Showing posts with label Alastair Darling. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alastair Darling. Show all posts

Saturday, April 25, 2009

Finally, The Mainstream Media 'Get it'....

I have already published two posts recently, but could not resist a further post. I have been reading the Sunday editions and it has become apparent that the mainstream media is finally waking up. The Darling budget has finally persuaded the commentariat of the profound difficulty with which the UK is confronted.

Regular readers can now see many of the views I have long been expressing starting to be mirrored in the press - and it does not make happy reading. Despite this, I read the views with a grim satisfaction. It is not the satisfaction of seeing others coming to share my views, but the satisfaction that the first step in fixing the economy is the recognition of the nature and severity of the problem. With the mainstream media finally confronting the reality of the situation it is quite possible that the politicians will have to start to respond with real plans to address the underlying problems.

One example comes from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in the Telegraph. He is recognising the impossibility of the funding of so many huge government deficits around the world. He points out that many of the previous supporters of Western debt are now turning off the taps, and that the level of debt raising was in any case increasingly impossible. Perhaps the most interesting comment he makes is as follows:
Traders already whisper that some governments are buying their own debt through proxies at bond auctions to keep up illusions – not to be confused with transparent buying by central banks under quantitative easing. This cannot continue for long.
I have long suspected that this has been a part of how the debt has continued to be purchased. When I pressed the Bank of England on the subject of quantitative easing, one of the questions I asked was for them to confirm that they would not be using proxies to purchase bonds in debt auctions (they confirmed that they would not). However, the impossibility of funding such massive debt has kept me questioning how the government might be intervening, and I have recently been trying to find sources for who is buying the gilts at the moment (to no avail). If Ambrose is correct, the government is intervening in the auctions, and my guess that the government is using banks effectively under state control to buy the debt may well be correct.

Perhaps the most vocal in the criticism is another Telegraph commentator, Liam Halligan. His latest article is almost a mirror of my posting on the budget. For example, he notes that the budget does not acknowledge the many forms of off-balance sheet borrowing, and also adds that the bank bailouts are not included:

Remember, also, the hundreds of billions of pounds of off-balance sheet liabilities – not least the bill for public-sector pensions and the utterly dishonest private finance initiative.

For all these reasons, even Darling's outlandish borrowing totals are just the start of the Government's extra debts. Oh – and by the way, much of the cost of the massive bank rescues isn't in these numbers either. The Budget fine print claims officials "haven't yet been able to calculate their impact […] on public sector net debt".

So these borrowing estimates can only rise – as they have after every Labour Budget since 2001. Already, debt service is the fourth biggest item on the Government's balance sheet. Soon we'll be spending more public money on interest payments than on schools and universities combined.

As a final example from the Telegraph, Tracy Corrigan, details the retreat of investors from the UK gilts market:

At least the recently introduced policy of quantitative easing, designed to boost the economy, is helping to support gilt prices. But for how long? The scale of the Bank of England's purchase of gilts under this programme – it is buying £75bn and could return for the same again, if it decides the economic case merits it – is having a powerful effect on the market. But that will be, by definition, relatively short-lived, and at some point that spending, too, will have to be financed.

For the moment, the Bank of England's bulk buying is covering up another unpalatable truth. Other investors are not quite so keen to get involved.

Although UK pension funds hold gilts, they aren't buying much at the moment. Overall, UK fund managers were net sellers last year, and the recession causing lower dividend income this year means they will have less new money to invest anyway. Banks have been buyers, partly to meet new requirements to hold liquid assets, but they now largely have what they need.

Of course, the elephant in the room in regards to the quantitative easing is that, at some point, the gilts being purchased by the Bank of England must be sold back into the market. This will need to be done at a time when investor confidence is diminishing (or disappeared), and the issuance of new debt by the government is exploding. From the FT, there is a leading article which expresses cautious concern over whether the government can continue to finance debt:

Which, of course, is the trick. At the moment, the UK government has little trouble finding lenders, but this can stop on short notice. If gilt investors began to doubt its commitment or ability to close the deficit, the market’s willingness to refinance UK sovereign debt could come to a sudden halt. The government must pre-empt perilously self-fulfilling doubts before it is too late.

Retaining market confidence calls for plausibility: this government must shed its reputation for overly optimistic forecasts. It must also try to avoid the need to roll over a large amount of debt at any one time. The plan to complement auctions with organised syndicates of lenders is a good one. So is the substitution of medium-term bonds for the shortest maturities in sovereign debt issuance. Puzzlingly, however, the government has not increased the share of the longest maturities, despite pension fund demand for more such paper.

These steps, although sensible, do not guarantee safety. Like its biblical namesake, economic original sin differs from ordinary sins: whether you are guilty of it is largely outside your control. Nonetheless, the UK government’s only hope is to stick to the straight and narrow
Willem Buiter likewise expresses concerns in his blog at the FT, although he is broadly positive about the budget:
If the necessary fiscal tightening is not forthcoming because different groups and vested interests are engaged in a war of attrition aimed at shifting the fiscal burden to the other guy, markets could easily panic and Britain could face an emerging market-style “sudden stop”, with the rest of the world withholding financing from its public and private sectors.

To forestall the occurrence of a triple crisis (banking, sterling and sovereign debt), it would behove the UK to apply for an IMF Flexible Credit Line (FCL). Unfortunately, the criteria for qualifying for an FCL arrangement include “ . . . (iv) a reserve position that is relatively comfortable . . . ; (v) sound public finances, including a sustainable public debt position; . . . (vii) the absence of bank solvency problems that pose an immediate threat of a systemic banking crisis; (viii) effective financial sector supervision.” It is questionable whether criteria (iv) and (v) are met. Criteria (vii) and (viii) are obviously not met. In addition, with a £175bn annual borrowing requirement for the next couple of years, the measly $240bn or so the IMF currently has at its disposal is unlikely to make much of a difference.

One of the interesting points is that the IMF is no longer seen as an option to bail out the UK. Quite simply, the demands of the UK are seen as too great for IMF funding, and the possibility of the IMF being a safety net looks increasingly dubious. As it is, the IMF is already confronting problems in raising cash to fund its operations.....

Meanwhile the Wall Street Journal is also expressing the view that there are increasing concerns in markets over the ability of the government to finance their borrowing:
The plunge [in output] raised fresh concerns about the U.K.'s ability to handle the mounting costs of its financial and economic bailouts. Compared with a year earlier, the U.K. economy shrank by 4.1%. That cast doubt on an official projection this week that the economy will contract by only 3.5% in 2009 and rebound quickly enough to help the government get its stretched finances under control.
Even the Times is now accepting that we might have reached the limits, and that a funding crisis looms. I have highlighted the point that is tucked away in their leading article today:
For the people of Britain, the consequences of that imprudence will be with us for many years. It will take nearly a decade to get public borrowing to acceptable levels – if the markets allow us that long – and until the 2030s to get government debt back to the 40% “ceiling”. Whoever wins the general election, we can look forward to years of austerity and tax rises.
From the Independent we have another allusion to the problems of financing the government's profligacy (I have again highlighted the point):
There are fundamental questions that all our political leaders – at least those with serious designs on power – need to answer. What services do we want the state to provide? And what can Britain, as a nation reliant on the confidence of international investors, afford?
One of the exceptions to the increasingly gloomy views on the UK Economy is the Guardian, which still sees relatively upbeat commentary. As one example, Ashley Seager has the following to say:

So where is the economy especially weak? Everywhere, it seems. Manufacturing suffered its biggest quarterly fall since records began in 1948, driven by a 50% annual drop in car output, while the much bigger services sector saw the biggest drop since 1979.

Still, there was one bright spot in separate data from the Office for National Statistics that showed an unexpected rise in retail sales in March, driven by higher clothing and food sales. Is that enough to help pull us out of recession? No chance.

At some point, though, the Bank of England's record interest rate cuts, its £75bn of new money for the economy, combined with Darling's recent tax cuts and the big fall in sterling should put the economy back on an even keel. Today's GDP figures, though, suggest that the battle is far from won.

It seems that he actually believes that it is possible to turn the problems around with interest rates and printing money, but such delusions are increasingly on the retreat. Another similar positive outlook comes from Krugman at the New York Times, who is also positive about the policy of printing money:
So I’m actually fairly hopeful about Britain; right now, the fact that it’s not on the euro is serving it well.
Despite the remaining optimists, there can be little doubt that there is a growing perception amongst the mainstream media that the UK is in very, very serious trouble, and increasing concerns about whether the UK can actually continue to support the proposed levels of borrowing and spending.

I think that, over the coming weeks, there will be considerable interest in gilt auctions, and I would guess that many analysts will looking for cracks in the government financing of debt or the possibility of a gilt strike. Alongside this, there will also be major question marks over the value of the £GB.....

Interesting days are ahead, and increasingly worrying times.

Monday, September 1, 2008

As Expected £Sterling Tumbles

It would be hard to have missed the furore over the recent comments of Alastair Darling. In the original interview he said:
'Britain is facing "arguably the worst" economic downturn in 60 years which will be "more profound and long-lasting" than people had expected'
Regular readers of this blog will know that I will applaud such frankness and recognition of the economic reality that is now confronting the UK. It is not that the loss of confidence that such a statement suggests is a good thing of itself, but rather that the people of the UK need to be prepared for the changes that must be made to the way in which the UK economy is structured. I have already made some suggestions for ways in which the UK might be restructured, for example in health, benefits and education. The big question remains as to whether anyone will grasp the reality of the necessity of change, or whether the politicians will retreat into populist 'head in the sand' measures.

Of particular note in the furore that followed Darling's statemnt was discussion of whether he was making a comparison with the right period of time. A good example of such discussion can be found in the Times. As is usual, what all of these commentators are missing is the profound and unique changes that have occured in the world economy, notably the massive increase in the supply of available labour. As I have discussed before, we can use the past as a starting point in understanding the economy, but we also need to be aware of the particular circumstances that apply in each case. No situation is ever the same, and until the economists and politicians wake up to the real differences this time, then nothing will be done to resolve the problems.

One of the outcomes of Darling's comments has been to accelerate the fall in the £sterling. The £GB is falling against the Euro, the Yen and the $US, and is likely to fall further relative to these currencies. I emphasise the word relative, as both the Euro and $US will also come under pressure, as the inevitable adjustment in the world economy continues (the Yen may be more stable). The £GB will just be in a situation where the weakening will be greater than the weakening of the other currencies. The curious point here is the mindset that the $US, £GB and Euro (and the Yen) are measured largely one against the other, but that it will be how these perform against other currencies that will really matter. The weakening of all of these currencies will not make sense unless they are measured against a wider basket of currencies, in particular the Yen and RMB (the problems of the RMB I have detailed elsewhere).

Meanwhile the UK economy is plunging further into gloom, almost exactly in line with my predictions. As each day passes, the headlines become more and more gloomy. For example, in the Times they report that mortgage approvals have sunk 71% to an all time low. A Guardian columnist has the following to say:
'Adding to the gloomy picture, a CIPS survey showed today that the manufacturing sector shrank for the fourth month in a row. Mortgage approvals fell to 33,000 in July, the lowest since the data series began in 1993, according to Bank of England figures released this morning. House prices fell in August for the eleventh consecutive month, according to a separate report from property consultants Hometrack. '
I have, of late, been making less posts than in the past. This is in part because the progress into economic collapse is very much in line with my previous predictions. I am in a situation where I am now just watching the inevitable collapse of the UK economy. The remaining question marks are when it will be that the UK economy will sink far enough to need the support of the IMF, as I predicted some months ago. The UK is structurally bankrupt, and it is just a question of when, not if, the UK will need support. The other question mark is when the next credit crisis will occur, at which time there will be several bank failures.

It is very likely that the current plunge in confidence in the UK economy is the beginning of the end. As I have discusssed elsewhere, confidence is the magic commodity of economics, and loss of confidence is the precursor to the collapse of the banks and the precursor to a 'cap in hand' visit to the IMF.

There are several outstanding questions that I have not yet covered and the state of the Chinese and Indian economies will need to watched carefully, as there is still a question mark over how these will fare in a situation of falling demand for their export of goods and services. In particular, there is potential for unrest in China if Chinese growth stumbles with the fall in Western demand. China is balanced on a knife edge, but I still feel that the Chinese government is in a position to ameliorate the fallout from the damage being done to the OECD economies. However, regular readers will know that I am very cautious on this issue.

The other question that needs some attention will be the supply and price of commodities. The world economy has metaphorically bounced back from the wall of commodity restraints, such that demand will fall back for a while yet. I have, for example, predicted that oil will continue to fall back in price over the next two years (wars and other potential blocks to supply allowing - I add this in light of Russia's recent behaviour). However, the overall trend in demand is going to increase upwards in the coming years, and the question then is at what point we will next hit the commodity wall. My best guess at the moment is that we will hit the wall again in about 3-4 years time. Key in this will be the growth in supply, so this needs to be watched carefully. However, in the current state of adjustment, the world economic system is going to go through a period that may be described as chaotic, such that any such prediction is dangerous (e.g. if China falls into unrest, then what will happen to the economy in China?)

I have several posts that are still outstanding. One of these is a review of UK government spending, another is the position of Japan. However, I would also like to continue with some solutions to the structural problems within the UK. As such, I will try to address the problems of regulation in the UK economy for the next post, provided that there is no compelling news that deflects me from this aim.