Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts

Thursday, January 14, 2010

The Winds of Change

Since first starting to write on the economy I have slowly developed a picture of the world economy, and that picture has alarmed me. As I wrote recently, it is a picture in which policymakers have an illusion that they are in control, but a reality that they are not really able to predict the consequences of their own actions within a dynamic and interconnected system.

I have also long highlighted the problem of the use of GDP figures, on the basis that they do not really signal anything of value in relation to the underlying health of the economy. All the figures provide is an illusory sense of comfort, in which borrowing by governments and consumers, as if by magic, is recorded as income. A typical example can be found for the UK on the BBC news website:
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) predicts that the economy returned to growth, bringing an end to the recession.

[and]

NIESR said the pace of growth appears to be increasing. It estimates that there was a 0.2% increase in GDP in the three months ending in November.
The fact that the 'growth' is accompanied by massive government fiscal deficits is not apparently an issue. I sometimes feel that I am repeating myself endlessly in highlighting this problem, but the trouble is that it will not go away. GDP 'growth' is widely believed to signify that an economy is moving in the right direction, and it is believed by policymakers, economists and (of course) much of the general public. Even as governments rack up ever more unsustainable debt, analysts scrutinise every minute shift in this largely useless metric.

There are many excuses made for fiscal profligacy made on behalf of governments. There is the idea of stopping a 'downward spiral'. The argument goes like this; if we can only spend enough, then we will put money in the pockets of consumers, and they will continue to shop, and continue to pay their mortgages, and this will halt the downwards spiral. The reason for the problem, which is that (in aggregate) nations were spending more than they were earning is ignored. The solution is, in the end, founded upon an idea that it is possible to borrow and spend your way to wealth. Note, not borrow to invest, but borrow to spend.

One commentator on the blog insists that government debt is different to personal debt. For example, the suggestion is that government debt is supported by the tax base, and the size of the tax base is large enough such that, if need be, the money might be repaid. This is the argument that government might put money in consumers' pockets to save the economy now, only to take more out of their pockets in the future. This will happen, of course, once the economy returns to 'growth'. The 'growth' that is created is, of course, the 'growth' created by government borrowing and spending rather than the kind of growth that will lead to exports and a return to current account surplus.

It seems that the policymakers recognise this, as lax fiscal policy is accompanied by lax monetary policy, including printing money. This serves to debase the value of currency, and allows for the (potential) rebalancing of trade, and the erosion of the value of debts held in the devaluing currency. It is the hope that governments might borrow and then stealthily default on the debt by reduction in the value of the debt. The fiscal stimuli act to tide the economy over and the intention is that the true value of the debt will never be repaid. As the country emerges from the crisis, as exports once again pick up, all will be well as the debt is repaid in currency that is devalued and export growth will pick up the slack.

That is the theory, but no policymaker speaks of it openly.

The problem is this; the policy can only work if the providers of credit are willing to be duped. That is the essential flaw in the policy. To date, the governments following this kind of policy have gotten away with it so far, and I am thinking of the UK and US in particular.

I have talked about the steady erosion of belief that is the foundation of these kinds of policies. It is the belief that the rich world countries will always be rich - that one way or another the wealth will always be there as if by some divine right. The rich world has always been rich, and always will be. This is simply a question of belief, and has no logical or empirical foundation.

Wealth is something that is created through hard work, dynamism, creativity and investment. It is achieved by out-competing the competition. There are many ways in which this might be achieved, but nonetheless, it is the bedrock of wealth creation. It is the aggregate of each individual's contribution within the economy to the creation of value.

What wealth creation is not is borrowing to spend, or creation of money with no foundation in an increase in output of value. Both of these are illusions of wealth, although the former might allow for a sense of real wealth for a while - if the country can get away with not repaying the money. As an analogy, we might think of a person borrowing to finance going on an expensive holiday. They really gain the benefit and enjoyment of the holiday whether they do, or do not, repay the loan that funded it. The fiscal profligacy of governments is providing the benefits in the hope that the full cost will never need to be repaid.

The problem is this; governments have promised their electorates that the 'holidays' are permanent, that we might continue with the lifestyles financed by borrowed money. Even as they are making such promises, they are quietly and surely defaulting on their borrowing. As I said earlier, the whole edifice rests upon creditors being duped. They must continue to believe that being paid in devalued currency is an acceptable deal.

The illusion really is coming to an end now and this is the reason for this post. The continuation of the policy maker's game all hinges on 'belief'. That belief is now being eroded as, day by day, more and more questions are being raised about what the policymakers are doing. The expression 'sovereign default' is appearing ever more frequently, and the policy maker's economic flim-flam is starting to be being seen for what it is; a fraud. I have just been reading the World Economic Forum's (WEF) report on the risks within the global economy. The following quote is of note:
The worst case scenario of overlapping economic recessions with political instability and social turbulence, triggered by untenable fiscal deficits and unsustainable government debt burdens, might not, after all, be impossible.
In their highlighted risks section, they say the following:
In response to the financial crisis, many countries are at risk of overextending unsustainable levels of debt, which, in turn, will exert strong upwards pressures on real interest rates. In the final instance, unsustainable debt levels could lead to full-fledged sovereign debt crises.
They express particular concern for the UK and US, saying that "Governments, in the US and the United Kingdom in particular, are now faced with a set of tough choices, all with consequences for future global risks." They highlight the increasing of structural costs, such as the ageing of populations, and the absolute necessity for credible plans of how the fiscal deficits might be reduced. They point out the problems with formulating such plans; that the politicians need the courage to tell their electorates of the tough choices.

Their assessment of risk in reality hinges upon the idea that countries like the US and UK are living beyond their means. They are borrowing more than they can repay, and the only way to resolve the situation is for the countries to live more modestly (if you can excuse the metonymy). In saying this, they are replicating the argument that this blog has made from the first post.

The WEF is not alone. Many others are expressing their concerns, such as Nouriel Roubini. In a recent article in Forbes, he says the following:
The severe recession, combined with a financial crisis during 2008-09, worsened the fiscal positions of developed countries due to stimulus spending, lower tax revenues and support to the financial sector. The impact was greater in countries that had a history of structural fiscal problems, maintained loose fiscal policies and ignored fiscal reforms during the boom years. Going forward, a weak economic recovery and an aging population is likely to increase the debt burden of many advanced economies, including the U.S., Britain, Japan and several eurozone countries.
Roubini highlights the risks for countries such as the UK and Spain for sovereign default, but suggests that the reserve status of the $US will allow it to be amongst the last of the 'at risk' countries to face 'investor aversion'. I am not so sure, but believe that, if a country like the UK defaults, the initial reaction will be to flee to the 'safe haven' of the $US, before a rapid realisation that this is jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

Roubini and the WEF are just some of the increasing number of analysts who are questioning the activities of policymakers. The voices talking of the unsustainable deficits are increasingly loud, and they will be making an impact. The nerves of investors in sovereign debt will be jangling. It is no longer just bloggers such as myself who are raising these concerns, but commentators with high profiles.

In my mind, it is just a question of timing now. When will the dominoes start to topple? It is still possible, in principle, that crisis might be averted. It is possible that the policymakers will pull back from fiscal irresponsibility. It is possible, but looks increasingly unlikely. They have promised to 'save' their economies. The big questions now are the questions of when it will start, and what will provide the push.

Note: At the start of last year, I made a prediction of crisis for April, and was proved to be completely wrong. The underlying principles I highlighted were the same as here. Why might I be right this time, when wrong before? The problem in my first discussion was that, I had simply not factored in the strength of 'belief' in countries like the UK and US. A sovereign crisis requires loss of belief in the creditworthiness of the country, and that belief has proved to be far more resilient than I imagined. It is why I have emphasised the high profile of commentators who are raising the concerns. It is more difficult to shift firmly held beliefs than I thought, but nevertheless it is possible for belief to shift. I believe that the process is now rapidly advancing.

Sunday, January 10, 2010

The Masters of the Universe

I have not posted for a while, but have two three quarter finished posts which I can not quite manage to finalise. The reason for the procrastination is that there are so many elements in the world economy that are flashing warning lights. Each element, of itself, might not be a major concern, but collectively they add up to some major concerns. The problem is how to convey concerns about such wide swathes of the global economy. I will do my best, but will apologise in advance for a lightly referenced and perhaps rather rambling post.

The other problem is the sheer volume of views and opinions on what is taking place. As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the Telegraphs says, it is time to rip up the textbooks. He is talking about the ongoing and partially hidden crash in US housing, and the underlying unemployment rate of just over 17%, and makes comparisons with the Great Depression. In my case, I long ago ripped up the economics textbooks, as they never made any sense, but it is interesting how many mainstream commentators are now taking this view.

What we saw in 2009 was the final and last gasps of the enactment of the textbook economic theory that has dominated policy over the last few years. The economists and policymakers have now shot most of their monetary and fiscal bolts. In other words, the politicians, the economists, and the central bankers have continued pulling and pushing on the levers of the economy in the hope that reality might be forced back into its box. We have seen fiscal stimuli, and a flood of printed money into the world, and this has been used to finance record government deficits. We have seen bailouts, guarantees of toxic assets, the concentration of the banking systems into ever fewer too big to fail players.

However, in 2009, whilst everything appeared to change, very little has really changed. Whilst many of the 'rich world' countries have fallen into deep recession (if not depression), there has been no change in the underlying reality of the world economy. On the surface, we can see all of the activity of governments to 'save' their economies, but the changes are restricted to appearances, not to the actual way in which their economies are really structured.

What do I mean by this?

It is very simple. Whilst governments intervene in ever greater swathes of the economy, nothing has changed in the underlying competitive position of the 'rich world' economies that are in such deep troubles. Except for the devaluation of currencies.

It is the lever of last resort. If you can not compete, do whatever you can to devalue the currency, and then your workforce will be cheaper relative to the work force of your competition. It is a strategy that directly reduces the standard of living of every person paid in that currency. It punishes the savers, punishes the investors, but if it is taken far enough, eventually the economy will once again be 'competitive'. It is an economic policy of impoverishment, however it may be dressed up.

However, even with such devaluations, all is still not as it should be. The imbalance at the heart of the world economy has not gone away. Even as the $US falls, the RMB falls with it, making the Chinese economy ever more competitive, and ensuring that Chinese goods and serviced continue to win on the back of mercantilism policy. Nothing has changed, as no country yet has the resolve to face down Chinese mercantilism, even as the policy of China slowly but surely destroys swathes of industry around the world. Even in the depths of recession, the pre-crisis current account deficits persist in many countries.

In the latest mercantilist move, China is now talking of restricting the export of rare earth metals, over which they have a virtual monopoly. These metals are vital commodities in the manufacture of a huge number of goods:
Worldwide, the industries reliant on REEs [rare earth metals], which produce anything from fibre-optic cables to missile guidance systems, are estimated to be worth £3 trillion, or 5 per cent of global GDP.
If you want to manufacture using these materials, best you have a base of supply and manufacture in China. Even the possibility of a freeze on exports will result in industries moving to China. And the response to this latest mercantilism policy? Nothing. No threats of trade sanctions, no action whatsoever. As before, China just continues its economic power grab, and the reaction is nothing of any substance. As I have said, nothing has really changed. Wealth creation will continue its inexorable shift to the East.

Then there is the structure of trade that is associated with the shift of wealth. Nothing has changed there either. Just as before, much of the 'rich world' continues to consume more than it produces. Sure, consumers are no longer the primary drivers of the debt binge economy, with the government seeking to fill the holes created by the retraction of consumer borrowing, but the essential reality of consuming more than is created continues. Nothing has really changed though because, in the end, government borrowing is consumer borrowing, as consumers will eventually pick up the bill.

There is one change that results from the debt binge of governments. The belief in the wealth of the 'rich world' is eroding, and the ability for the rich world to raise finance is eroding with this belief. It brings us full circle to the problem of printing money to pay the government's bills. If ever there were an exemplar of the underlying reality that this is a means to finance government profligacy, the Bank of England should metaphorically step forward. Tasked with maintenance of steady CPI inflation, the Bank of England claimed that the policy of printing money was to stave off deflation. Even as CPI inflation threatens to climb upwards, the original purpose of the policy is de-emphasised, and the policy continues.

For a while, the massive government borrowing of countries like the US and UK appeared to be possible. It seemed that the world accepted that all would be well, that the rich countries would continue to be rich, and were good for their debt. It seemed that countries could even 'get away with' printing money to finance government spending. I for one, never believed that such a situation could be possible, and was certain that it would all rapidly end in tears. However, throughout 2009 governments 'got away with it'.

As we enter into 2010, this looks unsustainable. More and more cracks are appearing in the edifice. Whilst each crack appears to be meaningless of itself, cumulatively they are destroying the integrity of the structure. There are the bilateral deals by China to trade outside of $US, the emergence of a petro-currency, the withdrawal of PIMCO from US and UK bonds, the shift of money into commodities, the carry trade of the $US and so many other small cracks....

The big question is this. Who is going to continue to finance the debt binge of the deficit countries in the coming year?

The cracks in the edifice of belief in the inevitability of the 'rich world' being rich mean that the supply of endless credit may well be coming to an end. In many countries, and I think of the US and UK in particular, though there are many others, there is the belief that the current structure of their economies might, somehow, be maintained. There is a lack of understanding that, in the end, that structure is built upon the credit provided by other countries, and without that credit, the structure can not be sustained. Even as the structure is crumbling before our eyes, there are many commentators, analysts and politicians claiming that this is a temporary aberration, and that all will one day return to normal. There are even claims that the economic crisis is coming to an end.

The analysts and commentators point to their indices, and say that, 'yes, things are looking up'. GDP is growing, or house prices rising once more, or industrial output has ticked up. The indicators are trotted out to suggest that all will be fine once again. The magic of governments and central banks pulling on their levers has worked. That the only explanation for such upticks is due to the largess of government, and that the largess of government is built upon overseas credit, is ignored. Strip out that overseas credit, and the situation looks very, very different.

Then there is the stability of the financial system. The banks appear to be making hay again, with business as normal having resumed. Meanwhile, in the background, do we really know what is going on? How much of that business as normal is resultant from the support of government and central banks? How much of this has been the socialisation of losses, the manipulation of accounting rules, the propping up of the house market through guarantees, and all of the other levers being pulled in the background. How much of the financial system sits upon the implicit guarantees of government, and how much risk is being transferred to the state?

What happens if the implicit guarantees of the state can no longer guarantee the financial system, because the states themselves are no longer seen as a guarantee? This is circular, as the more guarantees provided by the state, the greater the liabilities of the state, and the less the guarantee of the state might be seen as a guarantee.

I am not sure that anyone can actually pull apart the increasingly tangled knots between the financial system and the state. They appear to be mutually dependent, with the state providing guarantees, and the financial system funding the state with financial support through bond purchases to shore up their capital ratios, and so forth. How convenient that bank capital adequacy encourages the holding of government debt. Going back to Renaissance Italy, bankers were granted licenses and monopolies if they were willing to lend to the state on preferential terms. Nothing has changed.

But that supposedly rock solid capital that the banks are accumulating in the form of government bonds might, itself, be less solid than it is supposed to be. The same framework on capital adequacy that says that such bonds are safe is the same framework that said that lending to an OECD bank was safe - even though this proved not to be the case. Except....except, the lending to other OECD banks did prove to be safe, as governments and central banks stepped in and socialised the losses. The difference this time is that, if government debt goes sour, who might step in and socialise the losses?

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is right when he suggests that we should rip up the economics textbooks. What we are seeing is a grand experiment, in which economists and policymakers are attempting to structure wealth in economies by fiat. As each lever is pulled, as each policy is enacted, there are ripples through the world economy. Flooding $US into the markets whilst holding interest rates low sees the export of $US popping up and creating bubbles elsewhere. Backstopping the mortgage market sees foreclosures reduced, but at the risk of calling into question (contributing to doubts about) the financial viability of the state. Holding the value of the RMB down leads to greater trade imbalances. Each policy has a consequence, and each policy interacts with the policy pursued by every other government.

In other words, as each lever is pulled, the consequences defeat the intention of the lever puller. For example, if the trade imbalances destroy the economic stability of the destination of Chinese exports, where will this leave the Chinese economy? The more each state pulls on the levers, the greater the turbulence between each of the economies. The world economy is a dynamic system, such that policy in one country impacts on the economy of another country, which then reacts with its own policy provisions, which then impact upon other countries. It is an endless cycle of reactivity, with each reaction driving further reaction, and developing an increasingly unstable system as each country enacts ever more dramatic policy to counter or ameliorate the effects of the policies of other countries.

A simple example is the relatively recent Japanese policy of printing money to stave off deflation. With rock bottom interest rates, the newly printed money was simply exported into other countries in the so called 'carry trade'. Within Japan, deflation persisted, whilst the newly printed Japanese money appeared in other countries, contributing to the process of asset price inflation in the countries that were the destination of the carry trade. The policy levers were pulled, but the consequences were far from those that were intended.

What textbook might be able to predict the outcome of such a dynamic system? Despite this, we see the policymakers pulling on their levers, and offering confidence that they know what they are doing. Apparently, the masters of the universe are in control.

I simply do not believe it.

As I said, nothing has really changed. The policymakers continue pulling their levers, continue to react, continue to seek to 'control' their respective economies. The only thing that has changed is the scale and scope and intensity of the policy. As they pull harder on ever more levers, the imbalances grow, the risks grow, and the consequences become ever less predictable. I was worried in 2009, but somehow governments succeeded in shoving reality back into its box. Can the masters of the universe continue to do so in 2010?

I am not convinced. Welcome to 2010.

Note: Thanks to Lemming who posted the link to the rare earth metals story, and thanks in general for the many interesting comments.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

When will the Money Printing Stop?

Having already posted today, this is more of a note than a full post. I have noted recently that the UK inflation figures yet again defied Bank of England expectations of deflation. Whilst their recent inflation report was full of caveats on inflation vs. deflation, the original justification for quantitative easing (QE-Money Printing) was a deflation scare. As I have pointed out in many posts, the target inflation rate has barely been missed throughout the entire period of QE, and the predictions of deflation have never come to pass. The requirement for the Bank of England to write a letter of explanation to the chancellor is if the Bank of England misses the inflation target by 1%.

Yet again, inflation is still sitting stubbornly close to the target, such that no letter is required. This from the Telegraph:
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI), which is the Government's preferred measure of inflation, dropped to 1.6pc from 1.8pc in July - the lowest level since January 2005 according to data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It was the third month in a row that CPI was below the 2pc target.
As it is, the main cause of the fall in the rate of inflation is lower gas and electricity prices, which have fallen by considerable amounts. If we turn our minds back, it is apparent that the high prices with which these price falls are compared were extremely high prices resultant from the spike in prices of oil, which I predicted would fall back.

It is also noteworthy that the reason for continuing inflation is the higher prices of imports, which was my suggested reason for continued inflation when considering inflation versus deflation. The weakness of the £GB was always going to have a counterveiling impact to the shrinking of the economy. This point is of particular note for the US, now that the $US is sliding. In the case of the UK, I pointed out that currency weakness would take a while to show up in import inflation, as prices and contracts will take a while to adjust (e.g. when a contract is signed, it takes often takes a long while before the contracted goods are actually delivered at the pre-inflation price). The same will apply for the US, with time lags in inflationary pressures.

Returning to QE, it is interesting to see that the media have been distracted from the original purpose of QE, now that the predicted deflation has not taken place. This is from the FT:

Although six months is a comparatively short time to judge QE, Mr King can already point to some signs of success, but these are balanced against other more negative indicators.

On the positive side, government and corporate bond yields have fallen, boosting company borrowing in the capital markets. Indeed, sterling corporate bond issuance has surged to an annual record, with three months still remaining of the year.

Ten-year gilt yields are only 3 basis points lower, at 3.61 per cent, than the day before QE - but Charles Bean, the Bank's deputy governor, insists that they would have been 50bp higher without QE.

Investment grade sterling bond yields are 2 percentage points lower, at 6 per cent, than in early March, although euro-denominated corporate bond yields have fallen just as sharply with the help of the European Central Bank's injections of liquidity into the money markets.

QE has also boosted the equity markets, although it is difficult to quantify how much money investors have switched into shares from their gilt sales. The FTSE 100 has risen 38 per cent since the launch of QE, but a lot of the gains were due to an improving world economy and resilient corporate profits.

Like so many commentators, the deflation scare that was the justification for QE is quietly being forgotten. It is not clear why the memory of so many journalists and commentators are so short. With the notable exception of Liam Halligan in the Telegraph, it seems that the origins of QE are of no importance.

Throughout the policy of QE the Bank of England has sought to generate confusion over the role of deflation and inflation as their justification for QE. This is an excerpt from a previous post, where I highlight the kind of methods being used:
If we remember, the bank targets CPI, not RPI. However, in the Bank of England inflation report from February, it might be noted that the RPI is discussed in the report, even though the CPI is the target for inflation. You will note how the measures are blurred in this passage.
Deflation is sometimes used to describe any fall in the general level of prices (as measured in the United Kingdom by the CPI, RPI or the GDP deflator), however short-lived. A more economically significant phenomenon, however, would be a sustained period of negative inflation.

The RPI is likely to fall temporarily over the coming months (Section 4.1). This period of negative retail price inflation would be unusual (Chart A) and predominantly reflects the much lower contribution from mortgage interest payments, following the recent large falls in Bank Rate. The MPC’s central projection is for its target measure, annual CPI inflation, to remain above zero throughout the forecast horizon. (p33)
Whilst there is no direct statement of targeting of RPI, the way in which the whole passage is put is somewhat grey. The same section of the report then goes on to warn of the dangers of deflation......it appears that the Bank of England is subtly conflating the two measures, and they even use a chart which is designated as the 'ONS composite index'. (p33) One of the interesting points is that an argument for printing money directly follows this discussion of RPI and deflation:
Periods of low inflation, associated with weak demand, may limit a central bank’s ability to use conventional monetary policy to stabilise the economy. But if reductions in official interest rates do not prove sufficient to meet the inflation target, policymakers still have other options available to them to stimulate the economy, if necessary (see the box on pages 44–45 in this Report). (p33)
In a previous post, I have explained exactly why there is no element of QE that might justify the policy. This is beyond either a summary or quote, so I would recommend those that have not already read the post, to read it now.

Yet again, despite no indication of serious deflation, there is no indications of any halt to quantitative easing. Why is this? More to the point, why is it that so many in the media are sitting back and watching the monetization of government debt continue with so little concern? At this point, the press should be filled with outrage. Instead, they appear to accept this policy as if it were perfectly normal. Have they not noticed that the policy justification has failed to materialise?

Exactly how or when QE might stop, and under what circumstances, continues to be opaque. It seems that nobody seems willing to give the answers, and the press does not appear to be concerned. In the interim, the government continues to spend money still wet from the printing press.....to say that this is a bad situation is an understatement.....

Monday, June 8, 2009

Treasury Yields and Currency

At the moment there is a great deal of talk about the falling prices of treasuries. The explanation for this appears to fall into two camps; one explanation is that there is perception that the worst of the crisis is over (meaning that investors are willing to abandon the 'safe haven' of treasuries), and the other is that markets are being spooked by government deficits and quantitative easing (QE - money printing) of the Federal Reserve. Without being a market insider, it is difficult to judge the relative importance of either factor.

One of the errors on this blog has been to overestimate the collective intelligence of the markets, which means that the former explanation is quite plausible. However, the critical factor in the US treasuries market are the rate of QE and the continued confidence of overseas buyers (in particular China). I will return to this, which is a well worn theme of the blog.

The really curious part in this is that any 'recovery' that might involve a move out of treasuries is quite simply impossible. The US is on course for a deficit of $1.84 trillion, which represents about 13% of GDP, and the 'recovery' therefore must be financed through treasuries. If there is any concerted move out of treasuries into other assets, what will be funding the deficit? During the early part of the crisis there was a 'flight to safety' into treasuries, which has inevitably held yields down on bonds, and allowed the growing deficits to be financed. If at any point this process sees any significant reversal, then funding the deficit will become increasingly difficult.

Quite simply, aside from the fact that a failure to fund the deficit would be catastrophic, what kind of 'recovery' is it, if it is being financed by borrowing 13% of GDP?

A long time ago, I made an analogy with a household to explain the absurdity of this notion. A household has been racking up huge debts due to too much expenditure on the 'good things in life', but continues spending. All the time the family's debt is increasing, and then the bad news comes. The wife's job is under threat, and the husband's working hours are being reduced. Their income is declining, but the cost and size of the debt is increasing. They are in deep financial trouble, and are borrowing more and more money in order to keep their lifestyle and also to make payments on previous debt.

It looks like the household is in crisis, and they will soon go bankrupt if they continue their profligate spending. Fortunately, so it seems to our irresponsible family, a visitor comes to their house from 'Dodgy Loan Corporation' and offers them a further and much bigger new loan. They look at the figures, and it appears that, if they accept the loan, the family will be able to continue to live the same lifestyle as they had before. A massive weight lifts off their shoulders, and they live happily ever after.....

We can all (I hope) see the problem in the happy ending. I have not mentioned the prospects for the family's income increasing in the future, and without a massive increase in income, bankruptcy will just be delayed. Sadly, for the family, there is no identifiable prospect of such a massive increase in income in the future, and they are just hoping that 'something will turn up'.

As such, when there is talk of recovery, it is necessary to ask how much of the 'recovery' is simply the massive amount of new borrowing appearing in economic activity. Whilst the money may allow, for a short while, a perception that all is OK, spending is simply exceeding income on an ever greater scale. The debts are just getting bigger, and the prospects of ever repaying are diminishing.

The underlying problem that arises is that the equivalent of the 'Dodgy Loan Corporation' is China, and China is less and less willing to lend. The problem for China is that they have already lent huge amounts, and bankruptcy will mean a loss on their previous lending. The next problem that China has is that the 'family' refuses to rein in their spending, and is continuing to spend more than they earn. In the event of bankruptcy, they lose it all, but if they continue there is no prospects of repayment of the new debt. They are faced with the problem of whether they too might believe that 'something will turn up', or whether they cut their losses.

I have, for months now, been highlighting the many articles in which China has been sounding warnings to the US about their profligacy, and will not repeat the same points I have made many times before. The important point is that China is losing patience, and certainly does not believe that the US policy is sustainable. The best expression of the doubts about the prospects for the US in China was not from official channels, but through the laughter from Chinese students in response to a speech by Geithner in China. He had proposed that the Chinese $US assets were 'very safe'.

The problem for the US is that China does represent the 'Dodgy Loan Corporation', and without their ongoing financial support, the US is bankrupt.

This returns to the question of the bond markets, and the impossibility of a 'recovery' in which money moves out of treasuries into other assets. The only way any movement of money out of treasuries into other assets might be sustained is if China steps up to the plate as the Dodgy Loan Corporation, and actually makes up for the shortfall that will arise. In other words, if other creditors are withdrawing support (for whatever reason), somebody has to enter the market in their place.

It looks very unlikely that China is going to play this role.

The question then arises as to how this problem might play out. I would like to give a firm answer, but must speculate. The problem is that it is impossible to forecast how markets might shift in a situation of an impossible dilemma. If the markets move out of treasuries into other assets, then increasing doubts about the viability of the US state will arise. At the same time, many other indices will tick up, apparently suggesting that recovery is around the corner. In other words the signals will contradict one another. If recovery is around the corner, then perhaps the US state is viable after all. If recovery occurs, then the state will be able to repay the borrowing.

The problem is that the recovery is not a 'recovery'. It is an upswing that is resultant in further expansion in borrowing.

I have to assume that the collective intelligence of the market is not very high, as indications over the last year suggest that they have a limited ability to adapt to new circumstances. Whilst they must eventually adapt, they are slow to do so. In the end, markets will shift towards acceptance of reality, but the process is delayed by clinging on to old paradigms.

In the interim, it is very likely that there are going to be wild swings in sentiment, and what appear to be contradictory indicators appearing all over the news.

These problems are not restricted to the US.

As many of the readers will be aware, there are significant problems in many of the traditionally rich countries - in the Euro area, the UK and in Japan. Each of these economies has a range of problems, similar solutions such as government stimuli and QE, and varying degrees of underlying economic problems. The key question that many investors will be asking in this situation is not which is the best bet as an investment, but which is least worst. I have recently written an article for TFR, in which I outline the underlying problems for investors - determining which currency might be 'safe'.

In the article, I ask why Sterling rose despite the negative watch on the currency from S&P. I will not repeat the article (you can read it here), but the underlying point is that all of the traditionally wealthy economies are looking 'ugly'. As a result, as has happened recently with Sterling, currencies will shift on any news - whether good or bad (e.g. the decline in Sterling as a result of the troubles of Gordon Brown).

What I am trying to do here is paint a picture of the potential for extreme volatility in the coming months. In particular, there are many contradictory forces within individual economies, and uncertainties about the relative health of the traditionally wealthy economies, when one is compared to another. There is, therefore, going to a period of considerable uncertainty as the underlying economic changes start to work through markets, and as investors flee from one high risk into another high risk.

The certainties in this scenario is that the economic shape will eventually shift to reflect the underlying shift in wealth, which is the shift from the traditionally wealthy countries to the 'emerging' markets, and that the economies of countries like the UK and US will be left in tatters.

It is also increasingly probable, but still not certain, that China is going to emerge as the dominant economic power.

In other words, what we are seeing is the final process of the shift of the world into the new economic shape. The only questions that remain are how the process will actually play out, over what timescale, and the level of drama with which the change happens.

Note 1: I have long been discussing the prospects of the RMB as the new reserve currency. I pointed out long ago that the Chinese government would never openly declare such an intention, but that they would rather use proxies. A recent article in the Telegraph reports a continuation of this process:

Guo Shuqing, the chairman of state-controlled China Construction Bank (CCB), also said he is exploring the possibility of issuing loans to trading companies in yuan, allowing Chinese and foreign companies to settle their bills in yuan rather than in dollars.

Mr Guo said the issuing of yuan bonds in Hong Kong and Shanghai would help to develop the debt markets in China and promote the yuan as a major international currency.

The reality is that Mr. Guo would never say such a thing without approval of the government. However, the government is still in a position where they can deny any such intentions, and deny any plan to make the RMB the reserve currency. In the interim, the IMF has suggested that their SDR might be the new reserve currency, following the line of the head of the Chinese central bank. Perhaps they do not realise that this proposal from China was simply a method of indirectly attacking the $US, as an early step in manouvering the RMB in to position as the replacement?

Note 2: Some replies to comments on the last article:

Lord Sidcup: I would like to reply to your 'bafflement', and might do so in the future. However, that is a complete post rather than a reply to a comment. I hope to answer your question at some stage.

Luke Skywalker: Some interesting ideas, which again need a long answer. I would hope though that I have answered many of them throughout the blog.

Matt: I have previously discussed the land tax idea I believe (following another commentator pointing it out), so I would guess that you can find my thoughts in the archive. If I remember correctly, my main worry was how the tax might be assessed. However, it is a long while ago. Overall I remained unconvinced, and will therefore apologise for not revisiting the subject.

Tiberius: Your quote seems to sum up the nature of the process of accepting reality and is relevant to this post, so I will requote here:
"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."
- Arthur Schopenhauer
Lord Keynes: Thank you for your many links, and well researched comments. I have previously read (and commented on, I believe) 'The Roving Cavaliers of Credit', which was linked to by a previous commentator. Like many such articles, it is very clever, but I believe misses the real basics of economics. If you increase the money supply, eventually it must lead to inflation. However you look at it, if you have 100 units of output, and 100 units of money, if you increase the units of money without increasing output, there is more money per unit of output. That, in the end, must lead to inflation. It is just a question of time....whether output can expand faster than the impact of the increase in supply.

Note 3: I am a bit short of time for replies, so apologies for the brevity and not including replies to all the comments. I wanted to take time to highlight a little discussion I had on the Von Mises Institute (Austrian Economics) comments section. I have argued in this blog for a fixed 'fiat' money supply, and posted a brief suggestion to that effect. I was rather surprised by the response. I am not certain that my idea is sound, and am open to positive or negative comments. However, I was a little surprised at the dogmatism of the responses from (presumably) Austrian economists. I have copied one of the replies below:
  • Cynicus Economicus,

    "regarding the origin of money, I do not believe this is an issue."

    You vastly underestimate the importance of this issue. Money can only originate in the processes of the market. In other words, the best money is chosen by the market. Moneys that don't originate on the market are not good moneys. So the system you're advocating would entail bad money because it cannot originate in the processes of the market.

    "Electronic money is the obvious answer, not paper money"

    Electronic money cannot originate in the processes of the market. The money commodity must have prior barter value before it can originate on the market. Electronic money doesn't have prior barter value. Furthermore, electronic money does not possess an important characteristic of good money: scarcity.

    To be blunt, the system you suggest has no promise.

This was a bad example, but I did feel that they did not address the points that I made. I am not sure that I was very eloquent, but even so...I seem to recall MattinShanghai identifying the Austrian school as dogmatic, and feel I have to agree. This is a pity, as I do like their arguments against Keynesianism. Am I being unfair to them - was my argument addressed? Or was it just poorly expressed, or completely unsound. Comments welcomed.....

Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Inflation, Deflation And Printing Money in the UK

Many of the readers from the UK may have been seeing news of the 'deflation' in the UK economy. A typical piece can be found in the Times as follows:

Deflation tightened its grip on the economy last month after a record fall in retail prices.

The retail prices index (RPI), the benchmark for pay deals, fell to -1.2 per cent, the lowest since records began in 1948, dragged down by a decline in energy and mortgage costs.

Economists expect that prices may fall farther as the recession takes its toll and unemployment rises. Some believe that the rate could fall to about -2.7 per cent, raising fears of prolonged deflation as consumers delay purchases and businesses withhold investment.

It becomes increasingly difficult to view such articles without a measure of irritation developing. In particular, the media seem to be subject to some confusion. As such, a quick introduction is given below to the two main measures of inflation, taken from National Statistics (emphasis added):
Consumer Prices Index (CPI)

The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) has been designed as a macro-economic measure of consumer price inflation and forms the basis for the Government's inflation target that the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee is required to achieve. It has been developed according to internationally agreed rules and internationally is known as the HICP. The HICP is the preferred measure for international comparisons of inflation.
Like the RPI, the CPI measures the average change from month to month in the prices of consumer goods and services. However it differs in the particular households it represents, the range of goods and services included, and the way the index is constructed.
Retail Prices Index (RPI)

The Retail Prices Index is the most familiar general purpose domestic measure of inflation in the United Kingdom and is continuously available from June 1947. It measures the average change from month to month in the prices of goods and services purchased by most households in the United Kingdom. The RPI or its derivatives are used by the Government for the uprating of pensions and benefits and index-linked gilts.
The important point to note here is the key difference between the two measures, which is in the cost of housing, as follows:
For example, the RPI basket includes a number of items chosen to represent owner-occupier housing costs, including mortgage interest payments and depreciation costs, all of which are excluded from the CPI. These differences are described in greater detail in Roe, D. and Fenwick, D. (2004), ‘The New Inflation target: the Statistical Perspective’. Beyond these specific areas, the contents of the CPI and RPI baskets are very similar, although the precise weights attached to the individual items in each index differ [the Roe and Fenwick article can be found here]
It is very easy to get these measures confused, but the important point to take forward is this:

The government and Bank of England use the CPI for inflation targets, and the CPI does not include housing costs.

By contrast, the RPI includes housing costs as follows, taken from the ONS guide here:
Rent
Private furnished rent Private unfurnished rent
Local authority rent Registered Social Landlord (RSL) rent
Mortgage interest payments
Average interest payments on a typical repayment mortgage (estimated/modelled)
Back in December, I wrote a post on what I thought the prospects were for deflation, and pointed out that currency weaknesses and therefore higher import prices would likely offset the deflationary factors within the UK economy. At the time of writing, food prices were already starting to climb. As it is, much as predicted, the CPI has continued to be inflationary. The chart below shows the different measures of inflation.
















[Chart from the ONS here]

Having introduced these measures, the astute reader will immediately see that there is a circularity to the measures. Mortgage interest payments are linked to the interest rate, and the interest rate is determined in part by the interest rate targeted by the central bank. As such, during the boom years, the RPI would have been held down due to the low level of measured inflation of the CPI. In other words, even though there was rampant inflation in the economy (in house prices), it was hidden in part by the way in which the statistics were used and measured.

It is here that we come to the source of irritation. At present, the Bank of England have reduced interest rates to record lows. As such, the cost of servicing mortgages and indirectly rental costs are falling. Furthermore, as house prices fall, there will be a combination of lower interest rates on smaller mortgages. In this scenario, the problem is that what we are seeing is a case of deflation being measured as a result of an asset price bubble popping, and central bank intervention.

It is hard to imagine that the asset price bubble bursting should be seen as a bad thing, as it is an inevitable correction in the market. As for the other element, the central bank intervention, this is where the circularity starts to kick in - sort of.....If we remember, the bank targets CPI, not RPI. However, in the Bank of England inflation report from February, it might be noted that the RPI is discussed in the report, even though the CPI is the target for inflation. You will note how the measures are blurred in this passage.
Deflation is sometimes used to describe any fall in the general level of prices (as measured in the United Kingdom by the CPI, RPI or the GDP deflator), however short-lived. A more economically significant phenomenon, however, would be a sustained period of negative inflation.

The RPI is likely to fall temporarily over the coming months (Section 4.1). This period of negative retail price inflation would be unusual (Chart A) and predominantly reflects the much lower contribution from mortgage interest payments, following the recent large falls in Bank Rate. The MPC’s central projection is for its target measure, annual CPI inflation, to remain above zero throughout the forecast horizon. (p33)
Whilst there is no direct statement of targeting of RPI, the way in which the whole passage is put is somewhat grey. The same section of the report then goes on to warn of the dangers of deflation......it appears that the Bank of England is subtly conflating the two measures, and they even use a chart which is designated as the 'ONS composite index'. (p33) One of the interesting points is that an argument for printing money directly follows this discussion of RPI and deflation:
Periods of low inflation, associated with weak demand, may limit a central bank’s ability to use conventional monetary policy to stabilise the economy. But if reductions in official interest rates do not prove sufficient to meet the inflation target, policymakers still have other options available to them to stimulate the economy, if necessary (see the box on pages 44–45 in this Report). (p33)
Page 44-45 are discussions of unconventional monetary tools, otherwise known as quantitative easing (QE- or printing money). The problem that we are now seeing is best expressed by Liam Halligan from the Telegraph:

Over the last few months, we've printed money on an unprecedented scale and run up enormous extra liabilities. When sensible people have protested, pointing out the clear dangers, we've been told such "bold" measures were necessary for the UK to avoid getting sucked into a deflationary spiral.

But now, just three months later, this looming threat has apparently passed. It warrants not a mention in the Bank's Inflation Report. Has deflation really gone away? Or did we never actually face such dangers? Was the spectre of deflation conjured up, instead, for other reasons – as an excuse for this ghastly Government to yank monetary policy back off the Bank and nail interest rates to the floor, while junking fiscal caution and borrowing in a fashion more akin to a banana republic?

Liam Halligan is quite correct that the latest report passes by the deflationary scare stories, and rightly identifies that there was no real prospect of CPI deflation. As can be seen from the chart earlier in the post, it is still relatively high. However, he misses the way in which the RPI was introduced as a means of pulling deflation into the picture in the February report. As you will see from the above text, it is done in a very subtle way, and this has been broadly absorbed by most of the media. The elements of the report that considered CPI were very nuanced, and were not firmly deflationary.

The February report was actually a very subtle and nuanced document overall. The spectre of deflation was primarily raised against the RPI, but the way that the report reads does not reflect this. Crucially, acceptance of the deflation argument was the reason for why quantitative easing (QE - printing money) was accepted in the media. Now that the controversy over QE has died down, the RPI issue is now quietly dropped, along with the talk of deflation.

Here is the central problem for the Bank of England. The only way to justify QE is through the fear of deflation, but the only measure that is showing deflation is the RPI. The bank's remit does not extend to RPI so that it can not use the RPI as an excuse to print money. As such, they subtly conflated the measures, planted the idea of deflation in the mind of the media, and 'lo and behold', deflation has appeared. It now looks like, post hoc, that the Bank of England can justify the deflationary scare. Through smoke and mirrors, the media have accepted the deflationary argument and continue to accept QE.

However, if the media were paying attention, they would note that the deflation is on RPI and, in part, due to the very policies that the Bank of England is actually pursuing. In particular, the Bank of England is fighting to reduce interest rates on consumer debt and mortgages through QE and historically low interest rate policies. Furthermore, the deflation of the housing bubble, in which asset prices are returning to sustainable levels, would be an extremely difficult reason to use to justify the policy of QE - if not impossible. Such an argument would be that the policy is aimed at reflating house prices, and I am not sure that anyone in their right mind might accept such a policy.

The fundamental problem in this whole picture is that the Bank of England has a problem with justifying QE if deflation is identified in the RPI. Over and above the problem that the remit is to target the CPI, the problem arises that targeting of the RPI would be to reverse a bubble deflating and would also preclude any further monetary easing. In particular, the monetary easing would serve to reduce interest rates, and thereby be deflationary through reduced costs in housing.....

I am hoping that, at this stage, it is apparent that there is a significant problem with the policy of QE. The remit of the bank is to target the CPI, the justification for QE is deflation, the index showing deflation is the RPI, and the bank is actually contributing to deflation in the RPI.

In other words, even if the principle of QE is accepted (which is not the case for this blog), there is currently no justification for the policy which can withstand scrutiny. Under such circumstances, it is only possible to return to the long standing argument/theory of the blog, and conclude that QE is simply a way of printing money to buy bonds and support the bond market. The policy is therefore really about printing money to support profligate government spending through printing money.

The trouble is that, excepting a few commentators like Liam Halligan, the media are still buying the lie that QE is to fight deflation.....

Note 1:

I did not want to make the main article too long, so I have not discussed the problems with deflation theory. I discussed this in a very long post previously, and have quoted from the post below [the most relevant bit]:

[Quote starts.....]

Economists say that deflation is a terrible thing. They say that it wrecks economies. If you have deflation, then people stop consuming, and stop investing.....

Let's start with the case of consumers stopping consuming. In this case, we have a good example of deflation to illustrate that deflation does not stop people buying things that they want. The example is computers which, as every year has gone by, have become ever cheaper in relation to their performance and sophistication. We all know that if we wait until next year, we will get a much better computer for our money. This is real deflation, but during a period of real deflation, the sales of computers has expanded, and expanded, and expanded.

If we think of a more mundane example, we might come up with something like a bottle of shampoo. Let's imagine that every year there are ongoing productivity gains in manufacturing shampoo such that the price falls by 3% per year. Does this mean that we will defer our buying of shampoo? Does that mean that, in order to benefit from the price reduction of shampoo, we will walk around with greasy hair.

Alternatively, we can take the case of a discretionary spend on something like a holiday. As some people will be aware, the low cost airlines have seen huge reductions in the cost of overseas travel, and the costs continued to go down over a period of years. Did this mean that people stopped overseas travel while they waited for the flight prices to drop even lower? What we actually saw in places like the UK was a massive expansion in overseas travel, as it became ever more affordable. However, this occurred despite deflating prices. This is like the example of the wine glasses....

The idea that people will not spend money during deflation is simply not true. However, if we knew that there was an unusual deflation about to take place, such that we expected the price of something to drop dramatically at some future point, we might defer our spending. For example, if the newspapers were to announce that in April of this year that there will be a new type of computer which will cost half the price of a computer today, then we would likely wait until April before buying a new computer. Moreover, when the new computers were released in April, then the sales of computers would increase as more people could afford them, and we would all potentially be richer by a factor of half a computer (if that makes sense).

However, such events would always be exceptions, and we readily buy computers despite the steady price deflation.

In short, steady deflation does not stop people from consuming.

[Quote ends]

I have since seen a book review, on the Mises institute website, that uses similar arguments and examples. I was hoping to link to it, but could not find the article (apologies).

The other nasty element proposed for deflation is discussed in the Economist:
Real debt burdens therefore rise, causing borrowers to cut spending to service their debts or to default. That undermines the financial system and deepens the recession.
However, this does not account for the savers. People who save see the value of their money grow, and this means that they have greater spending power. The problem is, of course, that there are too many debtors rather than savers....but this is perverse way of looking at the problem. A more balanced economy would not see such a situation, and it is lax monetary policy that caused the problem in the first place.

However, I do not want to go into the full argument here. I detail far more in the original post, and (bear with it) this can be found here. The issue of inflation versus deflation is very complex, and I am not sure that even my long article does the subject full justice.

Note 2:

I have long been grumbling about the use of inflation statistics. It has been a regular feature of the blog. Two quotes are given below, but these are only a limited selection.

This is from a post I wrote in January.
Now the expression measured is very important, because asset price inflation did not count in official inflation. In particular, as fast as new money was produced, asset prices such as houses inflated. Greenspan, in his wisdom, allowed one bubble after another to soak up the expansion in money. However, we have now gone one bubble too far, and there is no new bubble on the horizon to soak up the money being dropped into the market (which would in any case just be a delay, not something that would be a 'good' thing). As such, one of the sources of money absorption has been bubbles in assets, which stopped the prices of other goods going up. Mainstream economists seem to think inflation was conquered, but it was just displaced into something that was not measured.
This is from a post in February:
It should be recognised that arguments against including house prices might be put forward, such as the idea that the cost of owning a house is in part dependent on the interest rates charged on mortgages, and that is a valid measure. However, this becomes a circular argument as, if house prices are inflating and are not measured in inflation, interest rates will remain low despite the actual inflation, thereby keeping the cost of the mortgage repayments relatively low whilst the asset price inflates. However you look at it, having to borrow £200,000 this year to by a house, and having to borrow £300,000 next year is inflation. The day to day cost of servicing the loan may change, but the cost of the good has still inflated.

You will find the UK Office of National Statistics personal inflation calculator here. You will note that they do not calculate the rate of inflation by the interest rate paid on borrowing when buying, for example, household goods. They measure it against the price of the good itself. It seems that they have not noticed that a house is a 'good', or more likely they have decided that the inflation of house prices is something they would rather not measure.
Note 3:

For US readers, you may be interested in an article here. It details how the inflation statistics have been manipulated in the US. It is not happy reading. I have yet to find a similar discussion of UK statistics, and would ideally like to look into this. I did consider it, but will admit to being 'outfaced' by the scale of the problem of digging through the various papers, and studying the methodology in enough depth. Any links to such articles would be appreciated.....

Note 4:

I hope the above article makes sense still. I had to chop it around to shorten it, and hope that this has not led to any errors. Comment if you spot any, and any other readers can then see any errors.

Note 5:

Sorry to not respond to any of the comments, but this post was rather demanding of time. The final article does not reflect all of the articles I have recently read on the subject...as there are just too many out there....

Note 6:

I have long been (against the grain of the same conventional economists that failed to predict the recession) arguing that regulation of the banking system was a major part of the crisis. I have been heartened to see a very similar argument from Niall Ferguson, which can be found in the New York Times here....

Note 7:

Regular readers will know that I have long been discussing the idea that China has been positioning the RMB as the new reserve currency. Arguably, progress in that direction can be seen in Brazil, and more and more people are picking up on it:

Brazilian President Lula is the latest world leader (after Wen Jiabao and Vladimir Putin) to call for moving away from the US dollar in trade and and for a new monetary and financial order. On the eve of his trip to China this week, Lula suggested in an interview with Caijing (and other news sources) that the two countries should conduct more of their trade in their own currencies rather than the US dollar.

“Between Brazil and China, we need to establish a trade that is paid for in our own currencies. We don't need dollars. Why do two important countries like China and Brazil have to use the dollar as a reference, instead of our own currencies? We've already started doing this with Argentina. Our trade is taking place in our own currencies. Otherwise, we'll be in an absurd situation, where the country that caused this crisis will be the country that gets the most dollars. It's crazy that the dollar is the reference, and that you give a single country the power to print that currency. We need to give greater value to the Chinese and Brazilian currencies.”

Early this year, China supplanted the U.S. to become Brazil’s largest trading partner, as its commodity demands resumed and Brazil’s trade with the U.S. slumped. At the moment, Brazil is one of the few countries with which China runs a significant deficit which rose to $11 billion for all of 2008. Chinese imports are almost all raw materials.

Greater use of the RMB in trade with Brazil would be yet another step China has recently taken to increase the use of the RMB outside of China. China has been signing 3-yr RMB/local currency swaps with a range of emerging and frontier markets including Argentina, Brazil’s neighbor. As Nouriel Roubini notes in a recent oped, these swaps are small steps towards a possible greater international role of the RMB – pilot projects to use RMB as a settlement currency in Hong Kong Macau and Asean are other such steps. These deals are also another way to provide a bit of trade finance to key trading partners. The swap with Argentina might help finance China’s extensive trade with the country. As a result, even if US dollars are not used, it could well be the RMB and not the BRL that is used, especially if China wanted to avoid bearing the exchange rate risk.

In addition to the Petrobras-CDB deal the Brazilian development bank BNDES is reportedly seeking a credit line from China. BNDES, like other trade credit providers globally, has taken on a higher profile in the face of the withdrawal of private trade finance. Such a loan could be conducted in RMB/BRL. While that would be major, there are significant preconditions before the RMB internationalization progresses further. In particular, the more the RMB is used outside of China’s border the less control the central bank has. In this way China’s shorter-term goals of economic stabilization and longer term goal of more sustainable consumption driven growth may conflict.

The really interesting step will be any move towards pricing oil in RMB. My guess is that we are on the cusp of such a move, though initially it will be small scale (i.e. not the Gulf states). However, it is possible to see the progression forwards of the RMb with each passing week.....

Saturday, May 9, 2009

Lies, Lies, Lies

My aim in this blog has largely been to give my best and most rational perspective on the reality of the economic situation. I have tried (and I hope) mostly succeeded in avoiding emotive and partisan viewpoints, and have tried as far as possible to see the actions of politicians as misguided. Of late, that perspective has been slipping, for the UK, the US and also for Europe.

I think that the key turning point was the Darling budget, in which the forecasts were so optimistic as to be beyond any rational belief. The budget was built upon these forecasts, and I simply do not believe that either Darling or Brown might even begin to believe such willful nonsense. Under such circumstances, it looks very much like Brown and Darling are willing to risk severe damage to the UK economy in order to prop up their electoral chances.

There are even more worrying signs, and these are more of a broad concern which extends beyond the UK into the whole Western world. Regular readers will know that I do not buy the conspiracy theorists, or that there is a nascent New World Order. I am far more inclined to the view that incompetence and idiocy are greater drivers of events than hyper-intelligent Mr. Evils plotting world domination. Furthermore, many of the conspiracy theories are nothing more than anti-Semitic nonsense, and if you are regular reader you will have seen many examples where I have highlighted such nonsense.

As for the idea that the evil bankers might have engineered this mess as a route to world domination, it is simply a laughable and implausible joke. As the major banks teeter on the brink of insolvency, with only government between them and oblivion, any notion that this might be a conspiracy for world domination looks positively delusional.

Having said all of this, it is not to say that there is nothing wrong at all. There are some very worrying aspects to this financial crisis, and that includes the role of both the financial institutions and the governments of the Western world. I am still not clear, even at this stage, whether the actions of governments are a combination of misguided thinking and power corruption, or just plain power corruption. What I am ever more certain of is that there is an unholy alliance between the financial institutions, central banks and government. To call such an alliance a cabal, or other such names, would be to dignify a rag-tag of self-interest and 'clubbiness'. However, that economic policy has ceased to serve the electorate, and is increasingly serving the large financial institutions is increasingly clear.

I do accept that the initial bailouts of the financial system might have been a panicked reaction to an emerging crisis, in which the politicians might have groped for any solution to try to stave off disaster. In order to do so, they inevitably turned to the heads of the central banks for advice and guidance, and may not have realised that the central banks were far too cosy with the institutions which they were supposed to 'supervise'. As such, we can safely put the initial reactions to the economic crisis down to a misguided and panicked reaction, though this can not be certain.

A good perspective on the relationship between banks, government and central banks has been provided by a commentator. The former Chief Economist of the IMF, Simon Johnson, has written an excellent article entitled 'The Quiet Coup', and he also includes how academic economists have been seduced into the orbit of influence of the major financial institutions. He paints a picture of the to and fro between government and the banks, from academia to the banks. For example, he has this to say of the close world of banking and politics:
One channel of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington. Robert Rubin, once the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, served in Washington as Treasury secretary under Clinton, and later became chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee. Henry Paulson, CEO of Goldman Sachs during the long boom, became Treasury secretary under George W.Bush. John Snow, Paulson’s predecessor, left to become chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, a large private-equity firm that also counts Dan Quayle among its executives. Alan Greenspan, after leaving the Federal Reserve, became a consultant to Pimco, perhaps the biggest player in international bond markets.
My intention is not to rework an article that expresses very well and very clearly the clubbiness of this world. I would suggest that you read the original article, which is long, but worth the read. Instead, what I would like to do is put this in some kind of context, to explain how the unholy alliance between the politicians, academia, the central banks and the financial giants is leading the West down a road to destruction.

In my last post on the state of the US economy I discussed the fact that there was something very, very wrong with the bailouts in principle. From the very first bailout, I have consistently opposed the actions. In particular, I pointed out in my earliest posts on the subject, that the first bailouts would be followed by further bailouts as the economy spiralled downwards. It was very clear from day one of the bailouts that the banks were in worse shape than anyone was admitting. At that early stage, I just thought that the politicians were misguided, that the central banks were misguided. It may indeed be true that this was the case, but I am not sure that we will know for certain. Perhaps they always knew that the situation was only going to get worse - much, much worse?

So what is the fundamental problem with the bailouts? Quite simply, as I pointed out in the early posts, the bailouts will, one way or another, be paid for by other businesses and ordinary tax payers. We were told, from those early days, that the financial system must be saved, or see the economy collapse. This is the justification for this unprecedented and gargantuan attempt to support these insolvent financial institutions.

Back in the early days, there was sufficient confusion and shock for this point of view to gain traction, and to allow for the bailouts to progress forwards. However, the scale and scope of the bailouts has continually been obscured, and what has never been widely apparent is just how much of the total economy is now directed towards saving these insolvent financial institutions. Quite simply, the entire Western economic system now appears to be pointed towards rescuing these insolvent institutions. It is, to say the least, the most shocking economic madness.

Another article, from the same magazine as the Simon Johnson article, details the astronomical figures for interventions by the Federal Reserve. A summary of these, as well as the bailouts from the government, can be found here. It is worth a long look. The author of the article has this to say:
Through a dozen programs introduced since the crisis began, the Fed will be on the hook for trillions of dollars in loans, bailouts, and asset purchases. The government expects to be repaid for most of these commitments, of course, with interest. But that’s the tricky part. Largely unencumbered by congressional meddling, the Fed has in most cases refused to reveal the beneficiaries of its largesse—or what assets they’ve used as collateral—lest panicky investors and depositors lose faith. As a result, outside the walls of the Eccles Building, almost no one knows how sound those loans really are.
In one very effective interactive graphic, the scale of the overall combined US government and Federal Reserve assistance becomes apparent. Again, spend some time on the chart. It is quite simply astounding.

If we then look at the UK, we see a similar pattern, but I have yet to see a source that pulls all of the costs together so neatly. From the Guardian, we have a graphic which shows the direct bailouts as £25 billion Northern Rock, £42 billion Bradford and Bingley, £37 billion HBOS/RBS/Lloyds, £22.5 billion more for RBS, and up to £10 billion for Lloyds. On top of this is the Credit Guarantee Scheme which is to:
make available new capital to UK banks and building societies to strengthen their resources, permitting them to restructure their finances, while maintaining their support for the real economy; and ensure that the banking system has the funds necessary to maintain lending in the medium term.
The scheme provides up to £250 billion worth of guarantees (the page linked to says 'at least £200 billion), and the users of the scheme are dominated by the 'usual suspects' such as RBS, but also includes Tesco Finance. We then have the Asset protection scheme, at £525 billion, with (you guessed it) RBS already having £325 billion insured under a scheme to insure risky assets, described by Vince Cable as:
“fraud at the taxpayer’s expense” and that it was weighted heavily in favour of the banks, who were being invited to dump their worst assets on the Treasury.
To these bailouts we need to add the Special Liquidity Scheme, 'to allow banks to swap temporarily their high quality mortgage-backed and other securities for UK Treasury Bills', which adds up to another £185 billion lent by February of this year (the Bank of England claims that there is no risk in the scheme - but why was it then necessary?). Finally there is the Asset Purchase Facility (£50 billion at the outset), which has subsequently morphed into the £150 billion quantitative easing scheme.

All told, these facilities add up to a massive government/central bank response to the insolvent UK banks, with many of the facilities creating massive potential liabilities. We are looking at a total that amounts to around £1 trillion of support for the banking system.

In both the US and the UK, the scale of this activity has seen a massive growth in the balance sheets of central banks, and a huge increase in their potential liabilities, as well as huge expansions in government debt.

It is at this point that we need to pause, take a long breath, and actually consider what it is that the banking system is for. In the many bailouts and rescues, we simply hear that the financial system must be saved, but do not hear what it is supposed to actually do. The standard line being trotted out is that the banks must be saved to get credit moving again. The question here is why it is that the limited numbers of banks that have received most of the various support measures are so important, and that is the question of what financial services are actually there for.

It is when we ask this simple question, this blindingly obvious question, that we can see the level of the fraud that is being done to the taxpayers and the damage to the wider economy. The financial system is indeed important in the provision of credit, in particular it is important in the provision of mortgages, investment in business and so forth. The core function, the real function of financial institutions, is to take the savings from person A, and make the money available to person B, or company C. As part of that process, the expectation is that the bank will lend the money with a level of care which is appropriate to the level of risk expected by the saver.

Here we have the problem. That is it. That is the only function of a bank/banking system in a healthy and well balanced economy.

As long as there are banks able to undertake this role, then the banking system is operating. In no way is any individual bank necessary for the underlying function of the financial system. Banks are intermediaries which should be there for the investment of savings, and provided that banks are able to function in this way, then the system is operating.

I am sure that this point of view will inspire objections (I look forward to the comments), such as the idea that the failure of the 'too big to fail' banks would have seen major bank runs, and a period of financial chaos. I do not, and have not, disputed this. The inevitable result of the failure of, for example RBS, would have been lines of people at every major financial institution, and a systemic failure. There would also have been social disorder and a period of great stress. However, the pain would have been short and sharp, and far less costly to the wider economy. It would have cost, but the bill would have been so much less than that which is now accumulating.

But here is the problem. We are now in a situation where our economic future is now being poured into the bottomless pits of financial institutions that are still insolvent, and which are going to need ever more support on an ongoing basis. The insolvent banks are quite literally eating up our present and future wealth, and threatening the very integrity of the Western economic structure. It is turning an economic crisis that turned into a financial crisis, and now risks turning these crises into a economic crisis of a magnitude that will threaten everything that the Western world has represented.

These are strong and dramatic assertions. However, as I have watched this crisis unfold, I have at various stages seen opportunities to turn the situation around. At every point in the crisis I have seen ever deeper digging of the hole in which we find ourselves. I now think that we are reaching the stage where the nature of the bailouts, the nature of the eventual cost to the economy, are so great that the very faith in systems that have supported Western democracy might be undermined.

In particular, the amount of support for the banking system is a ticking time bomb, and a time bomb because, quite simply, those that are governing us are lying about the costs to ordinary people - the cost for their support, and the denial of the risks that they incur with each round of bailouts.

I have come to this conclusion over several months. I have watched as insolvent banks are allowed to declare profits when they are insolvent through accounting tricks - supported by governments and central banks. All we have to do is see the massive support that has been poured into the banking system to see that any notion of profits must be a lie, but governments, central banks, the media, and even academics are all supporting this lie.

More recently, we have seen the so called bank stress tests in the United States. As one analyst identified (sorry, I can not find the link), even under optimistic projections, there is a massive amount of losses coming the way of the banks. Apparently they only need $75 billion of new capital, even though this is nowhere near enough to cover such losses. As the analyst pointed out, for the stress tests to be set at the right level, this would mean that the banks are currently massively over-capitalised - a complete absurdity. A brief review of the news stories (e.g. here) showed that the banks were negotiating on the levels of capital that were required of them. How can this be justified?

Quite simply, we are being lied to in a systemic way. The banking system is still insolvent, and ever more support will be needed to hide this reality. This is support at a cost that is creating ever greater strains on the rest of the economy - and which will eventually sink the rest of the economy to a low that we can not imagine.

All built upon lies, lies, lies.

As if this were not all bad enough, we have what has become a subject of great interest to this blog - the weasel worded quantitative easing, or printing of money by central banks. As I have pointed out endlessly, this is one of the most outrageous policies that is being undertaken by the central banks, and can only end in ruin for the economic well being of the countries undertaking it. The explanations for the policy all follow a line that says that it is to ease credit in the marketplace, but the problem is that - once started - it seems to rapidly move into the purchase of government debt. Whilst there are technical explanations trotted out for this, it seems more than coincidence that the central banks undertaking this are those who are issuing huge mountains of government debt.

If you doubt this, take a look at the debate for the European Central Bank's move to the policy, and you will find that it is the southern countries of Europe and Ireland, countries in economic freefall, true bubble economies, that have pushed through the policy against opposition by Germany. Whilst government debt is not on the list for purchase yet, viewing the countries that pushed the policy it can only be a matter of time.

As if this is not bad enough, that central banks are indirectly monetising government debt, there are rumours that governments are now buying their own debt. This is still unsubstantiated, but this from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard:
Traders already whisper that some governments are buying their own debt through proxies at bond auctions to keep up illusions – not to be confused with transparent buying by central banks under quantitative easing. This cannot continue for long.
Quite frankly, I suspect that the rumours are true. When discussing QE, this was one of the themes, or scenarios, that I considered. If true, at some point the truth will eventually emerge, and the consequences can only be dire.

Once again, we have lies, lies, lies.

And then there are the economic forecasts. We have the infamous Darling budget, a work of fiction, a new sunny forecast from the Bank of England (but nevertheless a suggestion of continuing extension of quantitative easing??), Bernanke and his optimism for recovery in consumer spending and the housing market and for the banking system. I hope that I showed in my recent review of the US economy that, quite simply, there is no prospect for any imminent recovery - at best a brief uptick or an inflationary 'recovery'.

Lies, lies, lies.

Above all else, we can see the lies working their way through the stockmarkets. If ever there were a suckers rally this is it. From one blogger, we have lists of 'insiders' buying and selling, with insiders selling hard (see here, here and here). Quite simply, this rally is built on lies, as no recovery is in sight. No doubt, those that will be hurt in the rally will be the outsiders, or ordinary people.

And the truth? In the UK, there are bloggers like myself, and a small number of commentators who question what is going on. For example, there is Fraser Nelson at the Spectator who, whilst a partisan commentator, is highlighting the 'fishiness' of quantitative easing. There is Liam Halligan at the Telegraph, who highlights in his most recent article that the end of QE will create a problem of how to sell bonds into a saturated market. There are more, but overall there are far too few commentators who are confronting what is going on, and questioning the underlying lies.

In the US, the situation is slightly better. Although there are legitimate critiques of Austrian economics, at least they are highlighting the nature of the lies. The Mises institute is pouring forth a steady stream of articles highlighting the madness of what is going on, with Ron Paul pulling that critique into practical political action (such as his campaign for an audit of the Federal Reserve). On top of this, there are the maverick bloggers, and the influence of people like Peter Schiff.

Most alarming of all, the greatest and most listened to cynicism is coming out of China - who see the QE policies of Western governments for what they are - harbingers of inflation. How desparate is it when it takes a totalitarian state to ram the truth home?

This is why I am writing an unusually angry post. I am sick of the lies that issuing forth, and I am sick and tired of the way in which the insiders appear to win, regardless of the cost to the rest of the economy. I have watched in horror as these bailouts have chewed up the wealth of the Western economies, both present and future wealth. I have watched in horror as governments have issued ever more debt to support their profligacy and support insolvent banks. I have watched in horror as central banks have commenced monetising government debts, and likely engineering inflationary defaults whilst risking eventual hyper-inflation.

Above all, it really does appear that governments and central banks are willing to sacrifice ever greater swathes of the economy to rescue incompetent and insolvent financial institutions. The only explanation that fits the facts is the grubby clubbiness of the system. It is not the great New World Order conspiracy, but rather the conjunction of interests between well placed individuals. Each, in their own way, moving forwards for their own personal gain. It is not the activity of great conspirators, but rather the collective movement of little men, of people who can think only of their personal gains. Money, vanity, power.

And the cost....

.....for there surely will be a cost.

That the economy will be left in tatters, I have no doubt.

That will mean unemployment, insolvency and hardship for many. But the cost will go much deeper than this. When the situation resolves to its eventual conclusion, and the real hardship starts, then the questions will start. The first and largest question to be asked will be to determine where our wealth went. Where did all of our wealth go?

At that point, as the lies are shown for what they are, there is the risk of the greatest cost of all. The risk is that people will start to question the legitimacy even of our form of government. The risk is that democracy is now in the firing line.

In the UK, a scandal is unfolding, a petty and mean scandal over how MPs have cheated their expense system. The status of politicians is at an all time low. If we look to the US on the other hand, the situation looks more benign. Obama is receiving widespread approval from those that he leads. In the case of Obama, I can see only the motive of personal vanity - that he believes his own mythology of being a saviour. However, in painting himself as a saviour, he risks the anger of dissillusionment when disaster comes in place of salvation. That is a dangerous thing.

When people are angry, when they feel disillusioned, and when they feel cheated - as they surely have been - that is when the crazies gain traction. The promises of brave new worlds, of new beginnings, the pied piper tune of 'if you just follow me...' This is the risk. I have alluded to this risk in a few early posts, and it has been part of my drive in writing this blog. I think we are now close to a point where such a risk is becoming real.

The extent of the manipulation, the cheating, the lies is now extending beyond what might be accepted. I think that people will become very, very angry.

An unhappy post.....

Note 1: I hope that this post does not offend regular readers. I have paused on hitting the publish button on this occasion. However, I think that this is worth saying. I believe that now might be the time for anger, as a way of possibly forestalling a greater anger later. As I wrote this post, I kept in mind that one of the commentators on the blog, Steve Tierney, is a politician. I think that even those that disagree with Steve would accept that he is a sincere and decent person. As such, I have some optimism - that perhaps there is an opportunity for a more decent and honest politics. My underlying worry is that perhaps there are too few of such people.

Note 2: A big thanks for the links against my last post, which led me to some articles that helped me pull this post together. As ever, very good comments, and my apologies for my lack of replies (as this post took a while to put together).