Wednesday, September 14, 2011

The UK Economy - A Review

It might seem odd to be writing about the UK economy as the Euro area crisis is drunkenly lurching forwards. However, the European crisis is now at a stage where past policy has set in place a structure which is now dictating events in the face of new policy provision. The reactions to the crisis will have an impact of some kind, but the choices on the table are constrained, and can only shape the direction of the crisis, rather than resolve the crisis in a positive way. Time and events allowing, I might return to this subject again, but for the moment, I thought I would fulfill my promise to review the UK situation.

The first and most important point in a review of the UK is to understand the situation of UK debt. The lessons being taught in Europe apply just as much to the UK as they do to the troubled states of Europe. I have already cited this before, but a paper from the Bank for International Settlements tells the story. At present, the corporate, household and 'public' debt (debt accrued in the name of the government but to be paid by individuals and businesses) as a percentage of nominal GDP in 2010 was 323%. The table shows the steady accumulation of debt since 1980, when the same figure was at 160%. An interesting comparison can be found in France, which is threatened with the spread of the Euro crisis, at a near identical 322% in 2010, or crisis-hit Spain at 355%.

There has been lots of publicity about the government 'austerity' measures which are supposed to address the problems of government debt. However, as yet, there is little sign of austerity, with government debt accrual continuing at a blistering pace. This chart from the UK Office for National Statistic using the troublesome measure of net debt to GDP is nevertheless indicative of the current position.



This is a quote from Liam Halligan at the Telegraph a short while ago:

What does surprise me, though, is that despite the broad support the Tories have received since taking office, and despite endless rhetoric about “living within our means”, UK fiscal policy is actually becoming more profligate. Far from insulating ourselves from systemic dangers, we are making the UK even weaker.

During April and May, the first two months of this fiscal year, the Government borrowed £27.4bn according to figures released last week, up from £25.9bn during the same months in 2010. That’s right, we’re borrowing more – despite all the Treasury’s tough talk.

He is absolutely correct, and the situation is not going to get better, but is going to get worse. Unemployment is on the rise, and is going to get worse:




The relentless rise in government spending has, so far, managed to hide the unemployment by using borrowed money to increase activity (and thus employment) in the economy. The problem faced by government is that, as they decrease the rate of borrowing increase, unemployment will rise, and tax receipts will fall while expenditure goes up, and activity in the economy will fall. It is a situation described by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard for Greece:

Let us be clear, the chief reason why Greece cannot meet its deficit targets is because the EU has imposed the most violent fiscal deflation ever inflicted on a modern developed economy - 16pc of GDP of net tightening in three years - without offsetting monetary stimulus, debt relief, or devaluation.

This has sent the economy into a self-feeding downward spiral, crushing tax revenues. The policy is obscurantist, a replay of the Gold Standard in 1931. It has self-evidently failed. As the Greek parliament said, the debt dynamic is "out of control".

It is a fascinating analysis, in how right it is - and how wrong. Yes, if governments borrow money, tax revenues are supported, as more people are employed. But....but in order to have that employment, a government is borrowing money in order to get x% of that money back in tax revenues. The more money that is borrowed, the greater the tax revenues from the economy, but it is a recipe for disaster. In the end, the government is borrowing money to pay itself back a small percentage of the borrowed money. It is a simplistic and extremely foolish way to run an economy.

To try to illustrate the point, imagine that you have a reasonable job, but are massively in debt, and with your expenditure exceeding your income. In order to continue forwards, you borrow more to spend, but also use some of the borrowed money to repay past borrowing. You appear to be ok as you are still paying your debt, but all the time the total net debt is increasing. As soon as you stop borrowing, you will need to reduce your spending, but also reduce your spending further in order to pay the debt that you were previously paying with further borrowing. It is a double whammy. In the case of governments, the repayment of previous borrowing with new borrowing is achieved indirectly through 'creating' employment with borrowed money, then retrieving a percentage of the income from the employment to use to pay for previous borrowing. What governments in this situation are really doing is hiding unemployment with borrowing and artificially bolstering tax receipts with money that was borrowed in the first place.

The UK government faces the problem that, if spending and borrowing is cut, unemployment rises, and as unemployment rises, tax receipts fall. This fall is both from less employment, but also from businesses who see their activity and profits fall as there is less spending in the economy due to lower employment levels. As government tax receipts fall, and unemployment rises, the economy contracts, and as the economy contracts, GDP appears to fall (appears, as GDP measures the activity in the economy that is resultant from borrowing), and as GDP contracts, bond purchasers become more nervous. Nervous bond purchaser then raise the cost of borrowing in response to their nervousness, and in doing so make the servicing of the extant debt pile more expensive, creating further problems for the government in cutting expenditure, as resources are transferred from spending towards higher debt repayment.

It is a relentless downward spiral. However, the option of continuing to borrow to support tax receipts, as explained earlier, is simply a self-defeating self-delusion. In the end, the only way ahead is to find the real rate of employment in the marketplace without borrowing, and the real rate of tax receipts, and real national income. The problem is that, in doing so, there is a risk that the scale of the contraction might just swamp the government finances and see shocking rises in unemployment (with risk of serious political/social instability).

In the meantime, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) lives in its own fantasy land. Their March report notes that their previous prediction for economic growth was overdone, and that the high inflation was unexpected. Nevertheless, they predict growth of 2.35% to 2013, and 2.1% after. Curiously, their fan chart of the possible GDP outcomes does not include the possibility of a decline in GDP, despite the huge uncertainties in the UK economy itself, or the broader instabilities in the world economy. It is within this context that we must examine their forecast for the fiscal situation, with deficits falling steadily to 1.5% in 2015-16, and also a significant decline in unemployment. In other words, their predictions are premised upon a significant economic recovery, which would presumably be the same economic recovery we have been told about for the last few years. The question to ask is; what has really changed?

In terms of the world economy, although I do not have the space to detail it here, it has become ever more unstable, and there is certainly no sign of a sustainable recovery. Instead, with the Euro crisis currently at centre stage for example, the risks are strongly on the downside (see chart below which is 2009-10 exports). With the Euro area representing our major trading area, the risks inherent in the Euro crisis for the UK are rather obvious.



The answer of many is that, even as government contracts borrowing, there should be a period of so-called monetary easing. The benchmark interest rate has already remained at record lows for a long period, as can be seen in the chart below:


Despite such low interest rates, which in 'normal' times would see a boom, the UK economy is barely moving. The result of the low interest rate target is that variable mortgages are currently averaging 4% (compared with 6.95% when the benchmark was at 5% in September 2008), a £5000 unsecured loan is currently 15% (compared with 11.5% when the benchmark was at 5% in September 2008). More interesting is the interest rate being paid to savers for time deposits, with 2% as the current average (compared with 3.22% when the benchmark was at 5% in September 2008). There are several points to note from these numbers. What we are seeing in these figures is far greater caution on the part of banks, despite the low interest rates, even during the bouts of money printing (called quantitative easing - QE). We are also seeing that the current interest rate is exceptionally low, which frees income from debt repayments to allow for more spending within the economy (all the above statistics from the Bank of England here). However, this is undertaken at the cost of savers, in particular when considering the inflation rate, as seen below:



Despite the poor returns and the rate of inflation, since the economic crisis became apparent, the savings rate has increased from 2.2% in 2007 to 5.4% today, though the increase in savings has gone into reverse and has fallen back from 6.4% in 2010. It is quite likely that the poor returns on savings and the squeeze on household finances are enough to offset the motivation to save through insecurities about the future. For example, average earnings in 2010 only increased by 2.1%, with inflation therefore eroding real earnings. As the chief economist of the Bank of England observed:

Mr Dale, appointed to his position in July 2008, admitted pressures on household finances would “likely to persist for some time”, or for at least “the next year or so”.
Aside from the optimistic timescale, he is acknowledging that there is an ongoing real decline in household disposable income. It is therefore unsurprising to see that retail sales are now in decline. The trend is not unique to the UK, as the middle and bottom are falling further behind in the OECD. A recent Economist report confirms my longstanding prediction that the emerging economies would not move up to OECD standards of living, but rather that the OECD standard of living would fall even as the emerging markets moved up, only to eventually meet somewhere in the middle. Just as real earnings are being squeezed, the asset that was formerly the 'piggy bank' of choice continues to decline in value in real terms:



A recent Halifax report suggested a decline in house prices, and offered the following dose of optimism on affordability:

Martin Ellis, the housing economist at the Halifax, said current low volume of sales tended to make house prices more volatile from month to month. "The underlying trend, as measured by the latest three monthly figures, showed a modest improvement in house prices from the second consecutive month," he said. Prices in August were 1pc higher than they were in the previous three months.

He pointed out that it wasn't all bad news for home owners. "The recent decline in average mortgage rates has further boosted home affordability for those able to raise a deposit to make a new purchase." He pointed out that low interest rates were likely to continue to support the market, but increased uncertainty about the economic outlook and pressure on householders' finances would continue to constrain demand, which was likely to act as a brake on prices.

He goes on to predict 'stability' in house prices, which means ongoing real decline in value of housing. Houses are no longer piggy banks. As for affordability, this is reliant on the continuation of rock bottom interest rates, and it is quite possible that, in the current state of broader economic instability, there could be a sudden dramatic reverse in response to crisis. Also, as earnings are further squeezed, there is real risk in purchasing based upon assumptions of low interest rates.

Returning to the inflation in general, the most curious point about the inflation rate shown above is that the Bank of England (BoE) is supposedly targeting inflation, and inflation has near as damn-it exceeded the target since the onset of the economic crisis (or rather since the economic crisis became apparent in the so-called financial crisis). At this stage, it is ever more apparent that the Bank of England is going beyond its remit to target inflation, and it can no longer be denied that they are now in the business of trying to target broader economic outcomes. If they had been following their inflation targets, they would have increased interest rates long ago. Curiously, the actual inflation target of 2% has disappeared from their general introduction to monetary policy.....I seem to recall that in past versions of the introduction, it was the central point.

However, as a contrast, in the BoE August Inflation report, the failure to meet the target leads the report. The report suggests that inflation will climb further in the short term, but then argues that it will later fall back. It is a familiar tale, and it is very similar to previous reports. The BoE are sounding increasingly like a broken record. Inflation exceeds the target, but it is always about to fall back. But it never does. In part, the inflations is resultant from the decline in the £GB. Below is a chart based upon the BoE trade weighted index:




It does not look too bad at the moment, but there are several factors that are supportive of sterling. The first key factor is that most of the other OECD economies are looking distinctly ugly. As such, the competition at the moment is not which is the most attractive currency, but which is the least ugly. Rightly or wrongly, the £GB is not perceived as too ugly, but that might be about to change. This from Bloomberg:

Bank of England policy maker Adam Posen’s signal that he may need to double his call for bond purchases will intensify the debate at the U.K. central bank for more stimulus as the economy falters.

Posen said yesterday the central bank may need to buy as much as 100 billion pounds ($158 billion) in securities within three months and warned that officials’ delay in acting has made economic prospects “worse.” He has voted since October for a 50 billion-pound increase in the bond plan.

Posen’s attempt to convince his colleagues on the Monetary Policy Committee that they are damaging the economy by doing nothing comes as central banks from the Federal Reserve to the Swiss National Bank seek new ways to bolster their recoveries. He has been the sole voice on the MPC voting for more so-called quantitative easing, and minutes of this month’s meeting on Sept. 21 will show if anyone else joined him.

“It wouldn’t take much to convince a few others,” Richard Barwell, an economist at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc in London and a former central bank official, said by phone. “We may see one more joining.”

The central bank bought 200 billion pounds of bonds in a program that ended in early 2010. Posen’s comments may point to a further shift in the MPC just two months after Spencer Dale and Martin Weale abandoned a push for higher interest rates to control inflation that accelerated to 4.5 percent in August. While that’s more than twice the bank’s goal, it has set its key rate at a record-low 0.5 percent since March 2009.

Posen has admitted that the first bout of QE added 'at least' 0.5% to inflation, but claimed that it had also added 1.5% to GDP growth. You might note that, in admitting this, it just serves to confirm that the inflation target at the BoE has been abandoned, albeit that he is alone in being explicit in this, and other members of the MPC may at least have some vague and loose sense of obligation to the target.

In my last post, I mentioned the emergence of currency wars, and it is not difficult to see that the BoE might react to the actions of others in their attempts at devaluation, and seek to devalue as a response. If QE were to be resumed in conjunction with dismal economic statistics, then there is room for further devaluation, and then the knock on effects on inflation. However, this would be to assume that the wider policy initiatives remain static, but with an emerging currency war, where policy in one country is a reaction to policy in another country, then the situation might go in any direction. However, the one certain result of a currency war in which countries rush to the bottom is that there will be further inflation in commodity prices, and this will feed into inflation. It just becomes a question of who gets how much of the inflation.....

In respect of these policy feedbacks, it would be a brave individual who would take a firm stance on the direction of the £GB in relation to other currencies. The role of GBP is going to be crucial with respect to another element in the UK economy, which is the current account and balance of trade:





The article which the graphic is taken from is gloomy, and rightly so. The trade deficit is an ongoing worry, and illustrates some of the policy dilemmas. The rock-bottom interest rates are in place to reduce the cost of servicing debt, but this in turn frees more income for expenditure. However, more expenditure translates into more imports, and this supports ongoing imbalances. However, if interest rates were raised, then this would encourage a 'carry trade' into the UK (interest rate arbitrage), which would see an appreciation of the GBP, with a potential knock on effect on exporters and encouraging imports. At the same time, carry trade money would start slushing around the economy, with a potential for reduction in real interest rates, as more money chases the same investment opportunities. The same carry trade money might further increase inflation, even as interest rates are rising, with asset price inflation driving general inflation upwards.

There are too many variables to consider (and currently too much extreme policymaking more broadly) in this dynamic system to see how each policy might finally impact upon the UK economy. Of course, the real underlying problem reflected in the trade imbalance is not interest rates and currency, but a fundamental problem with the competitive position of the UK economy overall. Even when the currency devalued, the problem of the ongoing trade imbalances continued. It is impossible to look at this in isolation, as the world as a whole was confronted by economic problems, but the worldwide economic problems left pre-crisis imbalances largely intact. The question to ask is why the same imbalances persisted even as some deficit countries fell into the economic quagmire, and even as they devalued. This should have left these countries in a position of reduced imbalances or (dare I say it) positive trade balances - but it did not.

What we have is the offset of government borrowing and rock bottom interest rates, along with money printing. In other words, we are straight back to the policy dilemma. The UK is creating policy which of itself encourages the problems that it seeks to resolve. The problem is that they see consumer spending as a support for the economy, but consumer spending just continues the trade imbalance. At the same time, they make saving a fool's errand with extremely low interest rates in relation to high inflation, again encouraging spending. Whilst savings rates did increase, as mentioned earlier, they appear to be reversing direction.

Poor savings rates also limits the capital available to financial institutions, outside of the problematic wholesale market, which in turn leads to the relatively high differentials between the benchmark rate and the retail/business lending rate (yes, I also accept that this is function of increased risk perception, new capital adequacy regulation and attempts to repair dubious balance sheets). The poor returns on saving in the UK also encourages banks into international wholesale markets, which in turn encourages private sector debt accumulation from overseas sources.

The real problem is that the current account imbalances must be funded from somewhere. That means that there must be an ongoing source of lending from overseas, to allow the UK to have the currency to pay for the import of goods and services. In the end, that means that the UK MUST continue accumulating debt funded from overseas, or must find ways to export or invest its way into current account surplus. The problem resolves around over-consumption in the UK economy, and this is being encouraged with low interest rates. Again, the policy dilemma looms large.

So what is to be done? It is a question that I have been pondering over the days that I have been writing the post, and I have to admit, I am somewhat at a loss. In particular, in the environment of currency wars, does it make sense to have high interest rates, or not to print money? The Swiss example is a worry, with the huge appreciation of their currency hitting exporters hard. Regular readers will know that I think that printing money is a road to ruin, but how do you react to other countries doing this? My normal certainty of the right course of action is wavering in the sea of madness that is the current state of the world economy. The mounting instabilities, and the ever more extreme policies being enacted, leave the UK bobbing around in a storm of uncertainty and confusion. Internally, the UK is beset with challenges as it tries to reverse the debt mountain accumulation, with the potential to see the downwards spiral. Externally, the situation of the global economy can only point in the direction of a further negative lever on the UK economy.

A certainty is that the UK economy must commence the process of reducing debt accumulation, however hard that may be. The spreading Euro crisis is indicative of the limits of ongoing borrowing by governments, companies, and individuals. A second certainty is that the downward trajectory of living standards cannot be reversed, and this has implication for taxing and government spending. This returns me to one of the themes of the blog, which is that only through reform can the UK government address the changes in the structure of the world economy. This means that sacred cows must be slaughtered. For example, the welfare state is currently unaffordable. It is no longer possible to have generational unemployment, and legions of individuals hidden away on disability benefits. I have previously suggested reforms of some of the sacred cows (see top left of the blog), and the necessity of these reforms grows with each year.

However, when I first proposed the reforms, the UK still had the possibility of financing the reforms. For example, the proposals for the reform of the benefits systems would, in the short term, be more expensive. Would the bond markets have the patience for reforms with a medium term positive outcome, in particular with risks of politics seeing a later reversal of reform?

The fundamental problem is that the policy actions undertaken since the economic crisis broke into view have only served to magnify underlying problems. As the world plunges ever deeper into economic chaos, the room to act is diminishing, and the UK may just be too late to enact any policy that might avoid a serious depression. Even if, and it seems unlikely, the UK were to enact reform now, the problems of the wider world and the legacy of past policy now have too much momentum to be stopped. I commenced the post with the idea that Europe was now set on a course dictated by past policy. So it is with the UK, and so it is with the world economy more broadly. Policy now, it seems, can only be enacted to pave the way for a route out of the unavoidable crises that are brewing. The crises are now beyond stopping, and can only be delayed at yet greater eventual cost.

So my conclusion for this post is that the UK can still act. However, it cannot act to avoid a coming crisis. It can act to position itself to emerge from the crisis as one of the stronger economic players in an ever more competitive world. My worry is that, as the real crisis finally breaks, will politicians and the general public have the courage to enact the reforms that are necessary, to accept that past wealth does not mean future wealth, and seek to rebuild a leaner and more efficient UK economy? I have my doubts, but....

Note: I have written a long post, and have therefore only had a limited time to check through it. As such, please accept my apologies for any 'clunkiness' or any small errors.

Note 2: Updated as some of the graphics were not showing correctly.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Europe and US Economic Situation

I was playing around with titles for this post, and examples that came to mind were 'what a mess', 'a downward spiral of chaos' and other similar themes. I thought it might be time for a review of the state of play in the world economy in the broad. However, I will only have the time for the US and Europe, as the post has already become extremely long. I will come back to this in a short while, depending upon 'events'.

The European Union

I am sure some readers have wondered why I have not devoted more to the comedy of the Euro and and Euro periphery nations. As it is, I have watched the crisis unfolding with genuine bemusement. How on earth are the politicians who created the mess of the Euro going to deal with the crisis in the Eurozone? A long, long time ago I discussed that the Euro would be in danger in the coming crisis, and even suggested that if you held Euros, you held them in a German bank account. I seem to recall that some commentators seemed to consider that this was considered to be a rather startling point of view......

As the situation stands, the contradictions within the whole Euro framework are now coming to an ugly fruition. My browse through the recent edition of the Economist just served to emphasise the tangle of complexity and impossibilities of digging the Euro out of its current hole. At the time I was first writing about the potential for the demise of the Euro, I added a strong caveat that the future of the Euro was as much a matter of political will as economic questions. Although economics is inherently mixed with politics, I hope that readers will forgive this use of political, by which I mean a matter of the support of the politicians and people in Europe.

I would probably have been described in the past as a 'little Englander' for my opposition to the extension of powers to the European Union. My concern was that the entire project lacked the democratic accountability that should be necessary for such a radical course of integration. Likewise, with regards to the Euro, my greatest concern was the lack of fiscal integration that was necessary to provide some kind of coherent foundation for the currency. The breaking of deficit rules early in the project by countries such as France only served to emphasise the weakness of the structure.

For the problem of accountability, the Charlemagne column in the Economist highlights the problem; calling him the 'godfather' of the EU, the column highlights how Jean Monnet set a course in which the end plan for the EU was left deliberately ambiguous, and how the policy of the EU accruing powers in a step-by-step fashion was established. What we are now witnessing is the destabilisation of the European Union that results from the method used for achieving 'ever closer union'. When it comes down to the crunch, the Germans are in the end concerned with Germany, not Greece, not Spain, not Portugal....Germany has undoubtedly, at least in some respects, benefited from the EU, but German politicians are increasingly reluctant to confront their electorate with further bailouts of those that are perceived as profligate and irresponsible.

What we are now seeing are politicians in contortions as they try to balance the European project and Euro against the concerns of domestic voters. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is widely regarded as inadequate as a means to stem the tide of financial stress in the European Union. The democratic deficit, and the lack of coherent structure in the EU will be tested today when the German constitutional court rules on the legality of the bailouts. I have no idea how the ruling will go, but it is illustrative of the structural problems that surround the Euro. As I pointed out in a recent post on money printing, the European Central Bank (ECB) is operating under constraints that will likely prevent major interventions in the crisis, or at least the ECB will not have the same degree of freedom as, for example, the US Federal Reserve. In the meantime, it has been easy for politicians in troubled countries to point accusing fingers at the rest of Europe for forcing austerity measures upon them. Lacking any real accountability, the Euro and wider European project have both become exposed.

Adding to the complexity is the massive exposure of the banks of bailout countries to the sovereign debt of the bailees. The IMF thinking has it that the European banks might already be exposed to Euro 200 billion of losses. Already, considerations for ameliorating the losses of the banks are being put on the table, including from the banks themselves. The point here is that, for the politicians, they are damned if they extend the EFSF, and damned if they don't. We should remember here that the Basel Accords that were critical in developing the structure of banking regulations that have helped create this crisis. In order to explain this, I will quote from a post that I made in December 2008:

The answer to this perceived problem, was Basel I. This is described in the BoE paper as follows:
The 1988 Accord represented a revolutionary approach
to setting bank capital—an agreement among the
Basel Committee member countries that their
internationally active banks would at a minimum carry
capital equivalent to 8% of risk-weighted assets (with
the Committee setting broad classes of risk weights).
The agreement was made against a background of
concerns about a decline in capital held by banks,
exacerbated by the expansion of off balance sheet
activity, and worries that banks from some jurisdictions
were seeking a short-term competitive advantage in
some markets by maintaining too low a level of
capital.

The introduction of the Accord seems to have led to
some rebuilding of capital by the banks in the G10, but
over time the broad nature of the risk categories created
strains.(2) The Accord differentiates between exposures
using general categories based on the type of loan—
exposures to sovereigns (split into OECD and
non-OECD), exposures to banks (split into OECD and
non-OECD, with the latter split into less than one year
and more than one year), retail mortgages, and other
private sector exposures. Little allowance is made for
collateral beyond cash, government securities and bank
guarantees.
So here we have a determination of risk which assumes that, for example, OECD based banks are safe. We now see that this is not the case, and many of the banks in the OECD would, without government support, now be bankrupt. We also see that lending into government securities is also 'safe' but, as I have argued elsewhere in this blog, countries such as the UK are extremely unsafe at present.

So here we have the essential problem. A bunch of very smart people got together and said that they were able to determine levels of risk. Their conclusions have been shown to be wrong. In particular, OECD banks have demonstrably been shown to be, in a very large number of cases, unsound. I will reiterate this point once again - they were wrong.

Another point in the Basel I accord was that it creates a perverse incentive to lend to governments. Investing in government debt means that money is not being invested into potentially wealth creating investments in the private sector. It also virtually guarantees that government will have access to credit, regardless of whether the governments are acting responsibly or irresponsibly. Such guaranteed provision will almost certainly have been a factor in the growth in Western government / OECD debt. However, it would be impossible to prove one way or another.
The Bank of England paper referred to can be found here. It is not difficult, with the benefit of hindsight, to see how the banks became entangled in the current sovereign debt crisis. In the post, I go on to discuss Basel II, and the way in which it also created new variants on the theme that certain kinds of lending might be viewed as risk free. As the situation stands, risk free assets have turned out not to be risk free, but are actually very high risk. A quick review of the Basel I risk categorisation now looks distinctly mad and the Basel II accords look just as absurd. When looking at the hopeless ineptitude of the regulators, I can only reiterate my earlier position on trying to regulate risk in banks; it is a hopeless cause...

Sitting underneath all of the troubles in the Euro area is the illusion of GDP growth. As long as a country appeared to be experiencing economic growth, it seemed safe to lend to the country. The trouble is that the growth was determined by the debt, not by any real increase in genuine wealth. As borrowed money was circulating around an economy, with the multiplier effect magnifying the impact of the borrowed money, it gave an illusion of real economic growth. So called 'austerity' just commences the process of exposing the real underlying wealth generating capacity of the country in question. As the borrowing spigot shuts, the economy contracts, and with it tax receipts, and this drives a need for further austerity, and this in turn sees further contraction. And so the process continues up to the point where the real wealth generating element of the economy is apparent. It is the point at which an economy is actually on a sustainable path, and it is a painful exposure of the real level of wealth in an economy.

Of course, this painful contraction is considered to be something that might be stopped. Economists argue for restraint in austerity measures, to push austerity to some undefined point in the 'medium term'. They argue that the contraction is self defeating. However, in doing so they ignore that the debt was accumulating even in the good times, that there was a massive accumulation of private/public debt before the crisis. The economies that are now in trouble were building up piles of debt in the good times, and their economies are now structured around debt. I do not agree with Keynes, but suggesting that debt accumulation should be ongoing, during both good and bad times, seems to be stretching even Keynesian thinking to breaking point.

As the situation stands, the Euro area is in distinct trouble. The lack of political structure, and the deficit in accountability have left the Euro and the European Union with no solid foundations. There is some political will to resolve the crises, but the lack of a coherent accountable framework makes resolution of the crisis nearly impossible. The crisis threatens to engulf both sovereign states and the banking system. It may be possible for the ECB, and the politicians to cobble together some kind of temporary fix, but the scale of the problem is such that any long term resolution is nearly impossible. The political backlash threatens the 'European Project' itself, as the limits and contradictions of the integration are laid bare. Politics and economics and the fruits of mad banking regulation are all riding in the same handcart. What a mess...

As a final point on the European situation, I recently discussed the impact of extreme policy making in one country rippling out and impacting on the policy of other countries. The ripples are now taking effect, with what appears to be the start of a major currency 'war':

The Swiss national bank (SNB) said it would “no longer tolerate” a euro rate below 1.20 francs. “The SNB will enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination and is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities. The massive overvaluation of the franc poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy and carries the risk of a deflationary development,” it said.

The franc plummeted against all major currencies, falling 9pc against the euro as markets opened on Tuesday. The Swiss action will be studied closely in Norway, Singapore and above all Japan, where the yen has also rocketed to levels that threaten to blight exporters and tip the country into deep deflation.

“The market must fear this will lead to a sharp escalation in currency wars,” said David Bloom from HSBC. “Gold is the only safe haven asset that will not do QE, put in capital controls or complain.”

Mr Bloom said the Swiss move will exacerbate Europe’s debt crisis by widening the spreads betweeen core EMU and the periphery. “This is a risky policy for the Swiss,” he said.

The same report speculates that Japan and the UK will resort to printing money in response to any further money printing in the US. In short, extreme policy begets extreme policy....

The US

With regards to the US economy, it is difficult even to know where to start...is it the banks with their mark to fantasy asset valuations, the housing and mortgage fiasco, or unemployment or the deficit, or the central bank, or...

A good starting point is to look to the past and the banks during the banking crisis. A Bloomberg report presents some shocking numbers as a result of a freedom of information request:

Citigroup Inc. (C) and Bank of America Corp. (BAC) were the reigning champions of finance in 2006 as home prices peaked, leading the 10 biggest U.S. banks and brokerage firms to their best year ever with $104 billion of profits.

By 2008, the housing market’s collapse forced those companies to take more than six times as much, $669 billion, in emergency loans from the U.S. Federal Reserve. The loans dwarfed the $160 billion in public bailouts the top 10 got from the U.S. Treasury, yet until now the full amounts have remained secret.

Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s unprecedented effort to keep the economy from plunging into depression included lending banks and other companies as much as $1.2 trillion of public money, about the same amount U.S. homeowners currently owe on 6.5 million delinquent and foreclosed mortgages. The largest borrower, Morgan Stanley (MS), got as much as $107.3 billion, while Citigroup took $99.5 billion and Bank of America $91.4 billion, according to a Bloomberg News compilation of data obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, months of litigation and an act of Congress.

“These are all whopping numbers,” said Robert Litan, a former Justice Department official who in the 1990s served on a commission probing the causes of the savings and loan crisis. “You’re talking about the aristocracy of American finance going down the tubes without the federal money.”

I strongly recommend taking a look at Bloomberg's interactive chart and reading the full article. As the crisis progressed, the Fed was willing to lend to the big banks against just about anything. It is a shocking picture, and therefore no surprise that the Fed fought against disclosure of the information. It seems that the major banks have a position in which, come what may, they will not be allowed to fail. This does not look anything like capitalism, but instead looks like....I genuinely struggle to find a word which might express this.

As if this were not bad enough, a deal is being offered to restrict the liability for banks flouting the law over robosigning and other illegal/dubious mortgage practices:

The talks aim to settle allegations that banks including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and Ally Financial, seized the homes of delinquent borrowers and broke state laws by employing so-called "robosigners," workers who signed off on foreclosure documents en masse without reviewing the paperwork.

The FT, citing five people with direct knowledge of the discussions, said state prosecutors have proposed settlement language in the "robosigning" cases that also might release the companies from legal liability for wrongful securitization practices.

This is actually a very complex story, and one I can barely do justice to in a short discussion (here for an introduction). The core of the story is that the major banks set up a system for documenting mortgages that was extra-legal, and which undermines the foundation of title on real estate, and was followed by illegal practices to force through foreclosures. In short, the banks may be about to be able to get away with illegal practices for which any ordinary person would be, if you forgive the expression, nailed to the wall.

This is not the end of the problems in the mortgage market for banks. In a related problem, their sloppy processing, and dubious sales of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) are now coming back to haunt them. This from the the Atlantic:

These days, it's hard to keep all of the mortgage-related lawsuits against banks straight. Investors are suing banks over bad mortgage-backed securities, claiming that securitization procedures were flawed. The Federal Housing Finance Agency has also filed lawsuits, saying that banks misled Fannie and Freddie about the quality of the mortgages underlying the bonds they purchased. Finally, states are suing big banks over their foreclosure practices, alleging that they didn't follow the law. The banks have reportedly been offered a settlement on that last suit by the group of state attorneys general. Unfortunately, the deal the states are offering isn't likely to be accepted.
An excellent summary of the foundations of the claims is as follows:

So, let's take a look at what Fannie and Freddie are claiming and how the banks are likely to respond. As an initial matter, it's important to distinguish between the two kinds of suits investors can bring against MBS issuers and originators of the underlying mortgage loans. One class of cases involves contract claims based on the representations and warranties issuers and originators made about the underlying mortgage loans. Under standard MBS securitization agreements, if investors can show that underlying mortgages don't measure up to the stated standards, they can demand that issuers buy back those deficient loans. Those are straightforward breach of contract claims, but there's a big catch: In order to bring a so-called put-back suit under standard securitization contracts, investors have to control 25 percent of the voting rights within an individual MBS trust. Gibbs & Bruns was able to negotiate the proposed $8.5 billion Bank of America MBS settlement, which would resolve investors' representations and warranties claims, because its group of 22 large institutional investors had the requisite voting rights in more than 200 Countrywide trusts. Fannie and Freddie previously settled their own reps and warranties claims against BofA (for mortgages they bought directly from Countrywide) in a $3 billion deal last January. But generally, plaintiffs lawyers have struggled to piece together coalitions of investors to cross that 25 percent threshold and bring contract claims.

Most investors -- including Fannie and Freddie in the suits filed Friday -- have instead asserted securities law claims against MBS issuers under federal, state, and common law theories. The housing finance agency's federal claims are based on the Securities Act of 1933. There are two key reasons why. The '33 Act sections FHFA is asserting involve standards for offering documentation. Under those provisions, investors don't have to show that issuers intended to deceive them or that they relied on the allegedly misleading documents. As I've previously explained, the '33 Act holds issuers to a strict liability standard, meaning investors just have to show that an offering statement contained false representations about the securities. As alternative routes to the same damages they're seeking under the '33 Act, Fannie and Freddie are also making claims under Virginia and District of Columbia securities laws, and under common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation theories.

Under both the state and federal claims, FHFA can demand that the banks repurchase securities issued under false offering documents. Here's where MBS contract cases and securities cases intersect: Both types of suits rely on investors' claims that issuers misrepresented the underlying mortgage loans. Fannie and Freddie's complaints against the banks offer pages and pages of evidence that issuers fed investors false information about the quality of the underlying loans. On their face, the complaints make quite a compelling case for issuer liability.

The big question is how much? There is considerable speculation about the size of the claims versus the final amount that might actually be achieved. The problem is that the banks were knowingly selling MBSs that they knew were complete junk (this extends beyond the examples given here):

Documents released by the US Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) claim that Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and HSBC retained the services of Clayton Holdings, a risk analysis specialist, to scrutinise loans before they were placed in bundles of mortgage-backed securities.

According to the filings, reports from Clayton show that 18pc of the mortgage loans RBS submitted to Clayton between the first quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2007 were rejected. However, 53pc of them were subsequently included in debt packages by the bank.

By contrast, 27pc of the mortgage loans HSBC submitted to Clayton were rejected, although 62pc of these were eventually included. RBS and HSBC are among 17 banks being sued by US regulators to recoup the $196bn (£120bn) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spent on mortgage-backed securities. RBS is facing action over $30.4bn of sales, HSBC over $6.2bn and Barclays in relation to $4.9bn.

I was following this story, and the foreclosure fraud stories, for a long time whilst I was not actively posting. I was more than a little surprised that it did not blow up sooner. The whole story deserves a post in its own right, as the sorry tale is one which I would characterise as one gigantic fraud. For the moment, the big question is one of whether the chaotic and illegal actions of the banks will blow up into a new financial crisis. As the Atlantic article points out, the banks are trying to seek protection from losses, but I have no idea whether this can be achieved.

Overall, it is apparent that there is something going horribly wrong in the US, and this has become ever more apparent over the course of the economic crisis. The major Wall Street banks seem to be immune to any negative results of their own misconduct, whether that misconduct is fraud or simple incompetence. It seems that, whatever they might do, they end up making fat profits. Again, this is not capitalism, and again I am at a loss for words that might describe this situation. What I do know is that this treatment of the Wall Street banks is not good for the economy. After all, as I have argued before, the purpose of banks is to service the rest of the economy, not for the rest of the economy to service the banks (and their profits). This gross distortion of the US economy is a fundamental problem, and the only way to resolve it is to take the pain that should have taken place at the time of the Lehman crisis. The problem is that, the problem has just grown, with for example more risk concentrated in fewer institutions.

Having discussed the entirely disfunctional banking system, what of the government. The story of the credit downgrade of the US needs no telling. The comedy of politics that led to the downgrade is astounding. Obama seems to have no direction and, even if finding a direction, it would likely lead the wrong way. In the meantime, the US debt mountain grows ever higher. There is, of course, the bipartisan debt super-committee, but it is already mired in political infighting:

As the U.S. Congress returns to work, the budget-cutting supercommittee is expected to take center stage amid no signs the August break eased raw relations between Republicans and Democrats.

President Barack Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, an Ohio Republican, clashed anew last week over the scheduling of a presidential speech outlining a jobs agenda, a spat that could help set the tone among the 12 lawmakers on the bipartisan committee.

“They have given tremendous amount of leeway and power to the supercommittee, that’s where all the eyes are,” said John Feehery, who advised former Republican House Speaker Dennis Hastert, of Illinois. “Republicans and Democrats have to decide whether they are comfortable with the status quo going into the election or if they need a game changer.”

The supercommittee’s work will start as more immediate skirmishes loom over competing job-creation plans and federal funding for highways, air travel and federal disaster aid.

Confrontations over those issues could feed the public’s discontent in advance of next year’s elections. Obama’s approval rating, at 42 percent in yesterday’s Gallup tracking poll, has been as low as 38 percent since he signed into law the agreement passed in early August to raise the federal borrowing limit and instruct the six Republicans and six Democrats on the supercommittee created by the accord to find $1.5 trillion dollars in budget savings by Nov. 23.

As it is, the committee will 'kick the debt can down the road'. The Bank for International Settlements offers a timely article that identifies that debt levels such as those seen in the US need to be addressed urgently, not some time in the future. The article points out that debt stabilisation measures are not sufficient when debt reaches the 80-100% of GDP level, in particular where there are problems with rising costs due to demographics. I am cynical about the role of BIS, so I hope I will be forgiven for cherry-picking this article. It might also be noted that, as long as the US continues to kick the can down the road, the longer and more entrenched will be an economic structure that is built around debt. Think of the example of Europe (e.g. Greece) and we can see that delay is only going to be worse in the long run. The longer that debt accumulation is a major part of the economy, the more the economy will structure around debt accumulation. It will be ever harder to structure the economy back to real wealth creation.

Above all else, the debt is not working. Regardless of how much borrowed money is being thrown into the US economy, and despite bouts of money printing and a general policy of targeting extremely low interest rates, the US economy simply refuses to move. It is no surprise to see that comparisons with the recent history of Japan are coming thick and fast. This from the Sydney Morning Herald:

At least then, though, governments were in a position to ride to the rescue. Today, governments are seen not as the solution but as part of the problem. The debt burden accumulated by the banks was, in effect, nationalised during the crisis.

It was hoped this would prove temporary, but the persistence of weak growth means that a private-debt crisis has become a sovereign-debt crisis. What's more, the markets sense that policymakers have run out of bullets to fire.

They can't cut official interest rates, they find it hard to justify more quantitative easing when inflation is at current levels and almost every Western government is trying to cut its budget deficit.

Put it all together and you get the full Japanese package: weak growth, weak banks, weak policy response. Not a good recipe for shares. Today Tokyo's Nikkei is at less than 25 per cent of its level at the peak of the sharemarket boom in the late 1980s.

The trouble is that the US is not Japan. At least Japan was running a current account surplus. The US continues to run a current account deficit, albeit one that has moderated since the start of the economic crisis.

I am sure that many readers of the blog will have read the numerous articles that have been proposing that the US economy would return to growth. The trouble is that it has just been an illusion, and the reality keeps peeking through the curtains. The recent lack of job creation in the US apparently came as a shock. However, the problems go much deeper if looking a labour force participation:

Some people criticize the way the unemployment rate is measured, since it doesn't include Americans who have left the workforce temporarily, but ultimately will want or need to get a job. If you include these people in the calculation, the labor market picture has worsened since last November, as I explained on Saturday. So Federal Reserve economists can't pretend that the unemployment picture has improved since their last intervention. But what if we went all the way back to January 2007?

At that time, the labor participation rate was 66.4%. In July 2011, it hit a new recessionary low of 63.9%. That 2.5% might not seem like a lot, but it would have meant nearly 6 million more people in July's labor force. If you add those people into the workforce, then the unemployment rate last month would have hit a new high of 12.5%, which is much higher than the official 9.1% reported.
I suggest that viewing the original article would be worthwhile. One of the great curiosities in the US is that, whilst labour participation overall is falling, GDP has been reported (and misreported) as rising. Either labour has become amazingly more productive, or something is amiss...If you think about it, it just serves to highlight the problems of GDP figures (again). As such, however you might spin it, the US economy is not in a good place.

Conclusion

In both Europe and US we have crises, but with a different flavour to both. However, they both share the common factor of political problems, and potential for new banking crises, as well as potential for sovereign debt crises. However, a major difference applies to the last factor; the US is still hanging on to reserve currency status, and is still mistaken as a safe haven by many. On the other hand, the Euro is being perceived as an increasingly fragile currency, such that the $US looks less ugly.

In both cases, the banks are looking very fragile, and it is only possible to speculate about what might happen if another banking crisis really hits. How far will the policymakers go to avert a new banking crisis? I am reluctant to say, as I have been shocked at the extent of support and preferential treatment given to the banking system. What I do know is that the current system of banking is so deeply flawed that it is beyond salvation. No new regulation or tweaks are going to resolve the problems. I have previously discussed reforming the banking system, but the kind of deep reform I have proposed is not going to happen in the current environment. The only prospect for real reform is another round of crisis.

A major difference between the US and Europe is that there are countries in Europe which still have strong economic foundations in productive wealth creation, albeit further chaos in Europe will likely reveal many weaknesses and may pull these countries into crisis. For example, if the Euro collapses into fragments, how will the German export machine perform in the face of devaluing sovereign currencies? How will the general economic woes reflect upon the stronger economies when their markets were founded in a circular issuance of credit by country A to country B to purchase their own goods and services.

This is not to write off the productive side of the US economy, which still has some outstanding and effective businesses. However, the size of the US economy does not currently reflect the real output of these productive firms, but rather the output + the debt accumulation structure. As BIS identify, the US is now at the point where the debt will weigh down on the ability for the US economy to grow. It already faces demographic headwinds and the headwinds of an ever more competitive global economy. It is increasingly poorly placed to respond to the challenges that it will face.

Also, the US dream and optimism appears to be fading. It is very difficult to pin down such an assertion, and difficult to explain how it might have a real impact on the US economy. It is rather a feeling that comes through the general tone of the media and also bloggers. The dream and optimism is about the belief that there is opportunity in the US for the hardworking. When people see the shattered state of the US economy, the corrupt banking system, the bickering and ineptitude of the politicians, it seems inevitable that the optimism will dissipate.

On that rather vague note, I will leave this post. As I have said in the introduction, I will try to broaden the review further in coming posts. My aim is, following the review, to try to pull all the strands together into a big picture, but I will see how events intervene in the meantime.


Saturday, September 3, 2011

Government Borrowing Does not Exist

I had a conversation with a friend recently, and she reminded me that some simple realities are often not acknowledged because they are never talked about. To me it seems perfectly obvious that governments can not borrow, but I forget how radical this idea actually is. This is the idea that governments cannot of themselves borrow money, as they have no means of repayment. Governments can only borrow on behalf of us as individuals and from collective entities such as businesses (which is also us). As such, when we hear the expression 'government borrowing', it is essentially a fallacy. It is an abstraction of our borrowing, which makes it appear that we are not as individuals accumulating debt.

The government might 'sign' the borrowing agreement, but they are not signing on the behalf of the government but on behalf of us. In the end, the only way that the borrowing can be repaid is for us to repay the borrowing. The government may determine the proportion of the debt that each of us will pay, but in the end, the borrowing is paid collectively by us, not by the government. The government is simply the conduit through which the money is repaid by us.

It is, of course, very convenient for governments to pretend that they are doing the borrowing, not us. In pretending that they are doing the borrowing, they can pretend that they are doing the right thing by us, when in fact they are imposing debts upon us, whilst pretending that they are not doing so. It is an outrageous misdirection, and one which people seem to accept without question. There are some exceptions, such as government holdings of enterprises that produce profit, but these are only a drop in the ocean of repayments. In the end, there is no way to repay 'government debt' except through our efforts and labour.

Nevertheless, we see the expressions 'government debt' and 'government borrowing' everywhere we look (including on this blog, which is something I will try to remember to address). The idea that governments do not repay debt, and the we do, came as a startling revelation to my friend. It is really quite odd that we collectively allow ourselves to be deluded into thinking that governments can, of themselves, borrow money. Long term readers of this blog will, I expect, be familiar with the problem of 'government borrowing', but I hope that newer readers will now listen to politicians/economists/pundits who talk of 'government borrowing' with a little more cynicism. In essence, the concept is just one great big deceit.

Krugman, the Nobel Prize Winner?

I often read the work of Paul Krugman, as he is a good indicator of the thinking of those who would see this economic crisis answered by exactly the wrong actions. Of late, he has managed to highlight the absurdity of his own views, with his now infamous argument that a fake alien invasion would serve to stimulate the world economy back to growth. Here follows the transcript of the now infamous nonsense (with original interview and transcript can be seen here):

PAUL KRUGMAN, NEW YORK TIMES: Think about World War II, right? That was actually negative social product spending, and yet it brought us out.

I mean, probably because you want to put these things together, if we say, "Look, we could use some inflation." Ken and I are both saying that, which is, of course, anathema to a lot of people in Washington but is, in fact, what fhe basic logic says.

It's very hard to get inflation in a depressed economy. But if you had a program of government spending plus an expansionary policy by the Fed, you could get that. So, if you think about using all of these things together, you could accomplish, you know, a great deal.

If we discovered that, you know, space aliens were planning to attack and we needed a massive buildup to counter the space alien threat and really inflation and budget deficits took secondary place to that, this slump would be over in 18 months. And then if we discovered, oops, we made a mistake, there aren't any aliens, we'd be better –

ROGOFF: And we need Orson Welles, is what you're saying.

KRUGMAN: No, there was a "Twilight Zone" episode like this in which scientists fake an alien threat in order to achieve world peace. Well, this time, we don't need it, we need it in order to get some fiscal stimulus.
It was an astounding moment in the discussion of economic theory, where the silliness of some economic theory was laid bare. As you would expect, many have seized upon this comment to make fun of Krugman. The idea that we should build planetary defences for an imaginary alien invasion just highlights the madness of diverting resources into non-productive uses, and the absurdity of the broken window fallacy. However, Krugman is still taken seriously by many, and is an influential economist.

I come to this story because of a recent article written by Krugman in the New York Times. In this case, the argument is far more moderate, and it is therefore the kind of argument that might gain traction/support. In this case, he is discussing the lack of support for ozone regulation by the President Obama. Here is his argument:

As some of us keep trying to point out, the United States is in a liquidity trap: private spending is inadequate to achieve full employment, and with short-term interest rates close to zero, conventional monetary policy is exhausted.

This puts us in a world of topsy-turvy, in which many of the usual rules of economics cease to hold. Thrift leads to lower investment; wage cuts reduce employment; even higher productivity can be a bad thing. And the broken windows fallacy ceases to be a fallacy: something that forces firms to replace capital, even if that something seemingly makes them poorer, can stimulate spending and raise employment. Indeed, in the absence of effective policy, that’s how recovery eventually happens: as Keynes put it, a slump goes on until “the shortage of capital through use, decay and obsolescence” gets firms spending again to replace their plant and equipment.

And now you can see why tighter ozone regulation would actually have created jobs: it would have forced firms to spend on upgrading or replacing equipment, helping to boost demand. Yes, it would have cost money — but that’s the point! And with corporations sitting on lots of idle cash, the money spent would not, to any significant extent, come at the expense of other investment.

It sounds considerably more reasonable than the alien invasion thesis. However, sitting underneath the apparent reason is some very problematic thinking. What he is suggesting is that this regulation will induce companies to spend on new equipment, and this will raise employment whilst creating a positive social outcome. I do not know the details of the ozone regulation, but will assume for the sake of argument that it would indeed create a positive social outcome. Assuming this, Krugman therefore presents a very seductive argument.

However, Krugman is making a major error in thinking that the US operates in a closed system. It does not. One of the underlying drivers of the problems in the US economy is that companies are choosing to invest overseas rather than the US. There is global competition, and the US economy is operating within a highly (hyper) competitive environment. As such, whilst the policy might indeed stimulate some activity in the economy, it would do so at increasing the costs of doing business in the US. His proposal presents an opportunity to create jobs now, but with a potential to destroy jobs later. Of course, I am not saying that this single regulation would directly cost jobs, but rather it would contribute to the overall regulatory burden which determines the cost of doing business in the US in comparison with other countries. If the burden is too high, then companies are given incentives to continue to invest overseas.

Perhaps the most astounding comment in this context is the idea that 'higher productivity can be a bad thing'. This is an argument that has a long lineage, for example with the 19th century 'Luddites' who broke machinery that they saw as destroying their jobs. In fact, whilst particular segments of society might lose jobs due to improved productivity from new processes or innovations, the overall efficiency of an economy is improved and our ability to enjoy more goods and services is improved. For example, if we followed this idea, the innovations of the railways, or the use of electricity in manufacturing should have been prevented, as they would 'cost jobs'. However, each of these innovations spurred huge economic growth. The same can be said of any improvement in productivity. In the very short term, the improvement may cost jobs, but will later produce more employment and greater wealth. Again, in the context of global competition, Krugman regrets the kind of innovations that might make the US more competitive, and which will improve living standards.

Another revealing comment is that in which he discusses companies having 'idle cash'. What does he mean by this? Implicitly, he means that companies must invest their cash regardless of whether the company can see any good opportunities for investment. If they won't invest, Krugman's answer is to make them invest in something that will not increase their profits, but which will eat into the cash pile. In doing so, when a company does see an investment opportunity to expand their business, they will have x amount less cash to invest in the opportunity to expand their business. His answer is to force companies to invest to meet the regulation at a cost later of having less cash to invest in the expansion of their business at a later time, and therefore less opportunity to create more employment.

There are other problematic arguments in the short quote given above, which are just as worrying. The idea that thrift is a bad thing, for example. However, without thrift, where is the money for investment to come from? Without savings, where is the capital for investment? In fact, when looking at each of the statements made in his argument, it is possible to find some very, very unusual thinking. I find it quite extraordinary that economists such as Krugman are actually taken seriously. The really shocking part is that, even after the alien invasion argument, people will still support his views and ideas. I mean, really, investing resources and labour into pointless defences against aliens that do not exist is a good thing? Maybe investing our resources into activity that improves our quality of life might be a better thing?