Showing posts with label ECB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ECB. Show all posts

Saturday, June 2, 2012

Nationalisation of Markets

Every once in a while, the Economist magazine gets it right. In this case, the point is made in the Buttonwood column, titled 'The Nationalisation of Markets':
EACH step taken by the authorities over the past five years has been designed to prop up the economy and save the financial system. But the cumulative effect has been the creeping nationalisation of markets. Central banks are the biggest players in many rich-world government-bond markets. Equity markets seem to perk up only when central banks are expanding the money supply. And banking systems are incredibly reliant on implicit or explicit government support.
It is a very worrying point, and reflects the discussion of Richard Duncan that I considered in a post a while ago. I summarised his position as follows:
The most interesting point about the talk is the dispassionate approach to the current and future situation. He simply accepts that, in a few years time, the world economy will have a horrendous crash, that states are now fully in the driving seat of the world economy, and most importantly that investment choices should now be based upon state action rather than market drivers. In simplistic terms, whenever a government prints money, his answer is buy, buy, buy!
When listening to Richard Duncan, some might suggest that his view is an outlier, or even outlandish. However, we know that, when the Economist reports the same thing (albeit in a column rather than an editorial), there has been a shift in broader perceptions about what is going on in the global economy. For regular readers of the blog, the idea that states are in the driving seats is nothing new. For example, in January 2010 I had the following to say, in a post titled 'Masters of the Universe':
I am not sure that anyone can actually pull apart the increasingly tangled knots between the financial system and the state. They appear to be mutually dependent, with the state providing guarantees, and the financial system funding the state with financial support through bond purchases to shore up their capital ratios, and so forth. How convenient that bank capital adequacy encourages the holding of government debt. Going back to Renaissance Italy, bankers were granted licenses and monopolies if they were willing to lend to the state on preferential terms. Nothing has changed. 
I described how governments were intervening in ever wider areas of their economies. I went on to say the following:
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is right when he suggests that we should rip up the economics textbooks. What we are seeing is a grand experiment, in which economists and policymakers are attempting to structure wealth in economies by fiat. As each lever is pulled, as each policy is enacted, there are ripples through the world economy. Flooding $US into the markets whilst holding interest rates low sees the export of $US popping up and creating bubbles elsewhere. Backstopping the mortgage market sees foreclosures reduced, but at the risk of calling into question (contributing to doubts about) the financial viability of the state. Holding the value of the RMB down leads to greater trade imbalances. Each policy has a consequence, and each policy interacts with the policy pursued by every other government.
In other words, as each lever is pulled, the consequences defeat the intention of the lever puller. For example, if the trade imbalances destroy the economic stability of the destination of Chinese exports, where will this leave the Chinese economy? The more each state pulls on the levers, the greater the turbulence between each of the economies. The world economy is a dynamic system, such that policy in one country impacts on the economy of another country, which then reacts with its own policy provisions, which then impact upon other countries. It is an endless cycle of reactivity, with each reaction driving further reaction, and developing an increasingly unstable system as each country enacts ever more dramatic policy to counter or ameliorate the effects of the policies of other countries.

A simple example is the relatively recent Japanese policy of printing money to stave off deflation. With rock bottom interest rates, the newly printed money was simply exported into other countries in the so called 'carry trade'. Within Japan, deflation persisted, whilst the newly printed Japanese money appeared in other countries, contributing to the process of asset price inflation in the countries that were the destination of the carry trade. The policy levers were pulled, but the consequences were far from those that were intended.

What textbook might be able to predict the outcome of such a dynamic system? Despite this, we see the policymakers pulling on their levers, and offering confidence that they know what they are doing. Apparently, the masters of the universe are in control.
I wrote this a long while ago, and we can now see that states are now firmly in the driving seats of global markets. The problem that I long ago identified is now playing out on the world stage. The 'masters of the universe' kept pulling on their policy levers, the ripples radiated out, interacted with the ripples of other policy levers being pulled, and the result is ever more pulling on policy levers. That we are now in a position in which governments are driving markets is unsurprising, and was the inevitable result of the dynamic that states set into action.

The fundamental problem is that, as the world situation deteriorates, the policy actions are becoming ever more extreme. The LTRO was but one example of the escalation, and there is surely more to come. The worrying part of these actions is that those who are pulling the levers are doing so in the belief that they are taking actions to correct problems in their economies, when the reality is that they are now fundamentally in the driving seats of their economies, and the problems that they seek to resolve are problems that they, and their colleagues in other countries, are creating. The markets are now resting on government policy actions, and they created the situation where this was the case. It did not happen by magic, but specifically because the extremes of policy interventions were overtaking 'normal' market signals.

At this point, the sane response would be to pull back. However, as the 'masters of the universe', policy makers are simply too arrogant. They think that they know what they are doing. They cannot see that the current parlous situation is being derived from their own policy responses. They are dealing with a system of such huge complexity that each action that they take can never have a predictable response.  This has always been true to some degree, but the extremes of current policy have changed the degree of the outcomes, and the intensity and the complexity of the feedback from each policy provision. A very simple illustration can be found in the LTRO, as I discussed a short while ago:
The problem is simple. No external investors believe that there is any real commitment to policy that might allow borrowers to pay back their debts. The only way any sane person will purchase the debt is if it sold at fire-sale prices, which means big losses for current holder of 'periphery' European debt. Instead, the only way forwards is for the European Central Bank (ECB) to continue its backdoor bailouts, by continuing to lend to bankrupt European banks so that they can buy their home country sovereign debt, and thereby expose themselves to ever more bad debt.


Having bought so much euro zone debt, banks in the periphery are now major holders of their governments’ liabilities and will be sitting on losses, given recent selling of peripheral debt, according to Das.

“As with the sovereigns, the LTRO does not solve the longer term problems of the solvency or funding of the banks, which now remain heavily dependent on the largesse of the central banks,” said Das, who fears deep recession. “It is a government-sponsored Ponzi scheme where weak banks are supporting weak sovereigns, who in turn are standing behind the banks — a process which can be described as two drowning people clinging to each other for mutual support.”
The analogy in the quote is quite apt. For those that have not read about it, the LTRO (Long-Term Refinancing Operation) is the ECB's complete abandonment of Germanic prudence, whereby bankrupt European banks are being bailed out by the ECB. As one wag put it, the ECB is accepting bus tickets as security for the lending at below market rates. The really stunning part of this is that it is possible to find commentators and analysts who support this lunacy. I mean really, bankrupt sovereigns supported by bankrupt banks, which in turn are supported by bankrupt sovereigns? And this is a good idea?
A good idea? Pour money into banks in countries like Spain, encourage the banks to buy their own sovereign debt and this will fix both the states and the banks. The result of this madness can be seen emerging into the financial headlines. When we read those headlines, we absolutely must remember that someone in a meeting/presentation actually said this was a good idea. This person was one of the self-selected 'masters of the universe', undoubtedly supported their good idea with reams of economic theory, but nevertheless was unable to foresee that their actions have left, for example in Spain, governments and banks in worse condition than before they started.

And here is the rub. As the situation continues downhill, there will likely be another policy response. It will now, as a matter of necessity, have to be even more extreme response than the last policy response. The problem has grown larger, not smaller, and the only 'solution' to the ever growing crisis will be a larger and more extreme policy responses. The illusion of control of the situation continues, but those who think they are in control just do not have any idea (or acceptance) that they are the problem, not the solution.


Thursday, May 17, 2012

Is Extend and Pretend Coming to an End?

I can't remember where I first saw the phrase 'extend and pretend' (so apologies to the originator for not citing them), but it is a good expression to the reaction to the economic crisis. Another good one is 'kicking the can down the road'. Both expressions concern the endless (and often hidden) bank bailouts, the fiscal stimuli and the monetary policy that has been the reaction to the economic crisis. What they have been attempting to bury with their policy levers is debt. Or rather, debt that is not going to be repaid. Consumer debt accumulated in the build up to the crisis, sovereign debt built up in the aftermath (and to some degree in some states before the crisis). Tied in with the rise in debt, was the rise in asset prices, as floods of borrowed money created booms.

In Europe, to add another metaphor to the many, the wheels look like they may be about to fall off the Euro bus. Yet another metaphor is contagion, but (as I mentioned before) a better metaphor is that the financial doctors have become better at diagnosis. It is not a contagious disease that is hitting Europe, but the cancer of debt fuelled consumption. We had a bust back in the days of Lehman's and, instead of taking the pain at the time, the reaction was to extend and pretend. Whatever happened, intoned our policy gurus, we must not repeat the Great Depression. And, with the magic of their policy levers, that is what they claim to have done. Avoided another Great Depression. The European Central Bank has thrown everything but the kitchen sink at the Euro crisis. The IMF and the EU, and even the Federal Reserve, have bailed out, and the bailees have to varying degrees tried to reduce their consumption.

If only we had not imposed 'austerity' is the cry of many. But who was going to continue to fund the borrow and spend policies? In Europe, the only taker stepping up was the ECB, who lent money to insolvent banks so that they could buy the debt of their insolvent governments. You may note here that there is something very wrong with the concept of austerity; it still includes huge amounts of borrowing by governments. No country is stopping their borrowing, they are just trying to decrease their rate of borrowing. That borrowing is going to support ongoing unaffordable consumption. In the meantime, the background is one of accumulation of mountains of debt.

Alongside the attempt to reduce the rate of borrowing, there has been shrinkage in many economies. As the economy shrinks, so does the ability to service the existing debt. It is not, as the growing legions of anti-austerity commentators claim, that austerity is causing the crisis. Their answer is to return to growth in the rate of debt accumulation in order to hide, for a little longer at least, the underlying fundamental problem. Many countries are consuming more than they produce, and have no real prospects of being able to pay back the money they have borrowed to over-consume, or to continue to live at the level they have become used to. They are, to quote my first ever post, poorer than they think. They mistook debt for wealth, and must now learn to live based on their own productive output.

The only real step that can solve the European crisis is to just stop borrowing. Alongside this, there needs to be a recognition that many countries have, in the most basic terms, an unaffordable lifestyle. It is very simple. They must accept that they are poorer than they think. In order to return to stability, that relative poverty must be accepted. In crude terms, over the economy as a whole, the borrowed and consumed money is the equivalent of adding to the salary of every individual within that economy. As the borrowed money flows through the economy, it is adding unaffordable goods and services for consumption. The borrowed money indirectly subsidises consumption, and in some cases does so directly.

The solution is simple, and always has been. Stop borrowing money. The Greeks complain of Germany forcing them into austerity by diktat. However, Germany is not forcing any country into anything. It is saying that, if you wish to continue to borrow, you must do something to ensure that you can repay the money. If Greece wishes to restore its sovereignty, the answer is to stop borrowing. It really is that simple.

However, in Greece, and in so many countries, there is a reluctance to accept this. The standard of living that they have enjoyed on borrowed money is seen as a right. Civil servants protest, unions protest, and anti-austerity leaders demand the lifestyle that the country cannot afford. They all demand the status quo of pre-crisis borrow and consume, but just do not accept that the lenders are no longer there. They are all demanding the impossible, and their populations believe that the impossible is possible. We can see how seductive the calls for greater borrowing and spending are. If you are a civil servant thrown out of work, and you have a mortgage and family to support, it just seems unfair.

However, when faced with pay cuts, the same civil servants will protest, even though their collective salaries are unaffordable. The same with the workers throughout the economy. They simply are not, collectively, productive enough to support their lifestyle. The answer is unpalatable. It is cuts in wages and benefits to the point where the economy as a whole returns to competitiveness. How these are spread over the economy is an issue of politics, but the reality is that this is the only answer. The reality is that, for all but the most productive economies, the price of labour must fall. There is a glut of labour in the world, and this is resultant from the emergence of the emerging economies. Unless labour is exceptionally productive, there is no other way out.

If we take the example of Germany and Spain, German workers and Spanish workers are in direct and indirect competition with one another. German workers are, in aggregate, more productive than their Spanish counterparts, but this is not reflected in the costs of workers. If it were, then Spain would be able to balance their trade with Germany. There are no trade barriers, and we have to just conclude that, in aggregate, Spain's companies cannot compete with those of Germany. I am not just talking about wages here, but the overall structure and cost of the economy as a whole. This is why I included benefits in my earlier point. The many benefits provided by governments are an indirect cost of labour. The cost of labour in the economy is a critical factor in competitiveness. It is the productivity of the collective output of the economy in relation to competing economies.

These underlying differences in the real productivity and competitiveness of economies were both obscured by debt accumulation. They can continue to be obscured by debt accumulation, but this simply prolongs the moment when reality must finally emerge. At this stage, we cannot know whether the ECB, EU or IMF might just pull some new lever to extend and pretend a little longer. However, it is starting to look like extend and pretend has reached the limits. It is starting to look like there is no road left to kick the can down. The cuts in wages and benefits looks to be the next step. This process looks likely to be disorderly, and that is the real pity. It could have been gradual, controlled, and less painful. The way it will take place, the degree of pain, can be laid directly at the door of extend and pretend. 

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Europe Crisis: Where will the lenders come from?

In a recent post, I pointed out that it was all very well for the anti-austerity movement to demand more government spending, but asked about who the lenders might be. As a very brief update, hot on the heels of the post comes this news from Bloomberg:

Gao Xiqing, president of China Investment Corp., said the nation’s sovereign wealth fund has stopped buying European government debt on concerns about the region’s financial turmoil.

CIC will continue to look for new investments in Europe as part of its strategy to boost allocations to infrastructure, private-equity assets as well as emerging markets to help boost returns, Gao said. CIC, with an estimated $440 billion in assets, is the world’s fifth-largest country fund, according to Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.

“What is happening in Europe right now is of course of concern,” Gao said in an interview in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the World Economic Forum on Africa. “We still have our people looking at opportunities in Europe, even though we don’t want to buy any government bonds.”
The problem is simple. No external investors believe that there is any real commitment to policy that might allow borrowers to pay back their debts. The only way any sane person will purchase the debt is if it sold at fire-sale prices, which means big losses for current holder of 'periphery' European debt. Instead, the only way forwards is for the European Central Bank (ECB) to continue its backdoor bailouts, by continuing to lend to bankrupt European banks so that they can buy their home country sovereign debt, and thereby expose themselves to ever more bad debt.

Having bought so much euro zone debt, banks in the periphery are now major holders of their governments’ liabilities and will be sitting on losses, given recent selling of peripheral debt, according to Das.

“As with the sovereigns, the LTRO does not solve the longer term problems of the solvency or funding of the banks, which now remain heavily dependent on the largesse of the central banks,” said Das, who fears deep recession. “It is a government-sponsored Ponzi scheme where weak banks are supporting weak sovereigns, who in turn are standing behind the banks — a process which can be described as two drowning people clinging to each other for mutual support.”
The analogy in the quote is quite apt. For those that have not read about it, the LTRO (Long-Term Refinancing Operation) is the ECB's complete abandonment of Germanic prudence, whereby bankrupt European banks are being bailed out by the ECB. As one wag put it, the ECB is accepting bus tickets as security for the lending at below market rates. The really stunning part of this is that it is possible to find commentators and analysts who support this lunacy. I mean really, bankrupt sovereigns supported by bankrupt banks, which in turn are supported by bankrupt sovereigns? And this is a good idea?

Note: I found that the Paypal donate button on the right of the page was still not working (the second time I have fixed it). I have (I hope) now fixed this. 

Monday, March 12, 2012

The Grinding Euro Crisis

There are two 'Bill and Ted' movies, and I forget which one contains this scene. For some reason, Bill and Ted are being sent to hell, and they are both falling into endless darkness. At the start of the scene, they are both screaming with fear. However, as they just continue falling and falling, they pause their screaming, start again, then stop.

This scene made me think of the European economic crisis. Bill and Ted (correctly) suspect that they will eventually hit the bottom, but they can only scream for so long. It is becoming like this with the crisis in the EU. In particular, we have the latest stage in the relentless fall of the Greek economy. Perhaps one of the most absurd elements of the Greek default was all of the technical gobbledygook about whether the default was in fact a default. As it is, there is still no end in sight for the problems of the Greek economy:

Greece implemented the biggest debt writedown in history on Monday, swapping the bulk of its privately-held bonds with new ones worth less than half their original value.

Although the exchange will keep Greece solvent and at the receiving end of billions in international rescue loans, markets were underwhelmed amid fears that the country's debt load still remains far too heavy.
A Finance Ministry statement said bonds issued under Greek law with a total face value of €177.2 billion ($232.5 billion) were exchanged. A smaller batch worth €28.5 billion, issued under foreign law or by state enterprises, will be swapped in coming weeks.

The debt exchange opens the way for Greece's second international bailout, expected to be finalized this week by finance ministers from eurozone nations. It will also transfer the majority of the country's debt from private into public ownership — its eurozone partners and the International Monetary Fund.
It is tempting to quote the many other commentaries which assume that this is not even the beginning of the end of the troubles of Greece. However, the real impact of the default is greater than the ongoing problems of Greece. It strains the credibility of the EU as a whole; all of the emergency summits and action plans have simply not worked. Also, the default has established that private bond holders of EU sovereign debt are now relegated to a junior status, meaning that the risks for the private bond holders are now increased. In the meantime, the ongoing bailouts of banks by the European Central Bank marches relentlessly onwards:

The European Central Bank’s balance sheet surged to a record 3.02 trillion euros ($3.96 trillion) last week, 31 percent bigger than the German economy, after a second tranche of three-year loans.

Lending to euro-area banks jumped 310.7 billion euros to 1.13 trillion euros in the week ended March 2, the Frankfurt- based ECB said in a statement today. The balance sheet gained 330.6 billion euros in the week. It is now more than a third bigger than the U.S. Federal Reserve’s $2.9 trillion and eclipses the 2.3 trillion-euro gross domestic product of Germany (EUANDE), the world’s fourth largest economy.
And the assets being pledged to the ECB have been steadily declining in quality. As you would expect, this massive expansion of the balance sheet has not been without criticism.

Jurgen Stark, the ECB's former chief economist and Germany's board member until two months ago, said the blitz of lending had corrupted collateral standards and risked inflation.

"The balance sheet of the euro system isn't just gigantic in size but also shocking in quality," he said.
Unlimited lending to banks for three years has pushed the ECB's balance sheet to over €3 trillion (£2.5 trillion), overtaking the US Federal Reserve to become the world's most activist bank.
The attack come days after Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann complained that the ECB's payments system known as Target2 had caused the Bundesbank to build up €547bn of claims on the rest of the system, mostly from the central banks of Greece, Ireland, Italy, and France. He demanded measures to protect German interests.
You may want to see an interview with Jurgen Stark (later in the interview), in which he again expresses concern at the ECB's activity, in particular the purchasing of government bonds 'in certain countries' which he argues postponed the reform in the economies. He is clearly against the principal of central banks financing government deficits, and states this very clearly.

The most interesting thing about the current situation in Europe is that the ECB is throwing ever larger amounts of money into the system, but the crisis continues to grind on. It is, in other words, not working. The alternative approach is to reverse austerity. If you look at the Stark interview, the presenter puts the argument more clearly than many. Austerity reduces the size of the tax base.

It is a wonderful Alice in Wonderland logic. If we stop borrowing and spending, people will have less income and will therefore give less tax. Therefore we should borrow x billion Euros to spend on consumption, and this will then generate more tax revenue which will give confidence that we have the income to pay our debts. So what we will do is borrow more money for consumption in order to use the small percentage of that money to us that is returned in taxation to pay for our existing borrowing whilst increasing our overall absolute borrowing.......Makes sense, does it not?

Note: Sorry for the lack of posting. I have been very, very busy, but will try to find a bit more time. There are many developments in the world economy that deserve comment, for example the further steps towards making the RMB a reserve currency, the 'faux' US recovery, and a host of other interesting points.



Friday, December 9, 2011

Are we close to the end?

I once read a comment about this blog which said that the analysis was good, but a shame about the market timing. I always keep this in mind now. As such, I ask you to approach this post with a great deal of caution. However, with cautionary note out of the way, I have to ask whether we are nearing the point at which the Euro crisis spirals out of control. There are flashing warning signs, but there also (temporary) fixes (again) being floated in the news. One serious indicator was an article in Spiegel, which describes the outflow of money from Greece:



With disarming honesty, the central banker explained to the lawmakers why the Greek economy isn't managing to recover from a recession that has gone on for three years now: "Our banking system lacks the scope to finance growth." He means that the outflow of funds from Greek bank accounts has been accelerating rapidly. At the start of 2010, savings and time deposits held by private households in Greece totalled €237.7 billion -- by the end of 2011, they had fallen by €49 billion. Since then, the decline has been gaining momentum. Savings fell by a further €5.4 billion in September and by an estimated €8.5 billion in October -- the biggest monthly outflow of funds since the start of the debt crisis in late 2009.

I also noted some similar, but less dramatic stories for the other 'at risk' countries, with money being moved into Scandinavia and (strange things happen) the UK, and out of Europe altogether. Today, in a story that has been effectively trailed by central bank interventions, another story appears suggesting that European banks are on the edge of crisis. At the moment, the wild card in the story is China. I discussed the possibility of China entering the picture when they had a stronger hand a while ago, saying:

The Chinese were seen as a hope, but they do not appear to be playing ball. However, I emphasise 'appear', as the Chinese will likely dive in if they can use the opportunity to strengthen their economic position versus the EU:


China had offered help in return for European support to grant it either more influence at the International Monetary Fund, market economy status in the World Trade Organisation, or the lifting of a European arms embargo [...]

Aside from these obvious benefits, there would be other repercussions. China's help would mean large scale purchases of Euros, which would see the Euro harden against the RMB, thus making European exports less competitive and Chinese exports more competitive. The shift in the currencies would see stronger competition from China, and those European manufacturers that are struggling already might well be pushed underwater where China offers direct competition. In other words, it is a short term fix, with long term painful consequences. 


There is (again) talk of Chinese intervention coming to the rescue, but it is still not confirmed. Bearing in mind my previous comment on China using the crisis as a bargaining opportunity, this interesting story comes from the Telegraph, which I will quote at length:

Hopes were further bolstered by improvements in the borrowing costs of Italian and Spanish government debt, which have soared in recent weeks on concerns about escalating risks. Yields on 10-year Italian bonds, which were recently above the critical 7pc level, fell 0.12 percentage points to 6.33pc while those on Spanish debt edged down 0.07 points to 5.71pc.
The rally came late in the day, as traders digested the news and after it emerged that China would consider stepping up its role in the crisis. According to Reuters, China's central bank has taken steps to create a new vehicle to manage two investment funds worth a total of $300bn – one to target investments in the US and the other focused on Europe.
"I guess they're hoping that China's going to be the white knight that rides to Europe's rescue," Joe Rundle, head of trading at ETX Capital, said. "I think in time China will probably step in and have an effect on Europe, but it's going to be very much on China's terms rather than European terms."

Chinese involvement has long been sought by the international community, as it has trillions of dollars at its disposal. For its part, China has long craved the freedom to invest in Europe and the US – but, to date, has met political resistance. However, the politics have changed now that stricken eurozone members hope to raise hundreds of billions of euros to cut their debts by privatising state-owned assets.

And the source of the story, this Reuters article (my emphasis):

The euro gradually strengthened on the summit news and was later boosted when a source, who asked not to be named, told Reuters China's central bank plans to create a new vehicle to manage investment funds worth a total of $300 billion, part of which will be focused on investments in Europe.
The euro rose to a session high of $1.3422 after the China news emerged from around $1.3380 beforehand to trade with gains of around 0.5 percent for the day.

It is curious that there is so much excitement in markets based on anonymous tip. However, provided that Europe will play ball, it is quite possible that China will finally intervene. Let's be frank - the European politicians are increasingly desperate, and will probably accede to nearly any vaguely acceptable demand by China (by which I mean demands which the public will not see as outrageous, rather than demands which might actually be outrageous). My best guess is that, right at this moment, China is dangling a bailout in front of Europe and playing some extremely serious hardball. As a note, the rumour of the Chinese bailout fund was probably an agreed leak by the Chinese government to wave the sight of potential 'salvation' in the face of Europe (using unofficial sources to float policy is not unusual in China, and leaves the Chinese government a line of retreat if they change their minds/or as need be).

The only other option open to the politicians is the ECB starting the printing presses. I would expect that, to turn the situation around, would probably require the greatest money creation exercise in history. However, alongside the latest package of measures, there is some talk (again talk) of the ECB turning the presses:

To further reassure bond markets so that investors continue to buy eurozone government debt, the condition that the private sector would automatically bear losses if the ESM was triggered has been dropped. At the same time, the European Central Bank (ECB) has committed to making up to €20bn of bond purchases a week and China has reportedly begun plans to create a $300bn (£190bn) investment vehicle to buy privatised assets.
Thomas Harjes, an economist at Barclays Capital, welcomed the announcements as positive news. "This may not amount to a single 'bazooka', but it does add up to a substantial package of measures," he said.
However, Louise Cooper at BGC Partners questioned whether it would be enough to settle bond markets. "These are positive developments but are not enough. We were promised the 'Big Bazooka' but got far less," she said. "Wasn't this supposed to be the week that saved the euro? Well, it didn't."

I would guess that the ECB is fully aware that, if they start the presses rolling, it will be ever harder to turn them off. You can imagine the special pleading, the 'social crises' that would be rolled out to get another hit of freshly printed money. If they do start printing, I do not think that it will be much more substantial than this mooted amount, and this is likely not going to be enough. As for the whole package, as the second quote above indicates, it is still unconvincing for many.

In short, there are potential avenues to stem the tide but these are still doubtful. However, each avenue will, in the long term just serve to ratchet the underlying problems upwards. They may delay a Euro road crash, but they will not solve the problems, but will just make them even worse in the long run. In the meantime, we can only look on and take guess at what events will bring.....but it is starting to look like crunch time.

Note 1: I would comment on the possibility of a Europe-wide downgrade, but this is (as usual) the ratings agencies following events. Their 20/20 hindsight is truly something to behold.

Note 2: A bit of a rushed post as I have a mountain of work to catch up on. However, with the 'events' taking place, I could not resist a brief post. Sorry not to respond to comments.