Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Krugman and Money Bubbles

In a recent NYT piece, Krugman suggests that 'money is only a “social contrivance”. It’s a convention, which works as long as the future is like the past.' He then goes on to say later:

A final thought: the notion that there must be a “fundamental” source for money’s value, although it’s a right-wing trope, bears a strong family resemblance to the Marxist labor theory of value. In each case what people are missing is that value is an emergent property, not an essence: money, and actually everything, has a market value based on the role it plays in our economy — full stop.
Before reading the rest of the post, you should really read his full discussion, as this post will not make sense without you doing so. For me, the problem is his idea that there is no fundamental source for the value of money. It is wholly fantasy.

Here, for the sake of simplicity, I will treat the following as 'money'; base money (e.g. bits of green paper, and money created by the central bank through open market operations, and debt money (e.g. bonds, bank credit etc.). I know that we could debate the question of differences between these money types, what should be included in money etc. However, my purpose here is specific, and you will (I hope)understand why I characterise money in this way.

For me, the most important thing about money is not about the nature of the money, but about the demands that money might make on the economy. For example, each unit of money is a future demand for x value of product and services in a particular economic unit, typically but not always a country. The interesting thing about money is that it can very broadly be divided into 'now' money, and money in y period of time, or money in y period of time and z now etc. In other words, money units have a temporal dimension. This gives us something of an idea of how money can be seen to be founded in something. This is that the value of money is determined by the demands that might be made on the total value of output in the economic unit.

The important point about this is that, at given moments in time, there is a combination of credit money and base money in any economy. However, at any given moment, there is a total level of output of value in the economy. I use the word value here because what value might be is subjectively derived; for person A, they may value a new television over a Wedgewood tea set, even where the tea set has a higher price. However, regardless of what individuals value, there is a total output, however difficult that might be to measure accurately, but with relative prices making the best proxy that we have for perceptions of value. The point is that, with a given labour force, given technologies, given skill sets, and so forth, there is finite amount of value that can be created in an economy at any given moment.

You will notice here that I am treating an economy as if it is an economic island, which is false. Economies are not islands, and an economy's output is also contingent on the value creation in other economies. For example, if country B makes a product better/more cost effectively (I leave this loose here) than country A, then the country A output of value is questionable unless they do something to match the country B output of value. As such it possible to have potential for output of value that will not be realised, as there is a real world of competition. Therefore, the potential output of value of an economic unit is not its potential, but its potential in relation to other economic units. That potential is continually shifting, dictated by policy, individual and corporate endeavour etc.

The value of money is therefore contingent upon several factors; temporal, quantity, and the potential value of output of the economy which the money represents. For example, the bond market is driven by second guessing the relative influence of these factors, albeit that the second guessing is often crude and misdirected. The key point here is that each monetary unit, given these contingencies, at any given moment in time, represents one x percent of the total value of output in the economy. In other words, money is rooted in the total output of value in the economy, at a given moment in time. There can only be, as an economy is currently structured now, x amount of value of goods/services that can be purchased. I am being simplistic here, as some people simply hold the 'now' money, so that it ceases to be a demand on the economic unit, even though the money exists. In this circumstance, it makes no call on the output of value at that moment. It is another contingency on how money is valued, but by not making a call on the value in the economy now, it allows for a call on value tomorrow. For example, for a bond that has matured, might not be used as money now, but to buy more bonds with a view that this will allow an even greater capture of value in the future.

There are several things that are important when viewing money and value of output in the future. It is quite possible to issue more money now in the expectation that output of value will increase in the future to match the increase in money. Creating a greater supply of money, with the contingency that output of value will match the increase in supply is a risk. If output of value does not increase commensurate to the increase in money, then there is a problem. The value of output per unit of money has diminished. Most damaging of all, is when the demand for the value of output sits outside of the economic unit; if the demand is within the economic, it might represent a transfer, for example the liquidation of a mortgage debt.

However, even then, it is possible that the issuance of too much mortgage 'money' might be inflationary, and problematic. If the mount of money created for mortgages increases faster than the value of the value of the housing stock, this means that there is a specific and narrow price inflation, but also with a wider price inflation in the economy as a whole, as that mortgage money transfers into the economy. It just takes time. The housing bubble was this process in action. The rate of mortgage money creation increased faster than the value of housing stock, and also prompted bubble activity, such as building McMansions as a process of trying to soak up some of this new money creation. This brings me back to the problem of external credit, which is far worse, as it never represents an internal transfer.

The external funding of new money in the economy, such as mortgage debt, is a future external demand on the output of value in the economy. In all cases, it quite literally means that in the future, a demand will be made on the value of output in the economy such that some of that value output will no longer be available within the economic unit. The greater the value of the money created through external debt, the greater the demand on future output of value. This kind of demand can accumulate to the point where the external demands on the total output of value are so large, that an economy has no reasonable chance of servicing the value without having so many goods and services flow out of the economic unit that the actors in the unit will be reduced to penury. This is Greece now.

The curious part of the Greece story is that it is divorced from base money, and the problems are entirely created by creditors realising that the output of the Greek economy is not able to provide the value that they expected, or rather that Greece is unwilling to deliver that value as the loss of that value of output from within the economic unit of Greece is too hard to bear. The external debt of Greece is simply a massive demand on the value of the total output of value of the economic unit called Greece.

The idea that monetary units have no foundation, except in a social construction is simply not true. It is founded in the output of value in the economy for which a particular currency pertains. It may be complex, due to the contingencies that I describe. This is why all debt markets are so complex. However, there is one thing that is certain. If the aggregrate money supply increases faster than the value of output, the value of each unit of money will be diminished. We must also remember that the value of each economic unit is contingent upon the ability of each unit in each area of business, and that the aggregate of the ability will inherently effect the value of money, as this will impact upon the ability to realise potential output of value in an economy. Finally, externally created money is the highest risk, as it will absolutely make a demand on output of value in the future, and that value, if repaid will mean less output of value in the economic unit. Even if the economy does grow in an economic unit, a portion of that growth will no longer be available in the economic unit. The economic unit will have less output of value at the time that the demand is made for the output of value.

The final point is this; expanding money supply without an ability for increases in the output of value destroys the value of money. Borrow and spend is exactly this, and external borrowing is horrendously risky.

Note: This started as a short and quick and 'dirty' post, but did not turn out that way. I hope it all hangs together, and I have avoided some complexity that might have been added due to time constraints, and to keep the ideas as simple as possible. The nature of internally generated debt money is a case in point. Comments, as ever, welcomed. Feel free to be critical and pick holes. I published despite this despite being loose ideas with critiques in mind; I would like to refine these ideas, and critiques (constructive ones) and suggestions will help. In short, I have thrown the ideas 'into the ring' to see how they stand up to critical eyes. Regular readers will know that I have considered money before (sorry, no time to find the link, but it would help in supporting this post), and this is just some further thoughts/evolution/adaptation of the earlier longer and more detailed consideration.









Saturday, October 20, 2012

The UK: Statistics and Economy

Some time ago, I was complaining about the increasing opacity/difficulty in obtaining information about the UK economy, for example with the previously wonderful National Statistics now completely hopeless. As such, I have to offer a big word of thanks to Dr. Tim Morgan of Tullett Prebon, who has made an excellent database of statistics available here, and would also recommend the database to those who are likewise frustrated with finding basic data from the official sites. In practical terms, it means less time looking for information, and more time looking at what the data might mean. This is what Dr. Morgan has to say:

Finding key data on UK issues such as inflation, the economy, spending, taxation and debt can all too often prove time-consuming and baffling. The Tullett Prebon UK Economic & Fiscal Database is designed to contribute to the quality of the public debate by providing all participants with ready access to objective and consistent data.

As a celebration of so much easily accessible information, I will today overload on statistics, and use the statistics as a foundation for a review of the UK economy. First of all the government finances, commencing with a breakdown of revenues (billions):


There are a couple of points of note here; the first is that after the drop that took place when the economic crisis became visible, revenue has been steadily increasing with VAT revenue growth particularly pronounced. A commentator recently suggested that the deficit growth was due to a collapse in revenue, but we can see that this only explains a small element of the deficit. With regards to collecting revenues, I propose a more open, efficient and transparent system, and a system that will also reduce costs and distortions in behaviour. For example, I propose the abolition of all corporation tax, and a flat income tax. Since writing the post on reform, I have identified some problems with the proposal, but still hold with the principles (I may update the post if I have some time).

Below, we have spending (£billions):


I don't think any reader of this blog will be unaware of the growing problems of financing pensions and health with an ageing population. I have often spoken about the necessity of priority; that the government needs to make some hard choices between where an ultimately limited amount of resource might go. I have also argued that there are ways of cutting the expenditure of government whilst also maintaining provision of services and safety nets. For example, as one of the more controversial suggestions, I propose that welfare becomes an interest free loan with a finite duration and amount. It is a system that would see the welfare share of spending fall, albeit that it would increase government borrowing in the short term. It is a return to the principle of welfare; that it is a safety net. If you look at the links at the top right of the page, you will find solutions to some other areas of spending. I chose the area chart format as they give a good picture of direction of spending and income, but the overview is better represented through a bar chart (billions, at current values):



It does not look very pretty overall. In fact, it look downright ugly. We then have to ask what this is achieving. How is the UK economy really doing? This is unemployment during massive credit expansion:



In this figure, we can see the impact of the boom, and the appearance of the economic crisis is vivid. When looking at the chart, when looking at the fall in unemployment, it needs to be considered in relation to debt, both government (see above) and private:



It is very apparent that debt growth was masking underlying problems in the UK economy. The second chart perhaps is more scary than it should be. We need to remember that the massive increase in aggregate debt took place during a period of high immigration; the massive expansion of borrowing and the activity that it generated had less impact upon unemployment as it also coincided with high immigration levels. This is from the ONS:


And this reflects in the number in employment:

In these charts, we can see that the rapid credit expansion did dent the unemployment statistics as much as would be expected, as the size of the workforce was also increasing, with significant immigration accompanying the credit boom. The really interesting part is to see what all of these people were actually doing:

Perhaps the most notable point in this, is the increasing size of financial intermediation. Although the figures only go to to 2010, we can see the expansion and subsequent contraction of areas that would be associated with a credit boom; wholesale and retail, real estate. Somewhat surprising is that hotel and restaurants did not see greater expansion. Financial intermediation by contrast, has grown and grown, and (at least as far as these figures go) has not yet started to contract, but I believe that this is now taking place from various news stories (and see below). I took a look at the 2007 SIC codes, to get some sense of what the high expansion in 'all other' means, and examples include legal and accounting, management consultancy, scientific research, R&D, Market Research, rental and leasing of machinery, recruitment consultancy, security services, administrative support services etc. In other words, some of these activities might be associated closely with credit expansion, and other not. Manufacturing is notably flat, as are the primary commodity sectors. Although the chart given above is helpful, it does not give an indication of actual employment, and I dug out some figures from ONS, and created the following (key is given underneath):


A = Agriculture, forestry & fishing, B = Mining and Quarrying, C = Manufacturing, D = Electricity, gas, steam & air conditioning supply, E = Water supply, sewerage etc., F = Construction, G = Wholesale, retail, motor trades, H = Transport and Storage, I = Accommodation and food, J = Information and Communication, K = Financial and Insurance, L = Real Estate, M = Professional and Technical Services, N = Admin and Support Services, O = Public admin, defence and compulsory social security, P = Education, Q = Human Health and social work, R = Arts, entertainment and rec, S = All other services.

The stand outs are the decline in manufacturing employment, Construction, Real Estate, and Retail, albeit that there is something of an uptick in the latter. Also notable is that the numbers working for the state appears to be in decline, but we need to consider this against the increase in 'All other' in the earlier chart of GVA and the increase in Professional Services in this chart; it may be that there is displacement going on here..... Another stand out is the increase in Q, Human Health and Social Work, which now seems to be reversing. A real curiosity is the growth in in D & E, which covers utilities; for E this can be explained by the rejuvenation of infrastructure being undertaken by the water companies (as a guess), but the increase in numbers for electricity is more of a puzzle. As discussed earlier, finance and insurance sees the numbers reducing, which is not apparent in the GVA chart. However, whilst this paints a picture of the post economic crisis, more interesting is to look at what has taken place whilst the world economy restructured in response to the entry of the emerging economies into the system, so I have added December 2000 to the chart, with the label of 'Series 6'. I have placed it next to the 2011 figures to make the changes more apparent.


Manufacturing is startling, even though we have long known this to be the case. For construction, there is still have a way to go before reaching pre-boom numbers, and any reversal of credit growth will mean this sector will shrink even further than pre-boom numbers. If we look at retail now in comparison with unsecured debt now and in 2000 (see earlier chart), the picture is mixed. In contrast to the more recent picture, accommodation and food, however, appears to be an area that may have some contraction if credit growth slows, but there is a question of whether people will forgo retail to continue to enjoy these services, which is a different question, and might mean contraction in retail. In other words, how will disposable income be split between these two sectors if credit expansion stops. Real estate activities still seems to over-large in numbers employed, and still has a way to go down. An offset here is that there are reports of inwards investment into UK real estate, with buyers considering the UK a safe haven. In other words, the sector may yet have 'legs', but my guess is that it is unlikely to last too long.

I have already discussed professional services, and the picture here may be seen as supporting the point about displacement (also see N, Admin support, which may be the same question). However, when looking at export figures, these services appear to have grown, so it is hard to make sense of the figures when aggregated. Education (P) is a real standout for growth in employment. It would be interesting to see how much of this growth is in the tertiary sector, which would reflect the government goals of expanding tertiary education, and also the increase in numbers of overseas students. Whether overseas students will continue to want a UK education is a question that is debatable, as questions are being raised about educational quality (beyond the scope of this post). Finally, we come to another huge standout; health (Q). This stands as an exemplar of the hard choices being confronted by government. In simple terms, each additional person employed in the health system is one less person with potential to be employed in underlying wealth generating activity in the wider economy. And the numbers are going to keep on growing as the population ages. Much more could be said on this subject, but I will leave this open for the moment (at risk of comments that point out that it is not as simple point as I make it). 

 We now come to wages. Below are some key figures for wages and inflation:



I have titled the chart 'getting poorer', as this is the picture it paints. You need to consider this in light of the ongoing massive borrow and spend of government, and the dubious activity of printing money. Also, you need to consider that the indices for inflation are questionable, and that even if accepting the indices in principle, the impact upon individual households is variable. If we really want to understand something about the underlying nature of the economy, the devil is in the detail (sorry for the messy chart, but it is readable). I have gone a bit further back than the chart above, and this is because of the fascinating story of consumer durables.

You will note how there was significant deflation in the price of consumer durables, which we can safely say reflects the entry of countries like China into the world economy. We can see the peaks in energy prices, and the fall in the same prices as the economic crisis bit home. And now, we see inflation in energy once again; however, this time, the inflation may yet be offset as the global economy teeters (in part driven by higher energy prices), in part by the adoption of fracking. On the other sideof the coin, so called 'green energy' are a potential driver in the UK towards higher electricity prices. The chart below gives annual electricity bills, and it is apparent that they are growing rapidly. It deserves a post in its own right, but there are considerable problems looming for UK electricity supply, and the real cost of 'green' energy is now becoming apparent in Germany (e.g. see here and here)



Higher energy prices, it should be remembered, impact more upon those with lower incomes, and the same can be said of food prices. Income spent on energy is not spent elsewhere. The final point of note is that consumer durables have now started to climb in price. If  we look at the $US exchange rate, which is the currency of trade, we can see something of the reason (£GB - $US).


Other factors that may also having an impact are rising wages in places like China, and rising energy prices. However, if China does slow significantly, it is quite possible that there will again be deflation in consumer durables; as orders in Chinese factories decline, there may be a period of significant discounting as businesses seek to at least contribute something to their fixed costs. However, the trajectory of the £GB may offset this, and there is ongoing money printing policies in the major economies to muddle any idea of future exchange rates. Competitive devaluation through printing money means that UK money printing effects may be neutralised by other countries printing money. In summary, inflation is very likely to continue, but the degree of future inflation is a very open question. There are simply too many variables that might impact upon inflation in the UK, with UK government and central bank policy simply additional influences.

With regards to house prices, they continue to fall in price in inflation adjusted terms, even if headline prices are relatively stable:

More interesting is the house price to earnings ratio, given below:

By historical standards, they are still high. I must however mention that house prices are, in part, being supported by the inwards investment, as discussed earlier, in particular in London. Nevertheless, the current ratio suggests current prices are not as stable as they may appear. The Economist also proposes that UK real estate is overvalued compared with rental value (26%) and income (17%), suggesting that real declines will continue at some stage.

My final chart of the day is one I will copy from a previous post, covers the balance of trade, and comes from the (from ONS):

£billion, seasonally adjusted
As I stated in a recent post, it is a good indicator of the long term sustainability of the standard of living within an economy and, again, it is not a very positive picture. 

So how can we add up all of these piles of charts? The first point I would like to make is that we can, in part, see that the economic crisis did NOT start in 2008, but started much earlier. It has been so easy for commentators to blame the 'financial crisis', as it evades the fact that there were changes taking place earlier, and that these were simply hidden under the cloak of massive extension of credit. The UK entered the 'financial crisis' already in a state of economic crisis. When looking at relatively benign inflation in the face of credit expansion, the impact of ongoing deflation driven by cheap labour and cost structures in emerging economies was not accounted for. The very real inflation in house prices was ignored; apparently that was un-worrisome inflation. When I first looked at the UK economy in any depth, it quickly became apparent that the boom years were built upon foundations of credit expansion, and I worried for the future and proposed that people were poorer than they thought. We can now see people becoming poorer in the decline in real standards of living, and the now steady decline in the value of most people's primary asset.

People are becoming poorer in spite of government borrow and spend, which is at astoundingly high levels. When consumers were unable to 'grow' the economy through more debt accumulation, the government tried to 'grow' the economy through debt. Spending tomorrow's income now is not a way to grow an economy, as it will see a shrinkage of disposable income in the future. As it is, private debt is now in a very slight decline. However, this slight decline is more than offset by the massive increase in government borrowing; but incomes still continue to fall. This only serves to illustrate the depth of the economic crisis that confronts the UK. Even whilst borrowing and spending more in aggregate, people were becoming poorer, and unemployment was rising. The UK has not even started to address the crisis that sits metaphorically in front of its nose. It does not take much imagination to see what might happen if the UK was to seriously try to balance its budget. Those £billions of debt generate a large amount of employment. What it does not do is generate underlying wealth; that wealth is generated in the primary commodity industries, manufacturing and the export of services. 

These sectors are the ones that are either sitting on plateaus or in decline. Sure, a flood of money into UK real estate might help tide the UK over for a little longer, but that is surely just another repeat of a bubble. There are still such temporary sticking plasters to cover the gaping wound in the UK economy. What these do not do is increase the ability of the UK to export goods and services, which allow the UK to trade in the goods and services necessary to sustain current standards of living. Quite simply, the UK is unable to compete well enough in world markets to sustain the current standard of living. In this post, I looked at government expenditure, and it is apparent that some expenditure is subject to upwards pressure; health care and pensions. These two expenditures look set to rise, even as the UK faces ongoing competitive pressures. In real terms, it means labour being taken from potentially wealth creating industries, and either being redirected into health care, or labour becoming inactive in increasing numbers. The ability to compete with such shifts in the labour force is a challenge the UK must face, in addition to facing the fiercer competition in the world. The UK is not, of course, alone in such challenges, but faces them whilst already struggling to compete. 

I keep on discussing this, but it does not do harm to say it again. The so-called 'austerity' of the current government is not austerity, but a luxury; a luxury that cannot be afforded. It is spending borrowed money to avoid confronting the real underlying standard of living in the UK. It is storing up trouble in the face of the challenges of shifts in the labour force, and a less forgiving world economy. So what is to be done?

The answer is to start to question what can, and cannot be afforded. My benefits reform is an example of how a principle might survive intact, whilst seeing reduction in cost. The aim is simple; to allow what was intended as a safety net to return to its original purpose. Real reform, the kind of reform that is increasingly necessary, requires that the shackles of historic legacies be thrown off. The benefits system did not start out as it is now; it evolved over time into what it has become. The same can be said of swathes of policy that comprises the foundation of government expenditure. If you look at the UK's tax code, it is possible to see that the (sometimes) good intentions of government after government has evolved into a sinkhole to drain away productive activity. Instead, the UK has a massive and fundamentally unproductive industry with the sole purpose of managing tax. Can the UK really afford to have so much productive capacity dedicated to what, in the end, is a process of collecting x amount of government revenue?

It is these really fundamental questions that must be asked, and asked of every area of government; what must the government do, how can it do what it must do differently and better, and where are the priorities for what government should do? These are the questions that are still not being addressed. In the meantime, the UK is becoming poorer. I see no change to this in current policy; but rather see the opposite outcome, which is an acceleration of the decline in the standard of living. After all, where is the policy to really address the poor and declining performance of the UK economy?

Note: I hope this is not too 'clunky'; comments welcomed on this and all points of the post. I have covered a lot of ground in this, so please point out any errors you may see.

Note 2: Shortly after publication - I am not sure I have made the best use of the data given - a bit like a kid in a sweetshop gorging without pause. Thoughts / comments welcomed.


Monday, October 15, 2012

Oh dear, Prof. Krugman

This is a very short post. This from the Guardian on the ever more odd discussions of Prof. Krugman:

On the day the Nobel prize for economics was announced in Stockholm, a former winner was in London urging the government to ditch the "mad" austerity policy that was keeping the British economy depressed. Paul Krugman joined Jonathan Portes for a debate on whether the government had gone too far, too fast.
In what world is the current level of government spending 'austerity'? It is the oddest idea that can be imagined. The deficit is huge (from the Guardian):


Apparently this is 'austerity'. Or at least according to the ever more unreal Prof. Krugman this is 'austerity'. Nevertheless, his words will be taken seriously by many. He may have won a nobel prize, but that does not make his pronouncements any more sensible than any other of the many economists that failed to recognise the problems in the world economy until they were already in plain sight.