value of the money that is retained, as it takes a while before the newly created money creates inflation in the economy. The issuance of new currency is therefore beneficial to the banks that receive it.
The problems extend beyond this. Such a system also undermines the utility of the money as a neutral account of the value of labour. If the supply of money is variable, it is not possible to calculate the relative value of labour now with the value of labour in the future with the money. How is it possible to exchange the money today at ‘x’ units of value of labour, if we do not know that we will, in the future have ‘x’ units returned to us. It makes the value of money arbitrary, and inherently unstable.
Furthermore, in the current world trading system, it is apparent that it is possible to manipulate currency issuance in order to pursue quasi-mercantilist policies. It is also possible for governments to impoverish sections of their society in order to meet state goals, and to hide fiscal imprudence through the manipulation of currency. These points will be discussed later.
Fixed Fiat Currency System
The only way that a system of money might offer both stability and fairness is to instigate a system of money that represents each individual’s actual input of value of labour into the wider economy that is utilising the money. The only way to do this is to fix the currency against the actual value of labour in the economy. This means that each unit of money becomes a token that represents ‘x’ percent of the total value of labour in the economy. In order that the token always represents such a percentage, the number of tokens must be invariant.
There are several advantages in such a system, which will be addressed later, as follows:
1. A fairer system of money, that allows more individual freedom of choice
2. Greater stability of the financial system, with a tendency towards consistent and steady price deflation
3. A system in which asset and other bubbles might be more evident, providing an early warning of the formation of bubbles
4. A more transparent world trading system that has self-balancing characteristics, and which will provide a fiscal discipline upon government
5. Allowance for a more transparent banking regulation system, and the removal of most current banking regulation.
The Problem of Currency Units
One of the potential arguments that might be provided against a fixed fiat system is that it provides for a system that will trend towards deflation (discussed later). In a situation of continual deflation, there is a potential problem with the utility of currency units. This is best illustrated with an extreme example. If we were to imagine that the Normans has instigated a fixed fiat currency in England in 1066, and there were 100,000 units of currency, each unit today would hold a value of labour that would make such units impractical for day to day usage.
As such, it would be necessary to break such units up into smaller units, to allow for the multitude of small exchanges that are necessary within an economy. The way that this might be accomplished without the inflation of the money supply is to view each unit of currency as if it were, for example, a loaf of bread. If the loaf is cut into smaller slices to share it out, the loaf of bread remains but in the form of many slices. It is still just one loaf of bread that is being shared out.
In the same way, as each individual currency unit becomes less useful, the currency would then be subdivided into smaller units, with the subdivision meaning that there is no actual change in the overall value of the original unit, just that the value is split amongst the new units. In practical terms, if we issue 100 pence in coins, we must destroy the £1 note that was divided.
Steady Deflation
One of the great advantages of a fixed fiat currency system is that it provides for a system which will achieve steady and consistent inflation. The assertion that this is advantageous might horrify many economists, and therefore requires some explanation. In particular, there appears to be a widespread belief that deflation is a ‘bad thing’. There is no evidence that this is the case, but rather there is plenty of evidence that a change in the rate of inflation or deflation, or a move from inflation to deflation is damaging.
However, before moving to the effects of change, it is worthwhile destroying some myths about deflation. The first myth is that deflation prevents individuals from making purchases, whilst they wait for better prices. In the following examples, it will be shown that the reality is that people do not delay purchases in the expectation of lower prices.
Example 1 – Fast Moving Consumer Goods
If a shampoo manufacturers were to improve their output by 5% through a manufacturing innovation each year, their output of shampoo would increase, and this would reflect in a decrease in the price of shampoo. In other words, there will be a steady and continued deflation in the price of shampoo. According to the idea that consumers will delay purchases in an environment of deflation, in such a situation, consumers would choose to walk around with greasy hair, never buying shampoo in the expectation of further price decreases. Such a proposition is fatuous.
Example 2 – Hedonic Goods
Over the last few years countries such as the UK have seen the emergence of many discount airlines, such as Easyjet. The emergence of these kinds of airlines, and the increase in competition within the sector, has seen the price of air travel deflating. Much of the utilisation of these airlines has been by consumers using the discount airlines to have cheap foreign holidays, and this can be described as a hedonic good. It is an entirely discretionary expenditure as there is no necessity to go on holiday to another country. Despite the continual deflation, there have been many years of continual expansion in the discount air travel market. The deflation has not prevented consumers from taking flights to go on holiday, but rather has had the opposite effect.
Example 3 – Computers
Personal computers (PCs) are an interesting case, as they have year on year improved performance and year on year seen deflation of actual prices. It is also an example that includes both business purchases and consumer purchases. Despite the ongoing deflation in the prices, the market for PCs has had a long period of explosive growth throughout this deflationary period. It seems that the steady deflation in prices has had no impact through the postponement of purchases.
Example 4 – Special Cases
Remaining with the example of PCs, it is possible to construct a hypothetical example of how consumers might indeed delay their purchase in expectation of deflation. If one of the large computer manufacturers were to announce that they would be introducing a new type of computer in the coming year, and that the computer was to offer twice the performance at half the cost, it is quite likely, assuming their claim were credible, that consumers might delay their purchase of computers in expectation of this future deflation.
If the thinking of those who argue against deflation is considered, such a deflation is a ‘bad thing’ as consumers withhold their money in expectation of lower prices. If this logic is followed, then the new and more effective design of computer is not a good thing for the economy, as it has created a deflation in the price of computers, and has caused a delay in the purchasing of computers. However, once the computer is introduced, it will make more computing power available to more people. How this might be a ‘bad thing’ is not entirely clear. Everyone who purchases a computer sees their wealth increase, as they are able to enjoy relatively more computing power in relation to their income. They are quite literally wealthier.
Debt and Deflation
There is an argument that suggests that deflation causes problems with the servicing of debt, as the value of the debt sees relative increases through the deflation. This is a scenario that appears to be very plausible, and can be backed by some solid calculations and formulae. However, what is missed in such arguments is that it is not deflation that is problematic, but the move from inflation to deflation. It is not the change in the value of money that is problematic, but the change in inflation/deflation from the original inflation/deflation position from the time of the issuance of the loan.
A good example of this can be seen in private mortgages on housing. If a loan is taken out in a high inflation environment, the interest rate will be relatively high. The targeted central bank interest rate will be high, and the lenders will seek to account for the high inflation by charging a rate of interest that will overcome the devaluation of the money that they are lending, such that they can achieve a positive return. If the interest rate is fixed over a period of, for example, five years and at year four the rate of inflation has fallen by a half, the holder of the debt is effectively seeing the value of their debt inflating. The earlier rate of inflation was eroding the value of their overall debt, and this was accounted for in the interest rate. However, with inflation falling, their debt value is no longer declining at the same high rate, but they are still servicing the debt as if this were the case. Their payments in relation to the actual value of the debt have increased.
If we think of this example and think of a change in the rate of inflation from 5% to 2%, and compare this with a change from 2% inflation to deflation of 1%, we can see that there is the same process taking place. In both cases we are seeing the relative burden of debt in relation to income moving in exactly the same way. In the inflation and deflation environment, interest rates will move to reflect the underlying changes in the value of money, and debt burdens will be locked into repayments that are based upon an out of date criterion.
In other words, it is not inflation or deflation that is problematic, but rather it is the change in inflation/deflation that alters the burden of the debt. As such, any monetary system should aim to achieve either stable inflation or stable deflation.
Fixed Fiat and Deflation
A fixed fiat system does not guarantee stability of deflation, but does have features which will inherently stabilise the rate of deflation. If it remembered that a fixed fiat currency is tied to the total value of labour in the economy that is issuing the currency, it is apparent why this is the case.
If output of value of labour in an economy increases, the value of labour per unit of currency will also see a commensurate increase. This is the deflationary effect of a fixed fiat currency. However, there is no guarantee of an increase in output of value of labour. For example, if there were no technological or process improvements over a period of time (unlikely), then there would be no inflation or deflation. Equally, if for example there were a natural disaster that destroyed infrastructure, then the output from the economy would fall, creating inflation.
External inflation such as an increase in commodity prices might also create inflation, though these inputs might reasonably be isolated from the overall measure of inflation/deflation in the economy. These are factors that can not be changed from within an economy, as they are resultant from both internal factors and external factors that are beyond any action in any individual country. For example, if there is a poor worldwide harvest of wheat, this might see food price inflation across the world.
No monetary policy or manipulation of the money supply will alter the amount of available wheat in the world. As such, any shift in prices of commodities might cause a temporary shift in inflation/deflation, but there is no monetary policy that might influence this. The only thing to do with such changes is monitor their effects, and try to strip out their effects from the trend of inflation and deflation.
In most cases, deflation will follow the gradual and progressive level of increased efficiency resultant from step-by-step innovations in process and technologies. However, if there were a major innovation, such as the introduction of new highly efficient technology, there might be a resultant period of relatively high deflation, as output increases rapidly such that the value of each unit of currency rapidly increases.
Real cases in history that might cause rapid deflation in a fixed fiat system would be the introduction of electricity into manufacturing, or the introduction of railways. In both cases, the introduction of the technologies resulted in higher output per unit of labour, such that there was a widespread overall increase in the value of labour across the economy. This is a positive form of deflation, as the overall output of value of labour has increased without an increase in the volume of available labour. The economy has simply become wealthier. This is best represented in the earlier argument about the introduction of a far better PC. We should wish for this kind of dramatic deflation.
Hoarding of Money in Deflation
It is possible to read in accounts of deflation the use of the word ‘hoarding’. Before discussing why people might invest in a deflationary environment, it is worth addressing the word ‘hoarding’. It is a word with particular connotations, such as the idea of a dragon hoarding gold. Within such connotations it is possible to perceive that there is an emotive meaning in that the word implies selfishness and greed. The use of such an emotive word should therefore start to ring alarm bells, as it is a rhetorical device rather than a reasoned argument.
However, there is an underlying concern that, in an environment of deflation, people will simply use cash as their method of saving, rather than using their money to invest in new productive activities. This appears to be a plausible argument.
Nevertheless, it is not as plausible as it seems. The underlying argument is that, if there is deflation, the value of cash is in any case going to increase over time, so why would an individual risk making an investment if they can just ‘sit on’ their cash and see a positive return.
The problem with this argument is that it does not account for the variable levels of risk that individuals are willing to take in order to see a return on their money. For example, in the environment pre-economic crisis, there were a range of investment opportunities, each with a relatively different level of risk. An individual in the UK might have placed their money in government bonds at a low rate of return but with very low perceived risk, or they might have invested their money in a perceived high risk and potential high reward emerging market tracker fund. We know that people invested their money in both of these investments, and this clearly demonstrates that different individuals at different points in their lives will be willing to take varying risks with their accumulated store of the value of their labour.
In a situation of steady deflation, the behaviour of individuals will not change. Some individuals will ‘sit on’ their money, and others will seek to gain a return on their money that is greater than the return provided by the deflation. The key difference in the system is that the necessity of investment is taken away, such that no individual is forced to risk their capital. If we think of an individual approaching retirement, due to continual inflation, they must risk the value of their labour stored throughout their life, if they are to retain the full value of the store. In doing so, they also risk the loss of that capital with the result that they might live through an impoverished retirement. There seems to be no reasonable justification to force such a risk on any individual.
Within a fixed fiat system of steady deflation, it is apparent that some individuals will utilise their store of labour value to invest in order to gain a return, and others will enjoy the benefits of retaining the value of their store in relative security. Whilst there are no guarantees that sitting on cash will preserve the purchasing power of that cash (e.g. the natural disaster example), the holder of the cash has the assurance that he/she will remain as wealthy relative to others under all circumstances.
Interest Rates and Investment in a Fixed Fiat System
In a period of steady deflation, how will investment actually work? It is an interesting question that is far simpler than it might first appear. If we were to imagine a steady rate of deflation of 2%, how might interest rates be determined?
As has been outlined, it is possible to ‘sit on’ cash, and that cash will then yield an annual return of 2%. In order to persuade an individual to invest, it is necessary to offer a higher yield relative to the perceived risk in the investment. In looking at the problem this way, it is apparent that investment decisions are no different to the choice that was outlined in the example of an inflationary environment. If inflation is running at a rate of 3%, an individual might seek a real return on their investment of 5%. As such, they will direct their investment to an area where they will expect a total return on their investment of 8%. If the rate of deflation is 2% they will, using the same calculation, seek an investment with a return of 3%. In both cases they are aiming for the same real return, and will make the same risk/reward calculation. There is absolutely no difference except that the individual has a choice on whether they might invest their money at all.
What if the rate of deflation was very high? The first point to understand is that a high rate of deflation means that the economy is actually very successful. It simply means that the output of the overall value of labour has seen a significant increase. In real terms, the economy is wealthier overall.
However, should the deflation reach a very high level, for example an extreme deflation of 10%, there will be a problem in presenting investments that might attract individuals to take risks. The rate of return on the investment would have to be very high, as few people would be willing to take risks when they can earn a 10% return by ‘sitting on’ their cash. The result would be that the flow of money for investment would diminish, and the speed of the growth in the output of the economy would be constrained. The question here is whether this might be a good or a bad outcome.
If the output of the economy is expanding at such a rapid rate, it is quite possible that there will be a period in which there will be ‘irrational exuberance’. The history of the many examples of how individuals might become carried away with a particular class of investment needs no retelling, from the South Sea bubble, to the more recent housing bubble.
However, there have also been other bubbles which have been resultant from the introductions of new technologies, such as the telecoms or Internet bubbles. In both cases, there were significant innovations which had potential to increase output in the economy, and in both cases early investment yielded strong returns. However, in both cases the early returns led to manias, and those manias saw significant overinvestment in the sectors, so that overinvestment took place with a resultant misallocation of resources.
In a fixed fiat currency system, the deflation that would result from the expansion in the economy would present a natural stabiliser on investment during technological innovation. It might be argued that the high deflation would ‘starve’ the new technology of capital for expansion, but the opposite view is that each innovation might be ‘digested’ before any manias developed. This is not to say that a fixed fiat system would guarantee no manias, as people will always have the potential for ‘irrational exuberance’ under any system. However, if an innovation creates dramatic deflation, the deflation might cause far greater caution in further investments, and therefore act as an automatic stabiliser.
As the drop in investment takes place, the growth in the output of the economy will start to moderate, and the economy should stabilise back towards a steadier rate of deflation. Whilst giving the extreme example of 10%, it is unlikely that there might be such extremes, as the stabilising effect is progressive and self correcting. One of the underlying strengths of the fixed fiat system is the inherent self-stabilising effect, such that investment and borrowing should be taking place in a steady rate of deflation, thereby ensuring that lending and borrowing do not see volatility such as the alterations in the costs of servicing debt burdens.
Stability of the Financial System
At the start of the discussion, it was identified that there are two types of money in an economy, broadly characterised as traditional money and IOU money. Up to this point IOU money has not been discussed, despite the important part that it plays in the system of money overall.
Whilst the fixed fiat money system might create a steady deflationary tendency, it does not account for the rise and fall in the supply of IOU money. This raises the question of how IOU money might be regulated such that there are no booms or busts due to overexpansion or contraction of this money supply. As has already been identified, there is a natural stabiliser which should ameliorate bubble forming investments and activities, but this does not fully account for expansion of IOU money. For example, if deflation is very high, it might be that one company will less willing to extend credit to another company. This is a natural circuit breaker on the economy in which fast expansion will see a commensurate contraction in credit.
However, one of the main sources of IOU money is the banking and financial system, and any stability in the monetary system must therefore ensure some stability in the creation of IOU money in the banking system. The temptation here is to introduce a system of complex regulation, and enforce various measures upon the banks. However, the use of a fixed fiat system, alongside provision of particular information, offers a simpler and more effective method of managing the banking system.
The first point is that the fixed fiat system allows individuals to hold cash at very low risk to their stored value of labour. This extremely low risk allows for the creation of what might be called ‘deposit banks’. These are banks which literally, for a small fee, will store the money of an individual, with the entire holdings of deposited money always available for return. This is so essential to the system that, if no private institution were established to offer this service, the government would need to offer such a service. The function of the deposit banks is simply to store the money, facilitate transfers and transactions, and a fee would be needed to pay for the services.
The reason for the necessity of these banks is that each individual must have a clear and available choice of a bank which does not does not risk their stored value of labour. In having this choice, individuals have real choice in the way that they risk their money.
The second element of the financial system is ‘speculative banks’, which are any banks or financial institutions which might not, on any given day, be able to return all of the deposits that they have taken. These are any financial institution that takes depositors money and uses it for any kind of investment. In all such banks, at least proportions of the deposits that are held are at risk of loss, and can not be returned on demand. The name of this type of bank is explicitly given to remind any depositors of money into the bank that they are speculating, and the banks would be regulated such that they would need to include the name speculative bank in their name.
However, the most important element of the regulation of these banks is not their name, but something more fundamental. It is essential that depositors into the speculative banks are aware of how much of their deposit is subject to risk at any particular period in time. For the sake of pragmatism, this information should be available on a daily basis, and would need to be published daily in all branches of the bank, and on the bank’s website homepage (in a specified format). In particular, each bank would need to give an exact percentage of their deposits available for withdrawal as cash on the previous day, as well as a rolling trend for the percentage. This information will ensure that every depositor is fully aware of the amount of their deposited money that is at risk. The penalties for the provision of false information would need to be severe.
The third element of the system is the provision of information about the nature of the risks being taken by the speculative banks. At present, there is no regulation that prevents the banks from paying for external assessment of their level of risk. The conflict of interest in such a system is apparent, and has been made more apparent as a result of the financial crisis. One of the problems in assessment of risk is considered to be the asymmetry of information, and it therefore necessary to ensure a system where there is well financed external assessment of the risks in individual banks. The only way of ensuring this is to regulate the usage of the information provided by external assessment agencies to ensure that each individual who uses the services of the agency is restricted to using the information for their own personal use. For example, newspapers could not report the assessment of agency ‘x’ of bank ‘y’ without the explicit permission of the agency.
The regulation would ensure that there was the available finance for an effective system of external and independent assessment of the banking system, and individual banks within the system. Even within such an independent system, errors will still be made, and any assessment would need to make a statutory declaration in a regulated format advising the recipient of this fact.
The purpose of the provision of information about the banks, and the development of deposit banks, is to provide individuals with the information about the risks that they are taking, and to make informed choices as to whether they take risk. No form of regulation can remove the risk taken in any form of investment, and the only solution to this problem is to make risk a choice, and make the nature of the risk as transparent as possible. When individuals are presented with information and choice, any guarantee of the deposits by the government no longer becomes necessary, and the financial system can be largely left to operate as the market demands.
The last element of the regulation relates to the one remaining problem that might arise in the banking system. This is the notion of the ‘too big to fail’ bank. It is apparent that, if institutions become large enough, their collapse might lead to severe problems in the economy. The existence of banks of this size is therefore a danger to the stability of the economy. It goes beyond the scope of this discussion to go into detail of how banks might be broken up and regulated in order to remove this risk, but regulation of size of banks would be a necessity.
So far, a radical system of regulation and deregulation has been presented. It is apparent that a fixed fiat system is necessary to allow the deposit banks to play their role in the system. However, this does not explain how stability in the provision of IOU money might be achieved.
In order to understand this, it is necessary to think of individuals making choice according to their own circumstance and their individual appetite for risk at various points in their life. Pension and life insurance markets give a clue to how these decisions are presented and made, and it is apparent that in aggregate the total level of risk individuals will take will remain relatively stable over time. Under the current system, any deposit into the banking system is undertaken without any heed to the levels of risk in an individual bank (excepting during the recent bank runs). The assurance of government guarantees of the banking system, and deposit guarantee schemes, means that banks are able to operate with levels of risk of which the depositors are unaware.
In the system proposed, in which levels of risk are more transparent, individuals will be confronted with clear information about the levels of risk that they are undertaking. If there is an aggregate steady level of acceptance of risk, the banking system will adapt to the informed choices of individuals, and will provide a range of options that will meet the aggregate demand for risk. As that aggregate demand will normally not see abrupt changes, any change in issuance of IOU money by the banks will be dampened to reflect the aggregate risk demand in the market. Once again, there is nothing in the system to prevent manias, although the deflationary nature of the system will ameliorate the manias. As a result, in normal time, the issuance of IOU money from financial institutions should remain relatively stable and constant.
This entire system can only be achieved in a system of a fixed fiat currency, which provides the foundation of the reformed system of banking and finance.
Government Issue of IOU Money
Another potential source of issuance of IOU money is government, typically in the form of government bonds. The purchase of these bonds can be broadly divided into domestic and overseas purchases, and each has a different impact and considerations in the consideration of financial stability.
A government issued bond, as with any form of money, is a promise to return a value of labour in the future. The key difference between a government bond and other forms of IOU money is that the government can utilise the law and tax system to force individuals to provide a proportion of their value of labour in servicing the obligations of the bond. It makes them a relatively sound form of money, as they can in principle make (within some boundaries) large claims on the value of labour in an economy.
The starting point in the consideration of the issue of bonds is the purchase of the instruments by overseas buyers. This has most curious effects on the economy that receives the bonds, and upon the perception of the state of the recipient economy. Before going on to these points, it is worth reiterating that the bonds that are issued are no different from the IOUs for gardening provided by Fred in the explanation of money, with the exception that the bonds might force Fred to work the necessary hours for repayment. Just as Fred uses the bond to allow him to consume beer, a stored value of labour, a UK bond purchased by a Japanese investor allows the UK government to consume the stored value of labour of Japanese workers.
A good way of thinking about this is to imagine that the purchase of the bond by a Japanese investor is being used to build a hospital. For the sake of simplicity, we will imagine that the bond is for the building of the hospital alone, and is only purchased by Japanese institutions. As part of the purchase, Japanese currency will arrive in the UK, and that might be used to exchange for other currencies to purchase material, services and equipment, or purchase these directly from Japan. In addition to this, some of the money will be used to pay UK contractors and suppliers. In all cases the payment is being made from the stored value of labour of Japan.
If we imagine the purchase of a piece of medical equipment from Japan, at some point in the future, the promise of the bond is that value labour of a good or service slightly greater than that purchased will be returned to Japan or whoever holds the bond. When the device is shipped to the UK from Japan, it will also generate significant activity in the economy, with an importer handling the import, a logistics company moving it to the hospital, and the contractors who install it into the hospital. At each stage of the process, the value of labour being utilised is a consumption of the Japanese value of labour that was provided in the currency exchanged for the bond. However, the impact upon the economy extends beyond these discrete actions.
For example, each of the individuals or organisations that have been paid through the issue of the bond will go on to spend the IOU money provided by the bond in the wider economy. For example, a contractor may save enough money to purchase a UK built car with cash, thereby increasing output of cars in the UK economy by one car. However, whilst he is paying for the car in what appears to traditional money, he is in fact spending the IOU money from the bond. If we think of the myriad of ways in which the bond IOU money will increase output in the economy, it is apparent that the IOU money has an effect on output far greater than the headline figure. The money from the bond becomes tied up with the traditional money in the economy, and separation of the IOU money from traditional money becomes impossible.
The issue of bonds then needs to be placed in a wider context, if we are to understand the implications and effects of the bond. If an economy is running a current account deficit, then the economy overall is being provided with goods and services over and above the output of the economy. If governments are issuing bonds and these are purchased by overseas investors, the money that then flows into the economy represents an aggregate consumption of the value of labour of the creditor country. The problem that then arises is how we might actually measure the output of the economy. As has been illustrated in the case of the hospital bond, the value of Japanese labour entering the economy becomes inextricably entwined with the economic output as a whole. It generates considerable activity throughout the economy.
If we then consider that GDP measures are a consideration of the activity within an economy, it is possible to see that the GDP figure is measuring the output of Japanese value of labour output as if it were UK value of labour output. Furthermore, the greater the issuance of bonds, the greater the activity in the economy, and the higher apparent GDP will be. Issuance of IOU money in the form of bonds will increase activity in the economy, giving an illusion of growth in the economy. This becomes particularly problematic if the sustainability of bond issuance is being measured as a percentage of GDP, as that figure will include the impact of previous bond issuance, and is not representative of the output of the UK, but is representative of the output of the UK economy and the imported value of labour of Japan (to return to the earlier example).
The GDP measure of the economy does not actually represent the output of the economy, but the measure of debt to GDP allows government to continue the issuance of more IOU money than might be sustainable.
It is here that we come to the question of how a fixed fiat system might prevent such problems. The first point is to say that a fixed fiat system will not be able to prevent governments from the issue of bonds, which is of itself a dubious practice in ordinary circumstances (though the reason for this will be left aside for this discussion). However, if a country is running an overall current account deficit, under the fixed fiat system, the country will find that money is flowing out of the country, and that there is a process of deflation taking place. This deflation will make the purchasing power of the currency increase, and will therefore make the goods and services of the country more attractive, as the currency will provide more goods and services per unit. This will mean that a current account imbalance, as soon as it appears, will start to correct itself.
However, if a government is issuing IOU money to overseas investors during a period of a current account deficit, it is immediately apparent that the government is seeking to artificially maintain the current account deficit. They are seeking to prop up consumption within the economy, and in doing so are building an unsustainable economic structure. In so doing, they are issuing money against a level of output that is already unable to service the current exchanges in value of labour between the bond issuing country and its trading partners. Without the endless confusions being caused in targeting variable interest rates, different volumes of money, such reckless behaviour will be very apparent.
In other words governments will not be able to hide irresponsible policy behind a wall of monetary policy. The current account balance between countries will become main the determinant of the relationship between their currencies. In terms of exchange rates, they will become transparent, and will alter according to trading relations, not with monetary policy. Our Japanese investor will see clearly that fiscal expansion during a current account deficit is a policy that can not be sustained, and the future repayment of the bonds must see a devaluation of the currency. No overseas investor would invest into such a poor currency.
A fixed fiat system prevents governments from borrowing more money than might be supported by the actual output of value of labour in the economy. It creates transparency and clarity about the state of the economy in relation to trading partners.
With regards to the issuance of IOU money, where the purchase is made by individuals or organisations from within the issuing economy, this is more problematic. However, there is an indicative measure of whether the government is indulging in fiscal irresponsibility which is that, within a fixed fiat system, inflation should only take place in few limited circumstances, and those circumstances can be reasonably isolated from the general trend within the economy.
Barring the impact of these circumstances, in the event of inflation, it is apparent that the government is issuing more IOU money than can be supported by the output of value of labour within the economy. Any inflation within the economy can be seen as a warning sign, and it is then a matter for the electorate to discipline the government for causing the inflation. This moves beyond economics, and is the question of how a mature democracy might function, and is therefore beyond the remit of this discussion. How or when a government might be disciplined is firmly within the realm of the relationship between governance and the democratic system.
Overall, the fixed fiat system provides clarity about the actual state of the economy, and also provides some mechanism of stabilisation of trade between countries. It is a system which should, in most situations, offer considerable stability and ensure that an economy grows in a sustainable way.
The Problem with a Fixed Fiat System
There is a problem with a fixed fiat system in a world in which the current fiat system holds sway. In particular, there is the problem that a fixed fiat currency would be very attractive to investors who have their domestic currency operating in a conventional fiat system. In particular, they will know that the value of the currency will never be eroded through the issuance of greater volume of the currency. As such, over the long term, it will appear to be a stable and secure form of money into which a person’s value of labour might be stored.
The problem that this stability represents is that it will encourage a situation in which the stability of the fixed fiat currency will be undermined by the apparent stability of the currency. It is a contradiction that requires some explanation.
If, for example, the UK switched to a fixed fiat currency, and Japan remained on a standard fiat system, then Japanese individuals would likely want to place their stored value of labour in the UK. The result of this would be to see lots of Japanese investors seeking places to put their money in the UK. For example, government bonds would appear to be attractive, offering considerable security. However, as has been detailed, the issuance of government bonds is in fact the issuance of money. As such, if the government, or other recipients, of Japanese investments accept the flood of Japanese money, the money supply will have increased, which is inflationary.
The problems that this might cause are best illustrated with the carry trade from Japan. The carry trade was resultant from the policy of quantitative easing in Japan in conjunction with low interest rates in Japan. The result of the policy was that, as fast as new traditional money was added to the Japanese money supply, money flooded out of Japan seeking higher interest rates in other countries. In so doing, the increase in the money supply helped create the asset and credit bubbles in countries such as the UK. Furthermore, the money that was being created was earning a rate of interest that helped counteract any loss of value of the Yen that should have resulted from the increased issuance. The investment of the money flowing out of Japan contributed to the positive current account balance of Japan, thereby strengthening the Yen.
In other words the targeting of interest rates and quantitative easing was a contributory factor in the development of imbalances in the world economy. It illustrates the danger in conventional fiat money systems, and these kinds of imbalances would appear in any economy with a fixed fiat system.
The only solution to this problem is that all currencies should move to a fixed fiat system. Under such a system, there would be no targeting of interest rates, as the money supply could not be manipulated, and also there would be no possibility of quantitative easing. In a world built around a fixed fiat system, the world economy would look very different. For example, if we imagine our Japanese investor, his choices will look very different.
In determining where to place his money, he will no longer be looking at the relative prospects for any individual currency in terms of monetary policy of the country, but will be looking at the fiscal policy of the country, and the output of the value of labour in the country. The interest rate in the country will no longer be set by the control of issuance of money, but by the conditions of the market in the country.
The only way such a system might be enacted would be through international agreement. For example, if the G20 were to agree to the system, and made trade with any country conditional on implementation of the system, then it would become the world currency system. The problem that arises is that the system would run counter to the quasi-mercantilist currency policies undertaken by countries like China. It would also present a constraint on governments borrowing from overseas sources, and this would force them to have to confront the underlying economic difficulties within their countries. Whether there could be any agreement in these circumstances is questionable.
Conclusion
So what is the key, the underlying principle behind the fixed fiat currency system? With a little reflection, it is apparent that the underlying driver behind the many benefits is the shift to something that becomes a representation of the actuality of the economy. It creates transparency, and thereby creates systems that are inherently stable. It removes power from the regulators, the central banks, the government and the financial system, and transfers and distributes that power into the wider economy. It is essentially a democratic reform.
Even if this reform of money were to found to be a sound and coherent approach to the management of money in the economy, it is unlikely that it would ever be enacted. It hurts too many interests, and those interests would fight any implementation of the system. However, if the system is workable, this paper is written and published on the basis that it is better to have an alternative system ‘out there’ in the world, rather than locked away in the thoughts of one individual.
I therefore conclude the article with two points. The first is that I am profoundly pessimistic about the prospects of any change which might remove the privilege and power of the banks, and even more pessimistic about the prospects of government accepting such reform. The second point is to reiterate the point at the start of the article. This is the musing of an individual without any schooling in economic theory. As such, thoughts, comments and critiques (hopefully polite) will be welcomed.
Notes:
Note 1: I am not sure how many might reach the end of the article, but I hope at least a few will find it worth the effort. For those who do get this far, I would like to thank you for your patience.
Note 2: I use Japan as an example on several occasions for illustration and examples. This is not to single out Japan as a particular source of problems, but rather the country is used for ease and consistency.
Note 3: A couple of the examples I have used for the deflation argument have been used elsewhere (I forget where), but I also used these examples in an article a long while ago, so I have not referenced the article.
Note 4: The Austrians will object to the fixed fiat system, as they believe all currency should originate in the 'market'. I see no reason for this, and would be happy to see a commodity currency compete with the fixed fiat. I am confident about which might win over as the chosen currency used by most people. It is also noteworthy that in reality, for a commodity currency, they are actually discussing gold and silver, both of which have considerable variation in value over time. This is an inherently unstable currency. I also had a brief debate on the subject of a fixed fiat currency system on the von Mises website. They suggested any fiat currency would be subject to debasement. My pointing out that commodity currencies have been debased throughout history fell on deaf ears.
Note 5: Suggestions and further ideas are welcomed. This is, after all, the first attempt to outline this system.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
The Bank of England and Printing Money: Still no public explanation of the policy
Having looked carefully at the documentation of the BoE that discusses the policy of QE, I have been somewhat suprised to find that there is absolutely detail whatsoever on the policy. To give a flavour of the degree of lack of information, there is absolutely no discussion of how much money will actually be created (printed), which would seem to be an absolute minimum of information that might be expected.
As such, I sent some detailed questions to the BoE (see note 1) which were essentially asking them to explain exactly what they are doing. The full reply from the BoE is included in Note 2 at the end of this post. The reply completely fails to answer any of the questions that were asked. There is, however, a suggestion that there will be some kind of further policy disclosure in the future:
The Bank has not published any information on quantitative easing since the latest Minutes. An exchange of letters between the Bank's Governor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer containing further information on the subject is due to be published this week.At this stage, we have no idea what such a letter might include, but I suspect that the letters will not include answers to questions of the detail of the policy. Such details are not normally found in letters of this kind, but rather in policy documentation. It may be that the 'letters' mentioned in the BoE reply will include the answers to my questions, but I very much doubt it.
The central question remains as to why it is that the BoE is not publishing a full policy document that details exactly what it is about to undertake. It is perfectly normal practice for policy documents to be provided to explain and detail major shifts in policy. An equal concern is that the method of reporting the activities proposed by the BoE is to report through the minutes of the BoE MPC. This is not what the minutes are there for, and is an inadequate method of reporting such a radical policy with such potential for profound effects on the economy.
In one sense, I believe that we have made a small amount of progress in gaining this reply. It appears to confirm that the two documents that are referred to in the BoE reply (see notes) are the only explanation of the policy that the BoE is actually about to undertake. This is really quite extraordinary.
Overall, this is a profoundly disturbing situation. This is perhaps the most radical economic policy that has ever been undertaken in the UK, and there is absolutely no detail on the policy whatsoever available to either the public or the media. I might summarise the situation as being that the only people who know the economic policy of the the government and Bank of England's are the Bank of England and the government. I do not believe that this is in any way an acceptable situation, as this means that the current economic policy is not being subjected to any external oversight whatsoever.
In light of this, I have sent another letter to the BoE requesting that they answer the questions that were actually asked. The new letter can be found in note 4. As before, I will inform you of any answer that may be returned. I considered waiting for the publication of the letters between the Bank's Governor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I do not want to delay on this when the BoE is so close to enacting the policy.
In a previous post I suggested that individuals might wish to write to their local MPs. I will repeat that suggestion, and a proposed letter and how to find your MP's contact details can be found in note 3. It might also be possible that some of the previous letters written to MPs have helped put pressure on the government and BoE to publish the letters (at least one MP responded by saying they would start to ask questions), and I suspect that is why my letter resulted in a reply from the BoE. As such, I hope that further pressure might help to bring some brighter light to bear on the subject.
Note 1: The questions I asked in my letter to the BoE:
- What quantity of money will the Bank of England be adding to base money in the period March-May, and the period June-August 2009? Please give totals or ranges under consideration, and any projected figures that you are using as the most likely scenario?
- In what form are you planning to add the money? This is the question of which assets the Bank of England will buy as part of the QE operations? Can you give a projected split / proportion of which type of assets will be purchased in the period March-May, and the period June-August 2009? Please give totals or ranges under consideration, and any projected figures that you are using as the most likely scenario?
- Can you give a clear description of how the split/proportion of assets to be purchased under QE has been determined?
- If you are unable to answer questions 1,2, & 3 can you confirm that this is because you have no firm plans for what you will be undertaking in relation to quantitative easing? If there are no plans, can you give a clear description of your criteria for the decision making that you will use in determining how much you will purchase of which kind of asset, under what circumstances?
- Can you give a clear description of the method you will use to purchase each asset class? In particular will you undertake any action to purchase gilts, or an other form of UK government bonds, directly through the UK Government Debt Office auction process or any other direct means?
- In a recent press conference Mervyn King suggested that the reporting of QE would be undertaken in the minutes of the MPC. Can you confirm in detail exactly what information will be provided in the minutes?
- The MPC minutes are not (I believe) intended as a reporting tool for activity such as QE. As such, why is the policy and action of QE not being reported in a formal publication dedicated to this policy? In particular, QE is widely seen as a radical policy, which Mervyn King describes as 'unconventional'. Under such circumstances, with significant implications for the operations of markets and the broader economy, why is no formal and transparent method of reporting being implemented?
You recently contacted the Bank of England with regard to a number of questions concerning quantitative easing based around the degree to which the monetary base might be expanded under such a policy, and the types of assets that might be purchased. You also asked whether reporting of any use of quantitative easing in the United Kingdom would be recorded in the Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
The most recent set of MPC Minutes, published 18 February and covering the meeting of 4 & 5 February, paragraphs 35 to 39, deal explicitly with the Committee’s most recent discussion of the potential use of quantitative easing. These paragraphs are set out below, but concluded with a unanimous request by the MPC "that the Governor should write on its behalf to the Chancellor to seek authority to conduct purchases of government and other securities, financed by the creation of central bank money using the APF."
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0902.pdf
36 But the MPC could also influence the economy by controlling the quantity of that central bank money directly. Increasing the supply of central bank money in the economy through additional purchases of government securities should raise private sector spending, both directly (through the increase in money holdings of private sector asset sellers) and indirectly (through an expansion by banks of the supply of credit).
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/conf090211.pdf
The Bank has not published any information on quantitative easing since the latest Minutes. An exchange of letters between the Bank's Governor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer containing further information on the subject is due to be published this week.
Note 3:Thanks to those who have already sent letters, and here is a suggested letter format for those who have not already done so. You can find the email address for your local MP here (click on the map for your constituency).
This is is my suggested letter which you can copy and paste, or alternatively write your own version:
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I am writing as I have very increasing concerns over the recent Bank of England policy to implement quantitative easing. In particular, I am worried about the following:
- There is no policy document that clearly outlines how this policy will operate, what quantity of money will be created, what assets the money will be used to purchase, and what method will be used for the purchases.
- In addition to this Mervyn King has suggested that the method of reporting for Quantitative Easing will be through the MPC minutes. This is not the purpose of the MPC minutes, and there is no requirement for full disclosure of activity in such a method of reporting.
I am very concerned at such opacity in consideration of the fact that the Bank of England will be using money creation to purchase gilts. In this situation the Bank of England will therefore be creating ('printing') money to purchase government debt. This might be seen as government operations being funded by printing money.
Under such circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the Bank of England to offer a transparent and detailed discussion of the policy as a formal policy document, as well as a formal, full and transparent procedure for reporting their activity.
I would therefore be most grateful if you could, on my behalf, seek to clarify why this process is being undertaken in such an opaque manner, and clarify exactly what the policy will be. I would also be grateful if you could press for a proper method of reporting on the policy of quantitative easing.
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Note 4:
Thank you for your reply of 24 February 2009.
Unfortunately, it appears that you have sent me information without having read the questions contained in my last letter. Instead of answering my questions you have pointed me to sources of information that I have already seen, and which do not offer answers to any of my questions. I have written to you because there are no answers to my questions available in your existing documentation.
As such, I will repeat the questions and you will therefore have a second opportunity to answer them. They are as follows (QE = Quantitative Easing):
- What quantity of money will the Bank of England be adding to base money in the period March-May, and the period June-August 2009? Please give totals or ranges under consideration, and any projected figures that you are using as the most likely scenario?
- In what form are you planning to add the money? This is the question of which assets the Bank of England will buy as part of the QE operations? Can you give a projected split / proportion of which type of assets will be purchased in the period March-May, and the period June-August 2009? Please give totals or ranges under consideration, and any projected figures that you are using as the most likely scenario?
- Can you give a clear description of how the split/proportion of assets to be purchased under QE has been determined?
- If you are unable to answer questions 1,2, & 3 can you confirm that this is because you have no firm plans for what you will be undertaking in relation to quantitative easing? If there are no plans, can you give a clear description of your criteria for the decision making that you will use in determining how much you will purchase of which kind of asset, under what circumstances?
- Can you give a clear description of the method you will use to purchase each asset class? In particular will you undertake any action to purchase gilts, or an other form of UK government bonds, directly through the UK Government Debt Office auction process or any other direct means?
- In a recent press conference Mervyn King suggested that the reporting of QE would be undertaken in the minutes of the MPC. Can you confirm in detail exactly what information will be provided in the minutes?
- The MPC minutes are not (I believe) intended as a reporting tool for activity such as QE. As such, why is the policy and action of QE not being reported in a formal publication dedicated to this policy? In particular, QE is widely seen as a radical policy, which Mervyn King describes as 'unconventional'. Under such circumstances, with significant implications for the operations of markets and the broader economy, why is no formal and transparent method of reporting being implemented?
I believe that my questions are quite clear, and quite specific. In my previous letter I asked 'In any reply, please do not refer me to documents that do not answer the specific questions that are being asked.' This is exactly what you have done - you have referred me to documents that do not answer the specific questions.
It may be that you do not have sufficient knowledge to answer the questions that I have asked, but I would think that within your organisation there will be many people who are in a position to answer the questions. I would therefore be grateful if you could forward my questions to such a person who is able to give specific answers to my specific questions. I assume that all of the information to answer my questions will be readily available, as I would expect that a policy as radical as QE will have been fully documented and a clear policy will have been outlined. As such, you just need to direct my questions to a person who has been part of that policy formulation process, and I would expect that they will have all of the answers to hand.
I look forward to the receipt of a full reply, and would like to thank you in advance for your help in gaining answers to each of my specific questions.
Note 5:
Many thanks for all of your kind responses to my last post, which are very encouraging. I was also planning to respond to some of the very interesting comments on deflation, but found the BoE letter in my inbox, so will delay my replies for a little while.
Friday, January 9, 2009
The Underlying Value in Currency - Why the £ is Falling
The problem with the way that the blog is structured is that it is a cumulative argument. I therefore strongly recommend that newer readers take a look through the key posts that I have linked to (these can be found to the left of this). In the meantime, I have adapted what was originally going to be a quick comment in the comments section of the UK borrowing post.
The original post discussed how low interest rates were possibly leading to a reluctance of depositors from depositing money in the banking system. I pointed out that under normal circumstances these deposits would be made available for investment, and the government was therefore constraining the supply of capital for investment through such low interest rates.
The first point I would like to address is that two commentators quite rightly identified that I was simplifying the methods by which bank deposits are channeled into the economy. This from B33ENN:
This is not exactly as I understand the mechanism. Yes, the banks do use the reserves as a basis for lending. However, the banks actually use the reserves as margin for leveraged lending. In simpler terms, they create “new money” in the form of new loans by amplifying the reserves according to the fractional reserve lending criteria. So for example, if a bank holds £10 in saved deposits, it then can create a further £90 worth of loans. These loans then become “real money” in the economy flowing out through business and individuals who borrowed and then deposit it into more banks that repeat the exercise until you reach a maximum amount that can be created from that first £10.Lemming also commented to this effect. They have have both rightly pointed out that I have simplified the method by which deposits are turned into lending. I did not want to go into Fractional Reserve Banking (FRB) as this would distract from the underlying themes of the post, which was the centralisation of the government in the economy and where the government was actually finding the money to lend. In a sense they are right that this is unavoidable as part of the discussion, but I wrongly assumed that it did not need to be detailed. The point here is that deposits create the opportunity for banks to make further lending.
For readers who have never previously heard of FRB, I strongly recommend the (controversial) Wikipedia article here as an introduction, as it also includes the role of central banks (you may also want to read the heated debate that is linked to at the top of the article if you are really interested). If you have never heard of the system, it may come as quite a surprise, or even a shock. Another interrelated point that you may want to consider is the system of 'fiat money' which I discuss here.
The reason why these are important considerations is that they are at the heart of our economic system. In the case of FRB, we have a system which is inherently inflationary, through a continual steady expansion of the money supply by central banks (printing money if you wish), and through fiat money we have a system in which the value of money is almost entirely built upon confidence (which I discuss here- not an easy post, but stick with it) and which allows for unconstrained printing of money. It should be noted that printing money does not require physical printing of bank notes and minting of coins and quantitative easing is a process in which the process of 'printing' money goes into overdrive.
My argument is simple. Flooding money into the market in the manner of quantitative easing to create money for the government to lend to the banks, in order for the banks to lend to the government, business and consumers can only lead to currency collapse and hyper-inflation. Governments/central banks are claiming that they are doing so to avoid deflation, and I will address this question for the UK.
What the government is doing is massively increasing supply of the currency at a point in time when the external demand for the currency is in free fall. A large part of the demand for the £GB has been to buy the £GB in order to then lend it into the UK, and this source of demand is disappearing. Another part of the demand is as a reserve currency, but that status is diminishing with the weakening of the £GB (the two factors are related). On the other hand, there has not been much demand for the £GB as a currency to buy goods or services from the UK, something that can be seen in the balance of trade figures. Essentially, the value of a currency rests in supply and demand, and the confidence in the currency. The confidence element needs some explanation.
Confidence is a very difficult problem as it is possible for individuals and institutions to assign a greater value to a currency than underlying supply and demand would suggest that it should have. The loss of confidence in the £GB is seeing the £GB's value declining through loss of confidence, but that loss of confidence is rooted in the reality that the UK does not produce enough goods or services that people in other countries want to buy. In other words, individuals and institutions have realised that the £GB is not very useful as a currency to exchange for goods and services - there are many pounds in the market but there is little demand for goods and services that are exchanged in pounds. In the end the value of a fiat currency is determined by how many goods and services there are that people want to buy versus how many units of currency there are in circulation.
What has happened over the last couple of decades is that this principle has been forgotten. Demand for the £GB (and the $US - though the $US is a more complex case), has been supported by demand to lend into UK consumption. What has been forgotten by all of these lenders is to ask exactly with what the UK could produce to repay this lending. This error is now being recognised and what you then have is a situation in which investors are 'getting out of'' the £GB, as they recognise that there is simply not enough being produced in the UK to support its value. It is for this reason that the £GB is falling so fast. At the same time as demand for the £GB is falling there is a situation in which government creating more £GB at a time when there are already more £GB than the market wants. This is inherently inflationary.
The inflationary aspect of this is twofold. On the one hand all imported goods are going to become more expensive. In a massive simplification, there is a situation in which the UK currently does not produce enough goods that the Chinese factory worker wants to buy, such that his labour on a plasma TV can not be exchanged for any goods from the UK.
In order for UK consumers to buy that plasma TV, they must produce something with a commensurate value that the Chinese worker wants to buy. If they do not, then there is nothing to exchange for that plasma TV. The only solution to the problem is devaluation of the £GB. What this means is that the UK worker must work x number of hours more in order to be able to offer something in exchange for the plasma TV. In other words, the value of the labour in the UK must be adjusted to a point at which it can produce something that has sufficient value in exchange for the Chinese worker to buy.
What you are seeing in the change in the exchange rate devaluation is the value of labour between the UK and China moving to a new equilibrium. This example, of course, is just for the UK and China but needs to be applied across the global economy which, whilst more complex, does not change the underlying question of relative efficiency in the production of goods and services between economies.
Quite simply, the UK is not efficient enough at producing goods and services to continue to compete in world markets on the current exchange rate. This has simply been hidden through a false confidence that arose out of demand for the £GB to support lending into consumption. The illusion of the £GB was built upon a false confidence in the efficiency of the UK as an economy. It is actually not very efficient.
In light of this, the £GB can only continue falling until it reaches a new equilibrium that reflects the true state of the UK's efficiency in the production of goods and services. This problem can only be compounded by the production of more currency. The underlying value of a currency can be simplified as follows (ignoring investment overseas):
The total of goods and services produced in the country which have value in exchange with other countries divided by the units of currency in circulation.
In a fiat money system, if you increase the units of currency in circulation, without increasing the value of goods and services that you produce, the value of the currency must eventually fall. As such, in printing money, you create inflation on all imported goods and services. If you print with wild abandon, then you create massive inflation in imported goods and services. A simple case in point is oil, which has been falling in price around the world as demand for oil has been reducing. In principle, as a net importer, the UK should be seeing dramatic drops in the price of this input, but the reality is that the reduction of the cost of this commodity is ameliorated by the falling £GB.
Whilst the UK is seeing an absolute fall in the price of oil, it is seeing a relative increase in the price of oil in relation to countries whose currency is appreciating against the £GB. In other words, the UK is becoming poorer relative to those countries, even though it appears that oil is becoming absolutely cheaper. In practical terms, the UK worker must now work x number of hours more than a worker in another country to fill up his car with petrol (gas if you are a US reader). However, the falling price of oil is seen as deflationary by government and the central bank, such that their solution is to incorporate this in overall inflation, and print more money to prevent this deflation.
In doing so, they increase the supply of units of currency, the value of £ goes down further, thereby increasing the cost of oil imports, further impoverishing the individual filling up their car with petrol relative to a person in another country. Although the solution has prevented deflation within the country, it has also done so at the relative impoverishment of the person filling his car up with petrol. In this case the person is poorer as the value of his £GB has been transferred to the newly printed money.
The real question however, is how all of this will balance out. Will the fall in the £GB offset the fall in the price of commodities and counteract the fall in demand for a range of goods and services. I have argued that it is more probable that the plunge of the £GB will actually counteract the deflationary effects of contraction in demand through the increased cost of all imports. However this is not certain, as it depends on where the £GB will eventually settle. This in turn depends, in part, on the government.
However, a fundamental problem in all of this is whether deflation is a bad thing. For example, if the price of a loaf of bread deflates, is this a cause for worry? The answer to questions such as this largely depend on whether you are a saver or borrower. If you are a saver, you see the value of your savings increase in relation to the price of goods and services so you do very well in a deflationary environment. On the other hand, if you are a borrower, you see the value of your debt in relation to goods and services increase. This is very bad news for you. It is also unfortunate that so much has been done to encourage you into borrowing, and discourage you from saving.
If we look at the wider economy, there has been a problem that too many people have been borrowing for consumption, and not enough people have been saving. This is a problem. Deflation creates a situation in which individuals are motivated to pay down debt as fast as possible, and people are encouraged to save. This would represent a dramatic shift in the balance of borrowing and saving, and arguably a shift that would rebalance the economy away from being consumption driven to being driven towards saving and investment.
The counter argument is that this deferral of spending will create a self-reinforcing downward spiral of the economy, where nobody is producing anything due to lack of demand, as everybody is saving or paying down debt. However, if the economy has been balanced to much towards borrowing for consumption, and has therefore become imbalanced (the crux of my argument), then surely this is exactly what is needed. If the only thing supporting large parts of your economy is rooted in unsustainable borrowing, then the only solution is that the parts of the economy that have been artificially supported by that borrowing driven consumption must be allowed to be destroyed. They could not be sustained in any case. Deflation is just a mechanism of rebalancing.
Deflation would also have the effect of creating greater savings. In so doing the capital base of the financial system would effectively be fixed, but painfully so. Those banks that were overstretched would go to the wall, creating a period of further crisis. However, the surviving banks would end up accumulating capital, and would then be able to divert that capital into the process of economic recovery. With the £GB having fallen, and the true efficiency of the UK economy reflected in the realigned £GB, many new potential areas of business would once again become potentially competitive. Such new businesses will need capital in order to grow.
As such, B33ENN was correct when saying that if the government did not act as it is, there would be huge asset liquidations. Where he is wrong is that the government has the capability to save the economy by acting as a guarantor through printing money and borrowing. The fundamental point is that the current crisis is about the fundamental state of the economy, the inability to produce enough goods and services to exchange for our massive levels of importation of goods and services. It is the massive imbalance in the economy that is the problem. The real problem with the deflationary solution is not that it would lead to a rebalancing of the economy away from debt fuelled consumption, which is any case essential, but that it would do so in a very painful way. This is politically unacceptable, but absolutely MUST happen.
We then have to ask ourselves what will happen with the borrowing and money printing solution. As I pointed out in my last post, the banks are now offering interest rates that are a deterrent to saving. As such, the only way to fill the hole in bank capitalisation is through the government providing that capital. However, the government must either print money, causing inflation and further disincentive for saving, or borrowing. How can either of these solutions possibly help in rebalancing the economy away from consumption? On the one hand the money printing will further devalue the £GB, but that would in any case happen with the £GB falling to its natural equilibrium value. It would not really have any impact on the reduction of the value in relation to the equilibrium, it would just be a further devaluation for devaluation's sake. In other words, it will not change the equilibrium which is determined by relative efficiency in creating goods and services for exchange versus the number of units in circulation.
Printing more money just changes the number of units, not the equilibrium point.
In addition we need to remember that, as I have pointed out in many posts, the creation of fiat money in this way is a transfer of value from the existing money supply onto the new money. As such it is a form of taxation. In this situation, the government is both pointlessly devaluing currency and also massively increasing the tax burden in a time of economic crisis. In doing so they are impoverishing every investor, and every saver. The only result of such activity is eventually to kill investment activity, and create capital flight. Available capital and investment is the long term solution to the crisis, and will be needed to restructure the economy.
As for borrowing more money, the problem arises (as I have endlessly pointed out) that borrowing for consumption today (which is what the borrowed money would primarily be used for) means a contraction at some point in the future. In other words, it will delay the contraction now at the cost of a greater contraction in the future.
My argument is that what all of this money creation and borrowing amounts to is an attempt at pretending that the economy is actually still producing enough wealth to support the UK's high standard of living. Whilst the economy was previously built upon consumer borrowing, the government is seeking to replace the position of borrower and spender. One of the comments of B33ENN was the traditional role of central banks is to be the lender of last resort. In this case the government is becoming the borrower of last resort. What it is doing is pretending that we still create value in goods and services for exchange with other countries that we do not in fact do. Borrowing money is just a method to try to bury this reality.
In short, the UK has built an economy around consumption, and that consumption is built upon debt, and without the flood of credit into the UK, nothing is going to allow us to continue the service/consumption economic model. Whatever the government does, somewhere, somehow, there must be sufficient wealth creation to pay for the goods and services that we consume from our trading partners. Our trading partners have (foolishly) been extending credit to us for a long time. That has stopped. No amount of government intervention is going to prevent reality from emerging.
Whatever the government does, the bankruptcy, unemployment MUST happen, as the basic shape of the economy was directed towards unsustainable consumption built upon debt provided by wealth producing economies.
The government can guarantee all kinds of things, but in doing so the government will just transfer the damage from private companies and individuals to the government, making the government ever less solvent. The government can, of course, just keep printing more and more money to address this. However, in doing so they just destroy the value of money, and this MUST lead to hyper inflation. If you doubt this is the case, you may wish to read this article in the Telegraph. Quite simply people are losing their confidence in money, even in the 'mighty' $US. In the case of the article, the rich are moving into having physical holdings of golds - literally buying gold as an 'in the hand' physical asset. The rich have the ability to get sophisticated advice on how to invest their money, and are therefore in the vanguard of the collapse in confidence.
The whole point of this blog is to point out that there is something fundamentally wrong in the UK economy. It is no longer able to generate the wealth to support itself at the current standard of living. As such I was surprised to see B33EN suggesting that the government can somehow turn back economic reality. He is not alone in this. Many clever economists are effectively telling us that you can create something from nothing, but at some point the illusion must disappear. Creating money from thin air does not create value, it transfers value. At some point, somehow, you have to create value, and that means engaging in activity that creates something - wealth creation through selling goods or services that our trading partners want.
We are simply not doing enough of this. How can government guarantees, borrowing money, and printing money change this reality?
B33ENN is falling into the trap that many mainstream economists fall into, by looking at the situation as if it were complex. It is not. It is very simple. A strong economy is one in which you create things that others want exchange with you. Without that, there is nothing.
Government can not make wealth. It can not produce anything, it can only spend the money of those that create wealth, which is those who create something with value in exchange. The only role government can have in wealth creation is to set up an environment in which wealth creators can thrive. Destroying the value of money is not such a situation, and nor is the taxation implicit in money printing. It is simply a way of pretending that the fundamental problems do not exist. If you do not sell enough goods and services that people want, eventually they will not want to sell you anything, as you do not have anything they want in return.
It can not be put more simply than this. All the rest is nonsense. All the rest is window dressing that hides this reality.
It has been a bit of a meandering post (again), but as usual I have simply been writing my thoughts as they occur to me. I hope, however, that this makes sense. I hope that I have illustrated that any illusions of endless government interventions is just (at best) a delaying mechanism. The economy must change, and that change will under all circumstances be painful. I am not sure that I have given the post a good title, but I hope that it is roughly right.
Update to the Post: 14 January 2009
I mention a couple of times in the post that the fundamental problem of the UK economy is that it is just not very good at the creation of goods and services that other countries want to buy. The result is revealed painfully in this Telegraph article:
The trade gap ballooned to £8.3bn from £7.6bn in October, the highest level since records began in 1697, reflecting the fact that Britain is importing more from other countries than it is exporting. Economists had expected the deficit to narrow to £7.5bn because of sterling's sharp slide in the final few months of 2008.This is a reflection of the underlying problems in the UK economy. Just as poor economic conditions expose the weakness of companies, it is the same with the economic position of countries. Even with a sinking currency, we are still importing more than we are exporting. However, we should also remember that there will be a time lag from currency change to the shift in the balance of trade. As such, whilst these figures probably reflect the exchange rate of the £ a few months ago, rather than now (e.g. in long supply chains, there will be delay before contracts expire, and new contracts sought)
A Note for one of the Regular Commentators, Steve Tierney: Steve, apologies but your post appears to have been lost by the Blogger system. I have had no email notification (I have checked through my inbox), and there is nothing in the system. Please be assured that your comments are seen as a welcome contribution to the blog, and I would not, in any case, not publish just because someone said something that I did not 'like'. As such please accept my apologies.
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I have had a complaint from a person for deleting a post which I believed was spam. I flicked through their very long web pages, and found that they were recruiting individuals into some kind of new form of investment. I read no further, and the person has complained that I did not understand what was written. My answer is simple - any offer of any kind of investment requires the capital of individuals. It is therefore treated as spam.